risingpowersproject.com

ISSN 2547-9423



Volume 3, Issue 4

May 2019



#### RISING POWERS QUARTERLY

Editor in Chief Deputy Editor Book Reviews Editor Manuscript Editor Ali Murat Kurşun Hakan Mehmetcik Ferit Belder Gökhan Katıtaş

#### **Editorial Board**

Adam Chapnik Prof, Canadian Forces College, Canada Adriana Erthal Abdenur Fellow, Instituto Igarapé, Brazil Alexander Cooley Prof, Columbia University, UK Amitav Acharya Prof, American University, USA Andre de Mello e Souza Prof, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Brazil Andrew Cooper Prof, University of Waterloo, Canada Anita Sengupta Senior Reseacher, Calcutta Research Group, India Ayşegül Sever Prof, Marmara University, Turkey Bertrand Badie Prof, SciencesPo Paris, France Brendon J. Cannon Prof, Khalifa University, UAE Charles A Kupchan Prof, Georgetown University, USA Daniel Deudney Prof, John Hopkins University, USA David Welch Prof, University of Waterloo, Canada Deepak Nayyar Professor Emeritus, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Detlef Nolte Prof, University of Hamburg, Germany Dmitri Trenin Dr, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia Elizabeth Sidiropoulos Chief Executive, SAIIA, South Africa Evelyn Goh Prof, The Australian National University, Australia Fikret Senses Prof, METU, Turkey G. John Ikenberry Prof, Princeton University, USA İlter Turan Prof, Bilgi University, Turkey Jack Donnelly Prof, University of Denver, USA Jonathan Luckhurst Prof, University of Guadalajara, Mexico Juliet Johnson Prof, McGill University, Canada Kal Holsti Emeritus Prof, University of British Columbia, Canada Karen Smith Dr, University of Cape Town, South Africa Kevin Gray Prof, University of Sussex, UK Lina Benabdallah University of Florida, USA

Maxi Schoeman Prof, University of Pretoria, South Africa Mehmet Emin Arda Prof Meliha Benli Altunışık Prof, METU, Turkey Mustafizur Rahman Prof, Centre for Policy Dialogue, Bangladesh Nathalie Tocci Prof, University of Tübingen, Germany Oliver Stuenkel, Ass. Prof, Getúlio Vargas Foundation Özden Zeynep Oktav Prof, Medeniyet University, Turkey Paul Kubicek Prof, Oakland University, USA Peter Ferdinand Prof, University of Warwick, UK Pınar Bilgin Prof, Bilkent University, Turkey Ramesh Thakur Prof, Australian National University, Australia **Richard Higgott** Prof, Vrije University, Belgium Richard Sakwa Prof, University of Kent, UK Rodney Bruce Hall Prof, University of Macau, China Sergei Medvedev Prof, National Research University Higher School of Economics., Russia Stephan Klingebiel Prof, University of Marburg, Germany Steven Slaughter Dr, Daekin Üniversity, Australia Suisheng Zhao Prof, University of Denver, USA Sven Grimm Assoc Prof, Stellenbosch University, Germany T. V. Paul Prof, McGill University, Canada Tarık Oğuzlu Prof, International Antalya Bilim University Terry Nardin Prof, National University of Singapore, Singapore Thomas Fues Dr, German Development Institute, Germany Tim Summers Ass. Prof, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China Vincent Pouliot Prof, McGill University, Canada Yongjin Zhang Prof, University of Briston, UK Ziya Öniş Prof, Koç University, Turkey

Rising Powers Quarterly is a peer-reviewed non-profit free-access journal dedicated to the study of the growing role of rising powers in global governance. It aims to explore the political, economic and social processes through which the states regarded as "rising powers" in world politics interact with other states as well as international and transnational organizations. All editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Editors at submissions?Fringpowers/project.com

# RISING POWERS QUARTERLY

Volume 3, Issue 4 May 2019



## CONTENTS

## ARTICLES

Introducing the Rising Powers Diplomatic Network (RPDN): A Dataset for Rising Power	rs' Presidential
Diplomacy and Diplomatic Presence Abroad	7
Rafael Mesquita	
Frustrated Emergence? Brazil and Mexico's Coming of Age	33
Fabricio H. Chagas-Bastos, Marcela Franzoni	
BOOK REVIEWS	
A Relational Theory of World Politics	61
Özge Taylan	
Japan as an 'Aid Receiver' from the United States and World Bank and an 'Aid Provider' to	the Emerging
Donors in Asia	65
Monir Hossain Moni	
Russia, BRICS and the Disruption of Global Order	79
Thomaz Alexandre Mayer Napoleão	

#### Article

Introducing the Rising Powers Diplomatic Network (RPDN): A Dataset for Rising Powers' Presidential Diplomacy and Diplomatic Presence Abroad

## **Rafael Mesquita**

Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE), German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) rafaelmesquita\_5688@hotmail.com

#### Abstract

This article introduces the Rising Powers Diplomatic Network (RPDN) dataset, which monitors the distribution of the diplomatic apparatus of emerging powers across the globe. RPDN's release version contains data on two countries, Brazil and Turkey, covering mainly the 1995-2015 timespan, thus providing a comprehensive portrait of the evolution of their diplomatic capacity and patterns of interstate interactions. Specifically, RPDN contains information on two items: presidential diplomacy (i.e.: number of official visits) and diplomatic presence (number and size of diplomatic representations abroad). Data for Turkey also list visits by the prime minister in addition to the president's. Data for Brazil also report: size of staff at each diplomatic post, post ranking/grade and number of military attachés abroad. The article concludes demonstrating RPDN's applicability, by addressing a central question in the regional powers literature: do regional powers emphasize their regions in their diplomacy in comparison to other destinations? It is expected that this dataset makes a contribution to quantitative research on rising powers and their diplomacy.

#### Keywords

RPDN, Brazil, Turkey, Foreign Policy, Rising Powers

#### Introduction

This article introduces the dataset "Rising Powers Diplomatic Network" (RPDN, available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5FISNQ) and displays its main features. RPDN contains data on the distribution of the diplomatic assets of emerging powers over time. Specifically, the release version brings data on Brazilian

and Turkish presidential diplomacy (i.e.: official visits by the head of state or government) and diplomatic presence (scope and size of diplomatic representations abroad), covering mainly the 1995-2015 time period.

The overarching goal behind RPDN is to allow for better empirical analyses of emerging countries' international behavior. As with other policy domains, diplomacy is one of the fields for which data are abundant for developed nations, but scarce elsewhere. Consequently, scholarship has been constrained on the variety of research it is able to conduct regarding emerging powers, as well as on the generality of its findings. Even research agendas that have developed around and focused intensively on such countries have suffered from this underprovision. The regional powers research agenda, for instance, has produced significant insight on features of regional powers as analytical concepts and a wealth of in-depth analyses, but has struggled to cumulate its findings and test its theoretical predicates beyond the confines of single case studies.

RPDN is an initial attempt to bridge that gap, since it provides original quantitative data on two countries that have captured much academic attention in the past two decades. We hope that this dataset can make a valuable contribution to scholarship focused on the empirical analysis of emerging powers' diplomacy.

The purpose of the current article is threefold. Firstly, to expound the motivation underpinning the creation of RPDN and its expected scholarly contribution. Secondly, to present RPDN, its variables, scope, main features, and to describe the data-gathering procedures adopted. Lastly, the article exemplifies RPDN in usage, showing how its data can be valuable for a solid, empirically grounded understanding of the international behavior of emerging powers. In particular, we will address one of the lingering questions in the literature on regional powers, namely, whether or not regional powers emphasize their regions in their diplomacy in comparison to other destinations. These three points are also the structure of this article.

## Motivation and Expected Contribution to Scholarship

The main motivation behind RPDN is to allow for thorough quantitative study of emerging powers in International Relations (IR). In particular, it seeks to advance available knowledge on the matter of diplomacy.

Diplomatic activity is one of the enduring fields of interest in IR and it has been approached from varied angles. Traditional diplomacy and its more recent presidential variant have been analyzed as both dependent and independent variables. The former type of research design focuses on uncovering the determinants of state visits (Lebovic & Saunders 2016), while the latter attempts to gauge the independent effect of high-level trips on matters such as trade (Nitsch 2007) and public opinion (Goldsmith & Horiuchi 2009).

In general, the literature accepts that state visits are a manifestation of a country's preferences and interests in the global arena. Most of the aforementioned research, however, shares a shortcoming: it is restricted to the US and Europe. Investigations of this nature on less developed states have been hitherto scant due to a number of factors, most notably the difficulty in finding reliable longitudinal data.

Diplomatic networks, in turn, are also an established object of research. Since Singer and Small's (1966) seminal work, the type and ranking of diplomatic representation established between dyads of countries have been utilized as indicators of varied concepts.<sup>1</sup> Scholarship on international status has regarded representation as a proxy for a country's standing in the international community (Neumayer 2008; Kinne 2014), while research on international political economy models the number of embassies and consulates as a trade-promoting factor (Moons & van Bergeijk 2017). These studies tend to be more global in scope, as typical panels will have data on all sovereign states for a given year. Though this allows for comparison across a greater number of units, including emerging countries, longitudinal data remain rare, thus restricting comparisons over time.

In light of the aforementioned, it is visible that there is an information gap when it comes to developing nations. Academia and other observers have repeatedly stressed the growing relevance of emerging countries and regional powers<sup>2</sup> in our increasingly multipolar reality, and yet efforts on gathering systematic information for such states still lag behind considerably. Lall (2016, p.415) argues that the abundance of data on developed states, in contrast to the scarcity for the rest of the world, leads many studies in IR and comparative political science to suffer from an "advanced democracy bias", i.e.: the majority of cases tested comes from the Western world, thus compromising the potential for generalization of such research. This skewness is not purely on the demand side, that is, solely to blame on any particular type of academic neglect; rather, it is often a supply issue. Less developed countries also tend to lack the administrative and budgetary capacity to systematically harness information (Jerven 2016, pp.345–346). Not to mention, they might also be prone to have less transparent governments, as gathering and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Noteworthy efforts to update and expand Singer and Small's approach include the works of Bayer (2006) and the Lowy Institute ('Global Diplomacy Index' 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The conceptual distinction between middle powers, regional powers, rising or emerging powers is not the central concern of this article, so that it will not be explored in detail. For the sake of expedience, a useful heuristic to distinguish between concepts can be found in the G20 and the BRICS. While the G20 can be considered a grouping of the foremost rising or emerging powers (excluding the G8 members also present), the BRICS bloc is normally considered to be a sample of typical regional powers. For more on the difference between concepts, see Paes et al. (2017).

publicizing data can have political – besides economic – costs. Thus, the availability and consistency of data for developing states has been an enduring issue, imposing limitations on the type of research that it is possible to conduct on such locations. Foreign policy is one of such areas for which information abounds for advanced democracies, but becomes rarer as we move away from the core Western states.

RPDN monitors Brazilian and Turkish diplomacy over an extended timespan. This is relevant in that it will provide a full picture of the evolutionary dynamics of their external affairs, as well as point out where these countries have been investing their diplomatic assets. For some of the metrics concerned, RPDN is the first resource to present longitudinal primary data. Thus, it fills an important gap, as it monitors the diplomatic activity of emerging countries for approximately two decades. Greater attention to the behavior of actors from the Global South has been long due, and an inquiry into which partners concentrate more diplomatic effort on the part of Brazil and Turkey can produce unprecedented evidence on the shifting landscape of international polarity.

A second matter which underscores the academic importance of RPDN relates to the trajectory of emerging and regional powers as a field of study. For more than a decade, the topic has received intense scholarly and policy attention. Based on the literature trends, it can be argued that this domain has advanced from an initial moment more oriented towards interpretation to another stage, where tests and validation become more relevant. The early articles on the theme started off from the limitations of established theories (especially middle-powermanship and regionalism) in explaining the behavior of emerging countries and attempted to propose new categories (Hurrell 2006; Jordaan 2003; Schoeman 2000; Soares De Lima & Hirst 2006). In the following years, there was effort towards theoretical consolidation, focused on crafting generalizable typologies (Destradi 2010; Nolte 2010; Prys 2010). Recently, applications of these typologies and their theoretical corollaries to different cases have proliferated, as researchers try to confirm or adjust the theoretical predicates. In particular, there has been an interest in broadening the conceptual space, through studies of countries that have traditionally not been considered as emerging or regional powers (Alden & Le Pere 2009; Burges 2015; Dal 2016; Flemes 2010; Godehardt & Nabers 2011; Malamud & Rodriguez 2013).

Throughout this trajectory, qualitative analyses, particularly single case studies or few-cases comparison, have been the preferred templates. The prevalence of small N studies yields an important consequence with regards to the development of the field. Many of the hypotheses and theoretical arguments produced to date have limited inferential scope, as they have only been elaborated and tested to a small number of cases and have not yet been verified across a larger number of

observations (Flemes & Nolte 2010).

Also due to this qualitative predominance, the diplomacy of rising powers has often been scrutinized by emphasizing some noteworthy episodes in the realm of high politics, such as mediation efforts, crisis management, or vicinal tensions, which creates problems of representativeness and rarity. A large N dataset such as RPDN is a significant contribution to the field, as it offers the possibility of testing various theoretical arguments developed so far against a vast population of cases, not depending exclusively on dramatic episodes of regional policy.

Having explained the main motivation of RPDN, as well as the contribution we expect this dataset brings to the field, we shall now unveil the actual data.

## Description of RPDN

For each country included in the RPDN, two specific domains of diplomatic activity are recorded: (1) presidential diplomacy and (2) diplomatic presence. The former is presented in a single dataset, while the latter is broken down into two datasets, one per level of aggregation. As the release version of RPDN covers Brazil and Turkey, it has a total of six individual datasets. Below, we explain each set.

## Presidential Diplomacy Data

The concentration of diplomatic activity in the hands of the country's leader is a typical trait of modern interstate interactions. It has been increasingly common that heads of state and/or government, instead of professional diplomats alone, take up the role of foremost representatives of their countries abroad (Cason & Power 2009; Rojas & Milet 1999). Emerging powers have also relied on this practice in their attempts to project influence. Some authors attribute part of those countries relative success in punching above their weight internationally to the direct engagement of their leaders in international affairs (Özcan, Köse & Karakoç 2015; Rouquié 2006), while others emphasize how the presidents' institutional powers are key in maintaining certain interstate arrangements operational (Malamud 2005; Mace et al. 2016).

Presidential diplomacy is normally measured via direct gestures from the head of state/government in interstate relations. From the range of possible actions, the state visit has become the privileged indicator for gauging how active a president is internationally, and which partners and venues it values the most (Goldstein 2008).

With that in mind, the measuring of Brazilian presidential diplomacy is straightforward: as the country has a presidential regime (i.e.: the president is both head of state and government), we only need to track the displacements of a single individual. Additionally, Brazilian presidents take office right on January 1st of the year following their election. It is thus simple to classify Brazil's foreign policy in different moments, according to the president and his/her term, and aggregating the results yearly. Presidencies covered by the RPDN include those of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1st term: 1995-1998, 2nd: 1999-2002), Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006, 2007-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014, 2015).

The same does not apply to the Turkish case, which, for the period considered, had both a prime-minister (henceforth "PM") and a president. Between 2000 and 2015 (which is the data range for Turkey, as it will be explained in the next topic), Ankara had three presidents and four PMs, as summarized in Table 1 below:

Year	President	Time Period	PM	Time Period	
2000					
2001			Bülent Ecevit (DSP, coali- tion with MHP-ANAP)	From 11/01/1999 to 18/11/2002	
2002			From 16/05/2000 to Abdullah Gül (AKP)		
2003	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	From 16/05/2000 to		From 18/11/2002 to 14/03/2003	
2004	(independent)	28/08/2007			
2005				From 14/03/2003 to 28/08/2014	
2006			Recep Tayyip Erdogan (AKP) 2007 to		
2007					
2008					
2009					
2010					
2011	Abdullah Gül (AKP)	From 28/08/2007 to 28/08/2014			
2012	2				
2013					
2014					
2015	Recep Tayyip Erdogan (AKP)	From 28/08/2014	Ahmet Davutoğlu (AKP)	From 28/08/2014 to 24/05/2016	

Table 1: Timeline of Turkish presidents and PMs (2000-2015)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

In fact, the terms held by the president and the PM are not synchronic and have at times been occupied by different parties, which complicates periodization. For this article, the successive PM cabinets were adopted as the standard time references, as it is usually done in the empiricist literature (cf. Çakır & Akdağ 2017). During the analyzed period, there were three general elections: November 2002, July 2007 and June 2011.<sup>3</sup> In such occasions, a new cabinet was formed, led by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In 2015 there were two elections to compose a new parliament. The first one took place in June and, as it led to a hung parliament, another one was held in November. The results of the November 2015 election are not taken into consideration for our periodization since they are considered only to take effect in 2016 (according to the categorization rule adopted for RPDN) and thus escape the period

the PM. Thus, the interval between 2000 and 2015 can be divided into four distinct governments: one cabinet under the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition (2000-2002), and three others under the AKP (2003-2007, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015). It should be noted that, by adopting this periodization, there will be terms when either the president (Gül - Erdogan in 2015) or the PM (Gül - Erdogan in 2003, Erdogan - Davutoğlu in 2015) were replaced during the same administration.

Another difference with regards to Brazil is that the onset of new governments in Turkey is not synchronic with calendar years, as new cabinets might take office in the middle of a given year. As this article uses years as the base interval of analysis, it is necessary to devise a solution to allocate governmental changes that occur during a regular calendar year. For ease of periodization, changes in Turkish government taking place in the second semester of a given year are coded as taking effect in the following year. This procedure is necessary due to our interest in yearly data. Researchers working on a different unit scale might feel no need for such adjustments and preserve the precise dates of cabinet changes.

Table 2 presents the main variables of substantive interest in the presidential diplomacy datasets for Brazil and Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

Variable Name	Description	Туре	Brazil Value Range	Turkey Value Range
dest_type	Destination type. Five possible values	Categorical	"STATE": Destination is a State; "IO": Destination is an Interna- tional Organization; "RO": Destination is a Regional Organization; "RRO": Destination is a Region- Region Organization; "RSO": Destination is a Region- State Organization	"STATE"; "IO"; "RO"; "RRO"; "RSO"
dest_name	Name of destination	Categorical	127 unique countries and organi- zations recorded	146 unique countries and organizations recorded
n_days	Length of visit in number of days (when reported). Counting of days starts at 1 (if return on the same day), so that count = 2 if return is the on the following day, and so forth. Variable applicable only to dest_type = STATE (NA if other)	Discrete	NA; 1 - 8	NA; 1 - 10

## Table 2: Main variables of substantive interest in the RPDN Presidential Diplomacy datasets

of interest.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Identification variables, such as ISO codes, were omitted from the table; refer to codebook for full list of variables.

Variable Name	Description	Туре	Brazil Value Range	Turkey Value Range
multi	Dummy variable for multilateral events. Equals 0 when pur- pose of travel to for- eign state is bilateral visit and 1 when it is a multilateral event. Variable applicable only to dest.type = STATE (NA if other)	Categorical	NA; 0; 1	NA; 0; 1
TOTAL NUMBER O	F OBSERVATIONS		626	687

Source: Elaborated by the author.

## Data-gathering process

#### Brazil

RPDN counts official visits abroad by Brazilian presidents from 1995 to 2015. The data were collected from the lists made available by the Library of the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil.<sup>5</sup> Additional information was gathered from media reports and from the webpage of one of the former president's personal foundation.<sup>6</sup> To assemble the base, all official visits to foreign countries were counted, including those to attend summits and multilateral events. Neither receptions of foreign representatives in Brazil, nor international events based in the country were computed, since the records of such events were not kept consistently over the years for all the lists consulted.

## Turkey

The original ambition with RPDN was to collect information from the 1990s to the 2010s for both Brazil and Turkey. Empirical difficulties, however, made it necessary to moderate this aim, reducing both the temporal extension and the number of observed indicators for Turkish diplomacy.

As mentioned, Ankara differs from Brasilia in its form of government. For the period studied, the Turkish system was parliamentary. Thus, the country presented both a president (head of state) and a PM (head of government). This institutional configuration was only amended by the constitutional referendum of April 16, 2017, which abolished the post of PM and established a fully presidential regime. As the studied interval ends in 2015, this change is not taken into account, so that Turkey has, during the period considered, both a president and a PM.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Available at: <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes>. Accessed on 08-07-2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Instituto FHC. List of travels by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso available at: <a href="http://acervo.ifnc.org.br/ModuloPesquisador/jsp/doctosApoio/8/viagens\_1995\_2002\_alfa.pdf">http://acervo.ifnc.org.br/ModuloPesquisador/jsp/doctosApoio/8/viagens\_1995\_2002\_alfa.pdf</a>>. Accessed on 05-01-2019

It is a matter of debate in the literature whether it is the president or the PM who exerts more influence in foreign policy (Robins 2003; Gumuscu 2016). Indeed, the relationship between the two seems to be variable and contingent. For the period under review, both figures can be seen performing similar duties: representing Turkey in summits and multilateral events, hosting visiting heads of state and leading mediation initiatives. It is, therefore, difficult to discern whether each actor has its own jurisdiction in the international arena, or if both act concurrently and in equal capacity. This apparent equivalence implies that focusing on only one of the two representatives may be misleading, since it would omit the gestures of another equally important agent.

Therefore, in order to avoid a partial depiction of Turkish diplomacy, RPDN presents the metrics of presidential diplomacy for both the president and the PM. The term employed remains "presidential diplomacy", though no longer restricted to the head of state alone. Official travel data were collected from various sources: the official websites of the Presidency<sup>7</sup> and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)<sup>8</sup>, the personal webpage of one of the former presidents<sup>9</sup>, several news sites, official government press<sup>10</sup>, and other miscellaneous sources.

Limits were set by data availability. It was possible to collect data with sufficient reliability from the year 2000 to 2015. Errors and omissions are nonetheless still possible, particular for the early years, since information on displacements is not systematized in a single standardized source throughout the period.

#### **Diplomatic Presence Data**

RPDN monitors the geographic distribution of diplomatic capacities of the Brazilian and Turkish foreign relations ministries. We term this allocation "diplomatic presence", as it represents a way to gauge where do emerging power choose to be more present. Such diplomatic investment can be weighted and compared in different forms. In RPDN, we understand that it relates to the size or complexity of the diplomatic mission in each country. That is, it can be assumed that a larger mission in a given host country (i.e.: more stations and posts, as well as personnel) means greater presence, and this in turn is a token of how highly this country is regarded in the foreign relations of the emerging power.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Website of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic: www.tccb.gov.tr. Accessed on 22-07-2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Turkish MFA website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/. Accessed on 22-07-2018. Note that, though the Ministry's official name in Turkish is "Dışişleri Bakanlığı", it regularly uses the English translation "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" in its international publications, so that the acronym "MFA" is utilized in this article as well.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Personal website of former president Abdullah Gül: www.abdullahgul.gen.tr. Accessed on 22-07-2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey ("T. C. Remis Gazete") reports absences from the head of state due to official visits abroad. Available at www.resmigazete.gov.tr. Accessed on 22-07-2018
<sup>11</sup> For an overview of the theoretical arguments linking the choice of where to open diplomatic rep-

The assessment of Brazilian and Turkish diplomatic presence abroad relies on official data on consular activity published by each country's ministry. As this information is not uniformly registered and publicized by each country, the amount of indicators we are able to utilize in RPDN varies from case to case.

For Brazil, we were able to collect data from 1995 to 2015. A total of four variables were monitored: the number and type of official representations abroad, the number of employees in these posts, hierarchical ranking of each post, and the number of military attachés abroad. For Turkey, in turn, fewer empirical indicators were available. We could only compute the number and type of official representations abroad, albeit for a longer time period (1995 to 2017).

Diplomatic presence data are available on two levels of aggregation: city and country. The first dataset presents diplomatic posts and related variables per city, while the latter aggregates the city data into national level. For Brazil, some variables are exclusive to the level of aggregation: post raking is only available on city level (as this cannot be aggregated nationally), and number of military attachés only on country level (as it cannot be disaggregated into cities).

Tables 3 and 4 present the substantive variables of the diplomatic presence datasets on the city and country levels of aggregation, respectively. As the city-level data records some information on different levels, a column for "level of observation" is added to Table 3 so as to distinguish between values pertaining to cities (level 1) and countries (level 2).

Variable name	Description	Level of obs.	Туре	Brazil Value Range	Turkey Value Range
host_city	Name of the city hosting the diplomatic post	1	Categorical	209 unique names	222 unique names
host_type	Type of host. Three possible values:	2	Categorical	"STATE"; "IO"; "RO"	"STATE"; "IO"
host_name	Name of country/organiza- tion hosting the diplomatic post	2	Categorical	152 unique names	145 unique names
post_type	Type of diplomatic post. Six possible values:	1	Categorical	"EM": Embassy; "CC": Consulate General; "C": Consulate; "VC": Vice-Consulate; "OF": Office (commercial, representation, liaison) "DE": Delegation (for IO and RO only)	"EM"; "CG"; "DE"

## Table 3: Main variables of substantive interest in the RPDN Diplomatic Presence datasets (city level)

resentations and a country's strategic preferences, refer to Singer and Small (1966), Neumayer (2008) and Kinne (2014).

Variable name	Description	Level of obs.	Туре	Brazil Value Range	Turkey Value Range
post_pers	Number of personnel sta- tioned at the diplomatic post	1	Discrete	0 - 51	(Variable not available)
post_rank	Ranking of the diplomatic post. Four possible values: A, B, C, D. Rankings only appear on the consulted MRE lists from 1997 on. Ranking range was broadened from A-C to A-D in 2007.	1	Ordinal	A - C (until 2006); A - D (from 2007 on)	(Variable not available)
imp	Dummy variable for missing data imputation. Equals 0 if data is original, 1 if imputa- tion was applied. Linear interpolation and repetition of preceding value were the adopted approaches.	1	Categorical	1;0	(Variable not available)
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS				4022	4263

Source: Elaborated by the author.

## Table 4: Main variables of substantive interest in the RPDN Diplomatic Presence datasets (country level)

Variable name	Description	Туре	Brazil Value Range	Turkey Value Range
host_name	Name of country/organization hosting the diplomatic post	Categorical	152 unique names	145 unique names
host_type	Type of host. Three possible values:	Categorical	"STATE"; "IO"; "RO"	"STATE"; "IO"
n_pers	Total number of personnel stationed in host country/organization	Discrete	0 - 206	(Variable not avail- able)
n_posts	Total number of diplomatic posts in host country/organization, combining embassies and other stations	Discrete	1 - 12	1 - 14
n_mil_at	Total number of military attachés stationed in host country. Count adds military attachés, deputy officers and assistants	Discrete	0 - 12	(Variable not avail- able)
imp	Dummy variable for missing data imputation. Equals 0 if data is original, 1 if imputation was applied. Linear in- terpolation and repetition of preceding value were the adopted approaches.	Categorical	1; 0	(Variable not avail- able)
TOTAL NUM	TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS			2773

Source: Elaborated by the author.

## Data-gathering process

#### Brazil

Information on Brazilian representations was obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Relations ("*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*", MRE, also known as Itamaraty). Specifically, from the personnel lists published semi-annually, which were retrieved via *in situ* research in August 2016 by the author in the Azeredo da Silveira Library in the ministry, where print copies are kept.

The lists contain information on the number and type of posts abroad, their ranking, and how many employees work in each one of them. They do not report the vacant positions or the expected capacity of each post. Instead, they present solely how many employees are actually working on site.<sup>12</sup> Records were not available for the whole period of interest: there was no list for the year 2005, so that imputation was required to complete the dataset.

The number of military attachés was not available in the lists, since the matter is handled by the Ministry of Defense. Thus, we analyzed a collection of presidential decrees ("*decretos presidenciais*"), issued between 1994 and 2015, determining how many attachés, deputy officers and auxiliaries should be allocated abroad.<sup>13</sup> The quantities do not necessarily change every year. It was common to find an interval of two to three years between the publication of new decrees updating the count. It was considered that the number of attachés remains unchanged until modified by a subsequent decree. Also, as the decrees do not specify the city of the posting, this information could only be presented at the national level.

Combining information from Itamaraty and presidential decrees comes at a cost. While the Itamaraty lists are administrative reports and therefore inform how many people are actually at each post, presidential decrees are legislation, establishing how many attachés *should be* in each country, with no reference as to whether they are actually there. Thus, it must be borne in mind that while the "number of diplomatic personnel" indicator refers to the actual staff count, the "number of military attachés" indicator shows the existing positions, occupied or not. It is expected, therefore, that the count of military attachés may be slightly inaccurate and perhaps upwardly biased.

## Turkey

Data availability was smaller for Turkey than it was for Brazil. Therefore, its measurement of diplomatic presence had to be operationalized with less indicators. Only information on the number and type of posts abroad was gathered. The data were provided by the MFA itself, upon request by the author. The spread-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Thus, it is not possible to know, for instance, if a post listing nine employees should have precisely nine people or, instead, ten, but one of the positions was still not filled.

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$  DECRETO Nº 1.299, DE 31 DE OUTUBRO DE 1994; DECRETO Nº 2.098, DE 18 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1996; DECRETO Nº 2.583, DE 12 DE MAIO DE 1998; DECRETO N° 3.397, DE 30 DE MARÇO DE 2000; DECRETO Nº 5.294 DE 1º DE DEZEMBRO DE 2004; DECRETO Nº 6.773, DE 18 DE FEVEREIRO DE 2009; DECRETO N° 7.848, DE 23 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2012; DECRETO N° 8.125, DE 21 DE OUTUBRO DE 2013; DECRETO N° 8.460, DE 26 DE MAIO DE 2015. Available at: <a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br">http://www.planalto.gov.br</a>. Accessed on: 29-07-2017

sheet provided by the ministry contained the opening years for all embassies and consulates. By reporting only opening dates, the spreadsheet is useful to indicate the cumulative total of posts that each country comes to host over time. However, it does not contain information on the closure of stations or other forms of diplomatic retraction. For this reason, the data may have an upward bias, since information on reductions is suppressed.

## Example of Usage: Assessing Regional Diplomatic Attention

The data in RPDN can be useful in various academic ventures. In this section, we try to briefly point out – by no means exhaustively – some of the information that can be extracted from it and types of research problems that it can answer. In particular, RPDN data will be utilized to address one of the main research questions which has been lingering on the regional powers literature. Namely, do regional powers effectively prioritize their regions in their diplomatic efforts? Or do they invest greater diplomatic attention elsewhere?

One of the core assumptions of the research agenda on regional powers was that these actors displayed significant levels of regional influence and engagement (Nolte 2010; Flemes & Nolte 2010). Such prioritization, however, was largely assumed instead of verified consistently. In fact, regional powers might have incentives to remain detached from vicinal matters and pursue their aims elsewhere (Prys 2010; Hurrell 2010). The ambiguous readings on Brazilian and Turkish regionalism testify to this indeterminacy.

Regarding Brazil, scholarship is not consensual on the region's centrality. It is acknowledged that since the 1990s Brazil has acted as a region-shaper and outlined South America as its preferred area of influence – as opposed to the more diffuse space of "Latin America" (Mesquita 2016; Rocha, Albuquerque & Medeiros 2018). Ambitious regional integration and cooperation initiatives, such as Mercosur in the 1990s and Unasur in the 2000s, were signs of Brasilia's willingness. Yet, some authors emphasize that, even though Brazil mobilizes regionalist efforts, it considers them as means to an end. In other words, the region is a stepping stone for consolidating greater influence at the global stage (Lazarou & Luciano 2015; Burges 2015; Krapohl, Meissner & Muntschick 2014; Malamud & Rodriguez 2013; Steiner, Medeiros & Lima 2014). Pinheiro and Gaio (2014), in contrast, stress that Brasilia's South American regionalism, particularly during the Lula da Silva administration, did not adopt an instrumental approach towards its neighbors and that the country eventually secured a role as a regional developmental leader.

Turkey, in turn, has been long-regarded as the archetypical "torn country" (Huntington 1993) or "cusp state" (Herzog & Robins 2014), straddling between East

and West. Hence, the matter of regional belonging has been a persistent Anatolian riddle. If we restrict our focus to recent scholarship, two grand narratives are underscored: Westernization and Middle-Easternization. Joining the community of Western states has been a stable and enduring foreign policy goal in Ankara (Hale 2000; Yilmaz & Bilgin 2006; Robins 2003). The most recent and momentous episode of this saga was the EU accession bid in the early-2000s, which dominated much of the country's foreign agenda in the beginning of decade. However, with the rise of the Islamist AKP to power in 2003, in addition to the disheartening and sluggish pace of the accession negotiations, analysts detected a gradual diplomatic shift. Turkey began to reduce its emphasis on Brussels and turn towards the Arab world, which led many to diagnose a "Middle-Easternization" of foreign relations (Altunişık 2014). Early analyses of this reorientation tended to consider it a pragmatic adjustment and by no means a rupture with the West (Oğuzlu 2008), but as time went by a growing number of scholars evaluated that Turkey was departing from the liberal order and adopting the style of political Islam current in its Arab neighborhood (Öniş 2013; Arda 2015). Indeed, over the course of the AKP governments, Ankara sought to play a greater role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, at first discretely, in an attempt to reverse the negative regional legacy previous administrations had left, and then more daringly, even seeking to consolidate Turkey as a role-model for a post-Arab Spring MENA (Oğuzlu 2016).

Hence, it can be said that the literature on both cases has struggled to address analogous questions. How important is South America in Brazil's diplomatic activity? How robust was Turkey's diplomatic shift away from Europe and towards the MENA? Though there have been some inventive attempts to gauge diplomatic attention devoted to regions,<sup>14</sup> there has been no standard approach to measure diplomatic activity across countries. Thus, much of the evidence on diplomatic preferences remains incommensurable.

RPDN allows us to address the issue in a novel way by looking into presidential diplomacy and diplomatic presence. Both concepts refer to enduring practices, which are embedded in the underlying structure of modern statehood and therefore have come to acquire stable meaning and significance for nearly all countries (Goldstein 2008; Kinne 2014). In other words, they are valid indicators of diplomatic attention across several cases. In addition, both measures combined provide a clearer picture of a country's diplomacy, as the presidential component is expected to capture a more dynamic and volitional vector, while the diplomatic presence should reflect deeper structural interests.

By grouping all countries listed in RPDN according to their geographic and po-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See for instance Jenne et al. (2017) and Çakir and Akdağ (2017).

litical regions and then aggregating the total amount of state visits received and diplomatic posts,<sup>15</sup> we are able to see which regions received a larger share of diplomatic attention. Figures 1 and 2 below show the results for Brazil and Turkey, respectively. To ensure visual clarity, values were aggregated per president or cabinet, as opposed to years, and regions which were not highlighted by the literature as relevant within this *problématique* were omitted.

## **Figure 1:** Brazilian presidential diplomacy and diplomatic presence for selected regions (1995-2015)<sup>16,17</sup>



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 1 shows that South America (black solid line with triangular marker) has consistently attracted most of Brazil's diplomatic activity. During the whole period considered, it was the first destination in terms of visits and second in number of diplomatic posts. Though this is evidence in favor of South America's priority, it is noteworthy that the region's centrality has actually decreased in rela-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> We chose to restrict the concept of diplomatic presence to just one indicator (i.e.: number of posts) in this example since some of our complementary indicators in this dataset (e.g.: number of personnel and military attachés) are not available for both Brazil and Turkey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Diplomatic representations on international organizations (e.g.: stations in Geneva referring to the UN instead of the Swiss government) were not counted. Total number of official visits is equal to the sum of visits to countries within a region during a president's office. Total number of posts is equal to the sum, for all countries in a region, of the mean number of posts a country had during an office. Countries were ascribed to specific regions based on geographical classifications utilized by each country's Ministry of Foreign Relations. Regional classifications are not included originally in RPDN as future users might have diverging views on the borders of a given region. Data for Brazil in 2005 is imputed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> South America comprises the following countries and territories: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, French Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela.

tive terms. While in Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency South America concentrated 43% of Brazilian visits and 24% of its stations, these figures would drop to 35% and 19% in the Dilma Rousseff years. It is clear that, from the Lula da Silva presidency onwards, Brazil's international relations became much more globalized. Though this increased activity also generated more frequent visits to and more posts in South America, a growing regional detachment and diplomatic diversification were also implied.

## Figure 2: Turkish presidential diplomacy and diplomatic presence for selected regions (2000-2015)<sup>18</sup>



Source: elaborated by the author.

Figure 2 reveals that Turkey's diplomatic shifts were much more pronounced in the presidential domain. Visits to Western Europe (dashed black line) peaked during AKP's first term, precisely when EU accession talks began, which reflects the high degree of personal engagement of the Turkish president and PM on the matter. However, right on the following AKP government (2003-2007), the MENA region (grey solid line) surpassed Western Europe and became the principal destination. This emphasis, however, would be ultimately short-lived. As the Arab spring convulsed the MENA and AKP's third cabinet experienced grave backlashes in its regional leadership attempts, the number of visits receded promptly. Though this could lead us to believe that Ankara's Middle-Easternization was strong and swift, the data on diplomatic presence nuance this reading, as they indicate that Turkey's consular network in the MENA remained mostly stable. Western Europe was the undisputed first place in number of stations throughout. Notably, Germany occupied a *sui generis* position, hosting as much

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The MENA comprises the following countries and territories: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Yemen, Palestine.

as 14 stations, while other top-tier counterparts (US, France, Greece), would not surpass 5 stations each. This exceedingly dense consular base reflects the strong interdependence between Turkey and Germany in terms of trade, investment and expatriate community (İçduygu 2012).

By comparing both cases, it is visible that Brazil devoted a higher level of diplomatic attention to its immediate region. South America concentrated the largest portion of Brasilia's diplomatic resources, albeit this margin diminished in relative terms with each passing year. The MENA, by comparison, was vigorously prioritized by Turkey for a period, but this emphasis was more pronounced in presidential diplomacy and rather brief. Turkish diplomatic presence remained strong in Western Europe throughout.

It is noteworthy that Brazilian regionalism has clearer institutional underpinnings, with established regional groupings and accompanying demand for presidential summits and bureaucracy (Medeiros, Lima & Cabral 2016). Though the main goal of this article is not to establish causality, it would be possible to argue that this institutionalization might explain why Brazil's diplomatic commitment towards South America was more stable, while Turkey's connection with the MENA seemed more mercurial. In addition, it is also visible that both countries finished the series with a much more diversified diplomatic portfolio than in the beginning.

Beyond the matter of regional centrality, other curious findings are also revealed by the data. Both Brazil and Turkey underwent a synchronic expansion in their diplomatic presence. They increased rapidly the number of embassies and consulates between 2007 and 2012, in a pace not repeated before or after in the series. Nearly all regions received greater consular attention as a result, though the same hierarchy tends to be preserved. The main exception for both cases was Sub-Saharan Africa (solid grey line with circle marker), which moved higher up in the ladder.

For Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa had, in the early 2000s, roughly the same amount of diplomatic posts as the MENA, and slightly less than Asia. From 2005 on, Sub-Saharan Africa surpassed Asia and it remained the third region with most posts until the last recorded year (2015). In the course of those ten years, 18 new posts were opened in the continent, more than in any other region, apart from the Americas.

This rise is more impressive for Turkey. Sub-Saharan Africa went from merely 7 posts in the beginning of the series to 36 in the end. In all cases, the new posts were the first Turkish embassies opened in those countries. The only exception was Somalia, which received an embassy and a consulate general. Hence, though

the literature has placed great emphasis on the Middle-Easternization of Turkish diplomacy, we can see that the data show concurrently an intriguing Africanization. From 64 new posts opened between 2007 and 2015, only 9 were in the MENA, while 29 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. While it is true that in other metrics, such as presidential diplomacy, the MENA indeed rose to preeminence, it was actually the region that grew the least in terms of diplomatic presence.

This focus on Africa reveals an unexpected similarity in the diplomatic agendas of the two emerging powers. It is noteworthy that Brazil and Turkey's diplomatic expansions, particularly under Lula and Erdogan, took on the shades of South-South dialogue, which meant a new and more relevant role for countries outside the Western circuit. Brazil's approximation with the African continent could be seen in a number of domains: active presidential diplomacy, a rise in development cooperation and other aid gestures – particularly with Lusophone Africa – (Mendonça Júnior & Faria 2015; Lima 2017), revival of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) (Abdenur, Mattheis & Seabra 2016; Seabra 2017), and discursive attempts to build a symbolic bridge between Brazil and Africa as "kin nations", sharing common history, culture and ethnic ties (Mesquita & Medeiros 2016).

As for Turkey, given that most of the debate on the previous decade was centered on its shift towards the MENA, little attention was devoted to its African diplomacy, apart from some recent studies on individual countries (Kadayifci-Orellana 2016). Through the RPDN data, it is possible to visualize how significant this African expansion was and to compare it with other *foci* of diplomatic attention.

## Conclusion

With this article, we presented the RPDN dataset, its motivation, features and some examples of usage. This contribution is relevant as it fills an important gap concerning data availability for emerging countries. We believe RPDN provides valuable resources for researchers interested in empirical, longitudinal analysis of Brazilian and Turkish foreign policy. As a concluding remark, we would like to point out that, through RPDN, we do not seek to advance methodological monism or advocate any intrinsic superiority of large N research designs. Our chief concern is rather to enable a broadening in the type of research which can be conducted on emerging countries – an endeavor for which quantitative data is required.

Our brief demonstration indicated how such data can address several research problems not yet answered in the literature. By combining measures of presidential diplomacy and diplomatic presence for Brazil and Turkey, we assessed to what extent those countries prioritized their immediate regions. It was possible to verify that Brasilia indeed privileged South America in all domains, albeit at declining rates, whereas Ankara's turn towards the MENA was impressive but brief and restricted chiefly to presidential diplomacy. The data also revealed how Brazil and Turkey displayed a similar interest in strengthening their presences in Africa – a finding which warrants further research.

Our example was merely an initial illustration of the usefulness of RPDN and how it can be utilized by the research community. Its datasets contain information on many other items pertaining to diplomacy, so that we are confident that a wide range of other research questions can be addressed through RPDN.

Nonetheless, as discussed throughout the article, the datasets still suffer from limitations. Most notably, not all empirical indicators were available for all countries and all years. Likewise, some of the variables were liable to biases and omissions due to idiosyncrasies of the information source. Additionally, Brazil and Turkey should be regarding as starting points of a greater academic enterprise. Hence, there remains significant room for improvement in future versions of RPDN with regards to data validity and quality, as well as number of countries included.

#### Acknowledgments and Funding

This article was made possible with the support of the following people: the staff from the *Embaixador Antônio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira* Library at Itamaraty for their assistance in gathering data on Brazilian diplomatic presence; the Turkish Embassy in Brasilia, for sharing data on Turkish diplomatic presence. This study was financed in part by the *Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)*, through the following grants: PROEX and PDSE (Process n. 88881.132436/2016-01). The presentation of early results in international congresses was supported through the *Pró-Reitoria de Pesquisa e Pós-Graduação* (Propesq) of the Federal University of Pernambuco.

#### Bio

Rafael Mesquita is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) and an Associate Research Fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) at the Research Program "Power and Ideas". His research focuses on regional powers and Brazilian foreign policy.

#### References

Abdenur, AE, Mattheis, F & Seabra, P 2016, 'An ocean for the Global South: Brazil and the zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 1112–1131.

- Alden, C & Le Pere, G 2009, 'South Africa in Africa: Bound To Lead?', Politikon, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 145–169.
- Altunışık, MB 2014, 'Turkey's "return" to the Middle East', in H Fürtig (ed), Regional powers in the Middle East: new constellations after the Arab revolts, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, GB, pp. 123–142.
- Arda, M 2015, 'Turkey the evolving interface of international relations and domestic politics', South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 203–226.
- Bayer, R 2006, 'Diplomatic Exchange Data set, v2006.1', retrieved from <a href="http://correlatesofwar.org">http://correlatesofwar.org</a>>.
- Burges, SW 2015, 'Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question', International Politics, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 193–207.
- Çakır, AA & Akdağ, GA 2017, 'An empirical analysis of the change in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government', Turkish Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 334–357.
- Cason, JW & Power, TJ 2009, 'Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era', International Political Science Review, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 117–140.
- Dal, EP 2016, 'Conceptualising and testing the "emerging regional power" of Turkey in the shifting international order', Third World Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 8, pp. 1425–1453.
- Destradi, S 2010, 'Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership', Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 04, pp. 903–930.
- Flemes, D (ed.) 2010, Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers, Ashgate Pub. Co, Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT.
- Flemes, D & Nolte, D 2010, 'Introduction', in Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers, Ashgate Pub. Co, Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT, pp. 1–14.
- 'Global Diplomacy Index' 2017, Lowy Institute, retrieved February 27, 2019, from <a href="http://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org">http://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org</a>>.
- Godehardt, N & Nabers, D (eds) 2011, Regional powers and regional orders, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York.
- Goldsmith, BE & Horiuchi, Y 2009, 'Spinning the Globe? U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion', The Journal of Politics, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 863–875.
- Goldstein, E 2008, 'The Politics of the State Visit', The Hague Journal of Diplo-

macy, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 153-178.

- Gumuscu, S 2016, 'Turkey's Peace Initiatives in the Middle East: a Tragic Turn of Events', in DU Eralp (ed), Turkey as a mediator: stories of success and failure, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, pp. 39–54.
- Hale, WM 2000, Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London ; Portland, OR.
- Herzog, M & Robins, P (eds) 2014, The role, position and agency of cusp states in international relations, Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY.
- Huntington, SP 1993, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, p. 22.
- Hurrell, A 2006, 'Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for wouldbe great powers?', International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 1–19.
- Hurrell, A 2010, 'Regional powers and the global system from a historical perspective', in Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers, Ashgate Pub. Co, Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT, pp. 15–27.
- İçduygu, A 2012, '50 years after the labour recruitment agreement with Germany: the consequences of emigration for Turkey', Perceptions, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 11.
- Jenne, N, Schenoni, LL & Urdinez, F 2017, 'Of words and deeds: Latin American declaratory regionalism, 1994–2014', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, pp. 1–21.
- Jerven, M 2016, 'Research Note: Africa by numbers: Reviewing the database approach to studying African economies', African Affairs, vol. 115, no. 459, pp. 342–358.
- Jordaan, E 2003, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers', Politikon, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 165–181.
- Kadayifci-Orellana, SA 2016, 'Turkish Mediation in Somalia for Peace and Stability', in DU Eralp (ed), Turkey as a mediator: stories of success and failure, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, pp. 99–123.
- Kinne, BJ 2014, 'Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 247–259.
- Krapohl, S, Meissner, KL & Muntschick, J 2014, 'Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos? The Ambivalent Behaviour of Brazil and South Africa in Regional Economic Integration: Regional powers as leaders or Rambos?', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 879–895.

- Lall, R 2016, 'How Multiple Imputation Makes a Difference', Political Analysis, vol. 24, no. 04, pp. 414–433.
- Lazarou, E & Luciano, BT 2015, 'Regionalism as an Instrument: Assessing Brazil's Relations with its Neighbourhood', Global Society, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 390–408.
- Lebovic, JH & Saunders, EN 2016, 'The Diplomatic Core: The Determinants of High-Level US Diplomatic Visits, 1946–2010', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 107–123.
- Lima, JA dos S 2017, 'Além do Haiti : a quem se destina a cooperação humanitária brasileira?', http://www.ipea.gov.br, retrieved July 11, 2018, from <http:// repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/8206>.
- Mace, G, Thérien, J-P, Tussie, D & Dabène, O (eds) 2016, Summits and regional governance: the Americas in comparative perspective, Routledge, London; New York.
- Malamud, A 2005, 'Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur: An Empirical Examination.', Latin American Research Review, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 138–164.
- Malamud, A & Rodriguez, JC 2013, 'Com um pé na região e outro no mundo: O dualismo crescente da política externa brasileira', Estudos internacionais: revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 167–184.
- Medeiros, M de A, Lima, RM de S & Cabral, MEF 2016, 'The impact of summitry on the governance of Mercosur', in G Mace, J-P Thérien, D Tussie, & O Dabène (eds), Summits and regional governance: the Americas in comparative perspective, Global institutions series, Routledge, London; New York, pp. 106–123.
- Mendonça Júnior, W & Faria, CAP de 2015, 'A cooperação técnica do Brasil com a África: comparando os governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e Lula da Silva (2003-2010)', Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol. 58, pp. 5–22.
- Mesquita, R 2016, 'The hegemonic hermano : South American collective identity and Brazilian regional strategy', Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue canadienne des études latino-américaines et caraïbes, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 215–238.
- Mesquita, R & Medeiros, M de A 2016, 'Legitimising Emerging Power Diplomacy: an Analysis of Government and Media Discourses on Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula', Contexto Internacional, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 385–432.
- Moons, SJV & van Bergeijk, PAG 2017, 'Does Economic Diplomacy Work? A Meta-analysis of Its Impact on Trade and Investment', The World Economy, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 336–368.

- Neumayer, E 2008, 'Distance, Power and Ideology: Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-States', Area, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 228–236.
- Nitsch, V 2007, 'State Visits and International Trade', The World Economy, vol. 30, no. 12, pp. 1797–1816.
- Nolte, D 2010, 'How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics', Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 04, pp. 881–901.
- Oğuzlu, HT 2016, 'Turkish foreign policy at the nexus of changing international and regional dynamics', Turkish Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 58–67.
- Oğuzlu, T 2008, 'Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?', Turkish Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3–20.
- Öniş, Z 2013, 'Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony', Insight Turkey, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 103–122.
- Özcan, M, Köse, T & Karakoç, E 2015, 'Assessments of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East During the Arab Uprisings', Turkish Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 195–218.
- Paes, L de O, Cunha, AM, Fonseca, PCD, University of Denver, Brazil, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil & Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil 2017, 'Narratives of Change and Theorisations on Continuity: the Duality of the Concept of Emerging Power in International Relations', Contexto Internacional, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 75–95.
- Pinheiro, L & Gaio, G 2014, 'Cooperation for Development, Brazilian Regional Leadership and Global Protagonism', Brazilian Political Science Review, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 8–30.
- Prys, M 2010, 'Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood: Differences in Regional Powerhood', International Studies Review, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 479–504.
- Robins, P 2003, Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War, Hurst, London.
- Rocha, FF de O, Albuquerque, RB de & Medeiros, M de A 2018, 'Do Concepts Matter? Latin America and South America in the Discourse of Brazilian Foreign Policymakers', Brazilian Political Science Review, vol. 12, no. 3, retrieved March 5, 2019, from <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1981-38212018000300205&lng=en&tlng=en">http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1981-38212018000300205&lng=en&tlng=en>.</a>
- Rojas, F & Milet, P 1999, 'Diplomacia de Cúpulas: O Multilateralismo Emergente do Século XXI', Contexto Internacional, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 291–359.
- Rouquié, A 2006, Le Brésil au XXIe siècle: naissance d'un nouveau grand, Fayard, France.
- Schoeman, M 2000, 'South Africa as an emerging middle power', African Secu-

rity Review, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 47-58.

- Seabra, P 2017, 'Stretching the Limits? Strengths and Pitfalls of South Atlantic Security Regionalism', Contexto Internacional, vol. 39, pp. 305–328.
- Singer, JD & Small, M 1966, 'The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815–1940', World Politics, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 236–282.
- Soares De Lima, MR & Hirst, M 2006, 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 21–40.
- Steiner, AQ, Medeiros, M de A & Lima, RM de S 2014, 'From Tegucigalpa to Teheran: Brazil's diplomacy as an emerging Western country', Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 40–58.
- Yilmaz, E & Bilgin, P 2006, 'Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft', International Journal, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 39–59.

#### Article

## Frustrated Emergence? Brazil and Mexico's Coming of Age

## Fabricio H. Chagas-Bastos

The University of Melbourne / Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences fchagasbastos@gmail.com

## Marcela Franzoni

São Paulo State University (UNESP) / Institute for Research on Public Policy and International Relations marcelafranzoni32@hotmail.com

#### Abstract

The beginning of the 2000s seemed promising to Brazil and Mexico. The combination of the outcomes of years of domestic reforms with the commodity boom allowed the two biggest economies in Latin America to afford more ambitious international goals. A cruise flight turned into turbulence, and the frustration did not take long to come. By the end of the 2010s, both countries do not exhibit the same impetus for seeking international insertion and recognition as they had at the beginning of the decade. Drawing on evidence across the four presidents who occupied the Planalto and National Palaces between 2006 and 2018, this paper explores in a comparative historical perspective the 'rising powers' trajectories of Brazil and Mexico. We ground our argument on the concept of international insertion, drawing on a Southern interpretation of international relations. We fill the gap upon the theorisation on how the transition from a peripheral position occurs and contribute to advance the understanding of how Southern countries seek new positions in global hierarchies and their international engagement —which the status-seeking approaches to IR do not adequately explain. By the end of the 2010s, although frequently seen as emerging economies and even multilateral diplomatic forces, both countries have only marginally reaped the gains of trying to act more assertively in the regional and global arenas.

#### Keywords

Brazil, Mexico, International Insertion, Global South, Emerging Posers, Latin America

#### Introduction

The beginning of the 2000s seemed promising to Brazil and Mexico. The sus-

tained diplo-matic performances translated into their inclusion in a series of different acronyms (e.g. BRICS, IBAS, MINT, Next Eleven), and highlighted the potential of Southern<sup>1</sup> states to contribute to the international order. Optimism was high. Everything seemed to indicate a sustained take off from their longstanding condition of peripheral countries.

A cruise flight turned into turbulence, and the frustration did not take long to come. By the end of the 2010s, both countries do not exhibit the same impetus for seeking international insertion and recognition as they had at the beginning of the decade (Franzoni, 2017; 2018; Malamud, 2017; Pellicer, 2014; Ramírez Meda & Rochin Aguilar, 2017; Vaz, 2018). In the end, both countries have only partially achieved success in their strategies to be recognised as 'new global powers'. To be sure, besides the symbolism of being labelled as 'new middle-powers', neither Brazil or Mexico retained the praises and graces of international markets they started to receive.

Why did the two largest and most industrialised economies in Latin America have retreated from their active international insertion<sup>2</sup> strategies by the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s? We hypothesise that continued domestic political and economic limitations undermined all the effort to create agency spaces towards international insertion.

Brazil's economy remains overly dependent on mineral or agriculture-based goods exports. Mexico, by its turn, has fully sustained neo-liberal economic policies from the 1990s onwards. Political instability is a significant component in the picture for both countries. Altogether, those factors have not allowed Mexico and Brazil to sustain their rise to international recognition, and subsequent status-seeking affordance by systemic gatekeepers.

Drawing on evidence across the four presidents who occupied the Planalto and National Palaces between 2006 and 2018, this paper explores in a comparative historical perspective the 'rising powers' trajectories of Brazil and Mexico. We ground our argument on the concept of international insertion, drawing on a Southern interpretation of international relations. We approach the centre-periphery inequalities from a post-dependency strategy, surpassing the structuralfunctionalist Dependency Theory tendency of presenting the countries in the South as victimised by structural con-straints. We also advance in the clarification of how Southern countries' demands are generally misattributed and treated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The 'Global South' —or just 'South'— comprise those regions that for years were known as the 'Third World', i.e., Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean (Alden, Morphet, & Vieira, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> We detail the concept in the next section, suffices for now defining 'international insertion' as the combination of for-eign, defence and economic policies to create spaces of agency enabling international recognition, as the step before of being able to seek status.

as mere seek for participation in international politics (see Chagas-Bastos, 2017).

Comparing the behaviour of two countries that escalated the global hierarchies while departing from the periphery is of interest to the broader discipline of IR because, first, it fills the gap up-on the theorisation on how the transition from a peripheral position occurs. Second, as highlighted by Chagas-Bastos (2017; 2018), it contributes to advance the understanding of how the Southern countries seek new positions in global hierarchies and their international engagement — which the status-seeking approaches to IR do not adequately explain. Finally, we add to the few comparative studies of the only two potential middle-powers in Latin America.

We organise the rest of the article in four sections. Section two outlines our framework to understand recognition and status patterns in international politics from a Southern perspective through the concepts of emergence and international insertion. Next, we briefly analyse the historical context in which Brazil and Mexico were launched as Latin American emerging powers at the beginning of the 2000s. Section four examines the international insertion patterns established by each country across the presidencies of Rousseff and Temer (Brazil), and Calderón and Peña Nieto (Mexico). In the final section, we compare such patterns and evaluate the prospects for future endeavours.

## **Emergence and International Insertion**

Mexico and Brazil have unique positions in the world. On the one hand, they have material capacities that position them at the top tier of power scales, such as vast territories, natural resources, significant populations, and economic potential. On the other, their structural political and economic vulnerabilities, as well as their proximity to the United States which limits their manoeuvrability. As such, these are countries that have been labelled by the scholarship in many ways with-in the power taxonomy and hierarchy literature: new middle, regional, rising, or emerging powers, and developing countries.

The process of creating agency spaces that both countries started during the 2000s —and at some extent, other states in the Global South as well— has been generically grasped by the literature as 'emergence' —with the mainstream IR focusing on 'new middle-power' or 'middle-market' emergence. Since then, researchers have produced a voluminous literature using generic and impre-cise labels to describe behaviour and 'new role' of this group of countries in international affairs<sup>3</sup>. Long (2017, p. 145) notes that "there are no clear-cut lines for 'smallness' and along the multifaceted continuum between weakness and strength there is little analytical purchase for the examination of one state; it only applies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Due to space constraints, we will not go further on this direction, for an overview see Jordaan (2017).

via comparison"-which is also true for those 'in the middle range'.

Burges (2013b) proposes a useful distinction to put some order in this conceptual confusion. Instead of using the overarching category of 'middle-power', he proposes using 'emerging coun-tries' to label those states behaving by investing in a reformist character towards the international order, by acting through its institutions. The rationale underlying this behaviour comes from the fact that the decision-making in the global hierarchies does not guarantee equal access to agenda setting. In doing so, they seek to foster the build-up of their (potentially) 'own' (or non-Western) international order. This brand-new international order would work as an appendix to the post World War II liberal order, and should be created, according to those emerging from the periphery, precisely because they consider that their strategic foreign policy objectives have not been --- and could not be- met because of the constraints imposed by the hierarchical gatekeepers -i.e. great and traditional middle-powers. He notes, however, that the observed reformism does not indicate that emerging countries do not benefit from the current configuration of international order and the scope in which their power can be exercised. They instead adopt a questioning posture of the nor-mative predominance of the U.S. and the West. In doing so, emerging countries seek to create or increase their regional and global political space, gain greater autonomy and improve their relative position within global hierarchies.

Despite the extant literature labelling those countries moving towards less peripheral positions, there is a lack of theorisation about how this transition occurs. In other words, theory fails to address how Southern countries would create agency spaces.

The notion of emergence assumes, however, a different character to those in the South. It has received a particular treatment by Latin American scholars studying how the countries in that region interact with global hierarchies —and crafted the generic label of 'international insertion' to explain it. The appropriation of the thought about the international in Latin America is deeply root-ed in the practical and problem-based focus on autonomy-seeking (Chagas-Bastos, 2018; Tickner, 2003a; 2003b; 2008). The idea behind it is to describe how the countries in the region deal with structural difficulties and their reduced agency leeway.

Although the scholarship has never had a theoretical orientation, the common wisdom around international insertion has been applied to the Latin American approach to foreign policy analysis (FPA) and international political economy<sup>4</sup> (IPE) (Chagas-Bastos, 2015a; 2018). The FPA and IPE Latin American literature still bear the dependency-autonomy dichotomy that can be traced back to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For a review and a historical account of the concept of international insertion see Chagas-Bastos (2015; 2018) and Cervo (2008; 2013).
the Dependency Theory. In this context, Evans (2107) argues that an essential element of the Dependence Theory is the fact that it assumed a Southern perspective from its starting point, considering the North as a "particular problem" to the South, and addressing how the political and economic dynamics within the peripheral countries shape the character of the dependency and the possible responses to it. Even though these perspectives try to address how Latin American —and most generally Southern— countries could offset their structural limitations, a critical shortcoming is the fact that *dependentistas* consider agency and sovereignty as synonyms of autonomy. The prob-lem here is a primary —and almost exclusive— focus on the increase of margins of manoeuvre with-in the international system.

Chagas-Bastos (2017; 2018) proposes a formal conceptualisation to international insertion to overcome those shortcomings. To him, international insertion aims at the creation of spaces of agency that lead first to recognition by the architects and hierarchical gatekeepers. Once those who seek insertion are recognised and accepted by the hierarchy's management group, they are allowed to seek status. Therefore, the first stage is the international insertion that leads to recognition, and the second is the search for status. The movement to create agency spaces is driven by a combination of three sets of domestic policies towards abroad: foreign, economic and defence policies.

The different levels of international insertion and the forms of agency spaces will vary in function of how Southern countries will read the contextual and structural systemic elements. Furthermore, it should be assessed through four categories: ideas, interests, institutions and strategies. Three steps are necessary to evaluate a state's international insertion. Firstly, the hierarchical position should inform how the demands for recognition should be placed —the agency ideational consistency (see Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Secondly, the form of how inconsistencies between systemic and the perceived deserved recognition levels are framed and presented to the hierarchy should inform the influence of each policy component in the formulation of demands —the demand modelling and targeting. Finally, one should examine not only at states' material capacities —the structural determinants— but also the interaction between its national political context and the design of domestic policies towards abroad —the domestic agency creation determinants.

At the heart of the international insertion, conceptual introduction to the IR debate is the fact that there are no explicit heightened tensions from a strategic-military perspective when Southern countries move (or try to move) towards midtier positions within international hierarchies. Brazil and Mexico's 'emergence' is, in fact, an attempt to pursue international insertion via two different ways as we describe in the following sections (Chagas-Bastos, 2017; 2018).

## The Launch of Latin American Emerging Powers

Latin America has always been relatively marginal in the strategic, political and economic international scenarios. The region assumed a weak position in the international division of labour while specialising in the exports of natural resources and semi-manufactured goods. That is the framework for the development of institutions, delimitation of interests and formation of Latin American ideas about the world from the 1940s until the beginning of the 1980s —when the abrupt process of deregulation and economic liberalisation took place. So, what were the conditions that made the two biggest Latin American economies be labelled as 'emerging powers'?

The 2000s brought new hope to the region. The series of political and economic problems that plagued Latin America over the twentieth century seemed to be being left behind slowly. The endless uncertainty over democracy and economic crises gave way to periodic and free elections, economic stabilisation and expansion of economic growth —in doing so, there was even some space to a weak reformism to include in the social agenda a mild version of income redistribution (D'Araujo, 2008; Gasparini & Cruces, 2013).

In the regional level, two perspectives, complementary and sometimes contradictory, set the pace of regional governance. The first dealt with the ambition to recover the lost unity after the colonial wars for liberation, with the impetus to consolidate a South American community —being much more intellectual and present in political rhetoric than geographically suitable. The second referred to the development of integration processes based on modules (Gardini, 2015; Quiliconi & Salgado, 2017) and coalition-like behaviour (Chagas-Bastos, n. d.). Even though based on a consensual hegemony strategy, the fragmented notion of integration limits spaces of negotiation excludes bottom-levels of governance and opens space for constant dispute for affirmation (Chagas-Bastos, 2015b; n. d.).

The Brazilian case has a neat and crisp path. Brazil's leadership actively sought to reorient the country's traditional course of international insertion towards the South, using the region (South and Latin America) as a springboard to global ambitions from the 2000s onwards (Burges, 2009; Galvão, 2009). In the imaginary of the Brazilian government, the country was already a "potential great power" and should be recognised as such (Burges, 2013b).

Brazil's trend of more assertive 'presidential diplomacy' positioned the nation globally in an unprecedentedly positive light, as the country progressively diversified its economic trading partnerships while not necessarily replacing or threatening traditional commercial and diplomatic alliances (Burges & Chagas-Bastos, 2016; 2017; Danese 1999). This path consolidated Brazil's economic presence in new regions, such as Africa and the Middle East. It also strengthened strategic ties with emerging economies, like China and India, especially employing multilateral initiatives, such as the BRICS, IBSA, and the G20.

Conversely, Mexico is on a more complicated path. It has been historically trapped to its unique, complicated relationship with its Northern neighbour. The swings between more independence and embeddedness should be seen like a spiral path, in which Mexico tends more to deepen its ties with the U.S. —particularly since the 1980s (Garza Elizondo, Schiavon, & Velázquez Flores, 2014; Hakim, 2002; Lajous Vargas, 2012). Some of the economic transformations in the Mexican economy in the last twenty years proved to be significant —and very painful to those negatively affected in the countryside by the flood of cheaper goods derived from the association with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (see Arashiro, 2011).

Since the early 1980s, in the throes of its severe debt crisis, Mexico, along with Chile, was a precursor of a trend that would become pervasive in the region about a decade later. The manufactured output rose in very remarkable ways, as between 1982 and 2005 the participation of industrial goods in the figures of export revenues rose from 4,4% to 24,5% (including the maquiladoras) —a remarkable trend that puts Mexico in different route vis-à-vis the growth of primary exports of much of the rest of the region.

The Mexican strategy to curb its embedded dependency of the U.S. was a full alignment with the neoliberal tenets prescribed by the Washington Consensus —which implied the involvement of the neighbour in multiple sectors of the national economy, including banking and industrial activities (Calva, 2007; De La Mora, 2014; González, 2012; Huérfano, 2012). Instead of receiving the promised benefits of the integration —as happened with Canada—, Mexico had its options for autonomic diplomatic behaviour reduced to a much greater extent. The limited space to international insertion apart of the American aegis compelled Mexican leadership, namely Fox and Calderón, to pursue agency spaces to create any little room for manoeuvring possible to make the country a relevant actor in the region and the world.

As a result of the changes over the 1990s, at the beginning of the 2000s, Brazil and Mexico were acclaimed as 'emerging powers' in Latin America. Although with marked differences —as we shall detail later in the article—, both countries used multilateralism as their international insertion strategy, developing capacities they could not have alone or while in direct confrontation with great or traditional middle powers.

Moreover, the two largest economies in Latin America had no preference to engage with any particular region of the world —i.e. the levels of conventional and privileged relations with the central countries were kept active as new agreements with other peripheral nations were also established. The pathways assumed by them, however, present marked differences but share similar goals and constraints. Brazil and Mexico experienced during the 2000s high exposure due to the new economic and political dynamics experienced both internationally and domestically. Those contexts proved conducive to new patterns of efforts towards political, economic and military global hierar-chies.

Even though seen as emerging economies and even diplomatic forces, they have only mar-ginally reaped the gains of trying to act more assertively in the regional and global arenas. Both countries still are very discrete participants in the post-Cold War order. Ironically, much of the rising activism has derived from ad hoc needs and opportunities, rather than concerted planning and strategic forethought. How Brazil and Mexico attempted to reposition themselves within global hierar-chies is what we detail in the next two sections.

# Brazil and Mexico's Frustrated International Insertion at the Dawn of the 21st Century

Although Mexico and Brazil faced similar challenges and attempted to reposition themselves in the global hierarchies, they pursued different paths and shared structural and domestic constraints. The political and economic frustration of their expectations came with less favourable international scenario inaugurated with the 2007-9 crisis. On the economic side, the gradual but steady decline in China's rates of growth provoked a consistent and accentuated reduction in prices paid for Latin America's export commodities. Moreover, Europe's sustained economic challenges and the U.S. growing domestic focus pursued under the Obama administration coalesced into a more challenging global arena for the continuation of the type of ambitious presidential diplomacy that had proven to be so successful. On the political side, the international system became much less mal-leable and significantly more hostile to diplomatic innovations. By 2010 the global financial crisis finally (and sharply) hit Latin America, replacing the political capital gained by economic difficulties.

Furthermore, though facing internal problems towards acting in a univocal fashion, the G8 managed, over the last six years or so, to minimise the relevance of new multilateral arrangements —such as the G20—, in ways that curbed the latter ability to influence international affairs. This can be seen, for instance, in the stalemate found in the Doha round of the WTO when traditionally industrialised countries managed to push back against demands of late-comer countries such as Mexi-co and Brazil. Moreover, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and especially ISIS threat (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) turned the international agenda away from the emergent world (Spektor, 2014).

# The lifelong 'country of the future'

"Brazil is the country of the future... and always will be". Charles de Gaulle's riposte epitomises the extreme variations the country has faced over its history. This common joke between Brazilians and foreigners seemed at an end when Lula da Silva started to change his country's status in the international system —working obstinately to gather the benefits from the global transformations in the twenty-first century and turn Brazil into a new great power (with pacific and collabo-rative credentials).

The literature addressing Rousseff's international efforts during her first term in office (2011-2014) —foreign policy in special— usually compares her in harsh terms with Lula da Silva and Cardoso (Almeida, 2017; Cervo & Lessa, 2014; Cornelet, 2014; Lehmann, 2017; Saraiva, 2014). It is noteworthy that we are not interested in such comparisons<sup>5</sup>.

Elected as Lula's anointed technocrat capable of sustaining the gains (economic growth and expansion of social programs) of the 2000s, Dilma Rousseff came to power in 2011 in the guise of continuity. Rousseff's initial term in office was mainly defined by growing adverse economic and political factors. On the one hand, the 2007-8 global economic crisis finally took a toll on the Brazilian economy. Specifically, in mid-year 2012, the counter-cyclical measures<sup>6</sup> applied by Lula and then Rousseff's Economic Minister, Guido Mantega, no longer seemed able to prevent a national economic slowdown. On the other, Rousseff faced massive street protests in 2013 that weakened severely her domestic political capital and constrained even more her international actions (Singer, 2018).

Over her tenure and half, Dilma sought to maintain Lula's pragmatic economic motivations to support the global expansion of Brazilian companies. In a commodity boom scenario, Lula's presidential diplomacy was primarily guided by pragmatic economic motivations and an unprecedented level of assertiveness to support the global expansion of big Brazilian companies. The oil, minerals, food and food processing, and construction sectors gained a continued to receive particular attention and funding from Brazilian authorities. Indeed, according to Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES) loans to Brazilian firms operating abroad rose over 1,185% between 2001 and 2010 —or from \$72,89 to \$937,08 million (Colombini Neto, 2013; Gandra, 2012; Hochstetler, 2014).

With the slowdown of the international commodity markets, a steady decline

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> As much as possible we will avoid using the past presidents as a metric to the remarkably different scenarios faced by Rousseff. The same applies to Michel Temer, Dilma's successor, given the peculiar political conditions under he came to power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> They mostly consisted of tax exemptions to industrial plants with no offsetting measures, reduction of interest in public financial institutions, and an aggressive public works agenda.

of industrial activities added even more problems to Rousseff's tenure. It was a clear side-effect of the path taken in the early 2000s. Even though growth was achieved, and the Brazilian economy revamped its path of fast-paced economic modernisation, the export-oriented activities eroded the industrial ba-ses of the economy (Bastos & Hiratuka, 2017; Bresser-Pereira, 2016; Oreiro & Feijó, 2010). In concrete terms, the five most exported Brazilian commodities rose in the percentage of the total volume of trade from 28% to 47% between 2005 and 2011 (Cervo & Lessa, 2014). Much in the same way, given the sustained reduction in growth rates in the Chinese market and its associated stalled European recovery, the commodity-export driven path of growth seen in Brazil in the early 2000s was presumably expected to find its limits —which came to happen around 2015-16.

The abrupt halt in the international economy led to a challenging reduction in Brazil's export revenues and the well-being of the country's increasingly important export sector. Two factors that chiefly worked to project the Brazilian economy regionally and globally along the 2000s were not in play anymore. On the one hand, the already mentioned high prices for most Latin American export commodities oscillated sharply, putting pressure in a dangerous growing public deficit<sup>7</sup>. On the other, the financial liquidity provided by global interest rates that were sustained in remarkably low figures for much of the period started to disappear<sup>8</sup>. Both were associated with the country's economic presidential diplomacy under Lula and allowed Brazilian companies to expand their opera-tions not only in South America but also in Africa, China and even the United States (Brazilian dip-lomat A, 2016; Burges, 2017).

The corporatist fashion for globalizing Brazilian economy under Lula da Silva was not abandoned by Rousseff, who rather sought to adjust it to new external and internal constraints —and deepen its program in some points (Chagas-Bastos, 2015a). Although the national and international scenarios were not favourable, the Brazilian government opened generous credit lines and offered fiscal incentives to some industrial sectors starting in 2013. Even though, business groups, and particularly industrial elites, were much more reluctant to work with Rousseff than they did during Lula's term in office (Singer, 2012; 2018).

With both tenures plagued by domestic problems, Dilma preferred to take an inertial strate-gy, following with low intensity the path traced by Lula da Silva for foreign and defense policies (Chagas-Bastos, 2015a). Rousseff, however, never seemed inclined even to try to tackle some of those emerging challenges using

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> As for 2019, for instance, Brazilian federal deficit corresponds to BRL 139 billion (around \$35,29 billion).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The effect on Brazilian firms was critical. Some of the 'national champions' — in particular animal protein compa-nies— were allowed to borrow strong currencies abroad to extend their export-oriented activities at home, and the rapid devaluation of Brazilian Real combined with the increase of international interest rates drove some to bankruptcy.

the capital of presidential diplomacy —differently from her prede-cessors, who worked to open new venues for Brazil's insertion in the global context (Burges & Chagas-Bastos, 2017).

While no radical policy departure from Lula's diplomatic course<sup>9</sup> was taken, she nonetheless toned down the assertiveness, as well as the critical accomplishments of her patron's tenure. The outcome was somewhat reversed to a pre-Cardoso era of very selective presidential involvement in diplomatic initiatives. To illustrate, while Lula had spent 269 days in international voyages in his second administration (2007-2010), Rousseff spent about 144 days abroad in her first term in office. She was also more discriminating in the destinies of her trips, having mostly visited countries seen as useful (rather than potential) strategic partners, such as Mercosur, the United States and Eu-ropean nations (Brazilian diplomat B, 2016; Cornelet, 2014; Schreiber, 2015).

The military component of international insertion followed the same low profile that had by the end of Lula da Silva years. The two main initiatives in the area were processes initiated before Rousseff takes office. The nuclear submarine development agreed with France in 2009, as well as the contract with the Swedish Saab to co-produce the Gripen jets signed in 2013 moved along slowly. In the same vein, the nomination and renewal of General Santos Cruz's mandate in the Congo, in 2012 and 2014, respectively, can be seen as more for the prestige of the Brazilian Army than for national defence policy. Similarly, the extension of Brazilian involvement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) also followed an inertial path. The baseline idea was not changing what had been successful over the past ten years (Chagas-Bastos, 2015a).

By the end of her second term (2014-2016), Dilma have already significantly diminished focus on international affairs reverted the globally activist path her country sustained in the last two decades. Brazil's geopolitical relevance reduced quickly, particularly when domestic economic and political problems deepened, and the global scenario became more challenging for regional powers.

Moreover, she was not able to harness the broad political support as her predecessor. When by a presidential decree she reduced the public banks' interest rates, the private banking sector followed but kept the vendetta prepared. The revenge opportunity appeared when the economic condi-tions got severely adverse, and she lost the support of her governing coalition. These can be credit as the main reasons that led to Dilma's impeachment in 2016 (Singer, 2018; Svartman &

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Though Cardoso and Lula da Silva respective political parties have fiercely competed for the presidency of the country in every election over the last three decades years, the latter sustained and deepened Cardoso's initiated path of pro-moting the country's international interests. The strategy moved Brazil's diplomatic focus from Latin to South Ameri-ca and developed new ties with key actors outside the region (Fonseca, 2017; Burges, 2009; 2017; Galvão, 2009).

Silva, 2016). All the attempts to promote economic diversification proved mostly insufficient and ended up in an economic and fiscal crisis in early 2015. In the end, deindustrialisation, loss of competitiveness, and associated deterioration of labour conditions in the formal economy seem to be some of the most vivid and painful consequences of Rousseff years; and inaugurated Temer's tenure.

Michel Temer was elected twice in the same ticket as Dilma Rousseff as her vicepresident. When became clear that the president had lost her political support in Congress, by the end of 2015, Temer overtly started to work to oust Rousseff from Planalto Palace. With more than two decades as a Congressman, the vice-president represented the guarantee wanted to keep the political ma-chine running; Dilma was at that time considered *persona non grata* by the majority of Brazilian Congress.

During his short term in office (2016-2018), Temer set as his primary goal the economic recovery, based on two pillars: recovering the public accounts after the catastrophic management un-der the last Rousseff years and stimulating the business environment (Safatle, Borges, & Oliveira, 2016). Those were not trivial tasks for a country accumulating three years of deep recession: Brazil's GDP grew 0,5% in 2014, shrank -3,55% in 2015, and -3,46% in 2016 (World Bank, 2019). Furthermore, the political instability brought by the impeachment process, as well as by the continued corruption scandals —and their investigations— drained the energy and resources of any major in-ternational ambition Brazil could bear.

Spektor (2018) notes, however, that even with limited time, resources, and domestic and in-ternational manoeuvrability, Temer could perform timidly, but well —given the presented condi-tions. The first measure was suspending Venezuela from Mercosur; without surrendering to the growing radicalisation of the South American right. Temer maintained his ambassador in Caracas, and when he was proposed to send Nicolas Maduro to the International Criminal Court, he declined the idea.

On the multilateral front, Mercosur received a push towards the free market with negotiated free trade agreements with Canada, Colombia, the Pacific Alliance and the European Union. Moreover, Brazil ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, applied for membership in the OECD, and signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Particular attention should be given to the efforts on the first public security coordination strategy in the Southern Cone, as a recogni-tion of one the greatest transnational threats in the region. Spektor (2018) observes that the president understood that Brazil gains strength when it uses the mechanisms of global governance for its own benefit —even though this represents very little if compared to the expectations raised during Cardoso or Lula da Silva's years.

Lula was favoured mainly by an external scenario of high commodities prices even if it has contributed to the deindustrialisation process in Brazil. When the international economic and financial crisis late reached Brazil and other emerging markets, domestic political instability aggravated the scenario. Besides Rousseff and Temer do not have the same negotiating skills as Lula, both had fewer resources and less interest in using foreign policy as an active pillar of Brazilian emergency. It brought a retraction to Brazil's regional and global protagonism.

## Mexico's fate: geographic or political determinism?

Porfirio Díaz's oft-quoted "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States" conveys the tone of Mexican international insertion. The country's destiny was paved under De La Madrid in the mid-1980s and then extended in the early 1990s by Salinas de Gortari. When joined NAFTA, Mexico only deepened the historical embedded dependent ties with the United States.

The country has the historic challenge of managing the weight and the influence of the U.S. in its international insertion. Vázquez and Meyer (2001) note that the country coexists with the di-lemma of developing a strong economy alongside its powerful neighbour and, at the same time, preserving its identity, national interests, and international ambitions. The shared border and economic dependence make Washington a permanent axis of Mexican foreign policy. The main domestic policy issues are related to bilateral relations —security and trade—, which forces Mexico to be in per-manent negotiation in search of concessions and agreements.

To Mexican leaders, the opening of domestic markets and closer economic integration with the U.S. market would not only help to address the severe financial and productive hurdles the country faced over the 1980s and 1990s but also would potentially maximise opportunities by attracting capital investments and technological innovation (Calva, 2007). Though some of these ex-pectations turned indeed to be accurate, this trend also proved in many ways to be very troublesome for Latin America's second-largest economy.

Expectations with trade and financial liberalisation were ambitious. When NAF-TA was under negotiations, Mexican leadership hoped that manufactured exports and the reception of foreign direct investment would sustain Mexico's economic growth (Armella, 1993). Over the 2010s, how-ever, the country's GDP grew by an average of 2,1% per annum, below the BRICS, and other emerging countries (World Bank, 2019).

By the beginning of the 2000s, the National Action Party (PAN) removed the seventy-year long-running Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) from power. PAN's Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) sought to

open some space for changes in the little margin of manoeuvre bore by Mexicans. They did sustain the liberal-conservative political and economic model set by PRI's predecessors but tried to diversify economic partners within and outside the Western hemisphere —with uneven rates of success (Flores & Domínguez, 2013; Garza Elizondo et al., 2014).

Vicente Fox promised to change Mexico's international insertion strategy, but in practice, his government deepened Mexico's dependence on the U.S. His main goal was to negotiate a migration agreement —which did not progress after the 9/11. Some other new issues, however, entered the foreign policy agenda during the first PAN years, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights —continuing the efforts initiated during Ernesto Zedillo's (1994-2000) tenure. This process opened up conflicts with some Latin American countries, when the Mexican government criticised the domestic situation in Cuba and Venezuela, for instance.

Calderón sought to expand Mexico's tight margins of manoeuvre without jeopardising the country's association with the United States. Bastidas (2012), Garza Elizondo et al. (2014), and Covarrubias (2014) point out that Mexico's international insertion low profile under Calderón is due to three factors. First, a more assertive and efficient repositioning of Mexico's international presence employing a concerted economic, diplomatic effort was halted by the low legitimacy of Calderón's winning ticket in the presidential election of 2006. The political polarisation generated after 2006 blocked any presidential initiative. Second, the climate of violence that resulted from the war on the organised crime. Finally, the international economic crisis in 2007-9 —and particularly relevant in the Mexican case, the U.S. economic downturn. We can also add the exhaustion of the benefits of NAFTA —which has been a long-term agenda-setting theme Mexican international insertion.

During the 2007-9 crisis and its aftershocks, the Mexican economy contracted 7% between 2008 and 2012 —remarkably a rate that was even worse than the recession the country had wit-nessed in the mid-1990s. Also, though China has become a vital trading associate to Mexico, the country's economy has seen a drastic slowdown. This seems directly tied to the fact that Mexico, along with much of Central America, is still very dependent on the U.S. economy. While the United States grew on average 0.8% between 2007 and 2012, Mexico's rate of growth averaged at around about 1,9% in the same period (World Bank, 2019).

With a poor economic performance, the cornerstone of the country's international insertion strategy became to be the Merida Initiative. Calderón merged foreign and military policies and rebuilding domestic public safety policy along with hemispheric concerns. That was not a fortuitous choice. Chabat (2014a, 2014b) notes that the efforts towards a more multidimensional —i.e. not strictly economic— overture to the United States were mainly based on Calderón's internal security agenda.

In the Mexico-U.S. relations, the drug trafficking has been a crucial component of the so-called 'war on drugs' —started in the mid-1970s—, and since 9/11 has been paired up with the Bush's global 'war on terror'. Calderón used this crucial long-standing element of the bilateral rela-tions to support his militarised decision to go after the powerful drug cartels. The baseline idea was to leverage Mexican domestic security policy-making using the significant funds that would come from the U.S. foreign aid. In doing so, Mexico received from Washington \$1,4 billion in economic assistance, intelligence coordination, policing and investigation technological improvements, and personnel training in various levels of the Mexican security apparatus (Arteaga, 2009; Lucatello, 2009; Olson & Wilson, 2010; Velázquez Flores & Lallande, 2009; Villa et al., 2015).

After the failure to negotiate a migration policy agreement with the United States, Mexico's increased its efforts to shift the domestic combat to drug trafficking to the regional level. The Meri-da Initiative represented the recognition by the United States that the Mexican government could not guarantee public order within its borders, and that such instability could spill-over and compromise American national security. The Initiative repositioned the United States' anti-drugs policy towards Latin America —which since the mid-1990s had been focused on Colombia. The strategy prioritised Mexico's growing drug violence and the associated social turmoil, as a focal point for the potential growth of foreign or home-grown terrorist cells in the US. In the eyes of Washington deci-sion-makers, to conflate drug-traffickers into terrorists was central to the country's efforts to legitimise its actions in combating both the drug trade and the, perceived as growing, terrorist threat in Latin America —and particularly in Mexico (Villa, Rodrigues, & Chagas-Bastos, 2015).

In this regard, Calderón's tenure was particularly violent, with human cost related to the drug trade reaching unprecedented levels, and the rates of poverty scaling back to figures not seen in many decades (Bastidas, 2012). The national politics leeway for the president was minimal since the very beginning, and as we mentioned before, the solution was to marry Mexican public security with the United States' war on terror.

In the end, the program was not able to curb cross-border drug trade or the smuggling of il-legal weapons. On the contrary, it has been seen as responsible for having increased the levels of violence both internally in Mexico, as well as in multiple border areas across the more than 5,000 miles separating the two

countries<sup>10</sup>. Much of the escalation in Mexico's domestic violence levels derived from Calderón's decision to involve the Mexican Armed Forces in the so-called internal 'war on drugs' (Lucatello, 2009). Although the program faced criticism pointing out that Mexico had increased its dependence on the U.S., it became more explicit that security was a co-responsibility problem of the two countries (Santa Cruz, 2014).

The alternative ways found to strengthen the nation's place within global hierarchies pointed towards China and the recovery of relations with Latin America. By this time, Mexico set the motto of 'being a bridge between the North and the South' to diversify its diplomatic network (Mexican diplomat A, 2015)<sup>11</sup>. The strategy foresaw the concentration of efforts to expand multilateral —but mostly non-economic related— issues.

Following the 'bridging' strategy, Mexico was the host of the Sixteenth session of the Con-ference of the Parties (COP 16), in 2010. The international conference was attended by over 2,500 people: 1,563 official delegates, 443 registered media and over 500 visitors. Differently from COP15 in Copenhagen, however, there was no expectations about a binding deal at Cancún that would commit countries to cut the carbon emissions. Mexico used the COP16 more to set a foot-hold back on multilateral negotiations than tried to help to disentangle global negotiations regarding climate change. In the same context, Calderón was an eloquent and enthusiastic host to the G20 Los Cabos Summit, in June 2012. At that time, the president defended global trade, open markets, and reductions in global protectionism as the best way to promote development and the reduction of national and international levels of poverty.

The rise of centre-left governments in Latin America cornered Mexico and its liberal orientation. From 2006 onwards, the country was compelled to participate in economic and political coop-eration processes with partners in the region —but with no changes on its international insertion strategy and economic development. In this context, Felipe Calderón tried to reorient his approach in his last year in office, attempting to revive a closer relationship with Latin America.

<sup>11</sup> This resembles Brazil's idea of being a 'bridge between old and new powers' (see Burges 2013a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Some of the bilateral economic linkages between the two countries are not always directly dependent on governmental actions. The massive remittances sent home from Mexican nationals living legally or illegally in the U.S. are an addi-tional complex element of the cross-border interactions taking place.

Former Mexico's Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda (2012a) estimates that about a third of Mexican families have currently a family member living in the U.S. from where they remit funds back to Mexican on a regular basis. Accord-ing to the Migration Policy Institute (2016), "[i]n 2014, more than 11,7 million Mexican immigrants resided in the Unit-ed States, accounting for 28 per cent of the 42,4 million foreign-born population —by far the largest immigrant origin group in the country".

González-González and Velázquez Flores (2014) suggests that the country's economic and associated diplomatic weakening undermined such approximation and ended up deteriorating its relations with the rest of Latin America due to its debilitated capabilities to influence international negotiations.

Mexico's relations with Latin America under Calderón were concentrated on the Communi-ty of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Pacific Alliance (PA). CELAC aimed at to be the primary mechanism for concertation between the thirty-three Latin America and the Caribbean states, as well as serving as a bridge between the region and China, Russia and the Euro-pean Union. The Pacific Alliance, by its turn, aimed at facilitating trade and investment between Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru —and has now expanded to other areas such as investments. Although participation in these initiatives was an attempt by the Mexican government to strengthen ties with Latin America, its results were limited. Mexico's primary attention to foreign policy issues —such as migration, security, and trade— continued to be bilaterally discussed with the U.S. The initiatives represented much more a reaction of the Mexican government to the domestic and international conjuncture, than a reformulation of the international insertion strategy. Cooperation with the United States has increased, notably with the Merida Initiative.

At the end of the day, Calderón's ambitions for his country's international insertion achieved little success, enlarging the leeway for Mexico only timidly. Rather than being able to move Mexico's strategic partnerships away from the United States, he managed to entangle even more his country with its Northern neighbour; in addition to the economic realm, Mexico became associated dependent to the U.S. in security matters (Chagas-Bastos, 2015a).

Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), maintained Calderón's initiatives, but with less enthusi-asm. The president did not participate in the 2015 and 2017 CELAC Summits, due to domestic agenda matters. Especially in the latter, Mexico lost the opportunity to obtain support against the threats perpetrated by Donald Trump —another indication of a lack of regional and global protago-nism (Franzoni, 2018).

Peña Nieto, however, reoriented the economic dimension of Mexico's international insertion (Ulloa, 2014). The ambitious Pact for Mexico, launched in December 2012, sought to create a 'new' Mexico through structural reforms in as diverse fields as education, telecommunications, labour, finance, judiciary, energy, among other constitutional measures. The Pact aimed at increasing na-tional productivity, strengthening and expanding the rights of Mexicans, and safeguarding democ-racy (Mexico, 2014). The outcome, in the end, was just the opening of several industrial sectors to foreign capital —which put the foreign policy to attract investment to the country. The frustration of such plan came with the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and when the Pact showed to have a flimsy basis —which inevitably raised questions about the Mexican real emerging potential (Franzoni, 2018).

Expectations were high. The official plan for the energy reform projected a 1% GDP in-crease for 2018 and approximately 2% by 2025, and the generation of millions of jobs (Mexico, 2014). According to data from the OECD (2017), Mexico's average economic growth under Enrique Peña Nieto was 2,1% per year, which shows how stagnated Mexican economy was.

Although the six-year period began with high expectations on the part of the Mexican gov-ernment, the structural and contextual problems redefined the course adopted. The case of the for-ty-three students who disappeared in Guerrero and the deaths of journalists, widely publicised by the international media, exposed the current human rights situation in the country and that the prob-lem of violence was far from being solved. Moreover, the election of Donald Trump did not make any simpler to Peña Nieto. Trump's threats to build a border wall and to be though while renegotiating NAFTA led the Mexican government to react to economic and political uncertainty towards its principal commercial partner. The Mexican Peso went through much instability, as international businesspeople feared for the effects of the protectionist economic policies adopted by the United States to the Mexican economy (Franzoni, 2018).

Economic stagnation combined with allegations of corruption and increased violence in Mexico led to the victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in 2018. Although the presi-dent himself argued that the 4th Revolution of Mexico is in course, the space for adopting more autonomist policies is small. The structural condition of dependence on the U.S. explains AMLO's participation in negotiations for the modernisation of NAFTA and the low mentions to Latin America in official speeches. The new president signals that he will use economic and social ties with the United States to implement his domestic agenda —therefore, with no reformulations in Mexico's economic development or international insertion strategies.

The common character in both, Brazilian and Mexican cases, is the intriguing fact that even dissatisfied with their positions within global hierarchies, there was no attempt posed any threat to regional, and more broadly, the international order. The regional power void, however, is to be stud-ied.

## **Final Remarks**

We argued in this paper that Brazil and Mexico are still very discrete participants in the post-Cold War order, even after the high and continued exposure they have experienced during the first decade and half of the 2000s. Although frequently seen as emerging economies and even multilat-eral diplomatic forces, both countries have only marginally reaped the gains of trying to act more assertively in the regional and global arenas.

Ironically, much of this rising international recognition has derived from ad hoc needs and opportunities rather than combined strategic planning in either case. Whichever levels of temporary success have mostly resulted from sporadic, though at times innovative manoeuvrings, particularly in the case of Brazil, within transitory more favourable scenarios.

Consistent with the factual reality of the 2010s, it is hard to foresee any long-term conse-quence of Brazilian and Mexican international insertion manoeuvres. We highlighted, nonetheless, some of the most innovative features of the courses of action chose by each country. The search for reorganising global spheres of power by taking more attentively into account the potential and de-sires of emerging nations is one of their most transformative components —at least since the 1970s.

It is reasonable therefore to assume that despite the early successes and innovative tone Bra-zil and Mexico's international insertion strategies assumed in the 21st century a more pragmatic orientation. More self-centred goals have primarily guided them, even if at times operating utilising regional, global, or theme-based group diplomacy. The state-supported pattern of international inser-tion pursued under Lula has come to an abrupt halt with Rousseff and Temer. The commonly called *country of the future* seemed indeed at the end of a cycle of economic and political exuberance. In the same vein, the liberal path deepened by Calderón has moved slightly Mexico away from the United States; whereas Peña Nieto only inertially moved Mexican international insertion ahead —in any case, the country is still distanced from God and closer from the Northern neighbour.

Mexico was not benefited from the increase in commodities prices since its exports contain a high index of manufactured goods. While Brazil has sought to establish itself as emerging from a leading position in South America, Mexico's dependence on the United States dictates its regional assertiveness. Despite the differences in the international insertion strategies outlined above, we tried to show that both countries still struggle mainly with domestic constraints to broaden their global power.

#### Bio

#### Fabricio H. Chagas-Bastos

Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne's School of Psychological Sciences. His research specialises in the intersection of International Relations and Social Psychology, taking an interdisciplinary approach with the broad aim to study the political, economic and developmental challenges faced by the Global South. His articles have appeared in Policy Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, Journal of Political Science Education, International Studies and Journal of Peacebuilding and Development.

#### Marcela Franzoni

PhD candidate at the São Paulo State University (UNESP)'s Institute for Research on Public Policy and International Relations. Her PhD research is fully funded by the FAPESP Graduate Scholarship Programme. She specialises in Mexican foreign policy and Mexico-U.S. relations. Her research has appeared in Conjuntura Internacional, Contextualizaciones Latinoamericanas, and the Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe.

#### References

- Alden, C., Morphet, S., & Vieira, M. A. (2010). The South in World Politics. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Almeida, P. R. (2017). Quinze anos de política externa: ensaios sobre a diplomacia brasileira, 2002-2017. Brasília: Edição do Autor.
- Arashiro, Z. (2011). Negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Armella, P. A. (1993). El camino mexicano de la transformación económica. México, DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Arteaga, N. (2009). The Merida Initiative: Security-Surveillance Harmonization in Latin America. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, (87), 103-110.
- Bastidas, S. (2012). México: el sexenio solitario de Felipe Calderón. Política Exterior, (148), 94-101.
- Bastos, P. P., & Hiratuka, C. (2017). A política econômica externa do governo Dilma Rousseff: co-mércio, cooperação e dependência. Texto para Discussão, (306). Campinas: Universidade de Cam-pinas.
- Brazilian diplomat A. (2016). Interview in 22 June.
- Brazilian diplomat B. (2016). Interview in 23 June.
- Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2016). Reflexões sobre o Novo Desenvolvimentismo e o Desenvolvimentis-mo Clássico. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 36(2), 237-265.
- Burges, S. (2009). Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War. Gainnesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

- Burges, S. (2013a). Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers? International Affairs, 89(3), 577-594.
- Burges, S. (2013b). Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power. Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, 19(2), 286-302.
- Burges, S. (2017). Brazil in the World. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Burges, S., & Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2016). Latin American Diplomacy. In P. Kerr, C. Constan-tinou, & P. Sharp (Eds.). The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy (pp. 372-384). London: Sage Publish-ing.
- Burges, S., & Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2017). The Importance of Presidential Leadership for Brazilian Foreign Policy. Policy Studies, 38(3), 277-290.
- Calva, J. L. (Coord.). (2007). México en el mundo: inserción eficiente. Agenda para el Desarrollo. v. 03. México, DF: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Castañeda, J. (2012). Mañana Forever? Mexico and the Mexicans. New York: Vintage Books.
- Cervo, A. (2008). Inserção Internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros. São Paulo: Saraiva.
- Cervo, A. (2013). Relações internacionais da América Latina: de 1930 a nossos dias. 3.ed. São Pau-lo: Saraiva.
- Cervo, A., & Lessa, A. C. (2014). O declínio: inserção internacional do Brasil (2011-2014). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 57(2), 133-151.
- Chabat, J. (2014a). La política exterior de México: De Calderón a Peña Nieto. In A. Bonilla, & G. Jaramillo (Eds.). La CELAC en el escenario contemporáneo de América Latina y del Caribe (pp. 27-44). Costa Rica: FLACSO.
- Chabat, J. (2014b). La seguridad en la política exterior de Calderón. In H. Garza Elizondo, J. A. Schiavon, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exterior de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/El Colegio de México.
- Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2015a). Modelos de Inserção Internacional na América Latina do início do século XXI (1990-2014): Uma análise comparativa de Brasil e México (Doctoral Thesis). São Paulo: University of São Paulo.
- Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2015b). Notas conceituais sobre o regionalismo latinoamericano rumo à se-gunda década do século XXI. Conjuntura Internacional, 12(2), 134-140.
- Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2017). Recognition and Status in World Politics: A Southern Perspective. University of Copenhagen. Department of Political Science — Max Weber Seminar Series. Copen-hagen, November 17.

- Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2018). La invención de la inserción internacional: fundaciones intelectuales y evolución histórica del concepto. Análisis Político, 31(94), 10-30.
- Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (n. d.). What makes integration hang together? Consensual Hegemony, Modu-larity and Power Coalitions in South America. (Mimeo).
- Colombini Neto, I. (2013). A atuação internacional do BNDES como parte do modelo Novo Desenvolvimentista. IBASE: Seminário Investimentos do BNDES na América Latina, 6-8 March. Rio de Janeiro: IBASE.
- Cornelet, J. M. (2014). A política externa de Dilma Rousseff: contenção na continuidade. Conjuntu-ra Austral, 5(24), 111-150.
- Covarrubias, A. (2014). La política exterior de Calderón: objetivos y acciones. In H. Garza Eli-zondo, J. A. Schiavon, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exterior de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/ El Colegio de México.
- Covarrubias, A. (2015). Containing Brazil: Mexico's Response to the Rise of Brazil. Bulletin of Lat-in American Research, 35(1), 49-63.
- D'Araujo, M. C. (2008). Densidade democrática e instabilidade na redemocratização latino-americana. In C. Fico (Coord.). Ditadura e democracia na América Latina. Rio de Janeiro: FGV.
- Danese, S. (1999). Diplomacia presidencial: história e crítica. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.
- De La Mora, L. M. (2014). La política comercial de México durante el gobierno del presidente Fe-lipe Calderón (2006-2012). In H. Garza Elizondo, J. A. Schiavon, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exterior de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/El Colegio de México.
- Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. (1998). What is Agency? The American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), 962-1023.
- Evans, P. (2017). The Relevance of Dependent Development Then and Now. In I. Kvangraven, M. Styve, U. Kufakurinani, & F. Santanta (Eds.). Dialogues on Development. Volume 1: Dependency (pp. 27-33). London: Institute for New Economic Thinking.
- Flores, R., & Domínguez, R. (2013). Balance de la política exterior de México en el sexenio de Fe-lipe Calderón bajo los tres niveles de análisis: límites y alcances. Foro Internacional, 53(3-4), 483-516.
- Fonseca, C. (2017). O Brasil de Lula: A permanente procura de um lugar no sistema internacional. Relações Internacionais, (55), 51-70.
- Franzoni, M. (2017). La política exterior de México en el gobierno de Peña Nieto: retos locales e internacionales. Contextualizaciones Latinoamericanas, (17), 1-9.

- Franzoni, M. (2018). A política externa do México no início do século XXI: os constrangimentos na busca por autonomia (Master's dissertation). São Paulo: San Tiago Dantas Joint Graduate Program.
- Galvão, T. (2009). América do Sul: construção pela reinvenção (2000-2008). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 52(2), 63-80.
- Gandra, A. (2012). Financiamentos do BNDES para projetos de infraestrutura no exterior foram destaque em 2012. Agência Brasil [online]. 30 December. http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/2012-12-30/financiamentosdo-bndes-para-projetos-de-infraestrutura-no-exterior-foram-destaqueem-2012
- Gardini, G. L. (2015). Towards modular regionalism: the proliferation of Latin American coopera-tion. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 58(1), 210-229.
- Gardini, G. L. (2016). Brazil: What Rise of What Power? Bulletin of Latin American Research, 35(1), 5-19.
- Garza Elizondo, H., Schiavon, J. A., & Velázquez Flores, R. (Eds.). (2014). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exterior de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/El Colegio de México.
- Gasparini, L., & Cruces, G. (2013). Poverty and inequality in Latin America: a story of two dec-ades. Journal of International Affairs, 66(2), 51-63.
- González-González, G., and Velázquez Flores, R. (2014). La política exterior de México hacia Amé-rica Latina en el sexenio de Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). In H. Garza Elizondo, J. A. Schiavon, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exterior de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/ El Colegio de México.
- González, F. (2012). Creative destruction? Economic crises and development in Latin America. Bal-timore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Gruss, B. (2014). After the Boom–Commodity Prices and Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. IMF Working Paper, WP/14/154.
- Hakim, P. (2002). Two Ways to Go Global. Foreign Affairs, 81(1), 148-162.
- Hochstetler, K. (2014). The Brazilian National Development Bank goes International: Innovations and Limitations of BNDES' Internationalization. Global Policy, 5(3), 360-365.
- Huérfano, E. (2012). El crecimiento económico con Felipe Calderón fue magro: ITESM. El Econo-mista [online]. 24 September. https://www.eleconomista. com.mx/economia/El-crecimiento-economico-con-Felipe-Calderon-fuemagro-ITESM-20120924-0052.html
- Jordaan, E. (2017). The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye? South African Jour-nal of International Affairs, 24(3), 395-412.

- Lajous Vargas, R. (2012). História mínima de las relaciones exteriores de México. México, DF: El Colégio de México.
- Lehmann, K. (2017). Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian Foreign Policy and What it Means for the Region. Rising Powers Quarterly, 2(2), 125-147.
- Long, T. (2017). It's not the size, it's the relationship: from 'small states' to asymmetry. Internation-al Politics, 54(2), 144-160.
- Lucatello, S. (2009). Cooperación mexicana bilateral frente a la cooperación multilateral en materia de seguridad: los retos de México en la Iniciativa Mérida. In R. Velázquez Flores & J. P. Lallande (Coords.). La Iniciativa Mérida: Nuevo paradigma de cooperación entre México y Estados Unidos en seguridad? México, DF: UNAM/Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.
- Malamud, A. (2017). Foreign Policy Retreat: Domestic and Systemic Causes of Brazil's Interna-tional Rollback. Rising Powers Quarterly, 2(2), 149-168.
- Mexican diplomat A. (2015). Interview in 22 October.
- Mexican diplomat B. (2016). Interview in 29 June.
- Mexico; Presidencia de la República. (2014). Reforma Energética. Reformas en Acción [online]. http://reformas.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Explicacion\_ampliada\_de\_la\_Reforma\_Energetica1.pdf
- Migration Policy Institute. (2016). Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Migration Information Source [online]. 17 March. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states
- Olson, E., & Wilson, C. (2010). Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security Cooperation. Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation. Washington, DC: Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center : Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego.
- Oreiro, J. L., & Feijó, C. (2010). Desindustrialização: conceituação, causas, efeitos e o caso brasilei-ro. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 30(2), 219-232.
- Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). (2017). Real GDP forecast [online]. https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp- forecast. htm
- Pellicer, O. (2014). México como potencia media en la política multilateral, 2006-2012. In H. Garza Elizondo, J. A. Schiavon, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exteri-or de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/El Colegio de México.
- Quiliconi, C., & Salgado, S. (2017). Latin American Integration: Regionalism à la Carte in a Multi-polar World? Colombia Internacional, (92), 15-41.
- Ramírez Meda, K., & Rochin Aguilar, N. (2017). La política exterior de México

durante el sexenio de Enrique Peña Nieto. Comillas Journal of International Relations, (8), 51-66.

- Safatle, C., Borges, J., & Oliveira, R. (2016). Anatomia de um desastre: Os bastidores da crise econômica que mergulhou o país na pior recessão de sua história. São Paulo: Portfolio Penguin.
- Santa Cruz, A. (2014). La política exterior de Felipe Calderón hacia América del Norte: crisis inter-na y redefinición de fronteras. In H. Garza Elizondo, J. A. Schiavon, & R. Velázquez Flores (Eds.). Balance y Perspectiva de la política exterior de México 2006-2012. México, DF: CIDE/El Colegio de México.
- Saraiva, M. (2014). Balanço da política externa de Dilma Rousseff: perspectivas futuras? Relações Internacionais, (44), 25-35.
- Schreiber, M. (2015). Dilma viaja menos da metade que Lula ao exterior. BBC Brasil [online], 21 January. http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2015/01/150113\_dilma\_viagens\_internacionais\_ms\_lgb
- Singer, A. (2012). Os sentidos do lulismo. Reforma gradual e pacto conservador. São Paulo: Com-panhia das Letras.
- Singer, A. (2018). O lulismo em crise: o quebra-cabeça do período Dilma (2011-2016). São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- Spektor, M. (2014). Política externa da polarização. Folha de São Paulo [online], 15 October. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/ matiasspektor/2014/10/1532688-politica-externa-da- polariza-cao.shtml
- Spektor, M. (2014). Política externa da polarização. Folha de São Paulo [online], 15 October. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/ matiasspektor/2014/10/1532688-politica-externa-da- polariza-cao.shtml
- Spektor, M. (2018). Legado de Temer em política externa é melhor que o esperado. Folha de São Paulo [online], 13 December. https://www1.folha.uol.com. br/colunas/matiasspektor/2018/12/legado-de-temer-em-politica-externa-emelhor-que-o-esperado.shtml
- Svartman, E., & Silva, A. L. (2016). Castigo Sem Crime? Raízes domésticas e implicações internac-ionais da crise brasileira. Conjuntura Austral, 7(35), 4-14.
- Temer, M. (2018). O Brasil no mundo: escritos de diplomacia presidencial (2016-2018). Brasília, DF: FUNAG.
- Tickner, A. (2003a). Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies. Internation-al Studies Perspectives, 4(4), 325-350
- Tickner, A. (2003b). Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 32(2), 295-324.
- Tickner, A. (2008). Latin American IR and the Primacy of lo práctico. International Studies Review, 10(4), 735-748.

- Ulloa, J. (2014). Enrique Peña Nieto y el primer año de gobierno: nueva visión para la política exte-rior. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de la UNAM, (119), 117-143.
- Vaz, A. (2018). Restraint and Regional Leadership after the PT Era: An Empirical and Conceptual Assessment. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(1), 25-43.
- Vázquez, J. Z., & Meyer, L. (2001). México frente a Estados Unidos: Un ensayo histórico, 1776-2000. México, DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Velázquez Flores, R., & Lallande, J. P. (Coords.). (2009). La Iniciativa Mérida: Nuevo paradigma de cooperación entre México y Estados Unidos en seguridad? México, DF: UNAM/Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.
- Villa, R., Rodrigues, T., & Chagas-Bastos, F. H. (2015). South America in the Post-Cold War Era: War on Drugs and the Reshaping of the US Security Agenda. Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval, 21(1), 33-62.
- World Bank. (2019). World Development Indicators. [online]. https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators

#### Book Review

# A Relational Theory of World Politics

Yaqing Qin, CUP, April 2018 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, April 2018), 412p., Online ISBN: 9781316869505, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316869505

# Özge Taylan

Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey otaylan@ybu.edu.tr

Ku-Hung-Ming, in his cult book *The Spirit of the Chinese People*, stated that when Chinese children start school, the first sentence of the first book they are given begins "the nature of man is good". This belief in the innate goodness of man is the complete opposite of Western belief, and therefore mainstream International Relations theory.

Indeed, if one were to take an introduction to International Relations (IR), one of the first discussions encountered would be whether the essence of the human being is good or not—in general, the discussion's conclusion will be 'bad', or will have failed to reach an absolute decision; never, however will it conclude with 'good'. In his *Religion of Good Citizenship*, Hung-Ming states that there existed a war for Chinese civilization too, but for Chinese, being on the alert or being on a knife-edge with the expectation of war is extreme. Inasmuch as, the spirituality and spiritual values such as justice, politeness and peace underlie quintessentially the Chinese civilization.

This vision and spirit, described a hundred years ago, stand out against mainstream IR discourse. As Qin strikingly claims, there is no non-Western IR theory (p.24), and no non-Western scholar should use their own culture and cultural resources for social theory construction. Thus, knowledge production will be diversified and different theories will emerge from different cultures.

In *A Relational Theory of World Politics*, Qin examines the question of how we understand the world. The concept of relationality is the focal point of the book, which consists of three sections. The first establishes the theoretical background, culture and social theory; the second section mainly concentrates on the relation and relationality, and the third part provides a reconceptualization of the power, cooperation and governance.

Throughout the book, Qin constantly makes references to mainstream American theories such as structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism and structural constructivism, and compares them to relational theory. His approach is to combine mainstream IR discourse and traditional Chinese dialectics. Because he believes that by cultivating the metaphysical components of the theoretical hard core, different social theories stemmed from different cultures are not mutually exclusive—on the contrary, they nourish each other, and thus lead to the diversification of the IR theory. He proposes "a relational theory of World politics" that centres on the relationality concept. By taking Chinese understanding as a reference point, Qin proposes relational theory, placing relationality, which is inherent to Confucian cultural communities, in the centre of IR world. The relational theory makes three main assumptions: interrelatedness, identities of social relations, and process. Interrelatedness refers to the world as being composed of continuous events and ongoing relations. Social relations shape the identities and roles of social actors. Process is also a key concept in relational theory that is about 'becoming'-for instance globalization, global governance, cooperation, conflict etc. All of these are processes. Harmony is a state of nature, Qin argues, which leads the writer to reach Chinese dialectics.

The second part of the book focuses on this area: *zhongyong* (the center of harmony/doctrine of the mean); and the *yin yang* diagram in which *yin* and *yang* coexist together, affecting and transforming each other. So, he argues, there are polar forces, but the relationship between them is based on complementary interaction and inclusive harmony. Unlike Hegelian dialectics, in the Chinese school, there is no thesis-antithesis, but rather co-theses.

In this world of relations, nothing is found in isolation. Neither can humans, as key relators, exist in isolation. This is what the author calls co-identity—there is no absolute or independent identity in a relational environment, because social actors act in a relational context. Considering the definition of relational theory, since social relations shape identities and roles of social actors, this, then, is an outgrowth.

In social relations, networking, doing/taking action, and relating to one another are very important. Rather than denying the rational individual, instead, Qin, as he so often does when outlining his argument, argues that social actors are rational because they are relational in the first place (p.xvii). Based on the 'human' experience, the author then explains the friendship, cooperation and conflict among the states. All in all, the author does not refute Western-centric understanding; rather he stresses complementarity, reminding us of Pierre Bourdieu's inter-paradigmatic complementarity.

Chapter Seven is particularly significant to consider, because here the writer talks

about the logic of relationality and logic of practicality. Relationality comes from practice, a critical point in distinguishing Confucianism and the individualistic Western world. In recent years, if one follows discussions about the theory of IR, one will have come across issues such as practice versus relational theory, and the role of theory in international practice theory. This section provides an excellent insight into how Chinese practices stabilise—or destabilise—the world.

The main weakness of Qin's book is its repetition, and long explanations of the assumptions within mainstream IR theory. Furthermore, as a reader, one might expect more by way of an exploration and scrutiny of the Chinese cultural and philosophical traditions for developing IR theory. The author highlights the differences and different cultures; however, other cultures dominated by Confucianism could be explored more. There are some references to other cultures, like the Japanese Tokugawa system, but this is definitely insufficient.

Overall, this book makes a considerable contribution to the global IR literature, which is still considered immature, and will be well received by its intended audience: academics and IR students with a background knowledge of IR theory. The book also provides a reference for those who wish to understand China's role in IR theory.

#### Bio

Özge Taylan graduated from Gazi University, Department of International Relations. She earned her LL.M. at International Law: Rights and Responsibilities degree from University of Sussex, UK. Currently, Taylan is a Ph.D. candidate in Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University and faculty member at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. Before joining Yildirim Beyazit University, she worked at Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy. She also served as a Visiting Scholar at Yonsei University/South Korea in 2017. Her research interests include International Political Economy, development studies, and East Asian studies.

#### Book Review

# Japan as an 'Aid Receiver' from the United States and World Bank and an 'Aid Provider' to the Emerging Donors in Asia

Jin Sato and Yasutami Shimomura (eds), The Rise of Asian Donors: Japan's Impact on the Evolution of Emerging Donors (Routledge-GRIPS Development Forum Studies Series) (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), vi + 189 pp, £100.00 (Hardback), ISBN 978-0-415-52439-1

# Monir Hossain Moni

Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS), Dhaka

#### Abstract

This timeous book is not only concerned with the proactive role of Japanese foreign aid in graduating some Asian economies (particularly China and India aside from South Korea) from recipient nations to emerging donors but also connected with how Japan has historically and spectacularly transformed itself from an aid beneficiary of the United States and the World Bank to one of the globe's topmost aid benefactors. However, it has many puny sides. At the start, this loosely organized volume suffers from not only a poorly planned title but also many antithetical statements, improvident observations, irrelevant exaggerations, fact avoidances and unrealistic optimisms. Besides, none of this biased book's authors (including both editors) are appropriate experts essentially from international relations disciplines. As a result, the co-editors were unable to adopt such ideal approach as 'aid diplomacy' ot 'donor-recipient partnership' to theoretically and arguably validate any central question/problem posed as part of their research method. More critically, although they have talked much about the traditional proposition on foreign aid, they have eventually failed to confidently prescribe any convincing suggestion (mainly on the increasingly important human security issues and sustainable development goals) for this policy-oriented work in which the reviewer was so interested. Hence, the foremost advice from the reviewer to the editors is that they should try their utmost to produce an exceptionally outstanding piece with truly creative thoughts on comparative development aid with an emphasis on their nation's self-esteemed official development assistance (ODA). Yet, this cursory study possesses several plus points. No doubt, the cooperative undertaking for which most of the contributors are Japanese citizens and some of whom were engaged with in-depth country case studies has whatsoever been actualized for both involved stakeholders and related literatures in a purposeful and contrasting way. Of course, as this independent and authoritative article-length book review is filled with robust criticisms and sharp judgments, it will definitely be of valuable feedbacks for further improvement of the intellectual activities by this so-called prominent publisher's book series as a commercial joint venture.

#### Keywords

Japan, China, India, South Korea, Asia, United States, World Bank, Foreign Aid, ODA, Development Cooperation, Emerging Donors, International Relations

As the first editor (Jin Sato) in his introductory chapter acknowledges with gratitude, this book is the outcome of a series of discussions that took place under a research project funded by the Grant-in-Aid from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). Also, the editors thanked the Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) and the University of Tokyo's Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA) for jointly organizing a conference on the developmental lessons from postwar Japan's aid. It is because they believe that the exchange of views shared in this event was reflected in this book's chapters. Besides, almost all authors (including the two editors) of this publication are academics from Japan's well-known universities located in and around the greater Tokyo area. One contributor himself is the deputy director of JICA. Indeed, the second editor (Yasutami Shimomura), who is a Professor Emeritus at Hosei University, served as Dean of this university's Graduate School of Environmental Management. He has had much professional work experiences as an ex-staff of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), the implementing agency for loan aid furnished by the Government of Japan as well as a former member of the Board of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), formerly the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), which is claimed to be the world's largest source of development finance. To be more striking, a graduate from the New York-based Columbia University, this senior Japanese is a prolific author whose copious volumes primarily on Japan's official development assistance (ODA) including this book have been produced from some of the globe's best-known publishers in recent years.

Anyway, I am not here at our Dhaka-based newly created Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS) that is formerly known as the Asia Pacific Institute for Global Studies (APIGS), a world-leading foreign policy research think thank, to sing the praises of any book what the majority of academic presses and the mediocre type of reviewers usually do. Frankly, I should point out the feeblenesses more than the soundnesses of this volume, because I have read it in and out. Also, my intention is not at all to negatively downsize the book creators' ideas, but to positively construct my valid criticisms as a part of the exercise on scholastic autonomy in this succinct but systematic review piece, from which all the concerned peoples, institutions and organizations (especially the authors and publishers of this volume) would sanguinely benefit. In support of my claim, several of my highly authoritative and genuinely influential articles on Japan's ODA policy have already been published in reputable journals hosted by the Tokyobased related research institutions and professional associations as well as many of my pieces on foreign aid from both established and emerging donors have appeared in globally renowned publication outlets outside Japan. Very confidently and delightfully, I am probably one of a very few non-Japanese Japan scholars from the international context in the world who has received the advanced educational degrees as well as so many research funds and scholarly distinctions from Japan, acclaiming that I am a winner of outstanding Asia academic awards named after two most influential prime ministers (Yasuhiro Nakasone and Masayoshi Ohira) in contemporary Japan.

First of all, the book's contents do not go according to its main title. More explicitly, the volume is divided into two parts with 10 chapters, consisting of Part I (chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5), and Part II (chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) in addition to the introductory chapter 1. In First Part, two big chapters (2 and 3) describe how aid from the United States at variance with Washington's diplomatic pestering in an austerity has over the 1950s persuaded Japan to form a functional configuration as a donor needed for the progress of its international economic cooperation. In chapter 4, the authors narrate the stories about how the World Bank has triggered technology transfer and technology development, for example, the advancement of Shinkansen (bullet train), in domestic Japan in the post-World War period, while chapter 5 (penned by them) concentrates on evaluating this Bank-supported loan for two pilot farm projects for this country's regional development after 50 years later. Nevertheless, all these chapters are impertinent and preposterous. Therefore, as the editors inescapably needed to corroborate and incorporate this sizable portion (ie, Part I) for their book, the existing main title "The Rise of Asian Donors" should have justifiably been replaced by "Japan's Emergence from a Recipient to a Donor", which is entitled by them for this part. Indeed, as the Second Part entitled "The Rise of Emerging Donors and Japan's Impact" is directly related to the thematic steam and intrinsic purpose of this volume, I eagerly desire to extend my creative thoughts both 'in line with' and 'in opposition to' the conventional perceptions presented by the each individual chapter's author for Part II.

In this section, chapter 6 on the Republic of China (PRC), which exceedingly covers the impact of major donors (mainly the Soviet Union in the 1950s) on China as an aid recipient, spotlights that Japan's massive bilateral ODA schemes have helped China to implement its open and reform policy through multiple channels, while miraculously affecting this country's economic development and foreign aid policymaking process. This writer views: "In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, Japan was the most important model for China. However, as the Chinese economy developed, Japan became less important" (p. 109). The author, who urges to essentially continue to pay close attention to China's status as a concurrent recipient and a donor, purblindly concludes that China still receives foreign assistance, even though it became the world's 2nd largest economy in 2010. Frankly, this chapter largely reads a public relations (PR) document delivered by a spokesperson of foreign ministries in Tokyo and Beijing. It is obviously because it does not sharply investigate how the Government of Japan and the Japanese ordinary people feel about a fast militarily and economically rising China as their nation's

'dearest darling' in foreign aid since 1979 has today become a most 'risky rival' with Beijing's 'two fisted' (ie, aggressive) strategy designed to take advantage of Japan's gradually weakening condition. With an emphasis on the synthesis of aid, investment and trade, the next chapter 7 less importantly identifies some internal features encapsulated in the socioeconomic circumstances for China's external aid. Though it even strives to discover some similarities between the aid approaches of Japan and China, it can be questioned how it makes sense in a sturdy and strong way that the chapter's co-writers (one of whom is the second editor himself) compare China as an 'unripe donor' with Japan as a 'mature donor'. Granted that the possibility of the 'East Asian Aid Model' is foreseen in this chapter, it still remains far-fetched about how such a 'best practice' of foreign aid as an indispensable component of international public goods could be replicated for the developing sub-regions of Asia, let alone the other world continents, unusually when none of these emerging donors possesses remarkably exultant mega-scale loan projects and large-scale business conglomerates what Japan is endowed with.

The author's speeches in chapter 8 dealing with Japan's nearest neighbor (South Korea) also seem to be overly verbose. It is because the chapter generally responds to the following often-asked enquiries about: how Japan has mattered for the transitional pathway of this country to a concomitant donor from a traditional recipient; why Tokyo has provided Seoul with aid; what kind of aid Japan has given to it and Korea to its aid receivers; whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) has engaged itself in the international ODA framework. In the chapter's finishing part, this writer is yet cross-examining why Japan assisted in Korean donorship, and how it means for Japan now that Korea has become an aid donor, without offering necessary answers to these questions. But the author should have critically delved into whether the Korean publics in general hold the attitude similarly as in the same of the Chinese citizens who are nowadays utterly ungracious to Japanese, since Japan's 'yen loans' (ie, 'soft loans' significantly contributing to economic growth through funding of industrial infrastructure projects) to their country have ended in 2008. Notwithstanding the truth that this chapter embellishes how Japan's technical cooperation has led to nurture Korea's human resources, we are yet informed of the secret about the symptomatic pattern of donor-recipient relations between Japan as a 'great power' and Korea as a 'middle power'. It might have been interesting for the involved parties, if this author had avoided his narrow-mindedness to build a foresight into whether Korea could really be a meaningful donor illustration. It is just because this nation, which had sadly been under the combative colonial rule of the Japanese Empire during 1910-1945, has come from being one of the world's poorest countries half a century ago to the globe's 11th most sizeable economy now while becoming a member nation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 2010, has frequently been heralded as the foreign aid success story. With this regard,

the author has given an inaccurate information, ie, Japan is seen in this chapter as the only Asian donor in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). For the writer's further knowledge, Korea is the 24th largest DAC provider in terms of its ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), and the 14th biggest by volume.

Concerning chapter 9, it provides a protracted history of the aid policy goals of India (as both a receiver and a giver) with a 10-page coverage that mostly follows a News-writing style, when only two and a half pages consider the "Role of Japan in the evolution of Indian aid policy", which is this Chapter's title. Nonetheless, though the analysis of this Japanese national working for JICA as its ODA decision-maker pinpoints the non-political dimension that distinguishes Japanese aid from aid by others, the chapter overlooks the most crucial reasons what basically motivate the JICA to sign various ODA loan agreements with the Indian government on the economic infrastructure sector in contrast to JICA's nugatory attention to the fundamental life-risking and life-saving realms of humanitarian emergencies as a means of its grant aid. As it is logically revealed in this chapter, the traditional donors ask how India as a country with the most overgrown poverty-stricken population on the planet could afford to provide aid. Whereas, this chapter appraises why India has stoutly decided to refuse foreign aid on different occasions from Western donors, even though these decisions hindered relief to its own disaster victims. But it is still unanswered why New Delhi of an already 'wealthy India' badgers Tokyo for an increasingly gigantic amount of ODA loans from Japan at a time when this supposedly powerhouse itself gives more aid than it receives simultaneously. So, it is at the same time a question why a 'post-tsunami Japan', which encounters a waning ODA tendency because of its three decadeslong economic misfortune, ought to shoulder its responsibility towards India, regretfully a 'nuclear power country' that has as far as one can see failed to become a 'role model' particularly compared to China's notably favorable achievement capitalized on Japan's ODA, despite India's position as one of the globe's highest recipients of multilateral development aid. In this connection, some Indian critics themselves are interrogating the veritable value of foreign aid, warning that much of it is unfortunately lost to political, bureaucratic and other corruptions. Instead, this JICA official eventually seems so cheery about interpolating that India did in fact learn something from Japan's approach to providing foreign aid contrary to the status of this nation that is up to this time far away from institutionalized policies and practices for foreign aid.

In the concluding chapter 10, the following two statements made by the volume's second editor respectively in the first and second paragraph (p. 181) contradict each other: "How to deal with emerging donors, particularly China, is a controversial issue for the traditional donors", and "The preceding section stressed that

the emerging donors' role is complementary to the traditional donors' one". In the second paragraph, he continues to suggest: "Moreover, their roles are vital as they could create 'an era of competing aid approaches'. In other words, they could transform the donor community (the DAC members and multilateral institutions) from a polar to a multipolar world" (p. 181). Also, he repeats the following statement that has already been made by some of his colleagues: "The rise of emerging donors is expected to counterbalance the excessive movement toward a polarized world, as they can expand the menu or the list of options for the aid recipients so as to enhance the recipients' leverage (Sato et al. 2011)". The book's last two sentences stipulate: "By proposing alternative aid approaches, the emerging donors are expected to contribute to the creation of an 'open public forum'. This is the role expected of the emerging donors" (p. 181). Such an incautious remark would easily invite someone to engage in a contest along the following lines: What are verily these alternative aid approaches? Why should they forge a substitute aid system? Will it not oppose the existing global aid architecture?

In any of his above propositions, this editor looks highly optimistic about some prognostic capacities of the emerging donors in general, rather than the already arrived donors in Asia, which is main and only theme of their book to cover. He is still catechizing the following three particular questions even in the final chapter: First, how and why did aid recipients transform into donors? Second, how can the Asian emerging donors contribute to the global development agenda? Third, what kinds of roles can the emerging donors play in the international aid community? But it would have definitely been useful to us if he had answered my more reasonable questions in respect to his above three questions as well as in line with this volume as follows: First, what a unique upshot his nation (Japan) based on its endogenous knowledge of economic prosperity can more eagerly and purposefully make to foster the South-South Cooperation (SSC) by the emerging donors of Asia both across this region and the Global South, and accordingly help ensure their equitable economic growth as well as collective self reliance by energetically and harmoniously partnering among all the foremost stakeholders including the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) while making the use of their own available resources and technologies, because Japan even caused by its continuously stagnant financial situation is still globally regarded as a dominant aid influencer and a conventional aid donor? Second, whether will the incipient donors of Asia (typically China and India) as the aspirant economic powers over the long haul be able to persuasively prove their performances in addressing the United Nations-endorsed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that is the pre-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), when the financial involvements of both these unmellowed aid powers even compared to Japan's stakes for the global and regional multilateral institutions are up to the present time so small as to be not worth considering, ostensibly condemning that its frightfully hostile

neighbor (China) has woefully transgressed against Japan's ODA by misusing the Japanese taxpayers' money mostly for modernizing its military forces? Third, how could China and India act in such a manner as to achieve a desired result for bolstering a absolutely inclusive global order for economic governance at a juncture when: (1) The West (mainly Europe)-dominated rich countries as members of the OECD might not demonstrate their political willingness to welcome the emerging donors; (2) China, which with its aid-like investments is so impelled by commercial interests around and beyond the Asian region (substantially in Africa), has allegedly shown its reluctance to accept some rules prescribed by the OECD's member states; and (3) In the case of India, it has not expressed any interest in joining this multilateral platform and even New Delhi has pulled out of cooperating with it?

The editors deem: "It highlights the historical sources that explain the pattern and strength of foreign aid that these new donors provide" (p. i). Indeed, there exist baggy books that mostly cover Japan's overseas development aid from the broadest perspective. In contrast to such a synoptic viewpoint, it would therefore have rather been more imperative for responding to whether Japan is really ready to more strongly implement its newly adopted 'pro-poor' human security policy as against its traditionally maintained 'industry-led' economic growth strategy when Tokyo's ODA policymakers face humongous pressures both domestically and internationally. More comprehensively, the Japanese editors of this volume admire that their country has remarkably shouldered for the East Asian miracle by utilizing its ODA for infrastructure building conducive to the promotion of private-sector trade and investment of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) led by the automobile and electronics companies. But such a guiding light is not a brand new one, while many skeptics (particularly from these East Asian recipient nations) are repeatedly casting aspersions on Japan that despite Tokyo's ODA generosity, this nation's self-serving aid efforts merely mean its own 'industrialization' or 'mercantilization'. Also, the editors underline an importance that the developing countries inside and outside Asia may learn from the growthoriented approach of the East Asia's emerging nations (like China, South Korea and Singapore) that have successfully graduated from ODA from their country (Japan) in recent decades. But there are a lot of harsh censures even from some Japanese ordinary people as well as civil society themselves that Tokyo's businessdriven official development assistance is not sufficiently attentive to the most fundamental needs of the poorest in the recipient countries, regardless of the fact that Japan as one of the most ebullient nations has since 2003 boosted Tokyo's diplomatic linchpin by giving an emphasis on the 'human security' paradigm with a colossal policy shift in the Charter of its ODA for a global future encompassing the three principal and integrated dimensions of 'sustainability' comprising social, economic and environmental.

"Why do countries give aid"? (p. 1). This is the starting sub-title of chapter 1 drafted by the first editor. But it is also a back dated and mostly asked question. In actuality, there are already countless literary works in the publishing world that have responded to this fundamental question concerning foreign aid by adopting various theories. Very rationally, the editors should have taken an analytical 'donor-recipient' approach, even though this outmoded type of relationship too often engenders a feeling of humiliation and frustration for which there is no justification, and which may at times absolve the political elites in developing countries from blame for a fault or wrongdoing. In other words, it is in sharp contradiction with 'candid partnership' in which a matching relationship prevails between partners based on open exchange and fruitful dialogue as well as equal respect and mutual benefit. Unusually however, this kind of donor-recipient relations is until now too firmly rooted in the twist of both the Northeast Asian nations' ambivalent dependencies and the bitter historical legacies plagued by these neighboring economic powerhouses. Even the editors did not necessarily develop a theoretical skeleton on 'aid diplomacy' as the anchor of foreign policy and international relations (IR) to attain the goals of such a qualitative research. Moreover, they did not unfold that in spite of enormous cynicisms over foreign aid as an interdisciplinary hybrid of politics and economics, there is a consensus on the real effect of 'quality' (ie, prompt, purposeful and productive) ODA to the poor recipients in a sharply unequal but growingly interdependent world. It has apparently happened, because the book's first editor is a natural resource scientist and the second one is an expert on environmental management. Coming across that one writer is a historian and another is with an IR background, most of the chapter contributors are development (agrarian/agricultural) economists and policy analysts. In this connection, the editors have exhibited their bias, because all participants (except one who is Chinese from China) of this joint project are Japanese mostly from Japan.

Given that the first editor has tried to rationalize the selection of Japan as a particular case study at a sub-section captioned "Why focus on Japan?" in his introductory chapter (p. 3), it sounds neither clear nor pertinent. Rather, he parrots the following obsolete comment made by an American academic "According to Lancaster (2010), Japanese aid has long been characterized as commercial" (p. 3), when failing to inevitably assert his personal voice on the foremost strengths or/and distinct attributes in line with the overarching principles and modalities of ODA locally from his homeland as an old donor. So, if it is factual or as it is the most carping concern I contended before, it can just be questioned why the emerging donors will unavoidably be lured by Japan as a perfect example of international development aid cooperation. Additionally, I understand that the book has selected three emerging economies from Asia (China and South Korea from Northeast Asia and India from South Asia), since Japanese ODA has markedly
shaped their current positions as 'donors from recipients'. But the term 'Asian' in the book's main title is loosely applied. To be frank, the editors visibly lack a sound knowledge about the region of Asia as a whole. For details, it remains vague why Indonesia (Southeast Asia), which has for several successive years been the single largest (No. 1) recipient of Japan's gross bilateral ODA, is not chosen as a case study. As the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website discloses, in addition to Mainland China and South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Northeast Asia), Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (Southeast Asia), Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait (West Asia, ie, the Middle East or the Persian Gulf) have by now graduated from Japanese ODA disbursed to them. Crucifying that two different chapters are offered from the same authors in Part I accompanied by an excessively historical reportage, a separate chapter indicating a full sub-region-wise list of these other emerging donors in Asia together with a succinct picture for all these Japanese ODA recipients might have been more fascinating. It would have also been sensible for us to learn how the Asian countries namely Saudi Arabia and Turkey as currently not only the members of the powerful multilateral Group of Twenty (G20) but also the rising donors other than the emerging aid givers outside the Asian region including South Africa (Africa) as well as Brazil and Mexico (South America) have practically been decided to change themselves as the recipients of Japanese ODA. While it is at the same event criticized that Japan has yet little involvement in the poverty-propelled African region, the ODA Charter of Japan evidences that most of this nation's aid has gone to the Asian continent (especially East Asia) where many of the 'Top 10'bilateral ODA recipients from Japan (as of 2013) are located. But the Japanese editors probably feel timorous to confess that the geographical focus of Japan's ODA extension on East Asia is not simply a natural outcome of their nation's perpetuation of strategic ambitions, political motivations and economic benefits (primarily its energy interest in Central Asia and Northern Asia, ie, Russian Asia beyond the Middle East), it is also reportedly related to Tokyo's monetary compensation for the war victims of this region in tandem with its postwar reparation policy because of wartime sins and offenses committed by Imperial Japan as one of the earth's most warmongering countries.

What is more, since the first sentence of the book's synopsis inquires "Why do poor countries give aid to others?" (p. i), any smart reader could fairly ask the editors: What is their definition about 'poor'? How can the 'poor countries' provide foreign aid and for whom they allocate their limited amount of monetary resources, while they themselves have normally and long been the aid receivers from the aid givers that are rich and industrialized nations? Why is there a difference between 'emerging donors' and 'poor countries', observing that some emerging donors (eg, China and India) are widely regarded as 'great powers' (both economically and militarily) at present? More specifically, the second editor declares:

"China and India, two major emerging donors, were still classified as 'low-income' countries by the World Bank in the early twenty-first century" (p. 176). Even so, this research was completed much later, and it still uses the outdated data. It is fact-based that by GNI per capita as of 2015, China belongs to list of the uppermiddle-income group and India to the lower-middle-income group. Anyway, neither China nor India should any more be called a poor nation. China must no longer be ranked even as a 'developing country', since it has in 2010 toppled Japan itself as the 2nd most gigantic economy in the world. As the editors also contrarily acknowledge, South Korea, which is 2nd to and only along with Japan from Northeast Asia, enjoys its status as a member belonging to the list of World Bank high-income economies. Besides, I cannot treat the main title of the volume as an intelligent one. It is because all the three synonymous terms (Rise, Evolution, Emerging), which are incautiously utilized in the title, when the same word (Donors) is ineptly used in both main title and sub-title. Furthermore, the key phrases of the title, ie, 'Asian Donors' and 'Emerging Donors' are not elaborated at all. Needless to say, expecting that this volume due to its 'regional' approach should have covered only Asia, the editors strive to incorporate some 'global' facets to an unwarranted degree, and it is not reflective in the book's title/sub-title as it stands.

To summarize, the co-edited publication's thickheaded title, irrelevant contents, irreconcilable statements, descriptive redundancies, circumstantial gaps apart from its poorly organized chapters, relatively old ideas and overwhelmingly enthusiastic anticipations rather than quite realistic forethoughts have made me very much puzzled. At the same time, it is badly short of any underlying question for theoretical hypothesis, analytical argument for heated debates and/or focal point for research problems. It is more heartbreaking that the editors have ultimately put forward some superficial suggestions that do not consistently reflect any light from the previous chapters of this policy-oriented project. To put it differently, they were not able to stumble upon any substantive message that can undeniably be accepted. With this respect, the attention on practical situations or true repercussions of international development aid from Japan as a modest pathfinder for the 'human security' arrangement for Asia and the world has by and large been ignored in this joint work. Still and all, I was so intrigued to get answers to the following questions: (1) What actions can this non-Western donor take so as to be free from the United States as a troublesome consequence of Washington's unceasing domineering attitudes for its own geo-strategic advantages toward Tokyo's aid as the most cardinal diplomatic contrivance, and thereby become a sovereign donor nation? (2) Whether should Japan be seriously afraid that its bargaining position as a traditionally established global aid power is threatened by the futuristic ventures of its rivals as new donors in Northeast Asia (notably China) as the long recipients of its ODA amid changing but ungainly geopolitical realities in Asia? (3) How could the Asian emerging donors coordinately with

Japan, other leading donors as well as nn-state actors globally through effective delivery of aid tackle such increasingly challenging human-centered sustainable development agenda as extreme poverty, chronic hunger, health diseases, education barriers, natural disasters, etc., that even many middle-income countries in this region still confront? I was reasonably and eagerly awaiting that the editors in their big volume would have resonated with me a process of talking about these urgent issues, but they dashed my hopes much. Honestly, these many-sided loopholes and limitations can easily help to make their book a low-quality one, which is not based on the end product of a rigorous study with scholarly rigor or research flavor.

Notwithstanding many hypercritical utterances and harsh protests from me, the book should not only be seen negatively to the hilt. Without doubt, it deserves a number of good marks. First, I have most recently reviewed another book, which is similar to this title. In contrast, this title highlights the chronicled experiences gathered by Japan not only as an 'aid provider' but also an 'aid recipient'. Second, it is unusually rare to find that even though most of the contributors are Japanese nationals, they engaged themselves in such a collaborative enterprise on the emerging powers in Asia and finally produced this book as its fruit. Third, this comparative survey offers a cohesive paradigm that contributes towards enhancing our prevailing perceptions of the overseas development assistance cooperation network interfaced by multiple actors (both internal and external) and affairs. Fourth, most chapters adds several references in Japanese as well as the related chapters present literary materials in Chinese (translated into English in both cases), even though this publication goes without the Korean and Indian language sources. Fifth, this East Asia-centric investigation, which does not covey its information with many obscurities and is up to attain its self-defined objectives, will be suitable for a few fixed circles (the government officials in particular) in Japan, South Korea and China.

It goes without saying that the emerging powers worldwide have come to noticeably transform the political economy of the 21st century's global order and especially with Asia's nascent donors' reverberations on reshaping the international aid governance architecture in a multipolar world amid competitive economic globalization. In accordance with such a progression, this timely and relevant text could surely be treated as a guide to ancillary services for the literatures on various discipline including Japanese Studies, Asian Studies, International Relations, International Development, Development Cooperation, Policy Research, etc. In closing, I do not have any reason that discourages me from giving my best wishes to Sato and Shimomura (the book's co-editors) for their untiring joint effort. But I cannot help adding a few more words. In order to cope with the proliferating challenges in the profoundly changing development aid landscape attempting to be more responsible for the insecure humanity in the impoverished world, the fabrication of some newfangled social values in Japanese ODA coupled with a culture of reforms in aid handling bodies has become vitally felicitous today. Hence, the editors must try their best to come up with another outstandingly unprecedented volume by dint of their brainstormed ideas aligned with my unpropitious but constructive suggestions that can make a sober impression on my scholarly mind's spirit of inquiries strongly enough to really appreciate them, rather than always seeing their nation as an exemplar of phenomenal transformation (from recipient to donor) thanks to its historical background of foreign aid and/or its mammoth volume of total ODA over about the last 60 years remarkably Japan's ranking 'Number 1' in the list of all global donor countries during the 1990s in which they take immense pleasure, or blindly overpraising the overseas development aid strategies of the newcomers (conspicuously China and India) that are allegedly controversial.

It should not be missed to mention that all the concerned stakeholders (academics, policymakers, professionals, activists, etc.) would definitely discover this so sharply argued, methodically systematized as well as entirely developed review piece of intellectual incitement not only innovative and suggestive but also effective and representative. My truthful, straightforward and unbiased opinions on this volume will particularly be useful for the mandatory progress of publishing pursuits by Routledge that has helped to bring it to light at a time when this commonly named publisher repeatedly contends that it remains the largest and best one among the globe's academic publishing industries in the areas of social sciences and area studies. It is also relevant to add that this book has actually been realized with the Development Forum of the Tokyo-based National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). For a little bit more details, this Japanese Government-funded university-level national institution asserts itself that it has since its establishment in 1997 been not only an elite, highly selective as well as stand-alone graduate school throughout Japan but also one of Asia's leading think tanks globally gorgeous to development practitioners, public decision-makers and social scientists focusing on policy studies. In fact, this research-intensive institute has in 2015 been categorized as Japan's 2nd highest-ranking one (after the University of Tokyo) on the study of economics and finance. Moreover, it is appreciated that this GRIPS-run book series endeavors to build on policy consensus and make for policy capability in practice by portraying concrete cases and comparative experiences from various mindsets, procedures and institutions while adding new viewpoints to global development thinking with a concentration on East Asia revolving around Japan. However, because this book series program of the GRIPS Development Forum is not yet free from doubts about the qualitative (rather than quantitative) value of its published works, it needs to be under an obligation to have a remodeled way to confidently respond to such interrogation

marks. In essence, both of them by consolidating their academic power with more enlightened professionalism must try their best to convincingly persuade the involved public audiences as the potential customers, not merely for their large voluminous books' sales by taking global target marketing strategies.

## Bio

A double Masters earned from University of Dhaka and Hitotsubashi University as well as a Waseda University-awarded Doctorate degree holder, Monir Hossain Moni is currently a Research Professor and Head for the Program on Japan & Global Affairs under the Division of Asia & Globalized World (for which he is also shouldering his responsibility as Director) of the Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS), a Dhaka-based unique, modern, evolving as well as inspiring 'role model' independent think tank beyond national and regional borders. Dr Moni's broadly diversified academic expertise area rotates around global multi-disciplinary and cross-comparative studies with concentration on Northeast Asia shedding light on Japan as a traditional power neighbored with China as an emerging power and South Korea as a proactive middle power amid the inter-relational and intra-regional strategic, political, economic, environmental, social, cultural and technological dynamics of the 21st century's advantageous but emulous globalization system. Pursuant to his prolonged research interests and specialties, this prolific, enthusiastic and optimistic as well as extensively worldwide traveled scholar has exceptionally contributed imaginative, authoritative and thus universally effective pieces to the leading journals produced not only by all the higher education world's most prominent publishers but also by many emerging presses across Asia and beyond in the most recent years. A winner of outstanding academic (scholarly and research) awards named after Japan's two prime ministers (Yasuhiro Nakasone and Masayoshi Ohira), Professor Moni is always committed to make his sincere efforts to publish for constructing a much-needed value towards helping flourish a more cooperative, stable as well as magnificent humanity with change and difference in the true sense.

#### Book Review

## Russia, BRICS and the Disruption of Global Order

Rachel S. Salzman Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019, 208 pp, US\$ 32.95 (paperback), ISBN 9781626166615

## Thomaz Alexandre Mayer Napoleão

Embassy of Brazil, Russia tnapoleao@hse.ru

Two of the most familiar narratives of the 21st century so far have been the geopolitical reemergence of Russia and the rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), a diplomatic coalition which has assertively promoted global governance reform for over a decade. What is the intersection between these phenomena? How did a very heterogeneous constellation of emerging economies become a key priority of Russian foreign policy? Which factors could explain Moscow's specific patterns of engagement within BRICS and towards the group?

These issues are examined in *Russia, BRICS and the Disruption of Global Order* by Rachel Salzman, a visiting scholar in the Department of European and Eurasian Studies of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a former postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies of Georgetown University. While this is her first book, she previously published several articles on the topic (Salzman 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017).

The volume consists of six chapters. After an introduction that outlines the book's main ideas, the first chapter discusses Russia's uneasy relationship with the Western-led international system since the collapse of the USSR. The author stresses that Moscow's interest in BRICS derives from domestic factors, such as the consolidation of "sovereign democracy" and elite debates on Russia's national (or civilizational) identity, as well as external developments, namely Moscow's ambivalent posture towards the post-Cold War security order in Europe. She argues that Russia views BRICS primarily as a political coalition aimed at fostering multipolarity, countering US hegemony and enhancing its members' global status, not as a mechanism of economic cooperation – a reasoning supported by the fact that intra-group trade and investment levels remain low, except for China's robust economic relations with all other members.

Salzman then portrays an institutional history of BRICS. She points out that the group was not the first attempt at an informal mechanism between large emerging nations, having been preceded by the RIC (Russia, India and China) strategic triangle, proposed in 1996 by Russian statesman Yevgeny Primakov; the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) forum, launched in 2003; and the Outreach 5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa), a cluster of countries occasionally invited to G8 summits after 2003. This information is vital to comprehend that BRICS is not primarily a catchphrase devised by an investment bank, as often claimed, but the consequence of a conscious political decision by governments that shared the belief in a "world order that allows for a multiplicity of domestic orders rather than the perceived imposition of a single set of norms and standards" (p. 30). Russia, as Salzman notes, was a leader in this process, having hosted the first ministerial and presidential meetings of the group in Yekaterinburg.

The three subsequent chapters, which form the book's core, debate the significance of BRICS and its predecessors for Russian foreign policy since 2000. Salzman's fundamental hypothesis is that Moscow's interest in BRICS has been transactional, opportunistic and tactical. In her view, the group's importance for Russia initially peaked during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, when BRIC (then still without the "S" of South Africa) successfully pushed for an increase in the voting power of developing nations at the International Monetary Fund. Afterwards, she believes, BRICS was relegated to a "theoretical alternative option deployed as a bargaining chip in other forums" (p. 59) and a "Potemkin village" of political rhetoric during most of the Medvedev presidency, when Moscow's relations with the West were generally cooperative.

A second watershed moment arose with the events of 2014 in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, when BRICS efficiently shielded Russia from criticism and the threat of isolation at the UN General Assembly, the G20 and other multilateral bodies. At this point, the reasoning goes, Moscow attempted to position BRICS no longer as a "bridge" to maximize influence in Western-led institutions, but as a "bulwark" against US/European encroachment in Russian strategic objectives. This momentum would not last, however, since a disillusionment with the institutional effectiveness of BRICS led Moscow to prioritize other projects, such as the Great Eurasian Partnership structured around the Eurasian Economic Union, according to Salzman.

The following chapter compares Russian perspectives of BRICS with those of China and India. It underlines that Moscow's capacity to shape and influence the group is constrained by the geopolitical and economic interests of Beijing and New Delhi, both of which are increasingly integrated into the global economy, generally benefit from the current structure of international governance and do not wish to see BRICS adopting an explicitly anti-Western character. In her conclusion, Salzman claims that BRICS is "no longer a big story in global governance" (p. 138), having lost prominence to China's Belt and Road Initiative and to the strategic uncertainty stemming from political crises in Europe and North America. She enumerates three conceivable alternatives for the group's future: a condition of stasis, deemed the most probable, in which BRICS would remain active but inertial, maintaining a critical rhetoric while achieving few concrete results; the risk of *implosion*, should BRICS cease to function due to tensions between two of its members, possibly China and India; and the potential of *constructive contribution* that may unfold if BRICS could define a positive cooperation agenda and be accepted as a legitimate interlocutor by the West. The author also warns that a rift may eventually arise between Russia, which "feels no real stake in the preservation of the existing governance system" (p. 143), and the other BRICS, whose approaches to the global order are cautious and evolutionary.

*Russia, BRICS and the Disruption of Global Order* is a concise, elegantly written and generally balanced work. Salzman comprehensively ascertains the main internal and external drivers of Russian foreign policy through appropriate research methods, such as discourse analysis, expert interviews and a literature review of Russian sources. It is also encouraging to note that the book was released by a publishing house affiliated with a leading US university. This is uncommon. The story of BRICS has been told before, but mostly by scholars of the concerned countries themselves, or by those who study global governance and the Global South (Stuenkel 2015, de Coning, Mandrup & Odgaard 2015, Kirton & Larionova 2018, among others). In contrast, Western authors tend to see BRICS as a passing intellectual fad or as an artificial political construct that would inevitably crumble under the weight of its contradictions. Salzman's work will contribute to mitigate this distortion.

Yet there is also room for improvement in at least three respects. Firstly, Salzman's analysis of the role of Brazil and South Africa within BRICS is somewhat superficial. She correctly points out that these countries are relatively peripheral from the standpoint of Russia, and that their foreign policies have been partially hindered by recent domestic crises, but this is not enough to adequately explain how their specific interests and agendas also influence the group's direction. Given that the volume includes a remarkably perceptive chapter on Chinese and Indian views of BRICS, it is to be hoped that future editions will be expanded to reflect the perspectives of Brasília and Pretoria as well.

Secondly, the assertion that BRICS "will not fulfill the promise of the 2014 summit in Fortaleza and become a more substantial and institutionalized organization" (p. 133) may be premature. New and tangible initiatives of intra-group cooperation are still being devised, particularly concerning health, financing for development and science, technology and innovation. For example, the recent Chinese and South African presidencies of the group, in 2017 and 2018, allowed for the creation of joint research platforms on vaccines and tuberculosis, a network of technology parks and new offices of the New Development Bank (the BRICS Bank) in Brazil and Russia.

More to the point, it is entirely normal for international forums to change and adapt. It could be argued that multilateral institutions have a life cycle that derives from their capacity to transform themselves to face new challenges, particularly in circumstances of multipolarity (Cohen 2018). A case in point was the successful reinvention of the G20 – previously a technical gathering of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and now the main platform of global macroeconomic coordination at the head of state level – during the 2008 financial crisis. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that BRICS will not be able to adapt to the changing political preferences of some of its members. The writing is not on the wall for the group.

Thirdly, and most crucially, the concluding chapter sometimes fails to reach the high standards of academic impartiality that were kept throughout the book. By arguing that BRICS "has had a detrimental effect (...) on the stability of the current system" (p. 140) and may even cause the "gradual weakening of the integrity of the current order" (p. 142), the author replicates, perhaps unwittingly, the sceptical assessment displayed by the Washington foreign policy establishment towards the group. This is not an isolated case: to a considerable extent, US research in International Relations (IR) – not unlike what occasionally transpires in some members of BRICS – has traditionally been oriented towards the achievement of governmental objectives. Salzman's comment that "the line between state and academia in Russia is somewhat blurred" (p. 78) could ironically be applied to her own country as well, at least in the discipline of IR.

It might have more accurate to acknowledge, as other parts of the book seemed to imply, that the rise of BRICS as a diplomatic coalition represents – among other things – a symptom of the current international order's crisis of legitimacy, rather than the cause of that crisis.

These shortcomings do not alter the fact that *Russia, BRICS and the Disruption* of *Global Order* is a timely, nuanced and sophisticated effort to cast light on a frequently debated but usually misunderstood subject. The volume is highly recommended for scholars and policymakers interested in BRICS, Russian foreign policy and the evolution of global governance.

### Bio

Thomaz Alexandre Mayer Napoleão is a diplomat at the Embassy of Brazil in Russia and a PhD student of Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow. His doctoral research discusses the evolving meanings of multipolarity in the discourses and cognitive maps of the foreign policy elites of the BRICS countries. Previously he worked at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in New York (2014-2018) and at the Embassy of Brazil in Pakistan (2011-2014). He holds MA degrees in International Security from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, 2008) as well as in Diplomacy from the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy (Rio Branco Institute, 2011). The views expressed here are strictly personal and do not represent the positions of the Government of Brazil.

## References

- Cohen, H. G. 2018, 'Multilateralism's Life Cycle', American Journal of International Law, vol. 112, no. 1, pp. 47-66.
- de Coning, C., Mandrup, T. & Odgaard L. 2015, The BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order, Routledge, New York, USA.
- Kirton J. & Larionova, M. 2018, BRICS and Global Governance, Routledge, London, UK.
- Salzman R. 2014a, 'Russia and BRICS: An Introduction', BRICS in Russian Foreign Policy, weblog post, 9 July, retrieved on 8 April 2019.

\_\_\_\_\_ 2014b, 'Russian Goals for BRICS: Then and Now', BRICS in Russian Foreign Policy, weblog post, 24 July, retrieved on 8 April 2019.

\_\_\_\_\_ 2015, 'From Bridge to Bulwark: The Evolution of BRICS in Russian Grand Strategy', Comillas Journal of International Relations, vol. 2, no. 3, 2015, pp. 1-12.

2017, 'Russian and Indian Approaches to BRICS and Global Governance', The Russia File (Wilson Center), weblog post, 17 March, retrieved on 8 April 2019.

\_\_\_\_\_ 2019, Russia, BRICS and the Disruption of Global Order, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, USA.

Stuenkel O. 2015, The BRICS and the Future of Global Order, Lexington, Lanham, UK.

**Rising Powers Quarterly** is a peer-reviewed non-profit free-access journal dedicated to the study of the growing role of rising powers in global governance. It aims to explore the political, economic and social processes through which the states regarded as "rising powers" in world politics interact with other states as well as international and transnational organizations. This journal also aims to fill the academic lacunae in the literature on rising powers and global governance related themes since there is a growing need for a journal specialized on rising powers in parallel to their increasing importance in world politics.

Published four times a year, Rising Powers Quarterly is particularly interested in original scientific contributions that analyze the operations and policies of regional & international organizations, international groupings such as the BRICS, IBSA, MIKTA and G-20, as well as their member states around the main themes of international political economy, global governance, North-South relations, developing world, changing international order, development, rising/emerging/middle/regional powers, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, peace, peacekeeping, security, democracy and international terrorism. Country-specific case studies with regard to their interrelation at the global level are also of particular concern of *Rising Powers Quarterly*. One of the main objectives of the journal is to provide a new forum for scholarly discussion on these topics as well as other issues related with world politics and global governance.

Rising Powers Quarterly publishes theoretically informed and empirically rich papers that seek to explore a broad set of research questions regarding the role played by the rising powers in global governance. Interdisciplinary research as well as critical approaches are particularly welcomed by the editors. The editors also encourage the submission of papers which have strong policy relevance as *Rising Powers Quarterly* is also designed to inform and engage policymakers as well as private and public corporations.

All articles in the journal undergo rigorous peer review which includes an initial assessment by the editors and anonymized refereeing process. The journal also publishes special issues on a broad range of topics related with the study of rising powers in world politics. Special issue proposals can be sent to the editors at any time and should include full details of the authors as well as the abstracts of the articles.

*Rising Powers Quarterly* is based at Marmara University, Faculty of Political Science, Istanbul, Turkey.

All editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Editors at submissions@risingpowersproject.com



contact@risingpowersproject.com

# RISING POWERS QUARTERLY

Volume 3, Issue 4 May 2019



ISSN 2547-9423

