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CONTENTS

Article

Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa

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Abstract

Upon Eritrean independence in 1993, Ethiopia became landlocked and therefore dependent on neighbors – especially Djibouti – for access to international markets. This dependency has hampered Ethiopia's aspiration to emerge as the uncontested regional power in the Horn of Africa. This article explains how Ethiopia has attempted to manipulate extra-regional interest in the Horn's coastal zone to alleviate the major economic and political liabilities associated with landlockedness. Previewing the main argument, this article shows how Ethiopia was able to anticipate dangers and opportunities linked to growing involvement of Gulf Arab States in the ports of the region, and how it embarked on an expeditionary foreign policy mission in the Gulf (specifically in the UAE) in order to steer investment towards the port town where Addis Ababa could derive the most strategic advantage – Berbera in semi-autonomous Somaliland. Moreover, this under-reported development in the port architecture of the Horn of Africa will, we argue, have important implications for the balance of power in the Horn and potentially for Ethiopia's bid to ascend to the top of the region's local hierarchy.

Keywords

Regional Security Complex, Landlockedness, Port Politics, Hegemony, Horn of Africa, Gulf Arab States

Introduction

The recent intensification of involvement in the Horn of Africa's coastal zone by the Gulf Arab States[1] has led to the surge in development activities at ports in the

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[1] Gulf Arab States are used throughout as a shorthand term for the six Gulf Arab monarchies that

region. These have coincided with various actions taken by Horn of Africa states to affect the regional distribution of power to their advantage. This includes land-locked Ethiopia's strategic drive to reduce its dependency on Djibouti's port for imports and exports through the refurbishment, development and use of other, regional ports: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. It is the development of the port of Berbera, in particular, that may prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law.

From a geostrategic perspective, Ethiopia's interest in Berbera certainly makes sense. Of the three ports, Berbera is closest to Ethiopia proper and offers the potential of opening up the vast, albeit isolated eastern region of Ethiopia to trade, particularly in the export of livestock and agriculture. However, the port is located in the Republic of Somaliland, which declared its independence from the Republic of Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognized internationally, therefore representing a political and legal headache for states wishing to engage with it substantively.

While developments involving recent ports deals have received scant attention by area specialists they have potentially wide-ranging consequences. These include Djibouti's virtual monopoly over maritime trade, the *de-facto* Balkanization of Somalia and the prospect of the region's rising power, Ethiopia, becoming the regional hegemon. What commentary that does exist overwhelmingly focuses on foreign involvement; it sees events as being externally driven and controlled, denying agency to the Horn of Africa states even though they are the actors with the largest stake in the course of events (Ulrichsen, 2011; Burke, 2016; Lefebvre, 2012). This omission is most striking in relation to Ethiopia, an aspiring regional power with considerable strategic interests in which regional ports are developed and by whom. Indeed, examining Ethiopian actions vis-à-vis Horn of Africa ports in general, and Berbera more specifically, sheds new light on the means by which an aspiring, albeit contested regional power seeks to capitalize on external involvement in its region.

We begin by examining Ethiopia's aspirations for regional leadership, giving special attention to the problems associated with lack of sea access and its corresponding interest in the port of Berbera in Somaliland. The article then turns to explaining how the intensification of activity of the Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa triggered a bouleversement in established port arrangements in the region that eventually dovetailed with Ethiopia's regional ambitions. Lastly, we trace and analyse the actions Ethiopia took to advance its interests and counter potential threats.

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form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Hierarchy in the Horn and Ethiopian Aspirations

The view that regions should be treated as the critical unit of analysis in international politics gained greater prominence after the Cold War. Defining regions as the level where states are linked together sufficiently tightly that their security cannot be considered separate from one another, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argued that much of the world could be divided into local security complexes. Given the intense security interaction between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, the Horn of Africa forms a region under this interpretation.

Scholarly focus on the regional level as a unit of analysis resulted in greater attention on the distribution of power within regions (Frazier & Ingersoll, 2010; Garzón Pereira, 2014). One particular area of enquiry was whether emerging powers, unleashed from the binds of a bipolar international system (Lake, 2009), might be able to dominate their regions and emerge as regional powers (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).[2] While the precise constituent characteristics of a regional power are contested, some assumptions can be made. First, regional powers need to possess superiority in terms of basic power capabilities vis-à-vis their neighbours. These are measured in terms of demographic size, economic capacity and military prowess.[3] Second, there must be an inequity in the distribution of the power, allowing the regional power to exert influence on the region (Destradi, 2010; 95; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; 55-62). Third, they must have political aspirations to dominate neighbours or at least be the leader in regional matters if domination is not attainable (Genrewold, 2014; 5).

In purely material terms, but also relative to its neighbours, Ethiopia has a good claim to be a regional power. First, with a population somewhere close to 100 million it is demographically much larger than its neighbours. It has the Horn of Africa's largest and arguably best-equipped military. Additionally, Ethiopia remains by some distance the region's biggest economy – and one that continues to grow faster than its neighbours.[4] Success in the economic sphere has, rightly or wrongly, driven the narrative of Ethiopia as a power on the rise. Ethiopia's advantageous geography has been a factor in this development, especially its plentiful natural resources of water. In sum, the distribution of power capabilities within the Horn of Africa overwhelmingly favours Addis Ababa. But what of its aspirations for leadership?

Ethiopia has a clear ambition to lead, to borrow Douglas Lemke's term, the 'local hierarchy' in the Horn of Africa (Lemke, 2002; 49). Ethiopia's aspiring role in supervising regional relations, however, is hampered by its conflictual relations

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[2] For a useful discussion on definition of 'regional power', see Flemes & Nolte (2010).

[3] For a full and instructive exploration of the ontology of regional powers, see Nolte (2010).

[4] The World Bank calculates that growth averaged 10.8% per year in 2003/04—2014/15 compared to the regional average of 5.4%.

with its neighbours. It has fought wars with both Somalia and Eritrea, and Eritrea is aligned with anti-Ethiopia factions in Somalia (Genrewold, 2014; 11). Being the seat of the African Union (AU) confers some influence on Addis Ababa regionally, but its legitimacy as a leader is undermined by its internal troubles, which include high levels of poverty, ethnic conflict, and food insecurity (Dehetz, 2008). Ethiopia may be a pivotal power in the region but its attempts thus far to establish its credentials as a regional leader have largely been rejected by its neighbours, which is often the case with aspiring regional leaders (Schirm, 2010; Flemes & Wojczewski, 2010). Arguably, the most important constraint on Ethiopia's aspirations for regional leadership is its lack of sea access. There will always be a considerable gap between its aspirations and its ability to act as regional power so long has it has a high level of dependency on one neighbour to access international waters.

Ethiopia Surrounded

Broadly construed, the main activity of ports in history has been transferring goods from ships to other means of transport and vice versa (Jacobs, Ducruet & De Langen, 2010; 97). Due to lower transaction and transportation costs, ports also serve as nodes for production and manufacturing. For these reasons, ports often form the centrepiece a country's overall economic plan, especially in developing nations (de Langen, 2007; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; 1018). Conversely, landlocked developing countries are at a major disadvantage (Paudel, 2014; Faye, et al. 2004). The lack of direct sea access inhibits integration with the global economy and entails a transport cost disadvantage compared to states with sea access.[5] Reducing maritime transit costs and more advanced logistics technology is exacerbating this imbalance in favour of sea-access states with well-developed ports. Also, the fact that trade from a landlocked country must pass through a sovereign transit country in order to access international shipping markets creates a serious political vulnerability on the former. If a landlocked country and its transit neighbour are in conflict, either military or diplomatic, the transit neighbour can block borders, implement regulatory changes that impede trade, or simply increase tariffs. Even when there is no direct conflict, landlocked countries are extremely vulnerable to the political vagaries of their transit neighbours.

To be sure, Ethiopia has suffered from its dependency on its neighbours for an outlet to the sea (Wuhib, 1997). The capture of Asmara in 1991 by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (ELFP) and the overthrow of the Marxist Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam shortly thereafter resulted in the Eritrea declaring its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. With the loss of Eritrean territory and the

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[5]   Studies on the interaction between geographic location, trade and economic growth have shown that landlocked countries on average experience weaker growth than maritime countries. See, for example, Mackellar, Wörgötter & Wörz (2002); Limao & Venables (2001); and Glassner (2003).

Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab, Ethiopia effectively became landlocked. Though Ethiopia briefly continued to use the port of Assab - where three-quarters of Ethiopian trade passed through duty-free until 1997 – it was forced to shift its trading route to the port of Djibouti, which at that point had a poorly functioning railroad and limited port facilities (Faye et al., 2004; 45-46). Djibouti's handling of Ethiopian general cargo and petroleum products quadrupled overnight creating a necessity for upgrading port facilities (Styan, 2013; 5). As Ethiopia's population and economy have grown so has its need to expand its export and import capabilities (World Bank, 2017).

Improvements have been slow in coming but with the assistance of mega-ports operator Dubai Ports World (DP World), Djibouti developed world-class port facilities in the late 2000s, which, for a time, were capable of keeping up with the demands of Ethiopia's booming economy (Chorin, 2010; The Economist, 2008). Opened in 2009, Doraleh container terminal and port became the sole facility in the region capable of handling 15,000-tonne-plus container vessels (Styan, 2013; 6). For its part, Ethiopia attempted to escape the high costs of freight services and long transportation time for importing and exporting goods suffered by landlocked countries by developing the Djibouti Corridor Authority (DCA) (Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999; Stone, 2001). Infrastructure development across national borders is more difficult to arrange than similar investments within a country. The DCA – a joint one-stop border post development project – has proved only moderately successful, at least from an economic perspective, given slow implementation and development as well as recurrent disputes with Djibouti over transit and taxation (Cannon, 2015). Ethiopia's 750km Ethiopia-Djibouti electric railway, built with Chinese loans and cutting the journey time from Addis Ababa down from three days by road to about 12 hours, has been more successful.

Yet, the result of these largely positive developments is that Ethiopia is now even more reliant on the port of Djibouti – importing and exporting a full 95 percent of its goods at the port (Gessesse, 2015).[6]

Dependence on Djibouti has rankled Addis Ababa, which has been exploring alternative options to lessen reliance on its neighbour to the northeast since at least 2006 (Giorgis, 2008). Ethiopia is understandably concerned by the strategic national security implications of being overly reliant on a single access point for trade and vital supplies. As such, Ethiopia has focused on securing access to ports in neighboring countries, particularly the port of Berbera.

Ethiopia's interest in Berbera certainly makes sense from a geostrategic perspective, as noted previously. Additionally, infrastructure development associated with increased trade to and from the port of Berbera through northeastern Ethiopia may further cement Addis Ababa's rule over these often-restive, largely Somali and Oromo-populated regions (Kefale, 2013; Richards & Bekele, 2011). Yet for a variety of legal, logistical and political reasons, Ethiopia has been unable until recently to fully exploit the port of Berbera.

To begin with, the port is located in the Republic of Somaliland, which declared its independence from the Republic of Somalia in 1991, but remains unrecognized internationally. Given Ethiopia's hosting of leadership role in both the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), engagement with a breakaway state such as Somaliland represents a grave political and legal headache (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). Furthermore, as a state with firsthand experience in losing significant territory to a breakaway state and experiencing inter-communal violence and separatist insurgencies (Yihun, 2014), Ethiopia is understandably reticent to formally recognize Somaliland (Jeffrey, 2016). However, the existence – officially or unofficially – of Somaliland has variously been supported and used by Ethiopia since 1991 to further Ethiopian interests in the region, with Addis Ababa maintaining an unofficial but very real embassy in Somaliland's capital, Hargeisa (Kaplan, 2008; Rudincová, 2016).[7] This is because Ethiopia's interest in developing the port of Berbera and fostering closer ties with Hargeisa go beyond strategic considerations such as resolving Ethiopia's landlockedness or economic considerations of imports and exports. Rather, the development and expansion of the port of Berbera simultaneously supports the two primary pillars of Ethiopia's regional policy deemed essential to Ethiopia's indivisibility, aspirations of hegemony and, indeed, survival. The first involves maintaining Eritrea's isolation in

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[6] In 2015, Ethiopia imported a total of US$13 billion's worth of goods, and exports around $3 billion annually. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti except for flowers and some perishable agro-processed foods such as meat.

[7] The author obtained an Ethiopian visa from the unmarked, unofficial embassy in downtown Hargeisa for overland travel from Hargeisa to Jijiga and Harar via the border crossing at Wachale/ Wajaale in April 2015.

order to weaken it to the point that it implodes, is formally reunited to Ethiopia or becomes a pliant, client state (Bereketeab, 2017; Bereketeab, 2013). Until 2015, Ethiopia, with the assistance of the UN and further helped by a cavalcade of allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by the government of President Isaias Afwerki in Asmara, had been fairly successful in corralling and isolating Eritrea. The second pillar held dear by the mandarins of Addis Ababa rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia (Cornwell, 2006). Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia means that Ethiopia can concentrate its attention and forces on quelling persistent internal security difficulties and continuing to isolate and pressure Eritrea.

Ethiopia has, until recently, been assisted in its goals vis-à-vis Somalia as much by the international community as by internal problems within Somalia (Menkhaus, 2013). The cross-purposes of the international community coupled with and reinforcing political instability in Somalia (Cannon, 2016a), particularly in the capital Mogadishu, have resulted in the inability of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to do anything substantive about the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland as well as the almost entirely autonomous northeastern region of Puntland.

Ethiopia has eyed the development of and access to the port of Berbera against this backdrop. However, Ethiopia found itself unable to fully exploit opportunities to expand its influence and power not only because of the potential legal and political headaches of doing deals with Somaliland, but also because of a paucity of critical resources and human capital. For example, as far back as 2005 Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a bilateral agency agreement on the Utilization of Port of Berbera and Transit Service (African Intelligence, 2016). In 2008, Ethiopia in the form of Ethiopian Shipping Lines (ESL) again exhibited keen interest in Berbera Port (Port Strategy, 2011). However, it lacked the technical expertise and resources necessary to transform the moribund brown water port into a commercially viable export and import shipping hub (Davison, 2016). Additionally, poor road infrastructure from the Ethiopian border with Somaliland at Wachale/Wajaale to Berbera severely hampered the movement of goods.

Ethiopia attempted to overcome these difficulties by signing trilateral agreements with China and Somaliland in 2011 covering gas, oil and logistics. The agreements also included the large-scale development of the port of Berbera by the Chinese company PetroTrans. At the same time, ESL placed an order for nine new vessels in China and voiced its hope to become one of the main shareholders in the port, perhaps in conjunction with an international terminal operator (Port Strategy, 2011). However, the agreements never materialized, partly because PetroTrans was unable to procure insurance for the port and proposed LNG facilities (Anderson, 2012). Berbera port remained undeveloped, in part, because Ethiopia was

unable to locate investors or companies with the incentive to take the substantial political and legal risks associated with business in Somaliland (Ahmed, 2000; Houssein, 2005; Yusuf, 2015). However, the outbreak of war across the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden from Somalia, in Yemen, started a sequence of actions and reactions creating both challenges to and opportunities for Addis Ababa that would potentially reconfigure the regional order.

Enter the Arab Gulf States

There are deep and historic connections between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa in terms of trade and the movement of people. The more recent intensification of geopolitical interest by the Arab Gulf States in this region, especially the coastal zone, was driven partly by efforts to secure favourable trade and resources, but was also a response to Iran's growing presence in the late 2000s (Ulrichsen, 2011; Burke, 2016). In 2008, Eritrea granted Iran access to Assab Port, providing Tehran with a support base from which to conduct maritime operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Lefebvre, 2012). The Saudi and Yemeni authorities fretted in particular that Iran would use Eritrean territory, especially the Hanish archipelago in the Red Sea, as a conduit for shipping arms to Shia Houthi rebels in northern Yemen (Al Arabiya, 2015). Concern in Gulf capitals over Iran's burgeoning military maritime presence in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden area, and more specifically its political relationship with Eritrea, coincided with a growing assertiveness of the Gulf States to intervene abroad (Ulrichsen, 2011; 120-121). After the breakdown in the regional order following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and to some degree Qatar, adopted more assertive and interventionist foreign policies (Young, 2013). Moreover, the perception that the United States under President Barrack Obama was more reticent to counter Iranian activity in the region led the Gulf States to believe that self-reliance was the order of the day.

In early 2015, after years of intermittent rebellion in the north of the country, the Houthis and their allies seized the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. When the Houthis began marching south towards Aden, Saudi Arabia announced the beginning of a pan-Arab military operation to roll back the Houthis and restore the government (Knights & Mello, 2015). Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the two principal military members of the coalition – initially used Djibouti, just across the Gulf of Aden, as a support hub for operations in southern Yemen (Reuters Staff, 2015a; Alwasat, 2015; Emarat TV, 2015).[8] However, in late April 2015, only a few weeks into the campaign, an altercation between a senior Emirati diplomat and the commander of Djibouti's air force ruptured bilateral relations between the UAE and Djibouti

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[8] The bulk of the forces were from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. From the GCC, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar also contributed small contingents. Senegal and Sudan also agreed to send troops.

(GSN, 2016).[9] Relations were already sour after Djibouti tried to force a renegotiation of DP World's 30-year port contract (2006-2036) and, after negotiations faltered, made allegations that the Dubai-based company was involved in serious corruption (Stevis & Fitch, 2016). As a consequence, the UAE (and to some extent Saudi Arabia) moved closer to Eritrea, which ended its formal cooperation agreement with Iran (Solomon, 2016). Throwing in its lot with the Arab Gulf States, Eritrea agreed to lease its Hanish Islands and facilities at the port city of Assab to the UAE for 30 years. This was one piece of a much wider UAE-Eritrea security agreement (Hokayem & Roberts, 2016; 171). With the signing of this agreement Assab became the UAE's first major power projection base outside of the Arabian Peninsula (Getachew, 2010). Starting with very little, Assab has been substantially developed by the UAE. It now includes a modern airbase[10], a military training depot, and, significantly, a deep-water port under construction (Katzman, 2017; 17).

Stoking Ethiopia-Eritrea Rivalry

While the rationale behind the UAE's deal with Eritrea revolved around the conflict in Yemen and the strategic advantage offered by a port on the opposite side of the Bab al Mandeb Strait, the UAE-Eritrea deal had the potential of upsetting the delicate regional balance of power that favored Ethiopia. Alarm bells rang in Addis Ababa over what was perceived as a significant breach of Eritrea's isolation, with Ethiopian leaders taking the view that any expansion of Eritrean power would result in a corresponding loss of power for Ethiopia. Ethiopia has concrete reasons for concern over an emboldened Eritrea. Recent UN monitoring mission reports on Eritrea conclude that the country supports armed groups in Ethiopia and offers sanctuary to anti-government rebels in its own country (UN Monitoring Group, 2016; 3).[11] Blaming a wave of unrest in regions around Addis Ababa in late 2016 on Eritrea, Ethiopian government spokesman, Getachew Reda noted, "There are countries which are directly involved in arming, financing and training these elements" (Reuters Staff, 2015b)

Following the UAE's tightening relationship with Eritrea and the construction activity at Assab Port, the Ethiopian leadership feared that the UAE's attention had swung towards Eritrea. A suitably panicked Ethiopia sent senior officials to Abu Dhabi in October 2015 to plead with the country's leadership not to pursue

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[9] The spat occurred after a UAE aircraft taking part in the operations over Yemen landed without prior authorization at Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport. Unsubstantiated reports claim that the argument descended into a fist fight.

[10] Over 2016, the UN Monitoring Group documented "a significant evolution" in military activities in and around Assab, including the presence of non-Eritrean military personnel, new military equipment on the territory and the construction of new military infrastructure relating to air and naval capacity.

[11] The UN monitoring team observed that Eritrea continued to harbour anti-Ethiopian armed groups, including the newly created Patriotic Ginbot 7.

the deal with Eritrea and focus on refurbishing and utilizing the port of Berbera (CDE, 2016). As Werqneh Gebeyehu, Ethiopia's Minister of Transport put it, "We are better off having the UAE investing in Somaliland than in Eritrea," adding, "We would not like to see any investment going to Eritrea…" (Somaliland Sun, 2016).

Ethiopia had been attempting to curry the interest of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in Berbera Port for some time and this round of urgent discussions was by no means the first time Addis Ababa had engaged the UAE regarding Berbera. Indeed, the Ethio-UAE Joint Ministerial Commission Meeting in Abu Dhabi was held in April 2015 when the volume of trade exchange between the two countries reportedly stood at over US$1 billion and Ethiopian statistical reports ranked the UAE number eight in terms of foreign investment volume in Ethiopia (Embassy of Ethiopia, 2015; WAM, 2015). The Joint Commission Meeting was reportedly the result of an agreement to increase bilateral relations following a visit by the UAE Foreign Minister to Ethiopia that occurred as far back as 2013. While no official communiques mention Berbera specifically, statements by the UAE Foreign Minister at the time were clear: The UAE and Ethiopia would pursue projects in the Horn of Africa region deemed to be mutually beneficial (WAM, 2013).

While the Yemen conflict provided Eritrea with opportunities to leverage its strategic geographical position in order to win outside supporters and break out of isolation it also provided opportunity spaces hitherto unavailable to Addis Ababa, which duly took advantage of them. Preliminary discussions were held in March 2015 between Dubai-owned P&O Ports[12] and the government of Somaliland to develop ports in the region, particularly Berbera (Cornwell, 2016). These discussions were themselves predated by a February 2015 deal between Ethiopia and the government of Somaliland to develop the port (Davison, 2016). While the two may be unrelated, the timing indicates otherwise, particularly given Ethiopia's desire to quash the Assab deal and its admission that it still lacked resources and expertise to effectively utilize or expand the port. "Ethiopia wanted 30 percent of its trade to go via Berbera by July of 2015, according to a five-year growth plan published in 2010," noted Ethiopia's Transport Minister. Linking the desire to develop Berbera with alleviating Ethiopian dependency, he went on to say: "As much as 97 percent of shipments are still going through Djibouti because of problems with the capacity and the condition of Berbera's port, the poor state of roads to Ethiopia and the lack of international recognition for Somaliland's statehood claims" (Davison, 2016).

Ethiopia's push to develop Berbera Port and convince the UAE to abandon Assab

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[12] P&O Ports is a sister company of Dubai Ports World and though they share the same chairman, DP World is owned by Dubai investment company Dubai World while P&O Ports is owned by state entity Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation (PCFC).

were assisted by two critical developments which affected decision making in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The first was the aforementioned spat between Djibouti and DP World. The second was the slow shift in the focus of UAE military operations in Yemen from the west coast to the east of Aden, particularly the Hadramout (Pollack & Knights, 2016). Given the shift in the UAE's military focus in Yemen and the fraught relations with Djibouti,[13] the UAE's, and correspondingly DP World's, interest in Berbera increased (Fitch, 2014). In economic terms, the port be potentially lucrative given Ethiopian assurances of imports and exports and the relatively small amount of financing required to upgrade the port. In political terms, the strategic importance of Berbera increased for the UAE given its proximity to Aden and areas east and lessened to some degree the importance of Assab to the UAE.

Ethiopia's diplomatic push and offer of economic incentives, coinciding with developments across the Gulf of Aden, finally achieved Addis Ababa's desired results when, in May 2016, DP World signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years (Stevis & Fitch, 2016).

Dissecting the Berbera Deal

It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal over Berbera if it did not see at least some long-term commercial benefit.[14] Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, DP World's chairman and chief executive, portrayed Berbera Port as a future magnet for shipping to eastern Africa that would spur regional economic growth. "Investment in this natural deep-water port will attract more shipping lines to East Africa and its modernization will act as a catalyst for the growth of the country and the region's economy," he said upon the deal's signing (Stevis & Fitch, 2016). But the deal also includes political and military dimensions. First, Dubai and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding, according to the person who has seen the concession agreement, under which Dubai will support Somaliland's fisheries industry; help build the road between Somaliland and Ethiopia; build a four-star hotel in either Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, or Berbera; and grant Somalilanders favourable migration terms so they can work in the UAE.[15]

Separate to DP World's deal, the government of semi-autonomous Somaliland in Hargeisa agreed in February 2017 to the UAE establishing a military installation at Berbera. The base, only 90 kilometres from the shores of Yemen, is intended to

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[13] At the time, DP World was locked in a court battle with the government of Djibouti. In 2014, the government of Djibouti launched arbitration proceedings in London accusing DP World of paying bribes to the former chairman of the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA), Abdourahman Boreh, while the Doraleh concession was being negotiated.

[14] Confidential interview with UAE official, Dubai, February 2017.

[15] Confidential interview with Somaliland official in Hargeisa, January 2017.

help the UAE forces tighten its blockade against Yemen. The base decision was reached after a parliamentary vote in Hargeisa in February 2017 in which 144 MPs voted in favour, two voted against, two abstained and nine other opponents were escorted out of the chamber by soldiers (BBC, 2017a).

The vote for the military base and the Berbera Port deal with DP World have provoked mixed reactions in Somaliland, with popular anger aimed at Somaliland's President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud aka "Silanyo" and his family who reportedly benefited personally.[16] Anger also stems from inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry over land, particularly in the Berbera area. The Somaliland Supreme Court is reportedly interested in reviewing the deal.[17]

The anger of some in Somaliland pales in comparison to that in Mogadishu. Given the sensitivities of the SFG regarding any formal engagement with Hargeisa that would negatively affect its own claim of suzerainty over Somaliland, coupled with the official diplomatic narrative by Washington, Ankara and other capitals that emphasizes a unitary Somalia, Hargeisa has, until the Berbera Port deal, remained largely isolated with the exception of humanitarian missions (TİKA, 2014).[18] Indeed, nothing better illustrates the earth-shaking nature of the Ethiopian-driven port deal in Berbera than Mogadishu's fury. SFG ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country (Press, TV, 2017). The irritation was so palpable that the UAE withdrew its ambassador to Somalia in March 2017 and Somali MPs in Mogadishu have reportedly started a motion to sue the UAE over the Berbera base deal (Dalsan Radio Mogadishu, 2017; Harun_Maruf, 2017). The deals between Hargeisa the UAE have also triggered a legal complaint from Mogadishu (Katzman, 2017). The Somali government's auditor general, Nur Jimale Farah, announced the federal government's plans to file the complaint against the UAE on charges of violating international law. "[The] UAE has already violated our national sovereignty and airspace because of its plans to come to Somaliland without paying air space tax and without the permission of Somalia's legitimate government," Farah protested to reporters (Press TV, 2017).

While the deal was reportedly rubberstamped by the government of former SFG President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Farah accused the SFG president and others, in both Somalia and Somaliland, of corrupt practices. "We know that individuals within the leadership of Somalia and Somaliland were invited to Dubai and that they were corrupted with bags full of cash to sign the agreement," he

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[16] Confidential interview with Somaliland official in Hargeisa, June 2017.

[17] Confidential interview with Somaliland official in Hargeisa, December 2016.

[18] For example, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) only opened visible office in Hargeisa in late 2015, four years after entering Mogadishu, despite building and running schools and other projects since mid-2012.

said (GSN, 2017).

Regardless of the dissatisfaction in both Somaliland and Somalia surrounding the UAE's deal with Hargeisa, Ethiopia has engineered – largely behind the scenes – access to another port, thus enhancing its security and strategic economic interests. The reality is that with the growth in annual volumes of Ethiopian transit cargo - over nine million tons in 2011 - Ethiopia has long required alternative routes for its cargo from Djibouti (Port Strategy, 2011). With the stroke of a pen, the slowly-dying port of Berbera will see investments totaling US$442 million for the management and development of a "world-class, multi-purpose deep seaport project" (Staff Report, 2016). The UAE has also reportedly agreed to build a modern highway between Berbera Port and the Somaliland/Ethiopia border town of Wachale/Wajaale.[19] This will link with the modern highway on the Ethiopian side of the border (National Staff, 2017a). Additionally, when the deal was inked between DP World and Somaliland, Ethiopia ensured its substantive presence in the running and development of the port in the form of ESL. ESL will reportedly control a 19 percent share in the deal - almost twice as much as it initially expected to receive (Manek, 2017; Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2017). This was partially confirmed later by Hussein Ige Dayr, a spokesperson for the president of Somaliland, who noted that DP World had allocated close to one-fifth of the port's capacity for Ethiopian shipments (JOC). Somaliland Foreign Minister Saad Ali Shire further confirmed the percentage, noting that DP World sold 14 percent of its shares to Ethiopia with the government of Somaliland selling five percent of its shares to Ethiopia (National Staff, 2017b). Lastly, Ethiopia was able to engineer a formal, legally-binding agreement between the *de-facto* but unrecognized, independent state of Somaliland and the UAE. In doing so, Ethiopia further ensured the continuing Balkanization of Somalia and potentially paved the way for eventual, international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.

Conclusion

Does the case of Berbera demonstrate that Ethiopia has established an accepted and uncontested hierarchy in the Horn of Africa? The short answer is no. But Ethiopia is no longer a rising power unduly constrained by landlockedness. Berbera represents a friendly corridor across the territory of a pliant state for Ethiopian markets. Our focus on Ethiopian foreign policy vis-à-vis the wider region has attempted to address a deficiency in the scant literature on recent geopolitical developments in the Horn of Africa, particularly in regards to port developments. As noted, most of these have focused on outside powers and security situations such as the conflict in Yemen that have the triggered the engagement of external

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[19] At the time of writing, the road linking the border crossing at Wachale/Wajaale and Hargeisa was in decent repair. However, the road network heading north and east from Hargeisa to Berbera, particularly after Burao/Burco, was in need of significant improvement.

states. By focusing on Ethiopia and its aims in its near abroad, we attempt to avoid the all-too-common pitfall whereby African states are deemed as passive and lacking in agency as they are acted upon by powers or regional blocs outside the continent (Cannon, 2016b; 57). However, a few caveats are in order. First, our article pays scant attention to the actions of the ruling cadre and business-people of the Republic of Somaliland in relation to developments with the port of Berbera. An analysis of these actions, often in concert with or encouraged by Addis Ababa, as well as dissatisfaction and anger over the deal within So-maliland are beyond the scope of this article and represent a potential follow-on research project. Second, our article largely ignores Ethiopian internal politics, partially because these are outside the scope of this article and partially because of a paucity of verifiable data emanating from Ethiopia. Finally, the article's focus on Ethiopia and the UAE solely may seem odd given the multiplicity of regional and international actors operating in Somalia. However, we argue that actors such as Turkey, the UK, US, Qatar, Italy and Kenya, among others, are clustered in Mogadishu – far to the south of Somaliland. Their strategic interests are informed by the political, economic and security dynamics in that theatre and their shifting relationships with the SFG.[20]

Regional powers should be able to decisively influence the policies of neighbours to achieve their own goals. Landlocked, Addis Ababa has been unable to ascend to this role despite the material distribution of power in the region being heavily in its favour. Rankled by its dependence on Djibouti for importing and exporting its marketable goods and essential materials, Ethiopia carried out expeditionary diplomacy on behalf of Somaliland in relation to Berbera Port in order to further its own interests as far back as 2008. Yet when faced with the possibility that its enemy, Eritrea, would shake-off international isolation, Ethiopia showed adroit-ness, using connections at the governmental and sub-governmental level to steer the UAE towards Berbera and away from Assab. While Ethiopia ultimately failed to convince the UAE to abandon the Eritrean port, it succeeded in its aim of getting DP World to refurbish and further develop Berbera Port so as to handle increased Ethiopian trade and the transit of goods. At present, only two percent of Ethiopia's imports and exports come through Berbera Port, which currently only has five berths. Yet development over the course of the next three decades of Berbera port by DP World will necessarily decrease Ethiopia's tremendous reliance on Djibouti and will mean that the most developed gateway to the Horn of Africa will no longer enjoy a de facto monopoly over trade with the region's largest economy and would-be hegemon.[21]

Ethiopia's regional interests were certainly advanced significantly by the UAE-

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[20] Confidential interview with Turkish official in Mogadishu, 05 February 2017.

[21] In February 2017, DP World was cleared of all charges and a London tribunal ordered the govern-ment of Djibouti to bear legal and other costs. See Kerr & Aglionby (2017).

Somaliland Berbera Port deal. In the process, Ethiopia further bolstered its other regional security objective: ensuring a divided and weak Somalia. Brilliantly, it did so by avoiding any overt action which could later be misconstrued in Mogadishu, the UN or the AU (Staff Report, 2016). Instead, Mogadishu's ire is directed at Somaliland and the UAE. In the process, a further fractured and divided Somalia and a largely isolated Eritrea mean Ethiopia is the undisputed local power broker in the region; the regional hegemon. As further deals for ports and mineral rights continue across the northern Somali coast,[22] Addis Ababa can potentially negotiate with Somaliland, the autonomous region of Puntland and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) all separately – unofficially or officially – depending on perceived need. Ethiopia has also further cemented its hold over Somaliland. Towards Hargeisa, Ethiopia has combined pressure with material incentives to achieve its goals. While Ethiopia was instrumental in bringing in significant outside investment and recognition to Somaliland, it also increasingly meddles in internal affairs. For example, when a delegation from Somaliland was invited to visit Egypt, Ethiopia reportedly lodged a harsh diplomatic complaint against the visit to its main Nile River rival and Hargeisa cancelled the visit (Somaliland Informer, 2017). As such, Hargeisa finds itself increasingly emboldened to act as an independent actor yet constrained by the need to obtain Addis Ababa's approval. As Ethiopia begins to move increasing amounts of goods and services across its border along Somaliland's new highway to the refurbished port of Berbera, Hargeisa may begin to question key aspects of the port deal. Yet one aspect will not be in question: Ethiopia's rising power and influence over the entire region.

Bio

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[22] Dubai's P&O Ports recently won a 30-year concession to manage the port in Bosaso, 2,000km north of Mogadishu and in the autonomous region of Puntland. See Anderson (2017).

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Understanding Turkey's Behaviour and Rising Activism in International Organizations: A Socialization Approach

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Abstract

The 21st Century Republic of Turkey has adopted a more proactive approach towards regional and international organizations (IOs) and makes every effort to play a constructive and reconciliatory role on current issues. As such, while taking an interest in global issues which are prominent in the UN's agenda, has made Turkey emerge as a center for IOs. Observers of Turkish foreign policy agree that it has entered a new era of activism and in line with the new perception of Turkey's role in the world, three questions have emerged: *What justifies and characterizes this recent behaviour and activism? Which approach in international relations theory best describes this and what is the impact of this rising activism in IOs on Turkey's political conduct and on institutional norms/policies?*

Using Johnston's process-based constructivist theory which explains the effect of involvement in an international institution on both states and the institution itself through the process of socialization, this paper sets out to analyze the theoretical foundations and the dynamic nature of this activism as well as the character of Turkey's involvement in a major international institution and in addressing important global issues. We could assume that, if Turkey succeeded to promote these norms and policies, its behavior and activism were substantive. Thus our paper argues that Turkey's international organization behavior and activism towards important global issues have varied from symbolic to substantive in various phases of its involvement in major IOs like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While being aware of domestic and external international factors including security, terrorism, trade and political pressure influencing the character of Turkey's participation in IOs, this paper due to its limited extent, is focused on the factor of socialization within NATO.

Keywords

Turkey, International Behaviour and Activism, NATO, Socialization Approach

Introduction

The 21st century Republic of Turkey shows an exceptional activity on the international scene, in terms of geographical range, thematic scope and the variety of used instruments. Observers of Turkish foreign policy agree that it has entered a new era of activism over the last decade. In this regard, what merits attention is the solid organization on the part of the contemporary Turkish elites of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), to play an assertive international and regional leadership role. As highlighted by Davutoğlu, Turkey wants to become the master, shaper and serviceman of the emerging order in the Middle East and such aspirations have become more obvious over the last three years as the Middle East has been going through tectonic changes during the course of the developments associated with the Arab Spring, international terrorism and the Syrian Crisis.[1] In line with its new perception of its role in the world, Turkey has increasingly asserted itself as a rising actor that is determined to make a unique contribution to regional and global affairs. In this process, Turkish foreign policy has been transformed, not only in its content, but also in the instruments and mechanisms for formulating and conducting a proactive foreign-policy agenda (Davutoğlu 2004).

In effect, most attention has been focused on the various regions and issue areas in which Turkey's activism has been demonstrated, but less on Turkey's major restructuring of the institutional architecture to support its new regional and global agenda (Davutoğlu 2010). Nevertheless, Turkey's attitude towards international organizations has also evolved significantly over the two last decades. In this light, it's our argument in this article that Turkey's international activism and behaviour within IOs, as part of its efforts to increase its strategic autonomy, regional and international influence, should be measured through its relationship with the major western super powers under different institutional platforms. As such, one of these platforms is nothing but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the manner in which Turkey interrelates with its Western allies appears to hold out great promise to exhibit the nature, scope, and limits of Turkey's aspirations to an emerging power status. In fact, the views that Turkey seems to have adopted during the transformation process of NATO's will tell us a lot about the codes of Turkey's behavior and activism in light with its emerging power status. Notwithstanding Turkey's uncertain position within the West, especially as concerns the existing objections to its European Union (EU) membership, there are generally some fundamental differences between Turkey and other emerging countries in the context of their relationship with some Western powers within major international institutions (Akgün, 2009).

Over the last two decades, it is well-known that NATO has been going through

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[1] Turkey Owns, Leads, Serves to 'New Mideast:' Davutoğlu

a profound process of transformation which involved many dimensions, of which the efforts to define the alliance's new strategic foundation and develop relations with non-western powers stands out as a distinctive feature (Wolff, 2009). The absence of the common existential threat emanating from the communist USSR, has obliged allies within NATO to be faced with the daunting tasks of defining new threats around which they could all be united as well as draw up roadmaps on how to develop cooperative relations with the states external to the alliance. As the allies within the alliance are still far away from sharing unifying threat perceptions as during the Cold War era, the process has proved to be risky and exhaustive, hence generating strong discrepancies among NATO allies with respect to numerous issues on transformation agenda of the alliance over the last two decades (Kay, 2005).

This article does not have as aim to decipher such intra-alliance disagreements in detail but to analyze Turkey's behavior and activism during this process with a view to measuring the extent to which Turkey sees itself as part of the Western international community in terms of security considerations. *Assessing the extent to which Turkey's claim to play a more influential regional and international role as well as represents a vital, if not existential, challenge to the primacy of the West in world politics, is of vital importance in this article.* In this light, NATO appears to be the ideal institutional setting to analyze whether Turkey's **activism and behaviour** has been in harmony or contradiction with the current security order established by the Western powers. Since the threatening September 11 attacks, many of the developments that have affected and defined Western security interests have transpired in Turkey's vicinity. Turkey's collaboration or lack cooperation thereof would be essential in determining whether the West would be able to achieve its interests in the region.

From what precedes, it is therefore clear that Turkey's raising activism in IOs has an impact on Turkey's political conduct and on institutional norms/policies. *Hence the central question on how this behaviour and activism in IOs can be characterized?* In order to understand Turkey's raising activism in IOs, this paper sets out to analyze the theoretical foundations and the dynamic nature of this activism as well as the character of Turkey's involvement in major IOs and in addressing important global issues. One could assume that, if Turkey succeeded in promoting these norms and policies, its behavior and activism were substantive. Hence, we argue that Turkey's international organizational behavior and activism towards important global issues have varied from symbolic to substantive in various phases of its involvement in major international organizations. While being aware of domestic and external international factors including security, terrorism trade and political pressure influencing the character of Turkey's participation in IOs, this paper due to its limited extent, is focused on the factor of *socialization* within international

institutions (Charlotte Epstein, 2012). **Socialization** might belong to the most explanatory concepts of the real nature of institutional activism in terms of compliance with organizational values as it focuses on non-material motivations.

Against this background, the first part of article will offer a brief theoretical/conceptual discussion of socialization theory in international relations. Here the goal is to offer the conceptual lenses/processes through which analysts could make sense of the activism and behaviour that Turkey has adopted in IOs especially during NATO's transformation process. Each of these conceptual processes will tell us something different about the nature of Turkey's behaviour within NATO as a security organization.

The second part of this paper, deeply analyzes the processes of socialization with emphases on the two-way process which critically permits an emerging country like Turkey to shape the international environment without directly confronting other super powers. Caution is necessary at this stage because when analyzing Turkey's activism and behaviour within NATO, the dynamics of Turkey's relations with the USA should be taken into consideration. In effect, NATO means the USA in the eyes of Turkey's public opinion and a majority of its political elites. This also suggests that Turkey's one-way or two-way socialization strategies within the alliance should be seen as Ankara's responses to the positions adopted by the US on these issues. As an established fact, NATO first came into existence as a US foreign and security policy tool in the aftermath of the Second World War and since then, the US has overwhelmingly shaped the strategic raison d'être, policy instruments and institutional design of the alliance. As the strategic reorientation of the US away from Europe to non-European geographies evolves despite the end of the Cold War, 75% of total military expenditure within NATO is still borne by the USA alone.

In the third part, in order to explain the dynamic nature of Turkey's organizational behavior, the paper will review the character of Turkey's involvement and relationship with the US and NATO from a security perspective. In other words, this part will simply compare and contrast the explanatory value of the two socialization logics mentioned above in understanding and explaining Turkey's activism and behaviour within NATO. Particular emphasis will be placed on the time period under which Turkey has been ruled by the JDP because it is under its reign that Turkey's claims to have been an active player in most IO's and on global issues. We will conclude with a recap of the main findings of this research and offer some projections as for the future direction of Turkey's security relationship with NATO and other global issues.

Note should be taken that, this article makes use of Johnston's process-based constructivist theory which explains the effect of involvement in an IO on both states

and the institution itself through the process of socialization (Alastair Johnston, 2001). In Johnston's understanding, social interactions where non-material factors are stimulated by human contacts provide a solid pull to conform to a policy or a norm.[2] While providing a valuable explanation for the social aspect of institutional behavior, this theory often neglects the spill-over effect from various areas: mostly security and foreign policy in Turkey's case. Nevertheless, due to the focus of this paper, Johnston's theory remains most suitable for further analysis.

Socialization: An International Relations Conceptual Explanation

In social sciences, socialization is a process whereby an individual acquires a social identity and learns the norms, values and behaviour appropriate to his or her social position.[3] *International relations scholars have borrowed the concept of socialization to conceptualize the interaction between states and international society.* Thus in international relations literature, different theorists conceptualize socialization from different perspectives. Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz treat socialization as an emulating process of competitive behaviours imposed by an anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979) Following Waltz's neo-realism, Joao Resende-santos argues that military emulation is a security-enhancing strategy in response to external threats, and that emulation is a form of balancing behavior (Resende-santos,2007). The neorealist process of homogenization is not actually socialization in common-sense usage, but a typical process of selection and competition. While Kenneth Waltz's structural model is rather spare, Cameron Thies tries to enrich neo-realism by specifying the conditioning effects of competition and socialization operating on behalf of the international structure. He develops a model of the socialization process that uses role theory to demonstrate how inter-state interaction is structured at the micro-level. Consistent with neo-realism, the model assumes that socialization is heavily conditioned by material capabilities, and operates mainly on the adjustment of state behaviour (Cameron G, 2010). *Constructivists conceptualize socialization as a process of the diffusion and internalization of norms,* (Waltz, 1979, p.127-128). Different from the logic of consequence, constructivists demonstrate the effects of socialization by analyzing the logic of appropriateness.[4] In particular, the question is that of how cooperative behaviour is possible without salient material incentives. Constructivists have investigated different mechanisms of socialization, such as **social influence**, **emulation** and

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[2] Johnston, *"Explaining."* Johnston described factors pushing the socialization process which are social influence, social liking and others.

[3] For socialisation in social sciences, see Talcott Parsons and Robert Bales, Family: Socialization and Interaction Process (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 130

[4] For the distinction between logic of appropriateness and logic of consequence, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 943–69.

mimicking.[5]

Bringing socialization into international relations literature sheds new light on international politics.[6] Socialization particularly helps to uncover the mechanisms and processes of norm dynamics in international politics. For instance, socialization could spread norms, and could also consolidate norms through internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Most existing studies of socialization, however view conceptualized **socialization as a one-way process**, which is not necessarily wrong but is at least incomplete. For instance, Checkel defines socialization as 'a process inducing actors into the norms and rules of a given society'.[7] Johnston conceptualizes socialization as a process through which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling, and acting (Alastair Johnston, 2001). Johnston also argues that there are two common themes in international relations literature: **first**, socialization is most evidently directed at, or experienced by, novices and newcomers; **second**, the internalization of the values, roles, and understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a member (Alastair Johnston, 2001, p.495). Many existing studies have empirically examined how new actors are learning and internalizing the existing international norms. For instance, Johnston argues that China has socialized into the existing international norms of arms control through three mechanisms of **mimicking, persuasion and social influence**[8] (Xiaojun Li, 2010, pp. 77). In a particular period of time, socialization as a one-way process reflects the main concerns of a rising China. How to shape the evolution of international norms is not a principal concern of China's foreign policy in that period. In this sense, the one-way process of socialization described in Johnston's Social States is justifiable and reasonable.

As a general pattern, however, the current focus of socialization as a one-directional process is biased and incomplete (Suzuki, 2011, p.56.). It is necessary to move the research forward in the following respects. *First of all*, from a theoretical perspective, socialization in social theories is often viewed as a two-way process: people are not only socializees who learn social norms; they could also act as proactive agents who could influence the content and outcome of the socialization process.[9] A one-way process of socialization often ignores the agency in inter-

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[5] For different processes of socialisation, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States.

[6] For instance, Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2005), pp. 801– 26; Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe', International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2005), pp. 1013–44.

[7] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe', p. 804

[8] Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States. See also Xiaojun Li, 'Social Rewards and Socialization Effects: An Alternative Explanation for the Motivation Behind China's Participation in International Institutions', The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2010), pp. 347–77

[9] Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine, Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality, pp.

national politics.[10] It is crucial to recognize the role of agency in shaping social and political change. In international normative politics, Turkey is not only the receiver of international normative pressure; but it is also an active agency that is shaping the further evolution of international norms.[11] *Second*, socialization in international relations literature has certain theoretical biases, which will blind us from understanding the complex interactions between emerging powers and international norms. The current conceptualization of socialization in international relations has largely ignored the role of non-Western powers in shaping the evolution of international norms. Instead, socialization in international relations literature focuses on socializing non-Western powers as aliens or infants. The perspective of the socializees (non-Western powers) is hence often missing; it is always the Western powers that tell the emerging powers how to behave (Charlotte Epstein, 2012).

Furthermore, socialization literature also presumes that some states are already socialized into an international society, and that other states (mostly non-Western powers) must be adopted into this club of nations (Maximillian Terhalle, 2011). If, however, the non-Western powers are not founding members of the West-dominated international society, these non-Western powers have no inherent obligations to abide by the existing rules of the game in the first place. When non-Western powers enter into the international society, therefore, the rules of the games should at least be renegotiated. *Third*, resistance, anti-hegemonic movement, and 'weapons of the weak' have a long tradition in social sciences in general and international relations in particular (James Scott, 1985, p.45). As James Scott puts it, 'relations of dominations are, at the same time, relations of resistance'. The current concept of socialization has largely ignored the resistance of norms from non-western powers.[12] In reality, non-Western powers will not passively accept

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65–66. Socialization as a two-way process is widely accepted in the literature of sociology and social psychology. However, most literatures in international relations do not conceptualise socialisation as a two-way process

[10] For the discussion of 'agency' in a general sense, see Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, 'What is Agency?', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 4 (1998), pp. 962–1023.

[11] For instance, most studies of China's interaction with international norms have conceptualised this as one way process in which China responds to the international pressure. See Ann Kent, 'States Monitoring States: The United States, Australia, and China's Human Rights, 1990-2001', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2001), pp. 583–624; Ann Kent, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations', Global Governance, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2002), pp. 343–64. For the studies that pay more attention to the active role of the Chinese state, see Chen Dingding, 'China's Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity Perspective', The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2009), pp. 399–419; Rana Siu Inboden and Titus C. Chen, 'China's Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights', The International Spectator, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2012), pp. 45–57

[12] Resistance is related to the notion of 'anti-socialization'. See Shiping Tang, 'Foundational Paradigms of Social Sciences', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2011), pp. 227–8. It should be noted that anti-socialisation is different from a two-way process of socialisation. That said, resistance is still related to a two-way process of socialisation. Resistance (or anti-socialization) could prepare

pressure from the dominant Western powers. **Fourth**, norm diffusion in international politics is not simply about whether and how ideas matter, but also whose ideas matter (Acharya, 2004). In other words, many studies on socialization do not carefully examine the question of who is socializing whom (Alice D, 2006). The existing constructivist and liberal studies on norms dynamics often focus on cases of normative transformation in which 'good' international norms prevail over the 'bad' local norms. Thus, socialization tends to be apprehended as a bettering of the socializee (non-Western powers), because of an implicit teleological assumption of normative change as international progress. As Acharya emphasizes, however, many local beliefs and practices are themselves part of a legitimate normative order, which conditions the acceptance of international norms.

Thus, it is necessary to provide a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit these agents' identities (Acharya, 2004) In norms dynamics, local actors will not either wholly accept the existing norms or totally reject them. Instead, socialization involves both resisting and reframing international norms in a particular context. Furthermore, socialization of emerging powers is not only concerned about normative socialization; emerging powers could also play a more active role in spreading their own ideas and norms in international society. Through a **two-way process**, therefore, emerging powers will shape the further change of international norms. **Finally**, from an empirical perspective, the dominant orientation of socialization cannot explain certain new patterns of interaction between emerging powers and international norms. With respect to international political change, existing theories in international politics often focus on how non-Western powers are socialized into the existing international norms. There are few discussions on how these powers will shape the emergence of new norms. Empirically, the one-way process of socialization is increasingly incompatible with the two-way process of socialization in international politics. *The other side of the story how emerging powers might influence the evolution of norms has been relatively under-theorized*, but it is also becoming more salient in international politics. To understand international political change, it is crucial to investigate the behaviours and perspectives of emerging powers.

Based on these theoretical and empirical reasons, this paper *conceptualizes socialization as a two-way process of interaction between nation-states and the existing international society.* Socialization as a two-way process is similar to the notion of *'reciprocal socialization'*: 'rising powers are socialized into the existing international order, while reshaping the order when they enter' (Maximillian Terhalle, 2011). Empirically, this paper focuses on how emerging powers like Turkey are

conditions for a new process of socialization. In other words, once the resister with an anti-hegemonic ideology becomes new dominant power, the new power could socialise others with new norms. Thanks to Tang Shiping for pointing this out.

shaping the emerging change of international norms. The spread of norms is not a one-way process in which local actors act as the students of transnational norm entrepreneurs. A more interactive understanding of the process is warranted in which non-Western powers are not just passive novices in international norms but proactive agents that shape their further evolution. Despite its increasingly critical stance in regard to the global governance institutions and their decision-making mechanisms in recent years, the normative challenges to Turkey and its behavioural posture within the current international order need to be nuanced from those of the other rising powers in the Global South. Turkey's complaints about the current international order are not informed by an anti-Western attitude or Third Worldist ideology, but clearly fall into the framework of a within-system challenge. Most researches have touched on the "normative" dimension of Turkish foreign policy through an in-depth analysis of Turkey's understanding of international law, justice and ethics and of its shifting approach to the UN over the years. It is known that the increasing normatively and cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy under the AK Party government have been harshly criticized by some political and academic circles both inside and outside the country in recent years. It is thus important to draw on the regional and international activism to Turkey's regional and global rise, as is done in this paper.

Socialization Process and Rising Powers: Mapping Turkey's International Behaviour and Activism

In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of academic studies on changes in the current international order and the way the so-called emerging powers have been contributing to these changes through their behaviours and strategies of global governance (Fontaine & Kliman , 2013). Hot debates are still ongoing in academic and political circles about whether, despite their normative challenges to the current order, these emerging states have been successfully integrated into the rule based and open liberal international order through international cooperation or have been destabilizing the liberal global governance with the aim of changing the order and functioning of global governance institutions according to their own interests. If a power transition is currently under way in the international system, how the emerging, middle and major powers are facing the systemic, regional and domestic effects of this transition remains as a fundamental question requiring an answer. In this light, socialization is crucial to the process of international political change: socialization will help define whose norms and ideas are accepted as legitimate in the international society, and what kind of social purpose a new world order will embrace.

Socialization as a One-way Process: Turkey as Norm Taker

Socialization as a one-way process is not necessarily wrong, but it is incomplete.

Here, it is a question of discussing why emerging powers such as Turkey are accepting some existing norms, and will also evaluate to what extent Turkey is still a norm-taker. Socialization as a one-way process is pertinent to the early stage of the development of Turkey. This is because of several reasons. **First** of all, at an early stage, the top priority of emerging powers is to integrate with the existing norms so as to be accepted as normal countries in international society. Thus, learning new norms could benefit the newcomers. **Second**, at the early stage, emerging powers are not strong enough to impose their own agenda in international society; they face a hegemonic system dominated by the West. International hegemony refers not only to concentrated material capabilities but also to ideological and institutional control.

Internationally, Turkey's socialization is related to Turkey's efforts to become a *"normal state"*, a *"pivotal state"*, a *"regional power"*, or a *"middle power"* in international society (Walter Bryce, 1956). During this early stage of Turkey's development, the major problematic of Turkey's international studies is that of how to deal with its relationship with the existing international society. Integration could hence be regarded as a core issue of Turkey's international relation theorizing. This one-directional process of socialization could also be applied to the case of India. Experiencing various frustrations after independence, India learned hard lessons, and was gradually socialized into the international system by emulating the behaviours of other great powers. In addition, whether an emerging power is a norm-taker or a norm-maker might depend on the specific context. For instance, in Turkey's foreign aid policy, Turkey's socialization into international norms varies with the thickness of the institutional environment. Turkey is emerging as a quite self-confident donor country and considers itself to be an alternative to both traditional as well as other new aid providers. As such, it shares the same underlying concepts of development cooperation as OECD-DAC donor countries. Thus many OECD-DAC donors are very interested in implementing triangular cooperation projects together with Turkey" (Jeannine Hausmann, 2014). At the regional level, Ankara is bolstering its influence over the norms and practices of regional developmental institutions (Aktaş, 2010). In a general sense, emerging powers are still norm takers in some issue areas, and continue to internalize certain exiting liberal norms, including free trade, market economy and the openness of the international system.

Socialization into the liberal order has strengthened the miraculous growth of emerging powers such as Turkey and Brazil. Emerging powers have been successful players under the existing liberal order, which states consider legitimate because it benefits not just the Western powers but all countries willing to invest in the system. Because the Western-led liberal order has provided emerging powers with unparalleled opportunities to become stronger, safer and more respected,

emerging powers largely pursue a grand strategy of integration, participating in international regimes and forming a largely accommodative relationship with the community of Western nations. From this perspective, democratic liberalism is universally valid and all major powers including Turkey will eventually become democratic (Gökçenay, 2011).

In summary, socialization as a one way process is particularly relevant at the early stage of emerging powers' development, but socialization as a one-directional process is incomplete. The next section will illustrate why socialization as a two-way process could help us better understand the more complex interactions between Turkey and international norms. As Turkey's power and influence grow, she will not passively accept the normative preferences of the Western powers. From this perspective, international legitimacy does not just mean emerging powers accept the status quo of the existing normative order. International legitimacy of great power status implies that the emerging powers want to have a say in defining which norms are legitimate in international society.

Socialization as a Two-way Process: Turkey as Norm Shaper

Emerging powers like Turkey do not accept all the rules of the game in the existing order, and attempt to shape the environment without directly confronting the hegemon. This is similar to the notion of **'reformist revisionist'** proposed by Barry Buzan: these emerging powers are not challenging the fundamental rules of the game, but are trying to incrementally change the system or at raise their voices within it. (Buzan, 2010) In this process, emerging powers are not only acting as norm-takers; they are also increasingly acting as norm-shapers. It is crucial to investigate how emerging powers are resisting certain norms and also trying to shape the evolution of international norms. The attitudes and behaviours of emerging powers could be viewed as those of rightful resistance. (O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, 2006) Consistent with the notion of rightful resistance, emerging powers take advantage of opportunities and authorized channels within the order to make relative gains, and to contest particular behaviours of the hegemon. (O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, 2006: 2) The strategy of rightful resistance can have opposite goals. It can strengthen the state's position for the purpose of working within the established order, or for the purpose of waging a hegemonic bid to overturn that order when doing so becomes a viable option. Accordingly, the strategy works for both limited-aims revisionists and unlimited-aims revisionists. Although emerging powers cannot balance the economic and military power of the western powers in the short term, emerging powers have been contesting the current order in several ways. From a socialization perspective, emerging powers are accepting certain existing norms and also trying to shape the further evolution of international norms. *How do emerging powers act like norm-shapers?*

First, emerging powers challenge the notion that Western ideas and culture are superior to those of the rest of the world (Kishore Mahbubali, 2008). Oliver Stuenkel, a scholar from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (a leading think-tank in Brazil), reflects on the American domination of ideas in international relations. He asks whether scholars from emerging powers could generate new ideas to solve global problems. In practice Turkey never initiated nor collaborated with counter hegemonic projects. Turkey strives for global change, but is not challenging the existing world order as such. (Kardaş, 2013: 651-653) On the contrary, Turkish power is deeply embedded in the Western international system (Cagaptay, 2013). Foreign Minister Davutoğlu deems it necessary to readjust the current balance of power, which should reflect the rise of new powers (Davutoğlu, 2010: 39-40). "There will be some inevitable changes in the current global political and economic system, the UN structure of governance, and the relations between countries and nation around the world. Our goal and mission is to place Turkey among those countries that will shape the new global system." (Justice and Development Party, 2012: 56) As such Turkey wants to contribute to the new world order through its activities in the UN Security Council, NATO, G20 and the Alliance of Civilizations. (Davutoğlu, 2010: 44) Turkey has been working in an institutional framework set up by the West, but it pursues reforms making these institutions to take into account the interests of new powers.

Second, emerging powers emphasize on their sovereignty and independence, and are hence hesitant to participate in the humanitarian interventions that the West often initiates. The normative preferences for sovereignty have significant impacts on the foreign policy behaviours of those emerging powers. For instance, in the case of the Somalian crisis, Ankara's interests are complex to the extent that concern about the implications of humanitarian intervention is more crucial than natural resources in determining its policy towards Somalia. Turkey is thus more influential than liberal democratic states in formulating the rules of humanitarian intervention in Somalia due to a lack of political will in the West (Özcan, 2015:4). The normative preferences of Turkey undoubtedly played a decisive role in shaping NATO's projects like the NATO Missile Defense System and decisions like the 2011 Libyan intervention, as well as NATO's operations in Afghanistan (Özcan, 2011). Another pillar of Turkey's conflict resolution ambitions is its contribution to intercultural understanding through the "UN Alliance of Civilizations" initiative. This initiative was launched in 2005 by Spain and Turkey as a reaction to the "clash of civilizations" thesis of Samuel Huntington, the 11 September 2001 attacks, and the 11 March 2004 attack in Madrid. (Balcı & Miş, 2008: 389-392) The project aims at stemming the atmosphere of mutual distrust, fear and polarization between the Islamic world and the West by gathering a broad coalition to foster greater cross-cultural tolerance and understanding. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s.d. g) Turkey launched in 2010, together with Finland, the

"UN Mediation for Peace Initiative", which aims at enhancing preventive diplomacy and mediation capacity of the UN, regional organizations and individual countries. The "Friends of Mediation Group", established by Turkey, Finland and Switzerland in March 2014 in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), serves as a platform for sharing best practices for peace-making. Istanbul now hosts the "Istanbul Conferences on Mediation, annually hold since February 2012. Turkey proposes to establish a "UN Retreat Center" in Istanbul to be used for the UN's mediation activities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s.d. e).

Third, emerging powers are using multilateral forums to influence the evolution of international norms. Turkey was the first non-western country to host the 4th "UN Conference on the LDCs" in May 2011. This conference addressed the needs of 48 states, with a combined population of 900 million people, displaying the lowest indicators of HDI (Haşimi, 2014: 137). The conference ended with the "Istanbul Declaration" and an agreement about the "Istanbul Programme of Action". Turkey is prepared to accommodate an "International Science, Technology and Innovation Center" and an "International Agriculture Center", both dedicated to the LDCs. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s.d. h) Turkey also hosted the first "World Humanitarian Summit" in Istanbul in 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, s.d. k).

Finally, emerging powers want to have a say in defining what kind of norms should be regarded as legitimate in international society. As mentioned earlier, Ankara has become a shaper of international humanitarian norms. Although Ankara has not obstructed the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it has placed its main efforts behind the state capacity-building functions of the R2P mandate. It has also worked to ensure R2P's focused application and a definition that constrains the operational methods associated with humanitarian intervention. Ankara has aimed to develop the norm in a direction that gives primacy to the preventative aspects of R2P in hopes of diminishing the instances where the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is breached (Foot, Rosemary 2011). Certain emerging countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, feel betrayed by the Western interpretation of the mandate under UNSC resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya. The UNSC resolution legitimated an initial series of strikes against Libyan air defences, but the emerging powers wanted the West to consider a settlement with Gaddafi after the initial strikes, and were shocked by the extension of the campaign into one of regime change. The Libya experience led to the formulation of the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) concept, which seeks to introduce more rigorous criteria with respect to the use of force in humanitarian intervention (Wright Thomasm, 2012).

Despite all this, UNSC has never mentioned an R2P norm in its Syria policy. Turkey, in the absence of the Security Council's as promotion of the norm, tried

to attract members of the international community to the carnage in Syria. In its calls to the international community, Turkey referred to the grave violations in Syria and to the extensive sufferings of the Syrian people, suggesting that the international community needed to replace the Syrian central government given that it became apparent the people were longer protected. A major initiative as part of this policy was Friends of Syria, an unofficial gathering of states expressing support for the opposition and/or the people in Syria. This bold initiative demonstrated some success in the initial stages. Turkey was able to attract more than 90 countries to this loose alliance. The initiative however, further required a strong and consolidated opposition which would have to prove its competence in order to replace the Assad regime. The example of the Friends of Syria illustrates the trend whereby emerging powers do not just act as norm-takers; they also want to be norm-shapers in international affairs.

In a nutshell, the relationship between Turkey and international norms is much more complicated than previously assumed. Emerging powers are accepting certain norms while shaping the further evolution of norms in other aspects. It is essential to investigate how ideas matter and also whose ideas matter in world politics. Socialization is not just a one-directional process through which emerging non-Western powers learn and internalize the existing norms; it is also a process through which emerging powers shape the evolution of international norms. The perspective of non-Western powers should be regarded as part of a legitimate normative order as will be illustrated through the behaviour and activism of Turkey within NATO.

Analyzing Turkey's Behaviour and International Activism within NATO

Turkey's position within NATO from a historical-institutional perspective shows that its approach toward the alliance has been simultaneously shaped from two different perspectives from the beginning of its membership in 1952. *Primo*, the fact that the alliance has been first and foremost a security alliance and balancer in the minds of Turkish elites and public opinion, Turkey tried to balance external threats levelled against its security through the NATO (Oğuzlu, 2012a). *Secondo*, Turkey's membership in NATO also implies that she has been a member of the Western international community and thus the qualifications of her Western/European identity have long been assured through her membership in the alliance. In this light, NATO symbolized not only the togetherness of a set of states which are united around common norms and identities but also the collective will of the Western powers to hold resolute opposition against the security threat posed by the hard-power potentials of USSR and the communist bloc. In effect, it is not only the survival of these norms and values in the face of the ideological and identity-oriented challenges posed by the communist world during the Cold War, but also the territorial security of the allies that was at stake (Sjursen, 2004).

Due to Turkey's geopolitical position and military capabilities, it was relatively easy for her to be admitted to the Western world through NATO as compared to the thorough and exhaustive EU membership process. She had never been asked to fulfil some membership criteria before her eventual accession because right from the very start, she has always been in an advantageous position within the alliance because of her hard-power capabilities and prerogatives. This has not only improved Turkey's leverage within the NATO from an instrumental perspective but also ensured the legitimacy of Turkey's claim to being a Western/ European country from an identity-related perspective. In fact, Turkey's commitments to NATO were guaranteed by security and identity-related considerations notwithstanding the occasional rise of anti-NATO and anti-USA feelings during the lengthy Cold War period. As an illustration, Turkish political and security elites remained committed to NATO from security and identity-related perspectives due to the Cyprus crisis in 1964, the opium crisis in 1971 and embargo crisis in 1975–78. Through its membership in NATO, Turkey was not only *in* but also *of* the West (Oğuzlu, 2012b).

There have been radical shifts in Turkey's definition of national identity and national security interests during the post Cold War era, which have indirectly affected Turkey's view of the alliance. In effect, due to the evaporation of the existential USSR threat, and the more pronounced non-Western/European dimensions of Turkey's national identity, one can affirm that Turkey's security feeling has improved (Öniş, 1995). From this perspective, it is clear the developments taking place more in the Middle East than in Europe began affecting Turkey's security as well as the intensification in her quest for a multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign policy orientation. These trends have simultaneously manifested themselves as regards in Turkey's policies within NATO thanks to added new momentum of the AKP. In this light, just as the alliance has gone through a two decades tumultuous period since the early 1990s while defining its new rationale in the absence of Soviet threat, Turkey has also experienced a significant shift in terms of its national identity and interests (Holmberg, 2011). To this effect, NATO's main transformational characteristics are:

Firstly, new countries have been admitted into the membership of NATO many of whom are the former communist countries of the Warsaw Pact who joined the alliance between the 1990s and the 2000s. **Secondly**, crisis management capabilities have been obtained by NATO in addition to its collective defence functions. This is in response to the intra-state kind of security challenges posed by the developments taking place on the peripheries of the alliance. In the same vein, within this period, NATO has organized many peacekeeping and peacemaking operations principally in the Balkans. Likewise in the context of NATO's extension toward non-European geographies, out-of-area operations of the alliance

have also taken place with one landmark development being that of NATO's mission in Afghanistan. This implies that the alliance has gradually transformed from being a collective defence organization in charge of Article 5 missions into being a collective security organization in charge of non-Article 5 missions. **Thirdly**, there has been an increase replacement of the territorial defence function of NATO's militaries by war-making expeditionary capabilities. Ultimately, the alliance has in this regard increasingly come more under American influence at the expense of the European allies alongside its out-of-areaization process. NATO has increasingly become a post European security organization at the service of American global security interests rather than remaining as a traditional European organization (Mowle & Sacko,2007). From what precedes, the next sub-section of this paper tries to decipher Turkey's changing behaviours and activism toward NATO by examining the explanatory value of the norm-taker and norm-shaper logics mentioned above in a comparative manner.

Turkey as Norm Taker within NATO

The norm-taker dynamics or the one-way socialization process in Turkey's relations with NATO has witnessed various examples in recent years. Within this context, the first important point to highlight is the of the actions of the ruling JDP political elites, most especially that of the former Prime Minister, Davutoğlu, who has on several occasions underlined that Turkey's aim within the alliance is to become one of the "owners" of NATO, but to be an issue or object of the transformation process (Davutoğlu, 2012: 7). Ankara political elites are generally prone to believe that Turkey is somehow an influential strategic actor on its own regardless of Turkey's long membership in NATO. Under such instances, whenever NATO adopts decisions, Turkey acts as if it does not have a role to play in the formulation. General beliefs used to be that decisions within NATO were made in Brussels between the US and other important European allies and Turkey simply responded to them. Nevertheless, this ideology has begun to change in recent times, since top-ranking JDP political figures are adopting the view that Turkey's role and mission within NATO is or should be that of helping shape the formation and implementation of the preferences and policies of the alliance. In effect, Turkey is not different from other European allies or the US in terms of its capacity to affect NATO's policies. As a legitimate member, it is Turkey's right and mission to get involved in all the policies and steer the future direction of NATO. Ankara has to make its views known by other allies in various NATO platforms as well as should not behave reactively in the transformation process. This implies that instead of ignoring, sidestepping or delegitimizing NATO, Turkey has grown more resolved than ever in helping shape the transformation process of NATO. Turkey's view of the alliance as a legitimate security actor and its willingness to identify itself with NATO, attests to this resolution.

Over the last two decades and with the reign of the JDP, helping shape NATO policies as well as owning it, are very much in line with the changing Turkish foreign policy mentality. This has been manifested in the following ways: Primo, Turkey's *socialization to the liberal foundations of the 21st century NATO*. From this perspective, it appears that Ankara is not at odds with the strengthening of the alliance's international identity as a liberal security community as well as NATO's efforts to project those values across the world. Generally speaking, NATO used to have three fundamental tasks in 1949 when was first established: keeping the US in, Germany down and Russia outside of Europe. These responsibilities fit the collective defence organizational identity of NATO. Nevertheless, the togetherness of likeminded states that share liberal-democratic values in common is also represented by NATO. Following the end of the Cold, this characteristic of NATO began to be more visible as the former communist states demonstrated a strong determination to join NATO to strengthen their western identity and liberal-democratic transformation. NATO's effort to develop closer security cooperation with Balkan, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus and Gulf region countries as well as its enlargement toward the former communist countries cannot solely be understood from a realpolitik perspective. In effect, the implementation of these policies also attest to the fact that allies' are determined to enlarge their liberal-democratic security community outside the traditional NATO area (Flockhart, 2010:3).

Illustrations of Turkey's adoption of the norm-taker strategy are, the country's active support to NATO's enlargement toward central and Eastern Europe as well as efforts of NATO to reach out to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries through the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiatives (Davutoğlu, 2012). Secondly, Ankara has taken a leading role in the strengthening of security cooperation between NATO and Eastern Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and Gulf region states. The enhancement of NATO's relations with these states in the fields of energy security, weapons of mass destruction, piracy and terrorism, through cooperation, has motivated Turkey to support such policies. This realpolitik of security cooperation seems also to have been informed by the ideational concern that these countries would gradually evolve into more democratic entities at home through cooperation with the Western international community. As such, on different occasions Turkish political elites have highlighted that the future transformation of these states would be shaped through liberal-democracy. The internal liberal democratic transformation of Turkey, illustrates this point to a significant degree (Oğuzlu,2011). Thirdly, Turkey's view of NATO from an identity perspective is also because of the growing reluctance of the EU members to admit Turkey to membership. In the eyes of Turkish decision-makers, it is clear that as the prospects for Turkey's Europeanization decreased, despite the fact that the negotiations for its accession formally

started, NATO appears to have gained some of the ground it lost in the past. As long as Turkey membership is denied by the EU, the alliance has continued to preserve its unrivalled status of being the most significant western international organization legitimizing Turkey's Western identity. We should bear in mind that from strategic and identity-related perspectives, Turkey's membership in Western international organizations is generally supported by the US, rather than European countries particularly those within the EU, (Tocci, 2012).

In effect, another good demonstration of the salience of the norm-taker logic lies in the fact that during the approval of NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in November 2010, Turkey sided with all other allies. From a close look, it is evident that threat perceptions of Turkey do significantly match with those of its allies within NATO (Özel, 2010). In November 2010, during the adoption of NATO's latest strategic concept in Lisbon, Turkey, together with other allies, played a key role, according to which collective defence, crisis management operations and comprehensive security were the three core missions of the alliance (*Active Engagement, Modern Defense Strategic Concept*). From what precedes, norm-taker process can be comforted in the fact that Turkey values the idea that NATO continues to represent the transatlantic security community rather than seeing the alliance become a relic of the past. As compared to other emerging countries that will probably be happy to see NATO destroyed, Turkey feels concern about some developments that might inadvertently engender the cohesion of the alliance and thus seems to have been acting as an ardent supporter of the NATO. To demonstrate this, it is important to highlight the fact that, the two shores of the North Atlantic area differ from each other in terms of security conceptualizations have been observed in the last two decades. In other words, NATO's European allies have increased their efforts to bestow the EU with distinctive institutional and military capabilities so that the Union could act as an autonomous security actor independent of the alliance, (Howorth, 2003) while the strategic attention of the US has increasingly been turned to non-European geographies and side-stepped the common institutional decision-making mechanisms of NATO in formulating its policies (Hallams, 2009). Within this context, Turkey has been keen on the point that the institutional strength and cohesiveness of the Atlantic security community should not be weakened by its European allies (Aykan, 2005).

On the other hand, during Drump's Era in the White House, Turkey has equally felt sympathetic toward the calls made by the USA for credible increases in the funds that European allies spend on defence and security. In effect, from a US standpoint, the reluctance by Europe to increase defence expenditures would probably end up with the detachment of America from the European security and thus a further erosion of NATO. While designing and implementing it's foreign and security policies, the US will continue taking NATO into consid-

eration and giving it more importance if and only if there is an increase in the European input in the alliance. In this light, for the US to treat NATO seriously and to give its consent to the idea that it be constrained by NATO's multilateral decision-making process, there would have to be an equal sharing of the task within the alliance. As compared to other rising countries that would love to see NATO weaken, Turkey has always expressed concerns whenever future of NATO as a credible security organization starts being contested. Turkey has not only felt uneasy whenever unilateralist foreign and security policy tendencies soared in America but has also only been against the attempts on the part of some European allies at turning the EU into a distinctive security actor independent of the alliance. In this perspective, Turkey objected to both the US inclinations to overlook the NATO at worst or turn it into an institutional platform conferring legitimacy to US-led wars in non-Western geographies at best as well as the European attempts at weakening NATO's security role and mission in Europe.

It is important to note that during discussions on constructing a larger Western international security community, Turkish political elites would like to see Turkey being accorded a prestigious place encompassing the USA, EU and Turkey as equal members within a trilateral platform. Also worth remembering is the fact that, from the perspectives of both Turkey and the Western powers alike, security used to the initial driving force of Turkey's Westernization process. For quite a sometime now, Turkey's feeling of security has been associated with the transformation of the country in line with Western/European norms at home as well as its membership in Western institutions, especially NATO. On the other hand, Turkey has been approached by Western powers from an instrumental perspective in that, in Western and non-Western geographies, her western values would increase proportionally to its potential contribution to the materialization of Western security interests. The remarkable issue in the norm-taker process is that, political elites in Ankara turn to remember Turkey's membership in NATO whenever Turkey's feeling of insecurity is increased, predominantly owing to the developments taking place in the Middle East. This is usually due to the incapability of Turkey to deal with the negative effects of the growing instability in the Middle East on its national security. As such, the fact that in 1991 and 2003, Turkey asked the alliance to deploy air defence systems on its soil and agreed to the instalment of Patriot missile defence systems provided by some allies, simply attest to Turkey's view of the alliance as a security provider. Additionally, Turkey also accepted to host the radar components of the NATO-led missile defence shield system in late 2011. In effect, this decision alone on the part of the JDP government in Ankara speaks volumes in terms of Turkey's norm-taker relationship with the US and NATO. The implication of this decision is that Turkey is a part of the western security system and its ability to deal with the Middle Eastern-originated security threats without NATO is not as high as some on-

lookers might believe.

Turkey as Norm Shaper within NATO

Within the norm-shaper logic, Turkey increases its efforts to help influence NATO's policies to make sure that they do not affect its global and regional foreign policy vision. In other words, this process is very much in line with the question of entrapment versus abandonment because through the two-way socialization process, the political elites of Ankara wanted to make sure that neither did NATO abandon Turkey nor that Turkey gets entrapped in unwanted contingencies (Güvenç & Özel, 2012). Additionally, Ankara shouldn't find itself in a position to have to choose between its Western allies on the one hand and non-NATO neighbours on the other. From this perspective, Turkey tries to develop cooperative strategic relations with the influential actors across the world and is thus considered to be a multi-identity country that feels at home wherever it looks. To policy-makers in Turkey, China and Russia are as important as European allies as well as the US and thus Ankara should not put all of its eggs in the same basket (Davutoğlu, 2012). As an illustration, remember that Ankara was in support of both the adoption of the ballistic missile defence capability and NATO's enlargement, however simultaneously put forward some reservations. The reason advanced by Turkey was simply that NATO's enlargement toward Eastern Europe should not make Russia to feel besieged because this might result in Russia adopting aggressive and confrontational stance in the wider Black Sea and Caucasus regions. The improving relations between Turkey and Iran should not put into jeopardy and signal that Turkey is eager to cooperate with the imperial Western powers due to the adoption of the ballistic missile defence capability by NATO. The forces deployed by NATO in Afghanistan and other predominantly Muslim-inhabited countries should not impact on the improving image of Turkey in the Muslim world.

Nevertheless, though, Turkey went along with the consensus view within NATO, the two-way socialization process appears to have also played a role in Turkey's initial reaction to the appointment of former Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen as the Secretary General of NATO. This was simply because Rasmussen had a negative image in the eyes of Muslims scattered across Europe and other regions due to his remarks on the infamous Cartoon crisis. During the Libyan crisis, this perspective came to the fore where by the NATO operation to oust Qaddafi from power was initially objected by Turkey because it also lacked the support of other international bodies, particularly the Arab League, the African Union and the OIC. This would have also implied that Turkey was not that different from imperial Western powers. Any NATO-led military involvement in Libya was highly criticized by Turkey for fear that such a development result in characterization of NATO as a tool in the hands of Western imperial powers thus simultane-

ously leading to the erosion of Turkey's hard-gained positive image across the Muslim world. Turkish political elites made the point that NATO should not be considered as an instrument forcing regime changes in predominantly Muslim countries (Ismail, 2011). Turkey also wanted to balance France through NATO during the Libyan crisis and thus Turkey seems to have supported the idea that any international military operation in the country should be conducted by a relevant international organization authorized by the UN rather than seeing France and the UK undertake a unilateral military operation in Libya.

Turkey's position on the NATO's involvement in Libya is not a successful example of the application of the norm-shaper strategy. She could not prevent NATO from getting militarily involved in Libya because her norm-shaper strategy had been limited to the definition of the operation modalities of the alliance. Nevertheless a good example of Turkey's two-way socialization process within NATO took place in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century when Turkey ferociously reacted to US' proposal on the deployment of NATO forces in the Black Sea as part of the ongoing war on global terrorism. In effect the fear was simply that such moves would antagonize Russia with which Turkey began to develop closer strategic and economic relations since the early 1990s (Çelikpala, 2010). Ankara's norm-shaper strategy can also be noticed in Turkey's efforts to prevent the US from using NATO platforms to secure legitimacy for the US-led military operations across the world (Aybet, 2012). Thus, the reaching of NATO outside its traditional area of should not erode the alliance's core functions as well as it's European and collective defence identity should be preserved. From Ankara's standpoint, the Americanization and globalization of NATO would likely run the risk of eroding alliance's European identity and consequently putting the credentials of Turkey's European identity at risk. This would also dilute the alliance's multilateral decision-making process, thus forcing Turkey, like other allies, to have bilateral dealings with US. Unquestionably, this would reduce Turkey's bargaining power vis-a `-vis Washington. The fact that Turkey felt exceedingly alarmed when America ignored the UN and NATO on the eve of the military operation against Iraq in March 2003 is a very good illustration.

From what proceeds, in the minds of Turkish Political Elites, 21st century NATO should not evolve into a global war machine that unilaterally intervenes in war zones and even without the permission of the UN. As such, Turkish new foreign policy understanding asserts that, the globalization of the alliance should not culminate in strengthening polarizations of multiple kinds all over the globe. In effect, the alliance should not transform into an institutional platform based on the idea of insiders versus outsiders. This transatlantic alliance should not evolve to become a platform of global democracies that would automatically adopt an exclusionary approach toward the countries which are not members of NATO.

(Davutoğlu, 2012). From Turkey's perspective, the basis of legitimacy for other kind of international military as well as NATO-led operations should rest with the UN. This shows Ankara's sensitivities toward having cooperative relations with the non-Western members of the UN Security Council, namely Russia and China.

Conclusion

From the analysis above, it is clear that in the coming decades, rising powers like Turkey will change the distribution of material power as well as challenge the Western domination of ideas and norms in the international society. So far, existing literature focuses on how Turkey is learning and internalizing the existing liberal norms. How she will shape the evolution of international norms is understudied. To redress this imbalance, this article has investigated the attitudes of Turkey to international norms. By conceptualizing socialization as a two-way process this paper has analyzed how Turkey behaves and interacts with the international society: Turkey is accepting certain international norms while trying to shape the further evolution of international norms as a whole.

In this light, Turkey does not necessarily oppose all the existing norms because in practice, it never initiated nor collaborated with counter hegemonic projects but strived for a global change while refusing to challenge the existing world order as such (Kardaş, 2013: 651-653). Turkey's power is deeply embedded in the Western international system (Cagaptay, 2013) and as such, socialization as a one-way process is still relevant in the early stage of Turkey's development. At the early stage, the top priority of Turkey is to integrate with the existing norms so as to be accepted as normal country in the international society while facing a Western-dominated hegemonic system. For instance, as a rising power, the major problematic of Turkey's international studies is that of how to deal with its relationship with the existing international society. Integration, therefore, could be regarded as a core issue of Turkey's international relation theorizing and thus, whether Turkey is a norm-taker or a norm-shaper might also depend on the specific context. Furthermore, Turkey holds to significant normative differences on issues such as liberal democracy and security. In other words, Turkey knows what she wants, but does not have a consensus on what she wants for a new world order.

From what precedes, this article has equally shown that Turkey's behavior and international activism within NATO can be more convincingly explained through the norm shaper and norm taker prisms of socialization. The fact that, Turkey values its membership the alliance and tries to impact its transformation process is in itself a testimony. The major difference between the two is that as concerns the norm shaper logic, Turkey's motivation is to help mitigate the negative consequences of the transformation of NATO on its national security interests, mostly

defined from an "Ankara-centric" perspective. Within this context, Turkey is defining its interest from a unilateral perspective and takes great care in ensuring that NATO's transformation policies do not impact it negatively. As such, Turkey does not identify itself with the NATO to the same extent as was the case during the Cold War era. Concerning the norm-taker logic, Turkey's goal is to rise with the West, which here defined as NATO and thus she finds the constitutive norms of the alliance legitimate and tries to adopt them in her efforts to feel more secure. In addition, she tries to prove the European and Western credentials of her national identity by helping the alliance promote and protect her values onto non-western geographies. This logic seems to convincingly explain why Turkey participated in NATO-led peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as well as unconditionally supported NATO's efforts to establish strong institutional and strategic relations with the countries located in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and Gulf regions.

In effect, the most important indications of Turkey's norm-taker logic to the alliance are on the one hand Turkey's determination to see that the transatlantic security community as represented by NATO continues to exist intact and on the other hand the strengthening of the discourse that Turkey is now an owner of the alliance rather than an object or issue of NATO's transformation process. Thus in the future, one can argue that Turkey's commitment to NATO will likely continue since she deeply feels the negative consequences of the emerging security environment in the Middle East in the context of the so-called Arab Spring and Syrian Crisis on its national security. In the context of the ballistic missile defense, Turkey's decision to concur with the installment of radar facilities of NATO can be interpreted as a sign of Turkey's continuing need to rely on security provided by NATO. The emerging polarizations across the globe appear to be decisive for Turkey's rediscovery of the alliance.

From the results one can consider that Turkey is fully on board with the established Western powers as regards the constitutive norms of the current international order. Turkey appears to share many points with other rising powers as she is sensitive on the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference in states' internal affairs. Rising powers do share the idea that the current international order should be revised in such a way that it can reflect the existing power configurations as well as the incorporation of the non-western contributions to global governance and justice. With this notion in mind, it is clear that the world in the 21st century is heading towards multiple versions of modernity and the legitimate model of political order will be more diverse, and the 'standard of civilization' renegotiated.

Hence, discussions on Turkey and international norms have significant implications for international normative order. First of all, the study challenges the con-

ventional wisdom that Turkey is either fundamentally challenging the status quo or integrated into the existing liberal order. The debate about America's century or China's century might miss the third likely trajectory: emerging world order will not be dominated by a single superpower, and the world must prepare for a 'world order without superpowers' (Barry Buzan, 2011). As Charles Kupchan argues, the emerging world might be 'no one's world'. (Kupchan, Charles, 2012). In terms of normative order, both the Western powers and Turkey must live in a more diverse world. Second, a dilemma confronts the Western powers. One the one hand, the West must cooperate with Turkey to address the common concerns of global issues such as international terrorism and security, migration and refugee crisis e.t.c. However, western countries also worry about challenges from Turkey to the existing liberal order. As discussed previously, the Turkey does not necessarily oppose all the existing liberal norms. Also, it is necessary to recognize that there are diverse opinions among the emerging powers on normative issues, and that the diverse opinions among emerging powers will continue to constrain their solidarity and reduce their prospects of building a coherent anti-hegemonic coalition. That said, the normative divide will constrain the prospect of effective global governance in the foreseeable future.

In summary, therefore, this essay analyzed Turkey's international organizational behavior in major international organizations with emphasis on its interactions with NATO and came to the conclusion that, currently Turkey's behavior often appears more substantive than symbolic. However, the main findings that importantly complement this conclusion are three. First, even though the number of global issues and international organizations was adjusted to the limited space, the nature of Turkey's behavior even in this framework is extremely complex. Turkey's organizational behavior varies significantly especially according to the period of time, international situation and the realm of participation where differences are especially visible between the economic and the political sphere. The level of cooperation also reveals important cleavages between rhetoric, policies and their actual implementation. Second, despite being applicable only to some aspects of Turkey's international organization behavior, Johnston's theory presents an important tool for analysis of Ankara's foreign policy. It reveals how participation in an international institution might contribute to the internalization of its norms and compliance with its values. Third, Turkey's international organization behavior does not appear to follow one stable pattern.

Bio

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Exploring 'Constructive Engagement': MIKTA and Global Development

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Abstract

Both diplomats and analysts have repeatedly pointed to the area of global development as a promising field for the Mexico-Indonesia-Korea-Turkey-Australia (MIKTA) partnership. As MIKTA countries sit on different sides of traditional divides between 'Northern donors' and 'Southern recipients', the diversity of its members makes the grouping a potentially unique platform for contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that promote a universal approach to addressing development challenges. So far, MIKTA engagement with development-related issues has been mainly 'inward-looking', i.e. focusing on consultation and exchange among the five MIKTA countries themselves. MIKTA's 'outward-bound' engagement with global development – including cooperation with third countries and multilateral organisations – has only started to be discussed in more detail. Against this backdrop, I suggest that a MIKTA Support Scheme for SDG implementation; a MIKTA Trust Fund for development; and a MIKTA Facility for supporting triangular cooperation are concrete examples for how the grouping can build on ongoing processes to provide a potentially 'constructive' contribution to the constantly evolving and still highly divided field of global development.

Keywords

MIKTA, Global Development, United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction

The Mexico-Indonesia-Korea-Turkey-Australia (MIKTA) grouping was established in 2013 as a "new innovative partnership" (MIKTA 2017b) which, according to the Foreign Ministers of the five member countries, would play a "constructive" (MIKTA 2015a) role in addressing issues of global concern. While the partnership has had a relatively low profile, and the appraisal of MIKTA action to date has been mixed,[1] both diplomats and analysts have repeatedly pointed to the

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[1] See, for example, Flake and Wang 2017; Maihold 2016; Snyder 2016; Mo 2015.

area of development as a particularly promising field for joint MIKTA activities,[2] arguing that engagement with global development processes would provide "a significant policy opportunity" (Cooper 2015, p. 43) for the partnership.[3]

In this paper, I take these general statements as a starting point to discuss the different positionalities of MIKTA countries in the sphere of global development and provide an overview of MIKTA action on development to date. I then share reflections on inward-looking and outward-bound MIKTA engagement and outline three concrete MIKTA schemes for supporting sustainable development. I suggest that if MIKTA countries were to expand and systematize their activities, global development would offer a complex but potentially fruitful sphere of engagement. By providing insights into the contours of concrete initiatives, this paper aims to provide input for discussions on MIKTA's 'constructive' contributions to global development under the guidance of Indonesia as 2018 MIKTA Chair.

MIKTA Countries and the Field of Global Development

Development cooperation dynamics have changed considerably over the last few years. For decades, international development was premised upon the – relatively clear – distinction between 'developing' and 'developed' countries (i.e. those who received and those who provided development assistance) and dominated by 'Northern' agents from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[4] Recently, however, this clear divide has been weakened, particularly through the growing clout of non-state actors and so-called 'Southern' provider countries.[5] The evolving field of what scholars now refer to as 'global' development is characterized by "multiple domestic and international sources of public and private development finance" (Horner & Hulme 2017, p. 40) and a far more complex layering of development patterns and challenges.

The dominant frames of the field have come to centre around the concept of 'sustainable development'. The United Nation's (UN) Agenda 2030 – with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its core – promotes an approach to development that aspires to synergise economic, social and environmental growth and wellbeing.[6] While the sustainable development approach is not without its

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[2] For a discussion on how so-called 'middle powers' – a concept often used to refer to MIKTA countries – engage with specific fields and 'niches' of world politics, see Cooper 1997; see also Robertson 2017.

[3] See also MIKTA 2014; MIKTA 2015; Mo 2015; Gowan 2015; Flake & Wang 2017, p. 31 and 32.

[4] On international development as a battlefield between different organisational platforms see Esteves & Assunção 2014.

[5] See, for example, Mawdsley 2012; Chaturvedi, Fues & Sidiropoulos 2012.

[6] On Agenda 2030 and the SDGs see UN 2015; for a critical analysis of the distinction between development processes ('small-d development') and development cooperation ('big-D development') see Hart 2001.

critics[7] it has, to a certain extent, redirected the focus of development discourse and practices towards more holistic ways of analysing and supporting development processes – and it has become the mainstream framework for engaging with development and development cooperation in bilateral and multilateral bodies as well as across a wide range of non-state institutions.[8]

While the Group of 20 (G20) provided the backdrop – and initially also the rationale – for MIKTA's emergence, diplomats from MIKTA countries have suggested that the UN is likely to provide a more relevant framework for future MIKTA action.[9] This is particularly relevant for action on sustainable development, as Agenda 2030 and the SDGs have been firmly rooted in UN processes and structures.[10] One of the main challenges for development-related UN initiatives has been the continuing divide between 'North' and 'South'; and even though the North-South binary as a simple description of the geographies of power and wealth is certainly outdated, it has remained a powerful imaginary in the field of global development.[11] While the SDGs are premised on abolishing the distinction between 'developing' and 'developed' countries, discussions over the last couple of years – for example, on how to finance sustainable development efforts – have followed traditional lines of contention between 'Northern donor' and 'Southern recipient' countries.[12]

The "anachronistic" (Weiss 2009, p. 278) North-South fault lines at the UN General Assembly – at the Second Committee, for instance, where most development-related issues are negotiated – have been particularly difficult to overcome. MIKTA countries are traditionally on opposite sides of this divide. Indonesia has been an important player in the Group of 77 (G77) that represents voices from the 'global South'; while Australia is part of the Canada-Australia-New Zealand (CANZ) grouping and, on most issues, closely aligned with the US.[13] Mexico often sides with Indonesia and other G77 member states; whereas both Turkey and Korea tend to abstain from controversial votes.[14] What is more, all MIKTA countries except for Indonesia are members of the OECD; only Australia and Korea, however, are members of the OECD-DAC – the club of so-called traditional donors – while the other three MIKTA members are listed as DAC

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[7] Critical accounts challenge the complicity of sustainable development rhetoric in strengthening neoliberal development logics; see, for example, Weber 2017; Kothari, Demaria & Acosta 2014.

[8] For an early contribution on sustainable development as the new (emerging) paradigm see Schuftan 2003; see also Weber 2017 for a critical analysis.

[9] Interviews with Australian, Mexican and Turkish diplomats, December 2017.

[10] Compare Cooper 2015 on the G20 as a key platform for global development.

[11] See, for example, McEwan 2009, p. 219.

[12] For a detailed account of processes at the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly see UNGA 2016.

[13] The CANZ grouping also abstains in some votes on controversial issues at the Second Committee, see, for example, UN 2016 and UN 2017b.

[14] See, for example, UN 2016 and UN 2017b; see also Gowan 2015.

recipient countries.

This heterogeneity is a challenge for cohesion within the MIKTA group (e.g. on identifying a strong foundation for joint action on contentious issues), but it also carries an arguably unique potential. MIKTA's diverse membership in terms of development trajectories and positionalities – comprising a lower-middle income economy (Indonesia), two upper-middle-income economies (Mexico and Turkey) and two high-income economies (Australia and Korea)[15] – reflects some of the diversity of current development realities around the globe. Depending on their focus and concrete terms of engagement, MIKTA initiatives might help to channel tensions among country blocs into more "constructive" (MIKTA 2015a) forms of collaboration. In generic terms, 'constructive' engagement is defined as behaviour that has or is "intended to have a useful or beneficial purpose."[16] In MIKTA's case – according to official accounts – this refers to engagement geared towards "protecting public goods and strengthening global governance" (MIK-TA 2015a) in a range of different issue areas, including sustainable development (MIKTA 2017e). By creating and promoting spaces where players from both sides of traditional divides collaborate on concrete development-related processes MIKTA might make a – maybe minor but potentially meaningful – contribution to (re)shaping the constantly evolving sphere of global development.

At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that, over the last decade, individual MIKTA countries have already tried to position themselves as brokers and facilitators in the sphere of global development, so far with mixed results. The development effectiveness agenda is a prominent case in point. Korea hosted the 2011 Busan meeting where OECD-led discussions about 'aid effectiveness' gave way to a more inclusive arrangement to address 'development effectiveness' across the board.[17] Indonesia then took over as one of the first Co-Chairs of the newly established Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), representing those countries that were both recipients and providers of development cooperation; and Mexico hosted the first major GPEDC meeting in 2014 and then replaced Indonesia as Co-Chair. The main challenge for the GPEDC has been to include the major 'Southern' players in discussions around development effectiveness. However, neither China nor India (or Brazil, for that matter) have been interested in joining the debate, arguing that the GPEDC is still an OECD-dominated process. In this regard, individual MIKTA members have not been particularly successful as bridge builders or facilitators;[18] and discussions on as well as expectations about the 'constructive' potential of MIKTA

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[15] For a detailed list see World Bank 2017.

[16] For a state-of-the-art definition of the term 'constructive' see Oxford Dictionaries 2017.

[17] The inclusion of major 'Southern' providers, in particular, was seen as a major move in terms of raising the level of inclusion in these debates; see Mawdsley, Savage & Kim 2012; Eyben & Savage 2013.

[18] On 'non-traditional middle powers' and bridging functions in global processes see Cooper 2015.

engagement with global development should take this experience into account.

MIKTA's First Steps of Engaging with Sustainable Development

Global development issues have played a relatively prominent role in MIKTA's statements and general rhetoric. Sustainable development was identified as one key issue area in MIKTA's 2015 Vision Statement and, then, as one of the seven priority areas MIKTA officials decided to focus on.[19] Out of MIKTA's 32 joint statements to date, roughly two thirds have addressed issues directly related to sustainable development, including gender equality, climate change and disaster risk reduction. More specifically, two MIKTA joint statements have addressed the issue of Financing for Development, one has focused on measures to end poverty and one on infrastructure development. If peace and security issues are included – that are also part of the SDGs' holistic and all-encompassing approach to development – all joint MIKTA statements are somewhat connected to sustainable development concerns. [20]

Over the last four years, MIKTA Chairs have also organized meetings and events that focused on sustainable development or related issues.[21] The MIKTA development seminars or workshops stand out as particularly relevant in this regard. They were held in Australia (2014), Korea (2015), again Australia (2016), and Turkey (2017).[22] The first workshop identified trade, development finance and accountability as areas of particular interest for joint MIKTA action; and the MIKTA Foreign Ministers underlined that "development cooperation is the area where MIKTA can immediately work together to promote global efforts to support prosperity and stability in developing countries" (MIKTA 2014).

The views of diplomats and experts who have participated in these MIKTA meetings diverge significantly: some outright question the utility of MIKTA action on development because of the heterogeneity of its members while others highlight and reiterate the platform's great – but still untapped – potential to make 'constructive' contributions.[23] In order to go beyond statements on MIKTA's generic potential and explore concrete options of MIKTA engagement with global development processes, in the following section I suggest distinguishing between two general dimensions of engagement: inward-looking and outward-bound. It might be helpful for both policy makers and analysts to keep the distinct logics of and

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[19] See MIKTA 2015a and MIKTA 2017e.

[20] For an (incomplete) list of MIKTA's joint statements see MIKTA 2017a.

[21] See MIKTA 2017d for an example – a side event held at the Fifth Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Mexico in May 2017.

[22] The MIKTA development workshops or seminars took place in September 2014 in Australia (see MIKTA 2014); in May 2015 in Seoul (see MIKTA 2015c); in April 2016 in Canberra (MIKTA 2016a); and in December 2017 in Istanbul (Turkish Government 2017).

[23] Interviews with MIKTA diplomats and experts in Ankara, Istanbul and Mexico City, December 2017.

the potential links between these two basic dimensions in mind when thinking about or designing MIKTA's future engagement with global development.[24]

Two Dimensions of MIKTA Engagement: Inward-looking and Outward-bound

According to MIKTA's Vision Statement, "MIKTA will serve as a bridgehead for fostering various forms of cooperation", something it is supposed to do under two dimensions of engagement. On the one hand, MIKTA countries see the partnership as a "consultative platform to increase mutual understanding, deepen bilateral ties, and find common grounds for cooperation." This more inward-looking dimension focuses on intra-MIKTA engagement and highlights the importance of "information-sharing and exchanges" among its members (MIKTA 2015a). So far, MIKTA encounters related to sustainable development – particularly the MIKTA development seminars and workshops – have followed this logic of a consultative platform for the five MIKTA countries to share experiences, standpoints and ideas about potential future collaboration.[25] At the 2017 MIKTA development seminar, for instance, participants discussed SDG implementation, the humanitarian/development nexus and the role of the private sector in sustainable development processes. [26]

One way of expanding these intra-MIKTA spaces and mechanisms for general discussions would be to explore the option of staff placements or exchanges between MIKTA bureaucrats. Building on existing MIKTA exchange and training schemes,[27] staff from Mexico's AMEXCID, Indonesia's ISSTC, Korea's KOICA, Turkey's TIKA or Australia's DFAT[28] would be able to spend a set amount of time at a 'sister' institution in another MIKTA country. Staff on exchange could contribute to the design of a joint MIKTA project or learn about specific organizational processes, such as monitoring and evaluation, depending on interests and needs of their home institutions. These exchange schemes would need to be carefully planned – including a clear timeframe and an explicit focus on expected outputs and outcomes – as previous support or learning schemes between entities

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[24] This also holds for other areas of engagement but is particularly relevant for sustainable development as related processes offer a wide variety of potential linkages between domestic, intra-MIKTA and global processes.

[25] Interviews with MIKTA diplomats and experts in Ankara, Istanbul and Mexico City, December 2017.

[26] See the agenda of the MIKTA Development Seminar and Academic Network meeting in Istanbul in December 2017 (Turkish Government 2017); see also Sheldrick 2017.

[27] For an overview of MIKTA exchange schemes see MIKTA 2017c; see also MIKTA 2016b for the Training Programme for Diplomats from MIKTA Countries in Turkey.

[28] AMEXCID is the Mexican International Development Cooperation Agency; ISSTC is Indonesia South-South Technical Cooperation; KOICA is the Korea International Cooperation Agency; TIKA is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency; and DFAT is Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

in charge of development cooperation have not always been successful and/or have faced serious challenges.[29]

On the other hand, MIKTA countries have promoted the partnership's outward-bound character by highlighting that they have "both the will and the capability to contribute to protecting public goods and strengthening global governance" and are ready to "play a bridging role between developed and developing countries". MIKTA sets out to do so by acting as a "catalyst or facilitator in launching initiatives" and developing guidelines for engagement (MIKTA 2015a). While rhetoric on MIKTA's outward-bound engagement aims high, the partnership's track record so far suggests that MIKTA as a group might rather want to focus on collaborating on concrete issue-specific processes to showcase the rhetorical commitment to promoting "pragmatic and creative" solutions to global challenges (MIKTA 2015a).[30]

Fikry Cassidy, an Indonesian senior diplomat, has suggested that "each MIKTA country could initiate a flagship project based on its strengths" that would be "continuously carried out, even when the [overall MIKTA] coordinator has changed from one country to another" (Cassidy 2017). According to this logic, individual MIKTA countries might want to consider leading MIKTA's outward-bound engagement on one specific process or issue connected to sustainable development, alone or maybe in pairs. This leadership would not need to be embedded in a formal arrangement; but countries could use synergies by adding a MIKTA component – endorsed by other members of the partnership – to their ongoing efforts in multilateral fora.

Turkey, for instance, has been an active supporter of the cause of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) at the UN – for example, through hosting the fourth LDC conference in Istanbul 2011 and by chairing the group of friends of LDCs in New York.[31] The latest development in that regard is the establishment – by the UN General Assembly – of the UN Technology Bank for LDCs that will be hosted in cooperation with the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey and be based close to Istanbul. Turkey is thus likely to continue its support for LDC issues for the foreseeable future; and MIKTA – if other member countries

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[29] Interviews with representatives from bilateral DAC donor agencies in Mexico City on collaboration schemes with the AMEXCID, February and March 2017.

[30] This seems at least more advisable than, say, trying to set up an alternative negotiation alliance at the UN – something that might not only be not feasible but also do more harm than good in an already polarized environment.

[31] In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, representatives from other MIKTA countries – particularly Australia, Korea and Mexico – have been wary about collaborating with the Turkish government, citing question about the rule of law, autocratic tendencies and space for opposition voices (interviews in 2016 and 2017). MIKTA countries will likely monitor this situation closely; see Maihold (2016, p. 562) on the idea of establishing a MIKTA "peer review process on the democratic governance of its members".

expressed interest – could support one strand of LDC support under Turkish leadership. The Technology Bank is set to focus on processes related to intellectual property rights and the broader field of Science, Technology and Innovation, and MIKTA countries might want to think about linking this engagement with Australia's work on promoting the MIKTA Innovation Group.[32]

Mexico, in turn, has been very much engaged with the Financing for Development process. As guardian of the "legacy of the Monterrey conference" (AMEX-CID 2017) – referring to the first Financing for Development meeting that took place in the Mexican city of Monterrey in 2002 – the Mexican government has been actively engaged in facilitating exchanges on how to finance Agenda 2030. MIKTA has already issued two joint statements on the Financing for Development process. This is relevant as discussions about financing sustainable development processes have been particularly contentious and, by and large, have followed North-South fault lines where 'Southern' players insist on the necessity and importance of fairer global terms of engagement and continued financial support from the dominant and wealthy parts of the world whereas 'Northern' partners are reluctant to change established frameworks and provide more resources.[33] Based on the identified common ground among MIKTA countries on the issue, Mexico would be in a good position to lead further MIKTA engagement on the changing development finance architecture, in close collaboration with both Australia and Korea as OECD-DAC member countries as well as Indonesia as a key voice from the G77.[34]

Exploring Concrete MIKTA Initiatives for Sustainable Development

In addition to issue-specific engagement led by individual MIKTA members, both analysts and representatives from MIKTA countries have been concerned with the potential for more substantial initiatives under the MIKTA label, such

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[32] Another field Turkey has been particularly engaged with is the role of the private sector in development. The UNDP global policy centre on the topic – the Istanbul International Centre for Private Sector in Development – is based in Turkey; and Turkey invited UNDP representatives to present on the topic at the 2017 MIKTA development seminar in Istanbul. The Centre has set up initiatives and programmes with a range of stakeholders and it would be a relatively straightforward enterprise to set up a MIKTA scheme, e.g. by financing a joint report on comparative strengths or synergies regarding the contributions of private sector entities from different MIKTA countries for sustainable development processes.

[33] For an overview of discussions at the 2015 Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa see Delpero 2015.

[34] Another issue where MIKTA countries might want to explore closer cooperation is the humanitarian-development nexus. Mexico has been leading on and facilitating discussions on Sustaining Peace at the UN, while Turkey hosted the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and has worked closely with the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs. MIKTA was explicitly mentioned in the WHS outcome document and the issue of the humanitarian-development nexus was also part of the agenda of the 2017 MIKTA development seminar in Istanbul (see Turkish Government 2017).

as the setup of joint programmes and mechanisms.[35] Since MIKTA's inception the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping has been both an implicit and explicit reference point for evaluating MIKTA's performance and usefulness.[36] The establishment of the New Development Bank has arguably been the most tangible outcome of BRICS cooperation on global development so far, spurring questions about similar MIKTA projects.[37]

At this stage, the setup of a major MIKTA institution for sustainable development – such as a MIKTA development bank – seems rather unlikely. However, there are other options to explore in case MIKTA countries decide to go beyond exchanges among themselves and set up outward-bound initiatives. In what follows I point to three potential schemes that MIKTA countries might want to consider when deciding about the next steps for supporting sustainable development initiatives: a MIKTA Support Scheme for SDG implementation and monitoring; a MIKTA Trust Fund in cooperation with an entity of the UN Development System; and a MIKTA Facility for triangular cooperation in cooperation with the UN Office for South-South Cooperation. These potential initiatives would build on or collaborate with existing institutions; they are thus not aimed at radical transformation but are embedded in the current status quo of global development.

MIKTA Support Scheme for SDG Implementation and Monitoring

UN member states have decided to follow the logic of the SDGs – from eradicating hunger to improving gender equality and changing consumption patterns – in their support for development processes at home and abroad until 2030. This UN development agenda is the first one that is explicitly directed at both 'developing' and 'developed' countries and thus attempts to overcome the North-South binary that has dominated both rhetoric and practice of development cooperation for decades. Any major MIKTA engagement with global development over the next decade is likely to be connected to the SDGs. As the setup of implementation and monitoring structures are still under way in most countries, MIKTA support in this area would probably meet demand and contribute to shaping the realities of global development over the next decade.

Mexico, Korea and Turkey were part of the first cohort of countries that presented their voluntary national reviews on SDG implementation in 2016; Indonesia presented its voluntary review in 2017 and Australia is set to present one

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[35] Particularly diplomats have deplored the absence of tangible results that carry the MIKTA brand and thus illustrate the added value of the partnership (interviews with Mexican and Turkish diplomats, December 2017). For a concrete MIKTA initiative on education and suggestions for further MIKTA engagement see Sheldrick 2017.

[36] Interviews with diplomants from Mexico and Turkey, December 2017.

[37] Interviews with experts and diplomats in Ankara, Istanbul and Mexico City, December 2017. On the New Development Bank see Costa Vazquez, Roychoudhury & Borges 2017.

in 2018.[38] By mid-2018 all MIKTA countries are thus set to have concluded their first round of voluntary reporting. Based on their national experiences in reporting progress and setting up national implementation and monitoring structures, MIKTA countries might want to carry out an intra-MIKTA exercise of compiling recommendations and design a MIKTA SDG implementation and monitoring kit. This MIKTA kit could contain modules and recommendations on how to set up SDG implementation structures – such as national SDG councils and strategies, or information-sharing channels between ministries, government agencies and non-state actors – and how to organize SDG monitoring processes, including, for instance, a review of potentials and pitfalls of different participatory mechanisms for data compilation and report drafting.

The MIKTA kit could provide the basis for exchanges with and capacity building measures for third countries; and the variety of domestic development and institutional realities in the five MIKTA countries would ensure that a considerable number of other countries might find systematized MIKTA input quite helpful. The concrete design of such a support scheme can draw on experiences – both best practices and lessons learned – from previous projects aimed at supporting the implementation and monitoring of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Mexico, for instance, supported Central American countries during the last phase of the MDGs with the monitoring of MDG implementation processes, drawing on experiences from Mexico's national context.[39]

MIKTA Trust Fund with the UN Development System

As MIKTA interest in UN processes has been growing, member countries might want to explore the possibility of setting up a MIKTA Trust Fund with an entity of the UN Development System. Trust funds are mechanisms through which multilateral development agencies receive financial resources from third parties; they allow contributing states to exercise some general guidance in terms of geographical and/or thematic reach but also provide leeway to the multilateral entity in question to use funds according to its corporate strategies and mandate.[40] One potential partner for this MIKTA Trust Fund would be the UN Development Programme (UNDP). All MIKTA member countries individually have long-lasting relationships with UNDP. Both Australia and Korea have been important partners for UNDP with, in 2016, a contribution of around 40 million USD each;[41] and Korea has also been hosting UNDP's Seoul Policy Centre for Global Development Partnerships.[42] Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico have signed strategic

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[38] On national voluntary reviews see UN 2017.

[39] On this initiative see AMEXCID 2014.

[40] Interviews with UNDP representatives in New York, March 2017; on UNDP Thematic Trust Funds see UNDP 2016b.

[41] On Australia's contributions to UNDP see UNDP 2017a; on Korea's contribution see UNDP 2017b.

[42] On the Seoul Centre see UNDP 2017c.

partnership agreements with UNDP[43] and, as both programme countries and major regional players, have occupied a key role for redefining the structure and position of multilateral development agencies more broadly.

UNDP has set up different kinds of trust funds, attempting to strike a balance between corporate interests and donors' priorities and preferences. Thematic trust funds allow different donors to contribute resources to programmes and processes in specific issue areas, such as democratic governance or the environment. In addition, there are trust funds specifically set up with individual countries, including Korea. The Republic of Korea-UNDP MDG Trust Fund[44] was established in 2009 to support MDG implementation processes and the preparation of the new development agenda across geographies and issue areas; and both parties established a follow-up scheme – the Republic of Korea-UNDP SDG Trust Fund – in October 2016.[45]

MIKTA countries might want to explore the possibility of signing a Memorandum of Understanding to contribute to or collaborate with the Korea-UNDP Trust Fund on specific initiatives. MIKTA could also set up a separate – probably relatively small – fund to support UNDP with particularly challenging issues, or in particularly challenging contexts, related to its support for SDG implementation, or in areas that are of particular relevance for MIKTA countries. One option would be for Korea to lead the exploration of MIKTA cooperation with the Korea-UNDP Trust Fund or the setup of a similar MIKTA Trust Fund, in line with Cassidy's (2017) suggestion that certain MIKTA initiatives should be taken forward by member states independent of the rotating chair.

MIKTA Facility for Supporting Triangular Cooperation

Finally, MIKTA could build on the experience of another minilateral grouping – the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum – cooperating with the UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC).[46] In 2004, IBSA states set up a Facility with the now UNOSSC, promoted as "a remarkable example of cooperation among three developing countries but also a pioneering initiative to implement South-South cooperation for the benefit of other Southern countries" (UNOSSC 2017a).[47] MIKTA would arguably be well suited to champion triangular cooperation – defined by the UN as a "collaboration in which traditional donor countries and multilateral organizations facilitate South-South initiatives through the provision of funding, training, management and technological systems" (UNOSSC

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[43] Turkey's relations with UNDP have, by far, expanded the most over the last years, see Haug 2016.
[44] On this Trust Fund see UNDP 2015.
[45] See UNDP 2017d; Korea has also pledged an additional 3 million USD to support UNDP's work on democratic governance for peaceful and inclusive societies over the next years, see UNDP 2016a.
[46] On the mandate, history and structure of the UNOSSC see UNOSSC 2017c.
[47] The design of the MIKTA Facility would need to critically evaluate the concrete setup and performance of the IBSA-UNOSSC scheme.

2017b). Building on the positions of Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia as both UN Development System programme countries and providers of development cooperation, MIKTA might be in a good – and arguably unique – position to champion support for triangular cooperation that goes beyond the still tangible divides between 'developed' and 'developing' countries.

Mexico and Indonesia, for instance, could build on their joint work on the topic in the framework of GPEDC-related processes on development effectiveness[48] and explore the possibility of engaging more thoroughly with the global promotion of South-South and triangular cooperation. Turkey, in turn, hosted the UN South-South Expo in December 2017; and together with Korea and Australia as members of the OECD-DAC MIKTA would thus offer a combination of a wide range of relevant experiences and positionalities: countries that have been receiving ODA and providing different forms of development cooperation to other countries (Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey), a country that transitioned from ODA recipient to DAC member status (Korea) as well as a long-standing member of the DAC (Australia).

All MIKTA countries have, in different ways and to different degrees, already engaged with triangular cooperation initiatives. Mexico has started designing and implementing triangular projects in Central America (e.g. with Germany);[49] Korea has implemented triangular projects with Latin American partners (e.g. with Chile in Bolivia and Paraguay);[50] Turkey has trilateral cooperation experiences with partners in a range of different regions (e.g. with Japan in Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan);[51] Indonesia has not only implemented trilateral schemes (e.g. with Norway and Myanmar)[52] but also developed standard operating procedures for triangular cooperation;[53] and also the Australian government has experience with triangular projects (e.g. with Germany and Chile in Paraguay).[54]

The UNOSSC would offer an established and arguably legitimate framework for building on these individual experiences and setting up the MIKTA Facility. While member countries would need to agree on investing some financial resources, initiatives implemented under the facility could focus on capacity development and the sharing of technical expertise and might not require investments that lie outside the current availability of financial resources of MIKTA

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[48] On Mexico and Indonesia leading the GPEDC's work on South-South and triangular cooperation, see GPEDC 2013.

[49] For a detailed overview see GIZ-AMEXCID (n.d.).

[50] See KOICA 2012.

[51] See TIKA 2016, p. 21.

[52] See ISSTC 2016, p. 17 and 18.

[53] See Mauludiah (n.d.).

[54] See GIZ 2014. It is important to note, however, that this project concluded in 2014 and was thus implemented before AusAID – the Australian aid agency – was merged with the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade.

governments. As an initial step, MIKTA countries might also want to explore the option of designing schemes where two or three MIKTA members collaborate on trilateral pilot projects together with partner countries in their respective regions; and these pilot projects might then inform the scope and structure of the MIKTA Facility.

MIKTA and Global Development: Towards 'Constructive Engagement' Under the 2018 Indonesia Chair?

Playing a "constructive" (MIKTA 2015a) role in global affairs can mean many different things,[55] and obstacles to joint MIKTA action on development should not be underestimated. The heterogeneity of development trajectories and current positionalities of the five MIKTA countries in the broader sphere of global development is considerable. So far, MIKTA-led exchanges on sustainable development have been broad and mostly unrelated to concrete initiatives that require the investment of time, energy, financial capital as well as political or reputational resources.

MIKTA has been, by and large, a forum for consultation. It is up to those representing the five member countries to decide about the depth, breadth and modalities of this partnership, taking into account the various factors and purposes of multilateral engagement and the domestic, regional and global contexts they are operating in. In case MIKTA member countries decide to expand and systematize their joint action, however, global development might be a potentially fruitful sphere to consider. Intra-MIKTA exchanges for staff in charge of development cooperation portfolios as well as the MIKTA SDG Support Scheme, the MIKTA Trust Fund and the MIKTA Facility for triangular cooperation might provide some concrete input for discussing engagement that goes beyond workshop exchanges and one-off side events at international meetings.

Indonesia – while often referred to as less enthusiastic MIKTA member[56] – might play a crucial role in expanding MIKTA's engagement with the sphere of global development. As host of the 1955 Bandung conference, a strong voice from the G77 and, more recently, a convenor trying to bring together 'developing' and 'developed' countries in processes on development effectiveness, Indonesia looks back on a substantive trajectory in terms of accompanying and shaping global development debates. Inspired by aspirations of gaining "more voice in the [international] system" (Santikajaya 2016, p. 574) and "gradually amend[ing] the global order" (Cassidy 2017), Indonesia might not only be able to convince fellow MIKTA members to invest in concrete schemes[57] to support sustainable devel-

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[55] See also Cassidy 2017.

[56] Interviews with Australian, Mexican and Turkish diplomats, December 2017.

[57] As Maihold (2016, 559) argues, this will require an agreement to "share burdens of increased re-

opment processes but also show a face of MIKTA to the world that is likely to be more appealing to countries beyond the G20, particularly those from the so-called 'global South'. While MIKTA initiatives – including those outlined in this paper – are unlikely to lead to any meaningful transformation of highly divided spaces, the kind of 'constructive' role MIKTA can play might be a humbler one: providing limited but concrete insights into what cooperation across traditional divides might look like.

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Bio

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sponsibility."

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The BRICS: The Last Line of Defence for Globalisation?

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Abstract

In the West, the rise of nationalist populism reached a tipping point in 2016 when it generated both the United Kingdom vote for Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as President in the United States of America. In contrast, the BRICS have over this same period invested in strengthening their commitment to the United Nations, global governance and economic globalisation. Although their primary focus has been on inter-BRICS financial, trade and economic cooperation, they opted to focus their 2017 annual Summit on developing strategies to defend global governance, economic globalisation, free trade and collective climate action. How did we get to the point where it seems to be up to the BRICS to play an important role in rescuing globalisation?

Keywords

BRICS, Rising Powers, Globalisation, Global Governance, Global Warming

Introduction

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa came together to form the BRICS grouping because they realised that by combining forces in a small but strategic group, and by binding key countries of the global south in Asia, Africa and Latin America together, they had a better chance of realising their common vision for a new global order. If the BRICS were meant to be an alternative, or counter-weight to the hegemony of the liberal global order led by Washington D.C., how did the BRICS – in less than 10 years – transform into an important force in the defence of global governance, economic globalisation, free trade and collective climate action? How did we get to the point where it seems it is up to the BRICS, together with a few like-minded countries in Europe and elsewhere, to rescue globalisation?

The answer may lie in two macro trends. In the West, the rise of nationalist popu-lism reached a tipping point in 2016 when it generated both the UK vote to leave

the European Union and the election in the US of a president who is a protectionist when it comes to free trade, who believes in an America First approach to global governance, and who is in denial when it comes to global climate change. In contrast, the BRICS have over this same period invested in strengthening both their inter-BRICS cooperation, as well as their commitment to the United Nations and other aspects of global governance and economic globalisation, that they regard as serving their own and the global common good.

In the past China used the argument that regulations aimed at controlling the emissions of green-house gasses should recognise the special needs of developing nations to lift their populations out of poverty, to restrain climate negotiations. However, by late 2015, and whilst still insisting on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, China shifted from being a constraining force in global climate change negotiations to an enthusiastic supporter when China became a signatory to the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement.

Over the last decade, the BRICS became more committed to those aspects of global governance and globalisation that it viewed as crucial to their own interests and the global common good. Over this same period some in the US, UK and several European countries, who spearheaded global governance, free trade and the global marketplace in the past, reached a point where they felt globalisation had gone too far. The Trump victory and the Brexit vote reflected a view that the negative effects of globalisation needed to be checked.

When Xi Jinping and Donald Trump had their first face-to-face meeting in the US in April 2017, they had similar objectives but competing theories of change. Donald Trump wanted to increase American jobs and strengthen the American economy by limiting free trade, whilst Xi Jinping wanted to strengthen the Chinese economy by protecting free trade, globalisation and global governance. The Economist magazine said that "they were looking in opposite directions: America away from shouldering global responsibilities, China towards it" (Duncan Green 2017).

This contrast was evident also at the January 2017 meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. While the new Trump administration sent no official representative to this annual celebration of globalisation – the meeting took place a week before the inauguration of President Trump - Xi Jinping gave the first ever address of a Chinese President to the WEF. In his address, the Chinese President stressed that there would be no winners from a trade war, and he urged that all countries continued to support the 2015 Paris climate change accord. "Pursuing protectionism is like locking oneself in a dark room," he said. "Wind and rain may be kept outside, but so is light and air" (Elliot and Wearden, 2017).

The Rise of the BRICS

The grouping that became known as the BRICS was established in 2009, and will have their tenth summit in 2018 in South Africa. A decade is a very short period of time in global politics. However, their collective influence is buoyed by the longer-term growth trajectories of especially China and India, the two BRICS members with the largest growing economies, as well as the credibility generated by their global representativeness, spanning Africa, Asia, South-East Asia and Latin America.

The importance of the BRICS grouping has been consistently downplayed by many, mostly western analysts. By choosing to focus on the differences within the group – Brazil, India and South Africa are democracies; India and China find themselves in competition on many dimensions; and Russia does not self-identify with the Global South – they tended to miss the shared interests that has made the BRICS a resilient and robust grouping. Instead of being doomed by its internal differences, as predicted by many observers in the West, the BRICS grouping has consolidated its identity and influence. The group has already produced significant institutions, such as their own development bank and contingency reserve fund, and more are in the pipe-line. They have also invested in a level of coordination and cooperation that is normally associated with regional unions like the European Union and African Union.

The BRICS countries are drawn to each other because they share a common experience; they were all negatively affected, in one way or another, over the past 50 years or more by being on the periphery of a world order dominated by the United States and its allies. They realised that they will only be able to break free from this dominance if they work together. The BRICS formulate their vision for an alternative global order as follows:

> We underline our support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states. We reiterate our support for political and dip-lomatic efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in international relations (BRICS, 2009, para. 12).

In *the BRICS and Coexistence*, de Coning, Mandrup and Odgaard (2015) argue that this vision of a future global order where the rules prevent any one state, or an alliance of states, from dominating the international system, can be understood as a coexistence model of global governance. The essence of the model is the prevention of hegemony. This is achieved by bringing about a multipolar world in which hegemony is initially constrained and eventually rendered impossible.

What does the BRICS Summits reveal about the coherence of the grouping?

One way to assess the degree to which the BRICS have been able to generate common positions, and act on them, in the areas of global governance, globalisation and climate change, is to make a content or discourse analysis of the official declarations or communiqués released after each of the BRICS annual summits. If one analyses the statements released at the eight BRICS summits that took place between 2009 and 2016, one can reach the conclusion that the BRICS countries have embarked on a significant cooperative project. The statements also list the steps they are taking to coordinate their policies on a wide range of issues, and they report on the progress of the institutions they have jointly created.

At each of the summits the BRICS countries have reaffirmed this shared macro-level analysis of the state of the global order, and have reiterated their alternative long-term strategic vision, based on their shared values. These values include mutual respect; collective decision making and co-management of global affairs; commitment to international law and to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its centre and foundation; global peace and the peaceful resolution of disputes; economic stability; social inclusion; equality; sustainable development, collective climate action and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries.

However, what sets the BRICS apart from other groupings that have had similar qualms with the existing global order - such as the Non-Aligned Movement established during the Cold War - is that this smaller group of five states have managed to break this grand strategic vision down to specific goals, which they have then pursued together in the short to medium-term. At each summit the key issues included international finance, international trade, climate negotiations and negotiations around sustainable development. At each summit the BRICS countries articulated what their common position was on these issues, and they have subsequently coordinated and cooperated in forums such as the G20, at the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank and in the Doha series of the World Trade Organisation negotiations.

The summits also reflect another significant distinguishing feature of the BRICS, namely how over a relatively short period, they have meaningfully increased inter-BRICS cooperation. For instance, in the area of international finance and trade, the BRICS countries have decided to trade among themselves in their own currencies, they have established their own $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and they have established their own development bank. Several other initiatives are underway, for example to establish an independent ratings agency, and to explore how insurance and reinsurance markets in BRICS countries can pool capacities.

Another significant feature of the cooperation among the BRICS is the way in

which their practical cooperation has been steadily expanding over the years. The first two BRIC summits (South Africa joined the grouping in 2010 where after it became the BRICS) were firmly anchored in the original motivation for the creation of the BRIC grouping, namely to respond collectively to the global financial crisis. The first summits were dominated by detailed positions on the international economy and the need to reform the international financial system. In the later summits, additional issues have been added each year, and increasingly sophisticated common positions have been developed on a range of issues spanning sustainable development, energy policies, climate change and a number of international political and security issues. For instance, to give one example of the breath of issues addressed, at the BRICS Summit in India in 2016, the following position was adopted on the internet:

> *We advocate also for an open, non-fragmented and secure Internet, and reaffirm that the Internet is a global resource and that States should participate on an equal footing in its evolution and functioning, taking into account the need to involve relevant stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities (BRICS 2016, para. 67).*

The last few summits have generated detailed common positions on a range of highly sensitive international political questions such as the Iran nuclear issue, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen. These common positions reflect a growing trust among the BRICS countries, and indicate the depth of preparation that goes into organising these annual meetings.

At the fifth BRICS Summit hosted by South Africa in 2013, the BRICS countries specifically committed themselves to progressively develop the BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics. The following non-exhaustive list is an example of some of the meetings that have been taking place between BRICS summits, and is indicative of the level of coordination and cooperation that underpins the BRICS grouping.

- On macro-economic and financial issues, there have been meetings to establish the multi-lateral contingent reserve arrangement, the new development bank, an independent ratings agency and annual meetings of the ministers of finance and the governors of the reserve banks of the BRICS countries to oversee these initiatives and to coordinate positions ahead of the IMF, World Bank and G20 meetings.

- On trade issues, there have been annual meetings of the customs authorities and the creation of a BRICS customs committee, BRICS expert dialogues on e-commerce, meetings of the heads of competition authorities,

and there is an annual BRICS Business Forum and annual meetings of the ministers of trade.

- On the political and security front there have been meetings on combating illicit trafficking of narcotics, a working group on counter-terrorism, a BRICS dialogue on foreign policy, consultations on the security of outer space activities, annual meetings of national security advisors, meetings of the defence industries, meetings on defence and security cooperation, and meetings of special envoys and deputy foreign ministers on specific issues such as the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. The BRICS ministers of foreign affairs meet regularly ahead of, or on the side-lines of international meetings, such as the annual UN General Assembly meetings.

Such meetings also take place in areas such as the environment, tax cooperation, disaster management, corruption, education, science and research. There is, for instance, an annual meeting of the BRICS science and technology funding parties, and each of the BRICS countries fund research into various aspects of BRICS cooperation. These formal inter-state meetings are, while most prominent, not the only ones. There are also annual BRICS think tanks council meetings, a BRICS academic forum and a BRICS university network. There have been meetings of the BRICS parliamentary forum, a BRICS youth summit, a BRICS civil-society forum and BRICS trade unions meetings. More recently there were also cultural events such as BRICS film festival and sporting events, including an under-17 BRICS football championship. The only other groupings that have achieved this depth and breadth of cooperation are established regional groupings like the European Union or the African Union. The fact that a grouping crossing Africa, Asia, Europe and South America can sustain such a level of cooperation is an indicator of the level of shared interests among the members and the value the members of the group assign to their cooperation.

When India hosted the eight BRICS Summit in Goa in October 2016, it was followed by an Outreach Summit of BRICS leaders with the leaders of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) member countries comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Similarly, when South Africa hosted the fifth BRICS Summit in 2013 it was followed by a retreat with African leaders, under the theme, "Unlocking Africa's potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure". It would thus seem that the BRICS countries are sensitive to criticism that they are an exclusive club and are taking steps to use their hosting of the BRICS summits to create beneficial linkages with their sub-regions.

The summits also reveal that whilst these countries share a macro-analysis that is

based on an assessment of the political-economy of the global order, and although their primary activities concern financial, trade and economic cooperation, their ability to develop a shared analysis of the geopolitical and security dimensions of the global order, and to generate common positions on the political issues of the day has steadily grown over time. For instance, on the political front, the Syrian issue has demonstrated how the BRICS, for the first time, were able to block the course of action the United States and its allies wanted to take, namely to externally enforce regime change, on a major international political question. It showed that the BRICS do not have to become as powerful as the United States to influence the global order, they only have to become influential enough to block the power of the United States to act unilaterally. On Syria, for example, the BRICS issued the following declaration following the October 2016 Summit hosted by India:

> We support all efforts for finding ways to the settlement of the crises in accordance with international law and in conformity with the principles of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries of the region. On Syria, we call upon all parties involved to work for a comprehensive and peaceful resolution of the conflict taking into account the legitimate aspirations of the people of Syria, through inclusive national dialogue and a Syrian-led political process based on Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 and in pursuance of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and 2268 for their full implementation. While continuing the relentless pursuit against terrorist groups so designated by the UN Security Council including ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist organisations designated by the UN Security Council (BRICS 2016).

As this statement suggest, the BRICS countries, together with other rising powers like Indonesia and Turkey, seem to engage in international conflict resolution in ways that differ significantly from the theories of change that the West employs when it comes to peacebuilding. In *Rising Powers* and *Peacebuilding*, Call and de Coning (2017) point out that for the rising powers, sustainable social change comes about as a result of relatively stable social and economic development. This is why the peacebuilding approaches of rising powers tend to focus on medium to long-term socio-economic development, rather than short to medium-term political transformation.

One of the issues on which there does not seem to be agreement among the BRICS is Security Council reform. In the first two summits, the communiqués merely note that China and Russia are also permanent members of the Security Council and acknowledge the increasingly important role that Brazil and India play in international affairs. In the last five summits the BRICS countries collectively call for the reform of the Security Council. However, they have not been able to develop a detailed position as to what such reforms may entail beyond a

call for making the Council more representative, effective and efficient, and to increase the representation of developing countries. Should their representation increase, the BRICS will have a very influential voice with both two permanent members and several others that have credible claims to be represented on the Security Council.

However, what the BRICS countries do agree on is the importance of the UN as the centrepiece of global governance, with the Security Council at its core. At every Summit the BRICS have reaffirmed the role of the United Nations and each summit has expanded the space given to UN related issues. The 2016 BRICS Summit declaration addressed UN related issues such as the Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the need to further strengthen UN peacekeeping, but it also referred back to the UN on a range of other issues such as the peaceful use of outer space, corruption, disarmament, communicable diseases and climate change, to mention a few.

The Strategic Patience of the BRICS

One of the reasons why the BRICS may have chosen not to pursue Security Council reform, and reform of other global institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, too aggressively, is because they are cautious not to destabilise the current global order. This is because their continued rise in influence in the international system is closely linked with the position their economies enjoy in the global economic system, and the degree to which they are able to make domestic progress with their national development agendas. Reforming the global system at too rapid a pace may destabilise the global economic and political order. This means that the BRICS are likely to be careful when pushing for reform of institutions like the UN Security Council, to ensure that such reforms do not harm their own interests. Whilst the progress made over the past years has been significant, the BRICS are not necessarily overly pressed for time when it comes to reshaping the international system. They can afford to engage with and influence the global order slowly over the medium- to long-term, whilst at the same time giving their own countries the opportunity to further develop and grow. This does not mean that the BRICS are not committed to serious reform of the global system, including its peace and security dimensions, but rather that such reforms will be pursued in a way and at a pace that is evolutionary rather than revolutionary (de Carvalho & de Coning 2013). Duncan Green (2017) echoes this analysis when he concludes that "China is a revisionist power, wanting to expand influence within the system. It is neither a revolutionary power bent on overthrowing things, nor a usurper, intent on grabbing global control."

Collectively, the theory of change that the BRICS are pursuing can be described as co-shaping the new global order, which is consistent with the coexistence

model of global governance. They do so by on the one hand coordinating their engagement in a wide range of international forums, such as the G20, to maximise their influence, whilst on the other hand the BRICS countries are increasing their own inter-BRICS cooperation. Creating their own institutions, such as the new development bank, help them overcome some of the limitations of the existing international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. At the same time, it helps them to push their international counterparts to reform these global institutions, by way of example and through competition.

Their cooperation in the BRICS grouping does not, of course, prevent the members from also participating in various other groupings, such as the G20. Nor does it suggest that the BRICS is the primary, or most important cooperative arrangement that the members of the BRICS are engaged in. South Africa, for instance, also belong to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), which it probably views as at least equally important to its membership of the BRICS and the G20. South Africa, Brazil and India, the three democracies within the BRICS, also belong to the IBSA forum, and India and South Africa also cooperate in the Indian Ocean Rim grouping. In fact, the extent to which the BRICS members are linked into this wider network of international and regional organisations further enhance their commitment to global governance and globalisation, and increases the influence that the BRICS can have in the international system.

No analyst foresaw, nor did the BRICS themselves, that in less than a decade, these actions would bring them to a point where the BRICS has become an important force in defence of global governance, economic globalisation, free trade, and collective climate action.

Acknowledgements

Bio

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Rising Powers Quarterly is a peer-reviewed non-profit free-access journal dedicated to the study of the growing role of rising powers in global governance. It aims to explore the political, economic and social processes through which the states regarded as "rising powers" in world politics interact with other states as well as international and transnational organizations. This journal also aims to fill the academic lacunae in the literature on rising powers and global governance related themes since there is a growing need for a journal specialized on rising powers in parallel to their increasing importance in world politics.

Published four times a year, Rising Powers Quarterly is particularly interested in original scientific contributions that analyze the operations and policies of regional & international organizations, international groupings such as the BRICS, IBSA, MIKTA and G-20, as well as their member states around the main themes of international political economy, global governance, North-South relations, developing world, changing international order, development, rising/emerging/middle/regional powers, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, peace, peacekeeping, security, democracy and international terrorism. Country-specific case studies with regard to their interrelation at the global level are also of particular concern of *Rising Powers Quarterly*. One of the main objectives of the journal is to provide a new forum for scholarly discussion on these topics as well as other issues related with world politics and global governance.

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