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Brazil: Geopolitical Challenges in a Multipolar World

Guest-edited by

Anthony W. Pereira

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Introduction

Brazil´s geopolitical and diplomatic "rise" has been heralded by many commentators in the last few years. A member of important new groupings of states including the expanded G20, IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in its own region, Brazil has also been a prominent voice in global negotiations over and initiatives involving trade, climate change, sustainable development, global public health, internet governance, peacekeeping, and international security. Brazil´s enhanced protagonism in global governance has generated a substantial number of new, insightful analyses.[1] Nevertheless, because of the complexity and changing nature of the topic, answers to important questions about it remain either under-explored or contested.

This special issue of Rising Powers Quarterly is dedicated to exploring some of those questions. Reflecting the ongoing work of a group of scholars that also produced a special section of International Affairs,[2] the seven articles that follow offer compelling analysis of at least three important aspects of Brazil´s global trajectory and foreign policy.

The first issue is Brazil´s recent rise in international prominence and influence. How substantial was that rise? What factors facilitated this emergence? Has Brazil´s rise stalled and, if so, why? And is the alleged decline temporary or more

[1] See, for example, Sean Burges (2017) Brazil in the World: The International Relations of a South American Giant, Manchester University Press, Manchester; David R. Mares and Harold A. Trinkunas, Harold A. (2016) Aspirational Power. Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC; Carlos Milani, Leticia Pinheiro and Maria Regina Soares de Lima (2017), "Brazil's Foreign Policy and the `Graduation Dilemma', International Affairs, 93 (3), 585-605; and Mathias Spektor (2016) "Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions" in William I. Hitchcock, Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (eds.) Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 17-35.

[2] Ana Margheritis (2017) "Introduction: The 'graduation dilemma´ in foreign policy: Brazil at a watershed", International Affairs, Volume 3, Number 3, 2017, pp. 581-584 and the other six articles in the special section, pp. 581-699.

long-term? The authors in this special issue approach these questions from different angles. Antonio Patriota suggests the importance of history, in that the latter furnishes other examples of transitions that opened the world system up to new actors. These were transitions to multipolarity after the end of a unipolar period. This type of transition, Patriota suggests, is happening now and is more universal and cooperative than its 19th century antecedent, which took place after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the 1815 Congress of Vienna. It is this transition that has furnished Brazil with opportunities to play a more active role in global decision-making.

The articles on Brazilian foreign policy in trade (Rodrigues Vieira), international development (Soldi Hardt, Mouron, and Apolinario Junior) and the defense of democracy (Pereira) largely confirm this view. Rodrigues Vieira, for example, takes a somewhat longer perspective and argues that Brazil is one of the most successful cases of post-WWII industrialization in the world; its industrial output quadrupled between 1965 and 1980, while Japan's tripled during the same period. Soldi Hardt, Mouron, and Apolinario Junior show that Brazil became an important participant in international development cooperation in the late 2000s, increasing its spending in this area significantly, before the impact of its economic slowdown led to a significant retreat.

Both Kai Lehmann and Andres Malamud focus on what they see as Brazil's recent decline in leadership and geopolitical prominence. They acknowledge Brazil´s recent rise, in Malamud´s case attributing it to domestic stabilization, an energetic and capable foreign policy, skillful leaders and a facilitating international environment, including China´s rapid growth in the 2000s. However, each author argues that Brazilian leadership has recently faltered in South America (Lehmann) and internationally (Malamud). This was partly due to recent economic and political crises, including a severe recession, the impeachment of the president in 2016, and a major corruption scandal[3], but also due to structural factors and limitations in Brazil´s resources and capabilities.

The second set of puzzles, related to the first, concerns the current world order. What are the system´s primary characteristics and trajectory? Is it genuinely multipolar, still unipolar, or something else? How real is the danger of major war in the current system? And what role are the rising powers playing in the solution of global problems? Patriota, in the article that follows this one, argues that the

[3] The extent to which the corruption of some of its companies abroad (revealed by the Carwash anti-corruption investigation begun in March 2014) has damaged Brazil's image and hampered its foreign policy is an under-researched topic in this area. For example, plea-bargained testimony made public in December 2016 suggests that between 2003 and 2014 the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht paid bribes worth a total of US $788 million in eleven countries in Latin America and Africa. See Malu Gaspar (2017), "Uma História do Peru: A ascensão e queda da Odebrecht na América Latina", Piauí 130, Ano 11, Julho, pp. 18-28; the reference is to page 19.

world order is already more multipolar than many observers are willing to recognize. It still contains vestiges of unipolarity, especially in the military sphere where US dominance is overwhelming, but the institutions of governance have begun to include more actors. For Patriota, this change has not been – up to now - destabilizing. China will become the biggest economy in the world in the next few decades, but shows little inclination to challenge the political status quo; therefore, the existence of the alleged "Thucydides trap" can be questioned.[4] This is good for Brazil, because it is a rising power that has invested relatively little in military power, and has staked its diplomatic reputation on the peaceful, multilateral resolution of conflicts.

Most of the other authors in this special issue share Patriota´s view that the global order is or is becoming multipolar, as well as his optimism that the system will not necessarily become more conflictual as it evolves. Urdinez and Rodrigues depart from this consensus, however, calling the present system "proto-bipolar", because the USA and China account for roughly one-half of global gross domestic product. These authors acknowledge that China's growth has helped Brazil's balance of trade. But they argue that the unbalanced nature of Brazil's commercial relations with China (commodities in exchange for manufactured goods) and its loss to China of market share in manufactured goods in neighboring countries and in its own domestic economy (contributing to Brazil's deindustrialization) has "trapped" Brazil and limited its global rise.

The authors in this special issue take slightly different views about what the main divisions within the current world order are and what the rising powers' contributions to it have been and could be, reflecting the specific issues that they focus on. For Patriota conventional distinctions between East and West, North and South seem to be less important than the over-arching division between those state and non-state actors willing to participate in "cooperative multipolarity" and those that are not. Crucial members of the former category, argues Patriota, are rising democratic powers such as India, South Africa, and Brazil.[5] For Rodrigues Vieira, on the other hand, a division between a "West" and "the rest" still retains some analytical purchase in international trade negotiations, with the West consisting of advanced industrialized democracies located in North America and western Europe, plus Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.[6] For Rodrigues Vieira, if the

[4] See Graham Allison (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York; James Holmes (2013) "Beware the Thucydides Trap Trap" in The Diplomat, 13 June at thediplomat.com/2013/06/beware-the-thucydides-trap-trap accessed on 8 July 2017 and Arthur Waldon (2017) "There is no Thucydides Trap" in The Straits Times Opinion 18 June at www.straitstimes.com/opinion/there-is-no-thucydides-trap accessed on 26 June 2017).

[5] For an exploration of some of the shared dilemmas of these three democratic rising powers, see Marco Antonio Vieira and Chris Alden (2011), "India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA): South-South Cooperation and the Paradox of Global Leadership", Global Governance, 17 (4): 507-528.

[6] For the argument that Brazil is one of several "non-Western" rising powers, see Oliver Stuenkel

United States pushes the West into a retreat from trade openness, the Brazilian reaction will be to seek bilateral deals, and to set aside the multilateral approach it has favored until recently.

For Soldi Hardt, Mouron, and Apolinario Junior there is a clear difference between the way the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) approaches official development assistance and the way some of the rising powers, including Brazil, engage in "technical cooperation". This distinction is likely to endure for some time, even though Brazil has now formally applied for membership in the OECD.[7] My article on the defense of democracy deals with another global dichotomy. It challenges the stereotype that only established powers such as the United States, the European Union and some of the Scandinavian countries actively promote and defend democracy, while rising powers are content to defend traditional notions of sovereignty and non-intervention and generally avoid getting involved in conflicts over democracy outside their borders. At least when it comes to the 2009 Honduran crisis, Brazil's foreign policy did not confirm this generalization.

The third cluster of questions addressed by this special issue concerns Brazilian views of and contributions to world order. How do Brazilian citizens and policymakers see the world? What are the factors that produce Brazil's foreign policy, and what is the relative weight of the domestic and the international among these factors? Is Brazil an anti-systemic actor in world affairs, or a mildly reformist one? And what is the Brazilian record of – and potential for - contributing to global governance?

Malamud argues that Brazil's South American neighborhood shaped its state formation in ways that distinguish it from European states and other rising powers. In South America wars and state death have been relatively rare and limited, and borders have often been demarcated peacefully, making power somewhat softer than in other regions. This distinctive experience has shaped Brazil's evolution into a relatively rule-abiding and peaceful global actor, a player whose size dwarfs those of its neighbors but whose behavior is often benign - a "vegetarian dino-

(2016) Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order, Polity Press, Cambridge.

[7] The OECD currently has 35 members, including South Korea, Mexico, and Chile (the first South American country to join). Brazil has been a "key partner" of the organization since 2007, when the OECD decided to increase its engagement with a set of important developing countries that, in addition to Brazil, includes China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. While Brazil has formally requested membership of the OECD's Secretary General, the process of admission is likely to take several years and will involve a review by OECD commissions of Brazil's legislation, policies, and statistics in areas such as taxation, trade, education, science and technology, agriculture, and the environment. From Mauricio Chapinoti and Gustavo Pagliuso Machado (2017), "O trajeto do Brasil e o que esperar da adesão à OCDE", Valor Econômico, 7 July, p. A10.

saur" in the words of former diplomat Rubens Ricupero.[8] Patriota articulates a similar understanding of Brazil's actions and intentions. He implicitly denies that Brazil is an anti-systemic actor, and explicitly states that what Brazilian diplomacy strives for is an end to unilateralism. In this view, Brazil wants the fair and consistent application of currently-existing rules to all actors, combined with the creation of new seats at the table of global governance for rising powers.

Rodrigues Vieira's portrait of Brazilian diplomacy in the Doha Round from 2003 to 2008 matches Patriota's account. The Brazilian Ministry of External Relations maintained a commitment to global trade liberalization despite skepticism about this position on the part of domestic interest groups, especially Brazilian manufacturers concerned about their industrial competitiveness. During that period, Brazil demanded that the established powers follow their own rules, liberalizing agriculture in the United States and the European Union and opening markets to Brazilian agribusiness. However, in other areas and at other times Brazil seems to want to change global rules, rather than simply apply existing rules more consistently. Soldi Hardt, Mouron and Apolinario Junior show this by looking at Brazil's engagement in international development cooperation from 2000 to 2016. They depict a rising power with an implicit critique of the neo-colonialism of the foreign aid industry, with its language of "aid", "assistance" and "donor", and vertical relations between donors and aid "recipients". The Brazilian approach, exemplified by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (*Agência Brasileira de Cooperação*), has been to talk of technical cooperation, solidarity between countries of the South, and horizontal relations between partners. This language helps Brazil position itself as a leader among developing countries and the South that is especially helpful in Africa, where it shares, for example, its research in tropical agriculture and its policies to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Whether Brazil's rhetorical commitments translate consistently into different practices on the ground in its technical cooperation projects is contested and perhaps understudied. One thing that Soldi Hardt, Mouron and Apolinario Junior show, however, is that Brazil's development cooperation is highly concentrated and leverages the country's affinities with other members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP, or *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*).[9] While Haiti received 40 percent of Brazil's spending on development cooperation between 2000 and 2016 (understandable given Brazil's leadership of the United Nations peacekeeping mission there beginning in 2004), five

[8] Comment made during a presentation at the Brazil Institute, King's College London, 23 October 2012. The presentation was entitled "Smart Power, Rio Branco and Brazilian Diplomacy in the Early Twentieth Century".

[9] The CPLP was created in 1996 and consists of nine member countries (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe) as well as ten observer countries.

of the top ten beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation in this period were members of the CPLP: Angola, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. This shows that Brazil is a rising power with a special affinity for and influence over countries that were also part of the Portuguese seaborne empire and that speak the Portuguese language. Brazil is a rising power with many facets; one is that it is a Lusophone rising power.

Urdinez and Rodrigues use survey research to produce an interesting argument about the Brazilian public's attitudes towards the global order. Perhaps not surprisingly, they find that the majority of Brazilians surveyed is comfortable with US influence in the Americas, and do no not fully trust China as a trade partner. However, Urdinez and Rodrigues also argue that the majority of survey respondents views the rise of China in relation to the United States as positive. This finding suggests that the Brazilian public, perhaps rather like the Brazilian foreign policy establishment, takes a pragmatic view of world affairs, and would not be upset by China becoming the world's largest economy.

Lehmann and Malamud take slightly different approaches to the question of Brazilian leadership. For Lehmann, Brazil's recent failures to exercise influence in South America (noticeable in its lack of involvement in attempts to mediate between the opposition and the Maduro regime in Venezuela) could be corrected if this failure were systematically addressed within the political system. The decline of Brazil's regional leadership capacity became locked in around 2014, argues Lehmann. However, this is conjunctural, and in Lehmann's view it remains at least theoretically possible for Brazilian policymakers, under conditions of economic revival and political stability, to forge a new consensus on foreign policy and to re-activate regional mechanisms of cooperation.

Malamud seems to see no such opportunity for Brazil to re-emerge, at least at the global level. For Malamud, Brazil's limitations condemn it to a cycle of foreign policy booms and busts, in which periods of economic growth foster international activism, and recessions lead to quietism. These limitations include poor infrastructure, an underperforming educational system, and an over-regulated economy with a low rate of productivity growth and innovation. In this perspective, there is little that policymakers can do about these limitations in the short and even medium term.

Others might interpret the facts presented by Malamud somewhat differently and claim that Brazil could continue to "punch above its weight" in foreign affairs, with a diplomatic GDP that exceeds its economic GDP.[10] Another of Malamud's

[10] Some of the ablest (but not the only) proponents of this view are Brazilian diplomats and former diplomats, including, for example, Celso Amorim (2015) Teerã, Ramalá e Doha: Memórias da Política Externa Ativa e Altiva, Benvirá, São Paulo; Rubens Barbosa (2015) The Washington Dissensus: A

claims is also likely to generate debate. That is that considering the apparent US retreat from trade liberalization and cooperation on climate change mitigation, the appeal of Brazil's pacific, green, and rule-oriented approach to world affairs as well as its own racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse society will decline. Some might question this claim. The US government has become more unilateral, isolationist, anti-science and ethno-nationalist, and ethnonational parties are popular in Europe. But large parts of the populations of both the United States and Europe – as well as other regions of the world - remain committed to rationalist, humanist, and cooperative values. Therefore, the appeal of Brazil's defense of peaceful multipolarity, sustainable approaches to development and racial and religious tolerance could rise rather than recede in the contemporary global order.

That issue, like so many others mentioned in this introduction, must be left for readers to decide. This special issue addresses vital questions about world order and Brazilian foreign policy, but it cannot definitively answer any of them. If this special issue serves a purpose, it is to inspire a broad, intense, multipolar debate about the geopolitical challenges facing Brazil in the contemporary global system. I hope that a reading of the seven articles that follow will be worthwhile to those who decide to take the journey.

Bio

Anthony W. Pereira is a Professor and Director of the Brazil Institute at King's College London. He has a B.A. from Sussex University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has held positions at the New School, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tulane University, and the University of East Anglia. His books include *Ditadura e Repressão* (Paz e Terra, 2010); and (with Lauro Mattei) *The Brazilian Economy Today: Towards a New Socio-Economic Model?* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). A visiting researcher at the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo in 2017, he is currently involved in a research network on Brazilian foreign policy and working on a book on the formation of the Brazilian state.

Privileged Observer's Perspective on US-Brazil Relations, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville; Celso Lafer (2009) "Brazil and the World" in Ignacy Sachs, Jorge Wilheim, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, (eds.) Brazil: A Century of Change, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, pp. 101-119; and Antonio Patriota in this special issue.

Article

Is the World Ready for Cooperative Multipolarity?

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Abstract

It is impossible to engage in a conversation about the geopolitical changes the world is currently undergoing without stumbling on the idea of multipolarity. Beyond the fascination exerted by topics such as a rising China, Europe after BREXIT, the Arab spring, BRICS or the relative decline of the United States, the 21st century has ushered in a renewed appetite for discussions on the international configuration of power. As a transition seems to be happening before our very eyes, geopolitical commentary has become a growth industry. If indeed the world is entering a multipolar era, what insights can we draw from international relations theory? What are the relevant lessons of history? What is the specificity of our situation? How can we work together to ensure multipolarity becomes a vehicle for sustainable development and durable peace? To start examining these questions we need an inclusive, multipolar debate. The following thoughts are presented in this spirit.

Keywords

Multipolarity, Multilateralism, International Relations, Global Governance, Brazilian Foreign Policy, Diplomacy

Are We Already Living in a Multipolar World?

Multipolarity has come to figure prominently in the everyday vocabulary of diplomats and world leaders. The first BRIC Summit in June 2009 expressed support for "a more democratic and just multipolar world order". Successive BRICS communiqués have continued to strike this chord, as have declarations by the Non-Aligned Movement. In 2010 former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton observed, during an official visit to New Zealand, that "we see a shifting of power to a more multipolar world as opposed to the Cold War model of a bipolar world". Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated at Stanford University in 2013 that we have begun to "move increasingly and irreversibly to a multipolar world". Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, declared at the second annual Russia-China Conference (2016) that "international relations have entered into

a conceptually new historical stage that consists in the emergence of a multipolar world order and reflects the strengthening of new centers of economic development and power".

While these manifestations reveal a general acceptance of the notion that multipolarity has become an inescapable concept to understand contemporary international dynamics, there seems to be less agreement on how inevitable or irreversible the transition to multipolarity really is. In fact, some of the declarations above signal a reluctance to acknowledge the complete disappearance of unipolarity. This is the underlying message in Hillary Clinton's choice of words when she speaks of a "more multipolar world". It would be safe to assume that a much stronger resistance to forego unipolarity permeates slogans that vow to "make America great again". Sergei Lavrov, in turn, speaks of an inability on the part of some to recognize that today "a unipolar world order is untenable". Could it be that we are experiencing a certain overlap of uni and multi-polar realities?

No doubt the US will remain a formidable world power for the foreseeable future. In military terms, the US is likely to remain number one for decades, even as China takes on the leading economic position. Other major developed economies will continue to wield significant influence worldwide. In other words, the established powers are not to be written off as submerging powers. China and Russia, although sometimes described as emerging powers, already enjoy great power status as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. An additional group of nations, often referred to as rising powers, are acquiring global outreach, influence and new diplomatic capabilities: Brazil, India and South Africa are cases in point. Their role in shaping international agendas through multilateral frameworks cannot be underestimated, as recent negotiations on sustainable development and climate change indicate.

A Glimpse at International Relations Theory and the Lessons of History

Before we consider the specificity of our geopolitical context, it is worth looking at some theoretical insights and historic precedents most relevant to our situation. To begin with, it is interesting to note that there is no consensus when it comes to the debate on whether multipolarity is more inherently unstable than bipolarity or unipolarity. At the height of the Cold War, Kenneth Waltz presented one set of arguments upholding the "Stability of the Bipolar World". In turn, Karl Deutsch and David Singer argued in favor of the greater stability of multipolarity in an article also published in 1964, entitled "Multipolar Systems and International Stability".

More recently, and from a different angle, Amitav Acharya in "The End of the American World Order" dismisses the fears – attributed to some scholars in the West – associated with the end of a unipolar US hegemony. Simon Reich and

Richard Ned Lebow in their 2014 book "Goodbye Hegemony", also question the belief – by both realist and liberal US academics – that a global system without a hegemon would become unstable and more war prone.

A distinction could perhaps be made between two unipolar attitudes: one that is favorably inclined towards multilateralism, the other more blatantly unilateralist. George H.W. Bush represents the first, and his son George W. Bush the second. Acharya notes with irony that the neo-conservative world view typical of the latter may have hastened the end of the unipolar moment by pushing for an aggressive Pax Americana that viewed the unilateral resort to use of military force as a natural US prerogative.

Another set of differentiations worth looking at pertain to the durability of orders and power configurations, the role of hegemonic wars and types of transitions. The Westphalian system dating to 1648 has organized world politics on the basis of relations among sovereign states for more than three and a half centuries, as successive world orders and configurations of power came and went – frequently in the aftermath of hegemonic wars. Robert Gilpin's thirty year old study on "War and Change in World Politics" remains an important reference on these questions, having given rise to a recent set of essays by a group of American scholars and edited by John Ikenberry under the title "Power, Order and Change". This compilation can be a useful guide to current perceptions among US specialists.

As emerges from these texts, changes in world order and in the distribution of power have taken place, to this day, without impacting on the essence of the Westphalian paradigm. At the same time, nuclear weapons and the specter of mutually assured destruction set the stage for transitions which do not necessarily involve wars. Indeed, in spite of the destructive proxy conflicts, which penalized several developing countries during the Cold War, the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity – after the fall of the Berlin Wall – did not involve a large-scale hegemonic war and took place within a world order continuum (the most notable institutional adjustment was the replacement of the Soviet Union by the Russian Federation as permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1992).

The current transition towards multipolarity is perhaps more transformative. In terms of governance, it has already entailed the incorporation of the BRICS, among others, into the G20 informal group of leading economies. Although agreement has yet to be reached on an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council, a consensus has existed since the end of the Cold War that its composition is not sufficiently representative of contemporary geopolitical realities. At the same time it is possible to argue that such adjustments to multipolarity – some already happening, others yet to take place – will not necessarily involve a challenge to the prevailing world order as shaped over the past seventy

years, with the UN Charter and the Bretton Woods institutions at its core. The so called "American-led world order" is in fact likely to survive the end of the unipolar moment and seems well suited to form the basis for a new multipolar order.

It is incorrect to imply that the rising powers aspire to create a radically different world order. Visibly, for the majority of the international community – rising powers included – the real issue is one of compliance by all with existing rules, without unilateralism, and with expanded opportunity for participation in decision-taking. In this respect, Marcos Tourinho presents an interesting view of the current world order which seems closer to reality. He considers that "the universal international society is a fundamentally syncretic society, since neither from an institutional or normative point of view was it shaped by Western powers alone" (Tourinho, 2015, 303). According to this view "parties have consistently found effective strategies to participate in international rulemaking by regulating the behavior of the most powerful and enhancing their own position in the hierarchy".

From this viewpoint it is possible to affirm that the contemporary world order, rather than being "Western" or "American-led" already reflects a plurality of influences and is not single-handedly led by anyone. Clearly, rising powers are more attached to it than those who feel a nostalgia for unipolar unilateralism. If we are to believe, as suggested by John Ikenberry (2014, 105), that "world orders do not just rise and decline, they also evolve" it is fair to conclude, as he does, that the forces of democracy and modernity can push and pull history in new, more cooperative, directions. It is also necessary not to underestimate the political forces that will resist adjustments or try to subvert order itself.

Historically, several situations provide useful lessons or insights for a world in transition such as ours. Two centuries ago a unipolar period came to an end and gave rise to a multipolarity of sorts, after the defeat of the Napoleonic army by the combined strength of Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia. At the Vienna Congress of 1815 a diplomatic effort aimed at reorganizing the European geopolitical landscape can be said to have brought about several decades of relative stability based on new forms of cooperation. The Concert of Europe was the precursor of the high-level conferences to which world leaders and diplomats have become accustomed. The Holy Alliance – though conservative in its objectives and repressive in its methods – could be considered a pioneer exercise in preserving peace. Equally noteworthy was the fact that France, although defeated in the battlefield, was not subjected to humiliating treatment by the victors.

It was clear from the outset that the objective of thwarting a return to unipolarity constituted a strong unifying factor among the victorious powers, as they engaged in groundbreaking forms of cooperation in the aftermath of Napoleon. Still, the experiment involved a narrow thematic scope and limited inclusiveness – even

within a non-universal, European context. The exclusion of the Ottoman Empire from the negotiating table, for example, sowed the seeds of the Crimean War, which marked the beginning of the prelude to the Great War of 1914. It must also be recognized that cooperation was placed – more often than not – at the service of repression of dissent and nationalist uprisings. In other words, multipolarity can be reactionary rather than progressive; hegemonic rather than democratic.

The Versailles Treaty was notoriously less successful than the Vienna settlements in advancing stability, the most obvious reason being the punitive treatment accorded to a defeated Germany. By contrast, the agreements emerging from World War II provided a new example of magnanimity towards the defeated, which proved to be wise and pragmatic.

Furthermore, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, limiting the use of force, required self-restraint on the part of the victorious powers, and can be described as a step forward for international relations. It appears thus that a learning process is possible, within a power sharing system such as the one that came into being after the Allied victory in 1945. Manifestly, the strategic choices made in the 1990's, that led to NATO expansion after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact did not draw inspiration from this logic.

A new type of threat from a non-State source tragically made its appearance on the geopolitical scene with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. This threat metastasized into a non-state movement seeking to impose its rule over large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, following the instability that resulted from the military intervention against Saddam Hussein in 2003. As described by Henry Kissinger, the geopolitical pattern in the region is now in "a shambles", with several states facing serious threats to their sovereignty. This "unrelenting foe of established order", has come to represent a historically unprecedented challenge to the Westphalian paradigm itself, as elaborated by Kissinger (2015) in his article "A path out of the Middle East collapse".

The declaration of a "war on terror" after the September 11 attacks inaugurated a new chapter in international relations fraught with unintended consequences. Rather than being defeated or curtailed by the most powerful military in history, terrorism assumed more radical features and expanded geographically.

We thus arrive at the latest transition, which seems to have been accelerated by a transgression of the established rules on the use of force, deliberately undertaken by the very power who was the alleged custodian of the prevailing order. The military intervention in Iraq of 2003, although it disregarded the UN System, did not spell the end of multilateralism. On the contrary, it may have indirectly reinforced it. The specificity of this new situation seems to defy our existing vocabulary as it

includes elements of unipolarity and multipolarity, and combines more traditional forms of geopolitical tension with a new threat to the very system within which world orders have evolved since 1648. Meanwhile, the tenets of our world order continue to survive.

What are the Specificities of 21st Century Multipolarity?

In certain respects the transition underway should not lead to an unqualified belief in the diminished relevance of material capabilities, economic or military. Traditional forms of competition for hegemonic influence, through arms build-ups and the search for territorial advantage, will continue to shape rivalries at the regional and global levels. In parallel, the strategic constraint on all-out war created by nuclear weapons will now be compounded by the proven limitations of military power to combat terrorism.

One of the most original features of the new configuration of power is the unprecedented fact that a non-European, non-Western power will assume the position of leading world economy during the decades ahead. China's economic growth is destined to translate into increased diplomatic influence. The same will apply to other regional powers from the South as they enhance their global outreach, admittedly in nonlinear ways. A resurgent Russia will still continue to wield considerable military might. A highly developed Europe may find a renewed sense of cohesion with Germany, France and Italy at its center. Japan will be faced with new strategic dilemmas, whether the US-China relationship becomes more cooperative, or adversarial. How the United States responds to a new situation of relative loss of influence will be of major relevance to the international community: the Obama legacy with respect to Iran or Cuba point in one direction; the "exceptionalist" mindset still prevalent among many in the US in another.

It is not clear whether this new environment amplifies the space for multilateralism, diplomacy and cooperation. But a number of characteristics that were absent from previous transitions, unique to the early 21st century, create a distinct framework for opportunity – alongside and beyond the obvious pitfalls. Certain factors, that were not present at other turning points can play – and indeed are already playing – a unifying role.

An important cross-cutting aspect is the higher degree of global interconnectedness among governments, economies and societies through, trade, investment, telecommunications, the media and people-to-people contacts. The flip side of this coin is the fact that this increase in connectivity may also be placed at the service of destabilizing agendas.

Among the most notable unifying elements is the challenge posed by global warming and climate change. This is a situation that, for the first time in human

history, forces the community of nations to confront the stark reality that there will be no salvation without cooperation. It affects countries large and small independently of their level of development, and cannot be mitigated without the active engagement of the largest emitters. As the resolution that adopted the Paris Agreement in December 2015 acknowledges, "climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries" (United Nations, 2015).

Violent extremism conducive to terrorism is increasingly perceived as a global threat requiring comprehensive, coordinated international efforts. The failure of the so called "war on terror" has created a heightened awareness of the need for harmonized, multilaterally agreed approaches to curtail the phenomenon. A recent UN report on the subject was particularly direct when it stated that "we must take action now to save succeeding generations".

The Ebola outbreak in 2014, which caused thousands of preventable deaths, has demonstrated that the world is ill-prepared to address the threat posed by epidemics. Although not a new threat in itself, the potentially devastating social and economic effects of health crises in an age of unprecedented human mobility has increased the level of international alert. The world drug problem is now considered a "common and shared responsibility", as nations at different points in the production and consumption chain acknowledge the unsatisfactory results of the "war on drugs" and seek more effective solutions through multilaterally concerted efforts.

Moreover, it is possible to affirm that civil society is assuming an increasingly important role in influencing international debates and agendas, in contrast with previous eras or transitions. The appearance on the world stage of a myriad of non-governmental organizations promoting causes which range from gender equality to disarmament and non-proliferation represent a historical evolution that cannot be ignored.

Differently from the 19th century's euro-centric multipolar experiment, a 21st century multipolar world order will be universal in scope. In other respects, however, the two periods may yet come to share certain similarities.

It is not unlikely that the new multipolar world order will give rise to coordinated attempts at thwarting a return to a unipolar hegemony. It is conceivable that rivalry and competition involving the main military powers will degenerate into increased tensions that could lead to widespread instability and even war. It is also possible to imagine other bleak, 21st century-specific scenarios involving the possession of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. The pressures resulting from large groups of refugees fleeing conflict and of migrants searching

for economic opportunity represent new challenges with unpredictable domestic and international repercussions.

Are We Dealing Constructively With the New Situation?

These imaginable and other as yet unimagined pitfalls could be avoided or circumvented in the presence of enlightened leadership and effective diplomacy. And there are reasons to draw encouragement from at least some of the responses to shared challenges that are already being articulated – both as regards multilateral governance structures, and with respect to the challenges themselves.

Let us first look at governance. International governance mechanisms have begun to incorporate a larger number of participants, as they adapt to a multipolar context. One of the first examples of this trend was the disappearance of the "Quad" group, composed of the US, the EU, Japan and Canada, from the GATT/WTO negotiating praxis. Since the Cancun Ministerial conference in 2003, developing countries with a special stake in negotiations on agriculture started making their way into the inner decision making circles of the WTO, with India and Brazil often taking the lead. The informal group of larger economies, known as the G7 (and then G8 as it temporarily reached out to Russia) was enlarged, in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, due to the perception – among its founders – that the group should embrace other players, including in particular the BRICS. Quota reform at the IMF and World Bank is starting to redress the asymmetries in voting rights at the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), bringing these more in line with the real economic weight of member states.

Within the United Nations system small steps are being taken to respond to a widespread demand for greater inclusiveness. An expanded Human Rights Council has been functioning in Geneva with new, more democratic, procedures such as the universal Periodic Review. Following a recommendation by the Rio+20 Conference, the membership of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme became universal. The procedures for the selection of a new Secretary-General now contemplate public hearings with the official candidates and include the possibility of participation of civil society. The High Level Plenary of the UN General Assembly on Migration and Refugees incorporated the International Organization for Migration into the UN family – a development that many hope will help to improve international coordination in response to the plight of migrants worldwide.

But the picture is not an entirely encouraging one, with many anachronistic institutional arrangements still in place, in spite of the pressure for change. The IFI's continue to be headed by nationals of developed countries. Key positions in the UN Secretariat tend to be monopolized by the five permanent members of

the Security Council. The unchanged composition of the Security Council itself reveals an incapacity on the part of the Organization to adapt to the geopolitical realities of the new century. When the membership of the UN doubled from the original 51 signatories of the Charter in 1945 to approximately 100 members in the early 1960s, the Council's composition increased from 11 to 15 – all new seats being in the non-permanent category. Today the UN has 193 members, a majority of which favor an expansion in the permanent and non-permanent category. As Bruce Jones from the Brookings Institution sustains in a recent paper, the Organization needs to more directly engage a wider set of states in the promotion of international peace and security and re-position itself for the new realities of geopolitics.

On the substantive front, the record is also mixed, with an array of unresolved problems and a few brighter spots. On the positive side, 2015 was hailed as a good year for diplomacy and multilateralism, on account of the consensus reached on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the adoption of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the successful negotiations on the Iranian nuclear file. These are not minor accomplishments and represent a victory for patient dialogue and persuasive diplomacy.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an innovative, transformative, universally applicable platform that seeks to combine economic growth with social progress and environmental awareness. With poverty eradication at its center, the Agenda is the most ambitious and comprehensive program of action ever adopted by the UN membership with its 17 goals and 169 targets. Development henceforth will be inextricably linked to sustainability. With active leadership from Brazil and Latin American countries, reducing inequality within and among nations was singled out as a stand-alone goal.

The Paris Agreement under the Framework Convention on Climate Change – adopted in December 2015 – lays the ground for holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees. With all major emitters on board, the agreement proved the skeptics wrong, notwithstanding the technical complexity and political sensitivity of the matter.

Three recent reports brought to the attention of the UN membership the related topics of peace operations, post-conflict peace building (or "sustaining peace" under the new terminology) and the role of women in the promotion of international peace and security. All three converged on the emphasis attributed to prevention; all three underlined the primacy of politics and diplomacy. The message was clear: military action should always be a measure of last resort, and carried out in full compliance with UN Charter provisions. This message can be seen as

a clear rejection of the more militaristic and interventionist mindsets of the first years of the century. The agreement reached by the P5+1 and Iran, with a view to ensuring that its nuclear capability is applied for peaceful purposes alone, should be appreciated through a similar logic. It stands as an example of a preventive measure obtained through effective diplomacy and political leadership on an issue of obvious relevance for world peace.

In the field of human rights, contemporary challenges, such as those related to the Edward Snowden revelations on mass surveillance, have been confronted multilaterally with the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. Another significant recent development was the appointment of an independent expert on the protection against discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

On the negative side a longer list could no doubt be drawn up, composed of the many unresolved international challenges with respect to which a constructive way forward is yet to be found. These are predominantly in the peace and security domain. A deadly fight for military advantage has been the hallmark of the tragic civil war in Syria, in spite of frequent admonitions to the effect that "there is no military solution to the conflict". Neglect has supplanted active diplomacy in the search for a two state solution in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Iraq, Libya and Yemen face momentous challenges. A defiant Taliban is a persistent source of instability in Afghanistan.

The absence of progress on the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a stark reminder of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the failure of the 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty exposed the continuing reluctance of the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their commitments. The persistent impasse regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East further highlights the limitations of the Treaty and its regime. The crisis in Ukraine reignited a level of animosity between Russia and the West reminiscent of the Cold War. In Africa, notwithstanding visible progress at sustaining peace in the western part of the continent, terrorism has spread across a large arc of instability along the Sahel, while efforts at stabilization in the Great Lakes region, in South Sudan and in the Central African Republic cannot be considered irreversible.

As Hugh White elaborates in "The China Choice" published in 2012, there are many ways in which the potential rivalry between the US and China could dangerously escalate, particularly along the maritime Asian fault lines. De-escalation will require dialogue, diplomacy and compromise, and the political vision capable of creating effective bilateral, regional and multilateral frameworks to reach the

necessary understandings. Such frameworks need to be established with a sense of urgency. It is obvious that the peaceful evolution of the China-US relationship is of paramount significance for the consolidation of a new order of international cooperation.

On the counter-terrorism front, even if a number of initiatives have met with consensus at the UN, a common sense of purpose based on collectively agreed strategies has yet to emerge in specific situations. As growing attention is given to the protection of civilians in situations of conflict, divergences persist, in particular with regard to the use of force – whether by peacekeepers or others – with legitimate concerns being raised regarding the negative consequences thereof. Mistrust generated by the instability wrought by the NATO intervention in Libya – authorized under a "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) mandate – has revived interest in the Brazilian proposals on "Responsibility while Protecting (RWP). It is ironic to note that the same Governments who are the most readily inclined to embrace military intervention for the alleged protection of civilians in situations of conflict, do not necessarily demonstrate a corresponding humanitarian impulse, when it comes to welcoming civilians fleeing conflict at their borders.

Subjacent to these problems is the major strategic challenge of de-conflicting great power tensions. Tensions involving the three top military powers might be compounded by several imaginable situations that need not be enumerated. If the UN evolves into a more capable machinery, built on a wider political coalition in line with multipolarity, there may be a chance that the top military powers will be able to develop confidence in such a tool. It is difficult to see how this can happen, however, without the long overdue Security Council reform.

Cooperative Multipolarity is Achievable

Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has spoken of the current geopolitical configuration as one without historic precedent, with none of the three top military powers in a position to assume a hegemonic role. In this respect Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow (2014, 183) correctly point out that "ultimately, hegemony is difficult to reconcile with democracy". It is undeniable that in the emerging multipolar configuration of power divergent agendas and world views will continue to collide and could well lead to open hostility and destructive competition. But it is also true that cooperative, and increasingly inclusive forms of interaction are happening every day on important, unifying issues, through multilateral arrangements which – although described as "American led" by some – in reality reflect an evolutionary path paved with the engaged participation of many nations large and small.

Cooperative multipolarity is therefore achievable and can be seen as the next,

more democratic and just stage in the evolutionary path of the international system. Important achievements, brought about through the active leadership of the victors of World War II, provide a firm foundation for our future efforts. These include the ruling out of the use of military force, except in situations of self-defense or in accordance with specific multilateral authorization, respect for the universality of human rights, as well as compliance with a vast body of international law establishing rights and obligations in a wide range of topics – from trade, finance and social justice, to health, education and culture.

Of the three "pillars" that compose the triad of the UN's field of activity – namely, development, human rights, peace and security – it is possible to affirm that a process of modernization and adaptation to new contemporary realities has been successfully advancing with respect to the first two. Such is the meaning of the universally applicable 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015; such is the sense of the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council created ten years ago.

In the peace and security realm, however, there is considerable room for improvement. But the situation is not hopeless. The militarism of the first years of the 21st century has come to illustrate the limitations of the use of force to confront new challenges posed by violent extremism conducive to terrorism, opening opportunities for cooperation on prevention. An effective combination of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy has produced constructive outcomes in dealing with thorny issues such as the Iranian nuclear file.

This of course is not sufficient or irreversible. Multipolarity will not lead to a more stable, cooperative world in and of itself. Governance mechanisms must become more inclusive and democratic. The most powerful will have to give up the inclination to view themselves as "exceptional" in favor of a universal, humanistic proclivity capable of celebrating our common, and diverse, humanity. Rising democratic powers can exercise their growing diplomatic influence by helping to build bridges across ideological divides, and reducing the many gaps in communication and understanding that separate countries from different cultural traditions or at different stages of economic and social development.

Nations of all sizes will need to derive benefits from the sovereign equality of states that lies at the core of our system, through improved and more inclusive multilateral frameworks for decision-taking and cooperation. Civil society will need to be afforded appropriate channels for their voices to be heard within states and internationally. The new UN Secretary-General will be called upon to exercise strong leadership, as cooperative multipolarity will not be able to thrive in the absence of robust multilateralism.

A convergence between a multipolar distribution of geopolitical influence and functional multilateral institutions that draws strength from confronting collective, unifying challenges absent from previous transitions can lead to a new international, sustainable, cooperative multipolarity. With enlightened political leadership, diplomatic resourcefulness and social mobilization, the citizens of our interconnected societies, who expect stability and opportunity to realize their potential and pursue happiness, will be supportive and ready.

Post-Scriptum

These thoughts were collected in 2016, and it seems appropriate to include a postscriptum in order to take the 2017 context into account. I would start by saying that the unilateralist impulse, which has come to manifest itself anew, is not in essence something new. We witnessed it in 2003 with respect to Iraq. As Amitav Acharya points out, a neo-conservative disregard for multilateralism, at that time, may have hastened the end of the unipolar moment rather than enhanced the standing of the predominant military and economic power in world affairs. In today's more multipolar environment, a renewed disregard for multilateralism could have even more problematic effects.

Moreover, it is worth remembering, as Marcos Tourinho argues, that the current world order – with its multilateral institutions – cannot be adequately described as led or owned by a single country or region; it has become our collective property. In this sense, it is to be expected that the international society – including governmental and non-governmental actors – will join forces to uphold the tenets of the established order and the international rules-based system. Climate change, the fight against terrorism and other unifying factors will play a part in exposing the limitations of unilateral approaches to common challenges.

Another set of considerations pertains to the limited power of nationalism to conquer hearts and minds internationally. Defending the national interest remains a priority for every government. But international leadership is difficult to sustain if it is lacking in content of universal resonance. Many in the Western media were quick to point out that Chinese President Xi Jinping struck a universal chord this year, at the Davos World Economic Forum, in highlighting the rewards of globalization, while recognizing that many had been excluded from its benefits and defending a more inclusive and humane economic order. Independently of one's religious affiliation, Pope Francis' words at the 70th UN General Assembly were met with a long unparalleled standing ovation, as his emphasis on the importance of enhancing international cooperation to alleviate poverty and protect the environment inspired and reassured. These two examples illustrate the fact that in our current international landscape, traditional categories of East and West, North and South may not fully capture the affinities that can arise across and above

divisions based on geography, ideology or level of development. The new divisions seem to be between rationality and irrationality, humanism and exceptionalism, the politics of cooperation and the politics of confrontation.

Multipolarity presupposes a competitive market for international political influence. Diplomatic clout, the capacity to lead and persuade is not a direct consequence of economic and military power, as the reference to the Vatican, above, demonstrates. The rise in the kind of populism that is lacking in solidarity towards migrants and refugees, tolerant towards prejudice, and ready to compromise universal values in favor of narrowly defined national interest represents a challenge of considerable scope. This only increases the responsibility of those who see merit in the institutional framework enshrined in our multilateral institutions to work together to preserve it, adapt it where necessary to the new geopolitical realities of multipolarity, and join forces across ideologies, religions and continents to construct a more rational, humane, cooperative international society.

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The views expressed in this article are offered by the author in an individual capacity.

Bio

Antonio de Aguiar Patriota was appointed Ambassador to Italy, Malta and San Marino in August 2016. He was the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations from 2013 to 2016. During his period as Ambassador to the UN, he was Chair of the 60th and 61st Sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women and chair of the Peacebuilding Commission of the UN (2013-2014). He served as Foreign Minister (2011-2013), Deputy Foreign Minister (2009-2010) and Ambassador to the United States (2007-2009). During his diplomatic career, he was also posted twice in Geneva (1983-1987 and 1999-2003) and in New York (1994-1999), Beijing (1987-1988) and Caracas (1988-1990). Born in Rio de Janeiro in 1954, he graduated from Brazil's Diplomatic Academy in 1979, having studied Philosophy at the University of Geneva. He was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Public Service by Chatham University in 2008. Among his publications are his thesis entitled "The UN Security Council after the Gulf War" (1998) and two volumes of "Speeches, articles and interviews" during his period as Foreign Minister. Ambassador Patriota is married to Tania Cooper Patriota, currently the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Colombia. They have two sons, Miguel and Thomas.

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Article

Blended Diplomacy: Institutional Design and Brazil's National Interest in Trade

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Abstract

How do different institutional designs in diplomacy affect the formation of the national interest in trade negotiations? While current evidence suggests that institutions influence such a process even when societal groups dominate policymaking and international factors limit state choices, it remains unclear to what extent domestic institutions shape bureaucrats' perceptions of both domestic and foreign constraints. Building upon Brazil's case during WTO's Doha Round between 2003 and 2008, I address that question through process-tracing and the triangulation of semi-structured elite interviews with archival and secondary sources. I focus the analysis on the diplomatic bureaucracy, understood as the institution at the forefront of international bargaining. I argue that if such a bureaucracy blends political and economic issues, being responsible for diplomacy in general, foreign constraints prevail. That was the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) in the period under analysis. A counterfactual exercise suggests that, should the diplomatic bureaucracy have been an economic-focused one, Brazil's liberalizing impetus at the multilateral level would have been tamed with the pursuit of preferential trade agreements (PTAs).

Keywords

Trade, National Interest, Bureaucracy, Diplomacy, WTO, Doha Round

Introduction

Trade negotiations are two-level games (Putnam 1988), implying that diplomats face domestic and international constraints. Policymakers, therefore, must make compromises in the process of elaborating the national interest. In doing so, bureaucrats and elected officials may disagree with each other while facing pressure from organized interests and foreign diplomats. In trying to understand a scenario, policymakers usually resort to ideas (Keohane and Goldstein 1993). However, both elected and unelected officials in charge of crafting a country's stances in negotiations are embedded in institutional settings (Allison 1971) located in

the interstice of the fluid divide between the domestic and the international levels (Chorev 2007). Such a fact prompts a question: how does the diplomatic institutional design impact a country's views on a trade negotiation? That is, do differences in the manner bureaucracies at the forefront of trade diplomacy relate to the international level and interact with domestic constituencies—including other state institutions—explain the national interest?

I answer those questions through the development of two categories of diplomatic bureaucracies. Such institutions correspond to the section of the state that coordinates policymaking in a negotiation, dealing with domestic inputs (including those from other state institutions) and representing the sovereign state in diplomatic summits. If the diplomatic bureaucracy is responsible for foreign policy in general, it blends politics with market-related concerns, being more embedded in the international level than in the domestic one. Alternatively, if such a bureaucracy is focused on economic issues only, domestic interests become the driving force in shaping negotiators' mindset. The distinction generates the two ideal types: blended diplomacy, which is more susceptible to foreign factors—including concerns related to high-politics—, and economic-focused diplomacy, which is more sensitive to the domestic dynamic of power—in particular pressures from interest groups. Of course, I do not assume that foreign policy can be conducted without any economic concerns. The point is that blended diplomacy subjects the immediate demands of market actors to a political filter that, in the eyes of policymakers, take into consideration long-term, state-centered goals. While policymakers can deliberately change institutions, the latter evolve in directions not foresaw by their creators (Pierson 2000). Therefore, the design of the diplomatic bureaucracy in charge of trade negotiations has independent consequences upon the formation of the national interest as well as on state-society interactions. Here I build upon Krasner's (1978, p. 35) notion of national interest, corresponding to general goals that decision-makers set, but not to specific preferences of interest groups or office-holders.

I develop the argument following the model of Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 17), combining process tracing with the purpose of theory-building. It implies in building first a conceptual framework and later demonstrating its operationalization and empirical application. With such a purpose, I study Brazil's case during the negotiations of World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Round and its Development Agenda (DDA) between 2003 and 2008. The Brazilian case approximate the blended ideal type as the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE, known as *Itamaraty*) oversees diplomacy in general and defended the liberalization of agricultural markets as a means of enhancing Brazil's position in international politics and soft-balancing (Hurrell 2006) the dominance of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) in global economic governance. The

counterfactual argument implies that, should Brazil have concentrated the formulation of negotiating positions in the hands of a focused bureaucracy, the national interest would have leaned towards protectionism. I reach the conclusions based upon semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats, office holders, members of business associations, and NGOs, triangulated with archival sources, and secondary literature (Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 123-143).

The findings suggest that Brazil could have devised a more balanced approach towards the DDA in the case it had not submitted its national interest in trade to broader considerations related to international politics. In contrast to worldwide trends at that time, Brazilian diplomats refrained from seeking second-best options to multilateral liberalization, such as the pursuit of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Although the DDA is still under negotiation, I delimited the time-frame of the study to control for alternative explanations, thus allowing me to increase the analytical leverage despite working only with a single case. The year 2003 marks the rise of Brazil as one of the main negotiating parts of the DDA. Along with India, the country displaced Canada and Japan from the so-called Quad, also formed by the EU and the US (Patriota, this volume). Furthermore, the failure of concluding the 2008 July Mini-Ministerial Meeting in Geneva represents the main deadlock that the negotiating parts of the DDA faced before the beginning of the global financial crisis (Narlikar and Van Houten 2010, p. 142). Since then, the prospects for effective multilateral liberalization of trade diminished significantly despite the establishment of the Trade Facilitation Agreement after the Bali Ministerial Meeting in 2013 (Rodrigues Vieira 2016).

Apart from being one of the most active negotiating parts representing interests from outside the West in the DDA (Hopewell 2015), Brazil has unique characteristics that make it a crucial case for developing the ideal types outlined above. Brazil's defense of liberalization is puzzling under alternative frameworks based on ideas, organization of interests, government preferences, and current institutional accounts. Those explanations predict the opposite set of national interests. In Brazil, MRE supposed autonomy vis-à-vis interest groups and historical alignment with the old import substitution industrialization (ISI) paradigm (Sikkink 1991) within a context of strong organization of manufacturing interests and economic debate pervaded by neo-developmental ideas (Ban 2013) would predict the defense of protectionism. Yet, the country remained committed to economic liberalization. Moreover, in the multilateral system of trade, Brazilian diplomacy has historically contested European and US dominance even under the period of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT, 1947-1994), before the creation of the WTO (Narlikar and Tussie 2004).

With the blended/focused typology, I contribute not only to the emerging scholarship that discusses the strategies and foreign policy of emerging powers (Car-

ranza 2016; Milani and Pinheiro 2016), but also to the literature that discusses the weight of state institutions on decision-making related to domestic-international phenomena (Farrell and Newman 2014). This is crucial to understand how states cooperate in a multipolar world (Patriota, this volume). In negotiations, institutions are often considered as being mere intervening factors to channel domestic interests, changing the weight of those interests on the final set of positions a country defends (Ikenberry 1988). Moreover, it remains unclear how different bureaucracies interact with each other, as well as whether different institutional settings lead the "fluid divide" between domestic and international constraints to generate distinct opportunities for a given country, as Chorev (2007) argued based upon the U.S. case.

In the first section, I explore the existing explanations for Brazil's positions in the DDA negotiations. I consider institutional factors, interests, ideas, and government preferences, justifying the case selection. Then in section two, I elaborate the blended and focused ideal types. In the third part, I analyze Brazilian positions in the DDA talks and make brief reference to empowerment of the MDIC—an economic-focused bureaucracy—vis-à-vis the Itamaraty in the 2010s, after the analyzed period. The conclusion discusses suggests new avenues of research based on the limitations of those ideal types.

An Empirical Puzzle with Theoretical Implications

Brazil's offensive demands had as main goal expanding market access abroad for its commercial agriculture, particularly in developed countries, such as EU members and the US. This, however, meant a trade-off at the expense of industry, as the EU and the US demanded the removal of trade barriers in the developing world for their manufactured goods (Gallagher 2007, p. 76). "We knew that, in the round, industry would be sacrificed," summarized a senior bureaucrat with close connections with the manufacturing sector when interviewed on 6 July 2012. Such a trade-off is puzzling given that, although not as strong as it had been before economic liberalization (Bresser-Pereira 2009), industry remained an important sector for the Brazilian economy, at least as much as the emerging agribusiness segment (Hopewell 2013).

Conventional institutional arguments cannot explain Brazilian preference for liberalization. The MRE and the President (who retains the constitutional prerogative of conducting foreign affairs) considered diverse inputs in formulating foreign trade policy. The Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) had links with agribusiness, while the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (MDIC) provided a channel for defensive industrial interests. The supposed "natural" preference of the Brazilian state for defending agricultural exports therefore does not hold: both agricultural and industrial sectors had access to policymakers.

Furthermore, the MRE was aligned with the import substitution project (Sikkink 1991), which is inconsistent with the diplomats' the country's supposed preference for liberalization in the DDA. Moreover, successive interactions with the WTO system supposedly enhanced Brazil's capacity to elaborate foreign trade policy (Shaffer et al. 2008). Yet, such was not the case of diplomacy in the DDA given that negotiators conceded too much in industry in exchange for market access in agriculture.

Interests do not provide insights into such a preference either, as both liberalizing and protectionist sectors lobbied the government during the DDA negotiations. Business organizations in industry had systematically been following foreign trade policymaking since mid-1990s, with the negotiations aimed at forming the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In 1996, the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) founded the Brazilian Business Coalition (CEB) with the goal of influencing the government in the FTAA talks (Carvalho 2003; Mancuso and Oliveira 2006). The CEB along with the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP)—where about 40 percent of Brazilian industry is based (SEADE 2012)—aggregated manufacturers' demands.[1] Agricultural commodity exporters adopted the same strategy, with segments (e.g., beef and soya bean producers) being as active as the National Confederation of Agriculture (CNA). However, peasants and small producers took a different position and demanded protection through the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG), which was expected to be as strong as the lobbying structures that represent large farmers.

In Brazil, the preference for favoring agriculture in the DDA is often explained by liberalizing economic ideas. Under such a view, the Brazilian economy had an inherent comparative advantage in agricultural commodities. However, in the first 13 years after liberalization in Brazil (1990–2003), industry's participation in exports of goods and services remained higher than that of the agricultural sector, contributing at least to 50 percent of all goods sold abroad (World Bank 2010). The Brazilian process of industrialization was one of the most successful industrializing experiences after the Second World War. Industrial output grew four times between 1965 and 1980. Such a rate is even higher than in Japan, which expanded three times in the same period (World Bank 2010). Also, when the DDA was launched, Brazil was moving towards an export-led strategy that included an emphasis on both agricultural commodities and manufactured goods (Rodrigues Vieira 2014), with domestic incentives to both segments (Ban 2013).

Finally, partisan preferences also do not provide a straightforward answer for Brazilian positions. The DDA negotiations started under Fernando Henrique Cardo-

[1] Sectorial associations, in particular of automobile, chemical, electrical, machinery, and textile segments, also played a crucial role in such a process.

so's government (1995–2003), whose Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) party was reputed to be more favorable to economic liberalization than his successor, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party (PT) (Ban 2013). Despite PT strong links with industrial workers and small peasants, prioritization of gains in agriculture continued under Lula. The lack of effectiveness of such links is puzzling considering that, while capitalists could shift capital from a sector to another in the case manufacturing crumbled, labor would have faced mobility problems. Moreover, under Lula, Brazil faced stronger competition from Chinese manufactures, and agricultural commodities began to dominate Brazilian exports.

If not these arguments based on institutions, organization of interests, ideas, and government preferences, what thus explains Brazil's national interest in the DDA talks? A hint lies in exploring in further detail institutional factors. Given the centrality of the MRE in defining positions in trade negotiations, its structure and position within the overall architecture of the state may explain why Brazil had offensive interests at the multilateral level. Current institutional arguments, however, face limitations in explaining how state institutions impact the formation of the national interest, which cannot be conceived as stable throughout time. Such limitations, in turn, demand further theoretical developments on how bureaucracies matter in crafting the national interest. With the considerations above in mind, I henceforth build on the institutional literature to elaborate the blended/focused typology and its theoretical implications. In doing so, I first examine arguments that conceive institutions as intervening factors that create incentives for societal actors such as interest groups and NGOs. Thereafter, I elaborate the concepts of blended and focused bureaucracies.

An Alternative Framework: Blended vs. Economic-Focused Bureaucracies

To identify the conditions under which a given set of interests prevails, a starting point is to apply veto player theory to trade negotiations. O'Reilly (2005) concludes that the existence of many veto players reduce the probability of changes in tariffs. Under such account, international factors and the action of interest groups do not explain trade policy. Nevertheless, in focusing on the number of players who can veto a decision, the theory overlooks a plausible scenario in which that numerous veto players could reach a common position if they share interests. The recent argument on access points in state bureaucracies has similar limitations. According to this logic, the more points of access in the state lobbies have, the more likely they are to influence policy outcomes as the costs of lobbying decrease (Ehrlich 2011). Although it is parsimonious, the theory ignores the unequal weights different bureaucracies have. Thus, not all bureaucracies that function as access points for lobbying groups are equal in terms of power. For instance, in the case of Brazil, the MRE is expected to have far more weight than other ministries in crafting negotiating positions. Therefore, although other bureaucratic

units that take part in the formation of the national interest, they are neither veto players nor access points through which lobbying could be effective.

A solution for the shortcomings of the veto players and access points theories lies in identifying which sectors of the state are central in international trade negotiations. If a given section of the state has more control over the negotiating agenda than others, such an institution can therefore have more power in defining the national interest. That is the case, for instance, when the executive branch of a democratic government has the prerogative of negotiating international agreements without suffering a constant scrutiny from legislators. According to Lake (1988, p. 57), in the US, the executive finds itself in a position that enables it to decide on foreign policy even against the will of societal actors. Milner (1997) corroborates this argument by arguing the executive branch empowers itself by controlling information related to negotiations.

In any country, however, the executive is hardly a unitary actor, having bureaucracies with different degrees of autonomy. While the head of government can be considered the chief negotiator, other officials deal with negotiations more frequently. Yet, even if the executive prevails, it is not necessarily the only government branch that define the national interest. In democratic regimes legislators may participate not only in the ratification of agreements, but also in its negotiation. The legislative, indeed, plays a role in negotiations even in the case that it abdicates the right of participating in the formation of the national interest rather than formally delegating it to the executive (Martin 2000, p. 148) In addition, certain institutions and actors—such as elected officers in executive and legislative branches—may have the power to define the whole institutional design itself, and, thus, change which section of the state holds the status of the diplomatic bureaucracy.

Therefore, should those institutions and actors be the analytical focus for explaining national interest in trade? The answer is "no" if two assumptions empirically hold. First, both bureaucrats and elected officials can hardly change the existent institutional design: that can be too costly depending on the number of effective veto players and divert political resources from the major goal—negotiating an agreement. In fact, institutional designs are usually inherited from past decisions (Goldstein 1988). Second, if a new institutional design is politically feasible, the shadow of the future might lead policymakers to avoid risk and pursue the desired outcome in negotiations by other means. Institutional changes open room for unintended consequences (Pierson 2000). Thus, *a priori* there is no need to problematize why a given institutional design exists in a country as long as the same is not modified just because of a *specific* international negotiation or in function of vested interests.

The discussion above corroborates Miles' Law (1978): decision-making depends on where one sits in the state apparatus. Such proposition follows Allison's (1971, p. 171) bureaucratic model of decision-making, in which "each player pulls and hauls with the power at his [or her] discretion for outcomes that will advance his [or her] conception of national, organizational, group, and personal interests." Thus, rather than being the consequence of careful rational action, the national interest arises from multiple interactions shaped by pre-given factors, such as the state's institutional design.

Complementing Miles' claim that "where you stand depends on where you sit," I propose that *how* one sits within a bureaucracy also impacts decision-making. If institutions are not easily changeable, thus one cannot choose *where* and *how* to sit when deciding. The perceptions of one who decides mixing political-economic issues are different to those of whose focus lies on economic questions only. A focus on the state, in particular the diplomatic bureaucracy, implies not treating its institutional design as an intervening factor. Nor it ignores government branches other than the executive. Instead, the design of domestic institutions has an independent—yet not exclusive—impact on trade positions. That is the case if the existence of the institutional design precedes a given trade negotiation and, thus, the definition of the national interest. I then expect that, insofar as the state formulates foreign policy, it ultimately defines what the national interest means (Allison 1971; Krasner 1978). Yet current accounts leave unanswered why domestic and international constraints impact differently such a process.

Chorev's (2007) concept of fluid divide attempts to overcome such limitation in conceiving both levels as being part of a single field of action. Notwithstanding its sophistication, the argument differs from the categories I work with. According to Chorev (2007, p. 660), "institutional arrangements of both states and international organizations affect the relative dominance of the competing factors involved in the process of policymaking." Therefore, the analysis of the institutions involved in trade policy in both domestic and international levels contributes to unfold the logics behind the shifting balance that attributes different weights to national and external constraints. In contrast to Chorev's argument, however, I contend that an institutional perspective can be more parsimonious if *focused only on the domestic bureaucracies* devoted to international trade negotiations.

Within such a model, both domestic and international factors are subsumed into a single framework, and it is possible to incorporate constraints that arise from within the bureaucracies themselves independently from societal pressures or foreign limitations. As explained in the previous section, agency shapes institutions, yet the latter evolve in unpredictable ways, opening room for unintended consequences. Such a fact implies that institutional design impacts policymaking independently from other factors as it embeds social action, framing decision-

makers' understanding of the negotiating conjecture. Out of all institutions, the bureaucracy responsible for negotiations is the section of the state that matters the most for understanding the formation of the national interest: it controls the negotiating agenda and, thus, constrains demands coming from other institutions. Other bureaucracies and the legislative power can still impact the formation of the national interest, yet will be subject to the constraints imposed by the design of the diplomatic bureaucracy.

That is the case as the weight of domestic and international factors upon decision-making depends on the institutional design of the state. This, in turn, determines whether domestic or international embeddedness prevails within a bureaucracy. Originally, the concept of embeddedness focused on the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis private interests in the domestic level (Evans 1995). The concept implies that the more embedded a state is, the more sensitive it is to demands from domestic players. For the sake of simplicity, the notion of autonomy can be left aside once the concept of embeddedness is converted into domestic embeddedness and contrasted with international embeddedness. They generate the focused and blended ideal types respectively. While blended bureaucracies are devoted to foreign policy in general take into account in decision-making foreign constraints mainly, focused bureaucracies focus above all domestic interests (including from other parts of the state, such as the legislative power in democracies) in decision-making given their specialization on economic-related issues. Figure 1 schematizes the argument, representing how each type of bureaucracy finds itself in relation to the domestic and international level.

Figure 1: Blended and Economic-Focused Bureaucracies



Certainly, those are ideal types that may not capture all variations in the domestic institutional design of decision-making on international trade negotiations. However, the identification of the diplomatic bureaucracy, followed by the definition of its main characteristic, furnishes basic elements for a rigorous, systematic explanation of the origins of a country's national interest in trade without ignoring the effects of competing explanations for the formation of the national interest.

Applying the Framework

"Insofar as the MRE faces the limits of foreign positions, it is reasonable that the ministry formulates the national demands in a trade negotiation." This is how a senior bureaucrat interviewed on 20 June 2012 explained the prominent role the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations played in relation to the DDA talks. As the negotiations evolved, the MRE however had to deal with an increasing number of institutions and non-state actors contributing with policymaking (Cason and Power 2009, p. 118). Therefore, how was it possible for the MRE to mitigate protectionist demands, such as those from manufacturing sectors, in the formation of the national interest? The answer is straightforward: the ministry retained the prerogative of conducting Brazil's foreign affairs and remained more embedded in the international level than in the domestic arena, defining the national interest based first and foremost based upon the broad international political conjecture. This limited the influence from other bureaucracies and business segments whose interests that could hinder the use of the DDA as a means of politically empowering Brazil in the world stage. In turn, such a project depended on defending liberalizing positions to weaken Global North's stances on trade.

The MRE is reputed to have more autonomy and internal coherence than other parts of the Brazilian state. While diplomats still claim to have a monopoly in defining the national interest, since mid-1990s the MRE receives more and more inputs from other units within the state (Armijo and Kearney 2008). In addition, given the complexities that arise from globalization, diplomats became more receptive to interactions with organized interests as a mean of avoiding misperceptions in negotiations. Those changes occurred, however, while the ministry preserved its status as the diplomatic bureaucracy for trade negotiations. Given that the MRE perceived the launch of a new multilateral round of trade liberalization as inevitable, the ministry consulted with other bureaucracies and societal organizations in 1999. In July of that year, four months before the Seattle Ministerial Meeting for launching the failed Millennium Round, President Cardoso created the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on International Trade of Goods and Services (GICI). The group focused on liberalization at the multilateral level.[2] In 2003, the MRE organized a working group dedicated to agriculture with the aim of building consensual positions for the sector, which was the Brazilian focus in the round (Bureaucrat, interview, 12 March 2012). Called the Informal Technical Group (GTI), it included players other than the MRE (Luiz Carmona, MAPA bureaucrat, interview 19 June 2012). The GTI was built upon the pre-existing

[2] The GICI was composed by diplomats and members from the ministries of Finance; MDIC; MAPA; Science and Technology; Budget and Public Management; and Environment, as well as the Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) (Presidência da República 1999). The latter, along with the three first ministries listed, will be analyzed in detail ahead as they remained as relevant players from the state in foreign trade policy as the DDA as the negotiations evolved.

connections between the MAPA and market actors (Carlos Cozendey, MRE bureaucrat, interview, 26 June 2012; Camila Sande, CNA Officer, interview, 27 June 2012). The group surpassed the GICI as the main forum for formulating Brazil's core positions for the DDA negotiations. As diplomats report, many positions that would later be presented at the negotiations by the Agricultural G-20 were first discussed at the GTI (Bureaucrat, interview, 12 March 2012; interview with senior bureaucrat, 18 October 2012). Moreover, the MRE contributed to the creation of a private think-tank called ICONE, which improved the negotiators' technical background on agriculture (André Nassar, ICONE Officer, interview, 20 July 2012).

A similar approach was taken with regards to industrial sectors. The MRE created a group for Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) themes analogous to the GTI, which focused on agriculture (Market Actor, interview, 4 June 2012). Also, at the beginning of 2004, the Permanent Mission in Geneva pressed the FIESP to expand its research capacity on international negotiations. Diplomats in the Permanent Mission wanted to build critical mass to negotiate NAMA, and, despite initial opposition from top-tier diplomats based in Brasília, the FIESP sent an official to Geneva to work with the Brazilian representatives to the WTO. The role of FIESP as an informal think-tank for negotiations involving industrial goods was crucial insofar as the MDIC opposed the trade-off that the DDA implied for Brazil (Frederico Meira, FIESP officer [2005-2013], interview, 2 August 2011; Market Actor, interview, 18 June 2012). As the round seemed to be reaching its end, in 2008, the Permanent Mission liaised directly with business associations to discuss the impact of the Swiss Formula (Gallagher 2007, p. 74-77) for tariff cuts and the selection of tariff lines for the exception list in NAMA (Senior Bureaucrat, interview, 15 June 2012).

Apart from the MRE, the MDIC—an example of focused bureaucracy—emerged during the DDA timeframe as the most relevant player for the elaboration of positions in foreign trade policy. The MDIC was created in 1999, from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), which had historical connections with the industrial sector, including the FIESP and the CNI. Those ties, particularly with the CNI through the CEB, prevailed as the ministry was converted into the MDIC, as part of Cardoso's strategy, launched in his second term (1999–2003), to boost Brazilian exports and to avoid disruptions in the balance of payments (Rodrigues Vieira 2014, p. 151). MDIC's ministers between 2003 and 2008 talked directly about the DDA with organized interests and entrepreneurs in manufacturing (Interview with Sérgio Amaral, MDIC's minister [2001-2002], 25 May 2012; interview with Luiz Fernando Furlan, MDIC's minister [2003-2006], 2 August 2012; Former Bureaucrat, interview, 14 December 2011). Nevertheless, the proposals and studies were submitted to the MRE, which coordinates de facto the

formation of positions in the domestic level (Welber Barral, MDIC's Secretary of Foreign Trade [2007-2011], interview, 18 June 2012). For instance, archives demonstrate that the MDIC sent to the MRE simulations on the effects of tariff cut proposals. Such an exchange indicates that some informational cooperation existed between both bureaucracies, notwithstanding different views on the negotiations (MDIC 2005 and 2006). The MDIC, however, resisted providing all the information that the MRE requested to define the limits of the inter-sectorial bargains that the country could offer and accept (Frederico Meira, FIESP officer [2005-2013], interview, 2 August 2011; Market Actor, interview, 18 June 2012). The MDIC was also the main access point for services, demanding positions from business associations in the sector. The interaction with them was enhanced in 2005 with the creation of the Secretary of Commerce and Services (Bureaucrat, interview, 5 July 2012). In spite of being mainly associated with manufacturing and services, the MDIC also received liberalizing demands from sectors that were part of the agribusiness chain, in particular food-processing (such as industrialized meat), which falls between the agriculture and industry (Welber Barral, MDIC's Secretary of Foreign Trade, 2007-2011, interview, 18 June 2012).[3]

Agribusiness, however, had its main links with the MAPA. As happened between, on the one hand, the heads of the MDIC and, on the other, the industrial sectors, major agricultural producers and organized interests had direct links with the minister of Agriculture. Marcus Vinícius Pratini de Moraes, minister of Agriculture when the round was launched in 2001, reported during an interview on 13 August 2011 that he talked directly with associations of agro-export sectors inputs to formulate initial positions for the round. Given the rising importance of commodity-exporting for Brazil's foreign trade, the ministry created a Secretary of International Relations to enhance its policymaking capacity in the area (Bureaucrat, interview, 20 June 2012). Small farmers, in turn, had their interests represented by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA). Created in 1999, the ministry only became involved in the DDA negotiations during Lula's government. This was part of a strategy of listening to the views of the small producers that had defensive interests, thus conferring more legitimacy to the formation of negotiating positions (Bureaucrat, interview, 20 June 2012; Luiz Vicente Facco, CONTAG director, interview, 3 July 2012). The clearest signal of MDA's incorporation in the process of policymaking in trade negotiations came in 2005, with a Presidential Decree that placed the minister of Agrarian Development in the Council of Ministers of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) (Presidência da República 2005), reflecting PT's links with peasant organizations and landless movements.

[3] This tended to happen more intensively in the period 2003-2006, when Luiz Fernando Furlan, a food-processing entrepreneur, was ahead of the MDIC.

The CAMEX had been created in 1995, just after Cardoso became President. Initially placed within the presidential office with the goal of acting as a coordination forum in foreign trade policy (WTO 2009, p. 15), it was transferred to the MDIC in 2001, as the head of the ministry was given the responsibility of presiding over the chamber. Officially, the CAMEX has the prerogative of determining the negotiation directives for international agreements related to trade issues (Presidência da República 2003). The main decision-making body within the chamber is the Council of Ministers, originally formed by the ministers of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (the chair); of the Civil House (the President's chief-of-staff); Foreign Relations; Finance; Planning, Budget and Administration; and Agriculture (Presidência da República 2001). In spite of officially controlling the CAMEX, the MDIC is far from having the last word on trade negotiations. Neither the ministry nor the chamber was part of the GTI that formulated positions in agriculture (Luiz Carmona, MAPA bureaucrat, interview, 19 June 2012). Insofar as the MRE remains in the charge of negotiations (Carlos Cozendey, MRE bureaucrat, interview, 26 June 2012), it retains the coordination position that is legally under CAMEX umbrella. Figure 2 exemplifies the blended model in Brazil, with international embeddedness prevailing due to MRE stronger linkages with external rather than domestic processes.

Figure 2: A Blended Model (Brazil)



Without the existence blended institutional design, Brazilian negotiators would hardly have downplayed the demands of protectionist segments as they were organized as an interest group (i.e., CEB and FIESP) and had connections with relevant sections of the state (i.e., MDIC). Within the international conjecture in which negotiations took place, Brazilian diplomacy considered the DDA an opportunity to enhance the country's gains not only in what concerns political status as an emerging power, but also in material terms through the expansion of agricultural exports. At the same time, with active participation within the WTO system, the country could signal to the international society commitment to multilateralism. However, under Lula's government, such a commitment was converted into a means to attempting to enhance leadership among developing countries.

Having been crafted under the perception that the West's power could be soft-

balanced (Hurrell 2006, p. 16; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, p. 431), the articulation of the Agricultural G-20 satisfied PT's aspirations to establish deeper relations between Brazil and the Global South (Burges 2009, p. 160-161), MRE left-wing-leaning bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs who had gained strength with the liberalization of the economy. However, that seemed odd under traditional ideas of realpolitik insofar as commodity exporting is hardly associated with state empowerment in the international arena (Gilpin 1981). The FTAA, in turn, which was in the interest of industrial sectors, never came into force in large part thanks for to the Brazilian government negotiating tactic of postponing substantial decisions until the US abandoned the project in 2005. These tactics met part of PT's anti-American stances, yet came about largely due to MRE's blended institutional design. As a senior bureaucrat interviewed on 15 June 2012 summarized, "the circumstances allowed ourselves to oppose the EU and the US … In sum, it was a magic moment which allowed us to project ourselves abroad." Another senior bureaucrat interviewed on 6 July 2012 went further and said that "…the conclusion of the round would enhance Brazil's diplomatic prestige in the world."

Developments in the aftermath of the analysed period corroborate the argument that an institutional design centred on a focused bureaucracy would have tamed Brazil's liberalizing impetus in Doha. Certainly, international factors—particularly the negotiations of the now-defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—contributed to the adjustment of Brazilian priorities in trade. Yet, the rising importance of the MDIC in the issue-area precedes such changes. Under President Dilma Rousseff's (2011-2016) administration, the MDIC conquered more space in the formulation of the national interest. An example was the pursuit of bilateral trade agreements by Minister Armando Monteiro, who was a former CNI president and commanded MDIC during Rousseff's second term (January 2015-May 2016, when she left office after the approval of impeachment proceedings). Amid the economic crisis that triggered mass discontent against PT's just re-elected president, Brazil signed with Uruguay a free-trade agreement to liberalize the commerce of automobiles—a sector subject to a special regime within MERCOSUR, the common market that those countries integrate (Brazil 2015). In the same year, Brazil and Colombia managed to create a quota-based regime for enhancing exchange in the same sector (Ibid.). Moreover, in April 2016, MDIC and Itamaraty signed an economic deal with Peru comprising even government procurement (Brazil 2016).

Those facts signalled that the government finally opened itself to the demands of manufacturers to look beyond MERCOSUR for new exporting markets, yet without concessions at the multilateral level (CNI 2014). Part of these demands steam from the exhaustion of the new developmental policies that stimulated

domestic consumption as a means of circumventing the effects of the 2008 crisis on the Brazilian economy (Ban 2013). Those trends only gained further traction within Michel Temer's government and the emphasis on economic diplomacy chancellor José Serra put during his short-term tenure in the Itamaraty (May 2016-February 2017). Both CAMEX and the Brazilian Agency for Export Promotion are placed under Itamaraty's umbrella since Temer became president. As of February 2017, however, the MDIC remains active in negotiating bilateral agreements, as its attempts to celebrate a deal with the European Free Trade Area suggest (EFTA 2017).

To summarize, since early 1990's Brazil witnessed the emergence of partisan preferences on foreign policy as well as of state actors other than the MRE—particularly the MDIC—in dealing with external affairs and the growing interest of organized groups in external economic relations. The MRE, however, retained during the 2000s its dominant position in defining the national interest in trade talks. As the ministry is embedded more internationally than domestically, it looked during that decade mainly at foreign constraints when elaborating the national interest in trade. Developments in 2010s corroborate such an argument as Brazil started to explore bilateral solutions in trade as the MDIC gained more prominence in the negotiation of commercial agreements. With U.S. President Donald Trump's retreat from trade openness, one could expect that Brazil's retains the pace of recent change in the institutional design of foreign policymaking and, hence, in its growing bilateral approach in that issue-area. The attempts of approximation between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance—which congregates Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, all of which Brazil already has deals with—suggest such a prediction is plausible.

Conclusion

In this article, I argued that the design of the bureaucracy at the forefront of trade negotiations decisively impacts the formation of the national interest in such issue-area. As bureaucrats craft the national interest, they are subject to constraints that have different weights on decision-making. Whether international or domestic factors prevail depends on the configuration of the diplomatic bureaucracy, which ultimately gathers domestic demands and represents the state abroad. If such a bureaucracy oversees foreign policy in general, international embeddedness prevails over domestic embeddedness, thus leading strategic considerations to prevail over immediate market demands in policymaking. In turn, the opposite happens whenever the main bureaucracy is focused on economic issues—leading a country to balance better distinct interests from liberalizing and protectionist segments. As the institutional design precedes the preferences of organized interests, bureaucrats, and politicians, such typology explains the formation of different notions of national interest.

The argument was built upon Brazil's case in the negotiations of WTO's DDA. The MRE conducts trade negotiations, representing a case of focused bureaucracy, then being more subject to international rather than to domestic forces. Brazil therefore viewed the DDA negotiations as a means of enhancing Brazil's prestige abroad rather than prioritizing the demands of protectionist segments, not offering second-best options for liberalizing segments such as commodity-producers. As the DDA went into deadlock, domestic factors gained more influence once the MDIC—an economic-focused bureaucracy—participated more in trade negotiations, thus suggesting that, had it controlled the negotiating agenda during the DDA, Brazil could have ended up balancing demands from sectors with opposed interests, creating more space for the demands of manufacturers.

Three main research avenues can be explored based on the ideal-types I developed. The first consists of exploring cross-temporal interactions inside states, particularly between executive and the legislative institutions, as the national interest is formed. In Brazil, no evidence on the impact of the legislative in forming the country's positions in the DDA arose from the interviews and archival research conducted for this work. Based on the US case, however, one could expect that legislative control over decision-making would mitigate the effects of a blended design as representatives would pressure diplomats to prioritize economic needs of constituencies over strategic goals in the light of factors other than market gains. The US legislative often delegates to the President the power of negotiating agreements through the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Yet, rather than leading the legislative to abdicate to its role in foreign policy (Martin 2000) and granting full autonomy to the President—who then appoints a Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate on the government's behalf—, TPA makes the executive more accountable vis-à-vis legislators (O'Halloran 1993; WTO 2008). In fact, during the TPA mandate that lasted between 2002 and 2007 the USTR started defending liberalizing positions, yet the American space for bargaining shrunk as domestic actors became more protectionist.

A second avenue corresponds to applying the blended/focused typology to other cases in issue-areas other than trade. In the case of Brazil, the effects of blended diplomacy are also evident in the approach adopted during the PT government—particularly under Lula—towards Latin America and Africa and in the process of creating of national champions in agriculture and services. The pursuit of partnerships with neighbors and the other side of the South Atlantic aimed to strengthen Brazil's position vis-à-vis both established and emerging powers, yet co-opted private actors, such as civil construction subcontractors (Rego and Figueira 2017). The strategy also relied on state owned companies, particularly the oil-giant Petrobras, as the disputes over gas fields in Bolivia (Ribeiro 2009) and the exploration of off-shore reserves in West Africa suggest. Moreover, in

current times the opposition to Brazil's application to become a full member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) can be understood within the context of blended diplomacy the MRE has historically conducted. Those against the application usually refer to the trade-offs between potential economic gains that OECD may bring and an eventual loss of autonomy in conducting key areas of foreign policy, particularly cooperation and development aid—for which that organization demands more transparency than what Brazil practices. Should Brazil have a diplomatic unit focused on economic affairs, membership in the OECD could perhaps have not been perceived under such a zero-sum game logic.

The third research line the blended vs. focused typology posits consists of exploring the impact of different types of international institutions on the formation of the national interest. The case I explored comprises an issue-area (trade) and an organization (WTO) with a high degree of legalization (Abbott et al 2000). This implies that the state does not have as much flexibility as it would have in the case of negotiating an agreement from scratch or even the formation of a new organization. Such a context may lead diplomacy to control the agenda of the formation of the national interest to extract as many gains as possible from negotiations not only in strategic terms, but also for what negotiators perceive to be the best to domestic actors. However, the Brazilian experience under the GATT—which was not as institutionalized the WTO—suggests that the domestic institutional design trumps any potential influence from the design of international organizations in the formation of the national interest. As mentioned in the introduction, Brazil have always bargained hard with the West in the multilateral system of trade. India's case corroborates such an argument as it has a similar trajectory in the GATT/WTO system, having been, however, much less flexible than Brazil, standing with protectionist positions even whenever the country could have strategically embraced liberalization (Rodrigues Vieira 2015). Indeed, such a fact may reflect the institutional design of the Indian diplomatic bureaucracy for trade negotiations, which is economic-focused as the Ministry of Commerce negotiates trade agreements for the country and interacts constantly with other bureaucracies and interest groups.

International phenomena are subject to multiple influences, being hardly the outcome of a chain of deliberate rational decisions only. Domestic institutions, thus, have an independent effect on the process of crafting national preferences and in absorbing external influence. As institutional design does not necessarily reflect the choices of those who participate in policymaking, but a previous political settlement, bureaucrats and politicians usually have no better choice than conforming themselves to the environment in which they are embedded. The same design determines whether bureaucrats will be primarily subject to international

or domestic factors as they define the national interest in trade negotiations and eventually the overall strategy of empowerment in the international arena.

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Bio

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Article

Rising Donors in a Transitional World: Challenges and Opportunities for Brazilian Technical Cooperation

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Abstract

How can a transitional multipolar world affect the rise of new actors in the area of International Development Cooperation? In this article, we analyze the evolution of Brazilian Technical Cooperation projects over the last 20 years. This period was characterized by a sharp increase in the amount of money spent on such policies, which in turn made Brazil an emerging donor and prompted research on the motives that drove this foreign policy strategy. However, the literature has still neglected to combine the changes that occurred in the international arena with changes that occurred in Brazilian domestic politics, to examine if Brazil chases international ambitions. To fill this gap, we gathered unpublished data on the expenditures of all bilateral and multilateral Brazilian Technical Cooperation projects from the last two decades. Our findings suggest that the increase in Technical Cooperation in this period was directed toward allied countries. We believe that this indicates that, despite the humanistic rhetoric, Brazilian Technical Cooperation projects played a major role in advancing Brazilian interests for gathering support in the international arena.

Keywords

Brazil, International Technical Cooperation, Transitional Multipolar World

"All these efforts at the multilateral level are complemented by my country's solidarity actions towards poorer nations, especially in Africa"

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
United Nations General Assembly, 2008

"Contrary to what has been spread among us, modern Africa does not ask for compassion, but expects an effective economic, technological and investment exchange"

Jose Serra
on his takeover as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016

Introduction

Few things have remained the same in the international arena since Francis Fukuyama announced the "*End of History*" (2006) a quarter of century ago. The distribution of power is nowadays quite different than it used to be and even if it is true that the United States will remain a major player in world, the 21st century has shown that it will not be the only such power. Therefore, while the world transitions to an order in which power is much more widely distributed, rising powers will be challenged with the possibility of assuming more leadership roles in areas where previously they had no voice.

In recent years, International Development Cooperation has undergone fundamental changes. The emergence of new actors that have progressively defied the traditional approach to development cooperation, historically pursued by members of the OECD, is particularly noteworthy (Quadir, 2013; Six, 2009). For instance, countries such as India, Turkey and Brazil have become important players in this arena[1] (Souza, 2012; Renzio & Seifert, 2014). Among these new players, Brazil has taken an active role in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The country's International Development Cooperation strategy since 2003 has drastically changed, with a significant increase in the number of agreements signed with developing countries under the umbrella of South-South cooperation (Puente, 2010; Oliveira & Onuki, 2012). There still remains the question, however, of whether this policy was designed to increase Brazilian soft power or if it was planned with only humanitarian purposes in mind. Moreover, will this policy be maintained due to the current economic and political crises and the foreign policy preferences of the current administration?

[1] It is worth noting that these countries are not keen on using the terms 'aid' or 'assistance'. Instead, they use the terms "development cooperation" and "partnership", as these appear to offer the possibility of building a horizontal relationship between the so-called donors and recipients (Quadir, 2013). In this sense, this paper utilizes the term Development Cooperation in referring to foreign aid policies. Regarding Brazilian initiatives, we analyze unpublished data on Brazilian Technical Cooperation projects, specific "aid" initiative under the umbrella of Brazilian International Development Cooperation.

Taking this scenario into account, the objective of this article is to analyze the evolution of Brazilian International Technical Cooperation policies since the beginning of the 2000s up to today, and examine if this policy targeted like-minded countries to boost Brazilian soft power in international organizations. To achieve this, we will follow three different but complementary strategies. First, we examine how the institutional arrangements of Brazilian International Technical Cooperation have evolved since their inception in the 1950s until the creation of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), the main institution responsible for the management of Brazilian Technical Cooperation. Secondly, we then analyze how Brazil has justified its International Technical Cooperation actions, placing greater emphasis on the change of discourse that took place under different ruling parties in Brazil, and on the changes that occurred in the world order. Thirdly, we present unpublished data granted to us by the ABC that describes Brazilian technical expenditures, considering whether they were channeled to bilateral or multilateral projects.

In accordance with these strategies, in the next sections, we analyze the *challenges* and *opportunities* faced by Brazil in providing technical cooperation. Based on the official rhetoric of South-South solidarity regarding these policies, we operationalize the *opportunities* concept as the support of the recipient countries for Brazil in governance issues of International Organizations (IOs). More specifically, we will analyze Brazilian support in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the Executive Boards of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and in the coalitions formed in the World Trade Organization (WTO). We operationalize the *challenges* concept as the economic constraints experienced by Brazil, utilizing some economic indicators, such as Brazilian GNP.

Our results suggest that, particularly between 2008 and 2012, Brazil assumed an active role as a cooperative player; a moment in which politicians and scholars claimed that the country had became a global player in the area. In this context, we argue that the Brazilian government engaged in these activities, through the rhetoric of South-South alliances, in order to look for opportunities to raise Brazil's international profile in the international arena. Accordingly, our results suggest that this increase in technical cooperation was directed toward allied countries in International Organizations, especially in IOs such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. Nevertheless, despite increasing engagement in international cooperation initiatives, Brazilian foreign technical cooperation strategy, either bilateral or multilateral, has been strongly influenced by the local economic and political situation ever since. Specifically, we found that the worsening economic situation was followed by a decrease in the provision of technical cooperation. Therefore, we discuss how the combination of economic and political crises might change Brazilian foreign policy priorities, and discuss

findings that are generalizable to other rising powers under the same conditions.

Brazilian International Technical Cooperation

Over the last fifteen years Brazil has become an important player in the field of International Development Cooperation. Although the country still receives technical and financial assistance, it has come to be an active donor, leading bilateral and multilateral initiatives in International Technical Cooperation.[2] The background for this change was a moment of economic growth and political stability, which allowed the Brazilian government to carry out a reorientation of foreign policy. Since 2003, through the promotion of alliances and agreements with partners from the Global South, Brazil has made several efforts to reduce the asymmetries between developing and developed countries (Oliveira & Onuki, 2012; Pinheiro & Gaio, 2014). Although International Technical Cooperation gained greater emphasis and became, with increasing clarity, an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy strategy since Lula's first administration, these strategies have a longstanding past, which deserves to be analyzed.

The first initiative that tried to establish a coherent "International Technical Cooperation System" took place in 1950, with the creation of the National Technical Assistance Commission (CNAT). This institution was composed of government representatives from the Secretariat of Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other ministries, while its main purpose was to establish the priorities for requesting technical assistance from abroad. Multilateral agencies were not common during this period, and so technical assistance was mainly provided by industrialized countries with which Brazil had specific technology transfer agreements in the form of cooperation (ABC, 2016).

Years later, broad institutional reform was carried out in 1969, centralizing by decree the basic skills of international technical cooperation (external negotiation, planning, coordination, promotion and follow-up) in the Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN) and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). However, the need for a new reform of the international aid management mechanisms was again outlined during 1984. At that moment, the Technical Cooperation System was under double command: the Technical Cooperation Division of Itamaraty and the Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation (SUBIN). In practical terms, while the former oversaw the political aspects of technical cooperation, the latter performed technical functions such as the proposal, analysis, approval and monitoring of projects (ABC, 2016).

[2] According to a survey conducted by Le Monde Diplomatique Brazil, between 2005 and 2009 the Brazilian government provided more international aid than what it obtained from countries and multilateral agencies. It is worth mentioning that Brazil continues to be an international aid recipient, one of the reasons why the country seeks to distance itself from the official CID terminology used by the OECD / DAC.

In order to resolve the tensions created by this dual command structure, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) was created on September 1987 from the merger of the two former units of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). The creation of ABC took place at a time of great changes in the flow of international development cooperation, which materialized in Brazil in two ways.

Initially, in the context of Brazil's technical cooperation relations with the multilateral system, a new management model of multilateral cooperation was introduced by the end of the 1980s. This put focus on a novel way of organization, which called for the control by developing countries of technical cooperation programs implemented by international organizations. It is important to emphasize that, until this point, the so-called 'Direct Execution' management model held sway. Under Direct Execution, international organizations were responsible for both the administrative and financial management and the technical conduction of the projects in the beneficiary countries[3] (ABC, 2016).

A second strand of Brazilian foreign policy, known as South-South technical cooperation, allowed for the expansion of ABC. Having been originally created to act as the axis of Brazilian South-South cooperation, the operational structure of the agency and the composition of its human resources and management systems framework was progressively structured along the lines of the dramatic growth of Brazil's horizontal cooperation programs, which were expanded in terms of partner countries served, projects implemented and resources effectively disbursed (ABC, 2016).

Thus, nowadays the institutional arrangements for the provision of technical cooperation are centered on ABC, which acts as an official body under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since its creation, ABC has assumed several roles, including planning, coordinating, negotiating, approving, executing, monitoring and evaluating cooperative initiatives at the national level, as well as being in charge of projects between Brazil and developing countries, including related actions in the field of training for the management of technical cooperation and dissemination of information (ABC, 2016). In other words, ABC has the role of negotiating, promoting and monitoring Brazilian cooperative projects and programs as a whole, although this does not impede the other 170 federal government agencies that participate in this process, including ministries, municipalities, foundations and public enterprises over a wide range of areas (Ipea, 2013). Technical Coopera-

[3] In order to change this framework, the United Nations Assembly adopted a resolution in 1989 recommending the implementation of a policy of "Government Execution", later consolidated in the expression "National Execution of Projects". These initiatives had the objective of promoting greater ownership and accountability of developing countries on technical cooperation programs implemented in partnership with United Nations' agencies.

tion is delineated by strong fragmentation and institutional dispersion, justified in part by the lack of specific legislation in Brazil that clearly defines the objectives, scope, mechanisms, competencies and processes of development cooperation (Costa Leite *et al*., 2014).

To conclude, changes in Brazilian technical cooperation strategy have been influenced by three major trends: (a) how cooperation was conceptualized and implemented by multilateral agencies; (b) institutional changes at the domestic level; and (c) the interaction among the international and domestic level which lead to a change of discourse, to which we pay more attention in the following section.

Why Does Brazil Engage in International Technical Cooperation? A Discursive Approach

More than a simple exchange of expertise or financial support, international cooperation can be used as a rhetorical asset. In this regard, between 2003 and 2016 Brazil sought to distance itself from the concept of foreign aid used by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC), and named its foreign aid policy as Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI).

In addition to this rebranding, Brazil started to reject terminologies such as "donor", "aid" and "assistance", in its public announcements.[4] Instead of these terms, the country started to adopt the definition given by the United Nations Confederation on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for cooperation as processes, institutions and agreements designed to promote political, economic and technical cooperation among developing countries that seek common development in a horizontal relationship (Milani & Carvalho, 2013). This movement was embedded in the idea that the South-to-South relationship is a more equal collaboration, as both countries are trying to develop themselves, and as such they are not interested in taking advantages of the other.

Moreover, Brazilian International Development Cooperation programs have several dimensions, such as Technical Cooperation, Humanitarian Cooperation, Educational Cooperation, Financial Cooperation, Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Peacekeeping Operations. Notable among these modalities is Technical Cooperation, which promotes training and transfer of knowledge in areas that Brazil has been successful, such as tropical agriculture and the fight against HIV/AIDS for example.

According to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, the Technical Cooperation actions constitute an instrument of foreign policy, which Brazil has used to ensure

[4] For more information, see the OECD glossary of statistical terms at: <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043>

its presence in countries and regions of interest. Nonetheless, more than one instrument was used to achieve such an end, namely: consultancies, training, and the eventual donation of equipment.

In this aspect, some authors claim that technical cooperation is beneficial to Brazil's image in different ways. It helps Brazil to build on its soft power (Puente 2010); and strengthens its identity as the champion of developing nations (Dauvergne & Farias 2012). In addition to these symbolic aims, some Brazilian diplomats and policymakers argue that technical cooperation can foster relations in other domains with developing countries, creating favorable conditions for the achievement of economic goals abroad (Cervo 1994; Milani & Carvalho, 2013; Pino & Leite 2009; Puente 2010; Filho 2007) and the gathering of international support for raising Brazil's international profile in international institutions (Apolinário Júnior, 2016; Hirst, Lima & Pinheiro, 2010).

Costa Leite et al. (2014) point out that Brazilian identity as a technical cooperation actor is also a product of the interplay between Brazil's foreign policy agenda and domestic politics. In this regard, the re-emergence of South-South cooperation for development in the 2000s has to be understood within the realm of state activism in the post-neoliberal setting, especially after the 2008 financial crisis (Hirst 2011; Leite 2012). Such shifts, which coincided with the Workers' Party (PT) coming to power in Brazil, contributed to these narratives of global distributive social justice and "solidarity diplomacy" (Faria & Paradis, 2013; Pino 2012).

In this sense, Faria and Paradis (2013) argue that the explanation for the 'solidarity' character of Brazil's international integration strategy, adopted after President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's inauguration, can be explained by domestic, regional and systemic factors. The domestic motives lie in the guidelines of the Workers' Party (PT), in the economic growth experienced during that period and in the success of domestic social policies that could be exported to other countries. The regional factors lie in the need to pay the costs of regional leadership, a long-standing goal of Brazilian foreign policy. Finally, the systemic motives are the opportunities arising from the US policy of War on Terror, the emergence of the BRICS as a political coalition, and the 2008 financial crisis.

Since 2004, the technical cooperation agreements signed by Brazil, in the context of the General Coordination of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (CGPD)[5], have been directed by the following guidelines. First, prioritize technical cooperation programs that favor the intensification of relations between Brazil and its developing partners, especially with countries that Brazilian

[5] According to ABC, its mission is "to contribute to the deepening of Brazil's relations with developing countries, to expand their exchanges, to generate, disseminate and use technical knowledge, to train their human resources and to strengthening their institutions".

foreign policy considers as having priority interest. Second, support projects that improve national development programs and the priorities of recipient countries. Third, channel CGPD efforts to projects of greater impact and influence, with a more intense multiplier effect. Fourth, favor projects with a greater range of results. Fifth, support projects with national counterparts and/or with the effective participation of partner institutions. And, finally, establish partnerships, preferably with genuinely national institutions.

Moreover, according to ABC, the CGPD concentrates its actions on prioritizing the commitments made on the official travels of the President of the Republic and the Chancellor. With regard to the regional distribution of the cooperation projects, the priorities are the South American and Central American continents, especially Haiti; Africa, the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOPS), and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), including East Timor in Asia. Special attention is also given to the triangular cooperation initiatives with developed countries and international organizations.

Figure 1: World Map with the Total Technical Expenditure in Bilateral Cooperation Projects



Figure elaborated by the authors. Source: ABC data.

These priorities can be visualized in Figure 1, which was created taking into account the amount of money received by Brazilian international cooperation beneficiaries between 2000 and 2016. The data corroborates the CGPD's priorities aforementioned, as most of the budget was spent in Haiti, East Timor, African and Latin American countries. It is worth highlighting the discrepancy of the

distribution of cooperative money given to different countries. Haiti received just under US$57 million, representing around 40% of the total budget spent in development cooperation during the given period.

Now that we have analyzed how Brazil has changed its foreign policy aims, as well as the modification in the official discourse and terminologies, the next section deals with the way in which technical cooperation has been implemented during the last decades.

Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

Depending on the partners involved, cooperation can be carried out in three different ways (Puente, 2010). First, it can happen between developed and developing countries, namely North-South Cooperation or Vertical Cooperation. Second, between two developing countries, termed Horizontal Cooperation. Finally, from a triangular process between developed and developing countries for the provision of assistance to underdeveloped countries, the so-called North-South-South or triangular cooperation.

With respect to Brazilian bilateral technical cooperation, Table 1 shows that it has been highly concentrated. The data on the top 20 recipients of bilateral projects indicate that Haiti and Mozambique have received about 50% of the total spent by Brazil on bilateral cooperation between 2000 and 2016. Moreover, after the top three recipients, all the other countries have received less than 10 million dollars, displaying a more fragmented pattern.

Table 1: Top Bilateral Recipients of Brazilian International Technical Cooperation

Rank	Receiving Country	Total Expenditure (US $ Millions)	Percentage (%)
1	Haiti	56.96	39.49
2	Mozambique	15.34	10.64
3	East Timor	10.47	7.26
4	Guinea-Bissau	7.80	5.41
5	Cape Verde	4.75	3.29
6	Paraguay	4.30	2.98
7	Angola	3.63	2.57
8	Guatemala	3.48	2.41
9	Peru	3.26	2.26
10	Jamaica	2.68	1.86
11	Uruguay	2.47	1.71
12	El Salvador	2.41	1.67
13	Cuba	2.00	1.39
14	Ecuador	1.94	1.35
15	Benin	1.86	1.29
16	Bolivia	1.66	1.15
17	Senegal	1.61	1.12
18	Dominican Republic	1.41	0.98
19	Algeria	1.36	0.94
20	Suriname	1.05	0.73

Table elaborated by the authors. Source: ABC data.

Even though Puente (2010) has made a clear typology of international cooperation, Brazil's South-South cooperation (SSC) does not neatly fit into its categories. Brazilian SSC is present on all continents, either through bilateral programs and projects, or through triangular partnerships with foreign governments and international organizations. In the case of Brazilian SSC, triangular cooperation is understood as an alternative and complementary arrangement to bilateral efforts. Moreover, it can be carried out with the help of two different entities: international organizations or a third country. On the one hand, the objective of

a trilateral partnership involving international organizations is to join the typical elements of Brazilian SSC with efforts to promote multilateral development agendas. On the other hand, the distinctiveness of a trilateral partnership involving third countries is the development of initiatives mainly with the additional support of developed countries that were traditional partners in bilateral cooperation with Brazil, for example Japan and Germany (ABC, 2016).

Over the past decade and in particular since 2008, there has been increasing participation of Northern partners in SSC, and they engage in several different ways (Abdenur & Fonseca, 2013). Although these configurations are not entirely a novelty, this type of arrangement seems to have expanded significantly in number and size over the past decade, with more countries (donors, pivots and recipients) taking part in trilateral configurations, with varying functions and degrees of involvement (Chaturvedi, 2012).

Despite the increasing prominence of such arrangements, there are competing definitions of what constitutes triangular cooperation. There is no international consensus on the definition of "triangular cooperation", which may also be referred to as "trilateral cooperation", "trilateral assistance", "tripartite cooperation" or "tripartite agreement". In relation to the first two concepts, trilateral and triangular cooperation, even though they are often used synonymously and interchangeably, some authors highlight an important distinction between them. Rhee (2011), for instance, suggests that triangular cooperation refers to South-South cooperation supported by a Northern country or a multilateral organization. On the other hand, trilateral cooperation refers to a North-South-South cooperation project that is carried out and financed by both sides.

According to McEwan and Mawdsley (2012), although the distinction is analytically useful, in practice these terms are used interchangeably and are related to a spectrum of institutional arrangements. More broadly, Langendorff (2012) uses the terms triangular and trilateral cooperation interchangeably to define a partnership between developed donors and emerging donors to implement development cooperation projects in beneficiary countries.

All these different definitions highlight the need for further work on building consensus on the main characteristics of triangular cooperation and to clarify how to make the most out of them and deal with its challenges (OECD, 2017). For instance, the OECD defines trilateral development cooperation as arrangements between an OECD – Development Assistance Committee (DAC) country or a multilateral institution, partnering with a "pivotal" country (or emerging power), to implement development cooperation programs in a third beneficiary country (Fordelone, 2009). In contrast, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), in its guidelines for the Development of Bilateral and Multilateral Technical Coopera-

tion, defines trilateral cooperation as a "modality of international technical cooperation projects in which coordination and follow-up of projects and activities are shared between the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the international cooperation agency or cooperating international body" (ABC 2014, p.18).

Although there is no agreed definition, the literature on triangular cooperation suggests that is widely understood that triangular or trilateral cooperation involves at least one provider of development cooperation, or an international organization, and one or more providers of South-South cooperation; the goal is to promote the sharing of knowledge and experience or to implement development co-operation projects in one or more recipient countries (OECD, 2013). In addition to these common objectives, the Northern donors have some set of interrelated reasons for engaging in triangular cooperation. First, they claim that it allows them to combine forces with the often-complementary knowhow and experience of Southern cooperation providers.

Second, Northern donors point out that triangular cooperation often generates benefits in terms of cost-effectiveness because it allows for the pooling of resources, even though it often requires more complex negotiations and bureaucratic arrangements. Third, the Northern countries frequently note that triangular cooperation gives them a chance to engage with Southern cooperation providers on issues of norms and practices of aid and cooperation in a concrete manner. Abdenur and Fonseca (2013) argue that within a context of decline in Northern aid, this engagement is a way to harness South-South cooperation in order to preserve and expand Northern influence, both within and outside the field of development cooperation.

Figure 2 illustrates the difference in amount of money spent on technical international cooperation between 2000 and 2016. The units are in millions of dollars and there are two categories: bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation. The data on multilateral cooperation include all types of triangular cooperation and any other arrangement that is different to bilateral cooperation. It can be seen that after 2006, the total amount of money spent on technical international cooperation increased, and between 2009 and 2012, the figures jumped from about 7.5 million to an average of around 17 million. After 2012, the trend of bilateral and multilateral international cooperation follows a similar negative path.

Figure 2: Trends in International Technical Cooperation. Brazil´s Expenditure Per Year



Figure elaborated by the authors. Source: ABC data.

Accordingly, if both bilateral and multilateral cooperation seem to follow the same pattern, we should examine the causes of such a trend. We devote the next section to such an endeavor.

Looking for opportunities in the international scene

To discuss opportunities for Brazil in the international arena with regard to the provision of technical cooperation, we analyze whether this policy was guided by political-diplomatic interests. The use of foreign aid for diplomatic purposes is well documented in the literature (Lancaster, 2007). Based on McKinley & Little (1979) donor's interest model, scholars have analyzed whether the foreign aid provided by the traditional donors was related to political support in international institutions such as the United Nations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dreher, Nunnunkamp & Thiele, 2008; Kuzienko & Werker, 2006), and International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (Vreeland, 2011). However, this relation is less clear regarding the South-South Cooperation for Development, as provided by the southern donors. Some authors suggest that these initiatives are not so different from the traditional foreign aid provided by developed countries and their *Realpolitik* objectives (Carmody, 2011; Souza, 2012; Prashad, 2013; Quadir, 2013; Six, 2009). Therefore, one objective of this article is to inquire as to whether Brazil, one of the major southern donors, is looking for political support to raise its profile in International Organizations.

Hypothesis 1: Brazilian technical cooperation is positively correlated with host country convergence with the Brazilian position in International Organizations.

For this hypothesis to be proven true, we would expect a positive relationship between expenditures on technical cooperation projects and the convergence of host countries with Brazil in the main IOs of the contemporary global governance structure. Specifically, we expect a positive relation between the provisions of Brazilian technical cooperation and voting convergence in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and a positive relationship between Brazil's technical cooperation and the political support of the recipient countries for the Brazilian Executive Director in the Bretton Woods financial institutions, namely the World Bank and the IMF. Finally, we expect that the provision of Brazilian technical cooperation was directed towards the country's main allies in the WTO.

To test this *opportunities* hypothesis, we used a variable referring to the position of recipients in relation to Brazil in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2012). We used dichotomous variables concerning the positions of these countries in relation to Brazil in international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, operationalized as the (non) participation in the coalitions led by Brazil in the Executive Boards of both organizations (Apolinário Júnior 2016). Furthermore, a variable was used regarding the positions of the recipients with regard to Brazil in the coalitions within the World Trade Organization (WTO). We operationalized this variable as the ratio of participation in each of the joint coalitions with Brazil in the WTO by the total of coalitions that Brazil integrated in a year[6]. Meanwhile, we expect that Brazilian technical cooperation is not correlated with economic characteristics of a country, such as the size of the population or the GDP per capita[7].

Hypothesis 2: Brazilian technical cooperation is not correlated with economic characteristics of the host countries.

If Brazilian technical cooperation were correlated in such a manner, this would mean that Brazil interests are more economic than political. Moreover, if these two variables are positively correlated with the total amount spent in technical support, we would not be able to disentangle the economic interests of Brazilian technical support from the political interests.

Before moving on to the statistical model, we analyze the individual relationship between these variables and the total amount spent by Brazil on technical cooperation per country. Figure 3 shows this comparison and in both cases the relationship is positive, even more for the Agreement in UN votes.[8] In this regard,

[6] NAMA-11, Mercosul, W-52, FANs, G20T e grupo de Cairns. Source: www.wto.org. Accessed on May, 2017.

[7] These two variables were obtained from the World Bank dataset.

[8] The variable "Total Spent on Foreign Aid" is logged since it has larger values. Moreover, given that the log of zero is undefined, only countries that have received Brazilian Foreign Aid are considered in these graphics.

the greater the convergence between Brazilian and host country positions in International Organizations, the higher the amount spent by Brazil on technical cooperation projects.

Figure 3: Quantile distribution of WTO collaboration and Agreement in the UN votes on the log of total spent on Foreign Aid



The results of these preliminary tests remain statistically significant after we control for all the independents variables, as Table 2 shows. Furthermore, the model chosen to understand the determinants that influence the chance a country receives foreign aid from Brazil was a panel logistic regression. This model enables us to account for the variance across time and country, as our database has information on Brazilian foreign aid for 96 countries between 2000 and 2018.[9]

The size of the population, a common measure of economic size, is not statistically significant for understanding if a country receives foreign aid. On the other hand, GDP per capita is significant, although its substantial impact is virtually nil - the odds of receiving foreign aid is multiplied by 1.00 for each additional dollar in GDP per capita.

In relation to the political variables *Agree in UN*, *WTO cooperation* and *IMF & WB* cooperation, these are all statistically significant and have a positive relation with receiving foreign aid. More specifically, for each additional point in convergence in UN votes, the country odds of receiving foreign aid are multiplied by 1327. Meanwhile, for each additional point in the ratio of participation in joint coalitions with Brazil in the WTO, the country odds of receiving foreign aid are multiplied by 96.59. Finally, the results for *IMF & WB cooperation* indicates that if a country switches from not participating in the coalitions led by Brazil in both IMF and WB to participating, the country odds of receiving foreign aid are multiplied by 108.27.

[9] The only drawback of the logistic model is the difficulty in interpreting its coefficients - Table 2 (1). Nonetheless, we can calculate the odds ratio of each coefficient to have a more straightforward analysis - Table 2 (2), since the interpretation can be done in odds (increase or decrease) of receiving foreign aid.

Table 2: Logistic Regressions on Foreign Aid

	(1) Logit Coeffs	(2) Odds Ratio Coeffs
Population	-0.00 (-0.99)	1.00 (-0.99)
GDP Per Capita	-0.00*** (-3.31)	1.00*** (-3.31)
Agree in UN	7.19*** -3.12	1327.22*** -3.12
Participation WTO	4.57*** (-2.71)	96.59*** (-2.71)
1. Participation IMG & WP	4.68*** (-3.29)	108.27*** (-3.29)
Years Ommited from Output		
N	**2710**	**2710**

t statistics in parentheses
** p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

In sum, the results indicate that during the last 17 years Brazilian Foreign Aid has targeted countries that hold similar political attitudes to Brazil in International Organizations. In contrast, economic characteristics appear to not have influenced the Brazilian decision to give foreign aid. Consequently, our findings confirm the hypothesis that Brazil is actively seeking political support to raise its profile in International Organizations.

International Cooperation during Economic and Political Turmoil

By the beginning of the current decade, Brazil had entered into a spiral of economic and political instability. Between 2010 and 2015 the country's GDP dropped considerably, a clear negative trend with only 2013 as an exception. Moreover, the former president Dilma Rousseff was impeached, leaving room for institutional discredit and lack of vertical accountability (Luna & Vergara, 2016).

We can analyze the current crisis in Brazil from two perspectives. Firstly, as a consequence of the turmoil in the world economy that started with the American subprime mortgage collapse in 2008. It is worth mentioning that at first Brazil was not affected directly, as the country's economy was powered by domestic demand, fueled by easy credit and growth rates of 7.5%. Nonetheless, after the first glimpse of domestic crisis, the Brazilian economy was hit hard, and presently the

recovery still looks to be far away.

According to several sources, even if the Brazilian economy grows at 2% for the next four years, unemployment rates will only climb down to 2014 levels in 2021. This four-year growth would create 2.9 million jobs, the same amount that was lost between 2015 and 2016. In its annual report, the International Labor Organization (ILO) said that, across the world, one in every three people that lost their job in 2016 was Brazilian.

The other side of an economic crisis is its political consequences. In 2010, mainly due to Lula's charisma and the inheritance of his popularity, Dilma Rousseff won the presidential election with 56% of the valid votes. Four years later, even though she managed to win re-election, her political credibility was at the limit. Economic problems, combined with her lack of support in Congress and the spillovers of judicial investigations, quickly eroded her good image. Ultimately, this scenario favored the appearance of an alternative political coalition, which destroyed the Workers' Party majority in both Legislative houses. This political crisis, combined with the recession in the economy, set the stage for the impeachment process, which culminated with the departure of Rousseff from the presidency in 2016.

Given this context, what are the consequences of Brazil's economic and political crisis for its international cooperation strategy? In economic terms, as can be seen in Figure 4, recession has a direct impact on the amount of money destined for international cooperation, either bilateral or multilateral. The units of both line charts are percentages, although they have different scales. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe that after 2010, when the Brazilian economy started to contract seriously, the funds made available for international cooperation has followed a similar path to the drop in GDP, with a more negative slope. In sum, the amount of money destined for cooperation has only diminished, with the exception of 2014, which can be explained as a result of the temporary recovery in 2013.

Figure 4: Brazilian Annual GDP % vs Brazilian Annual Budget



Graphs elaborated by the authors. Sources: World Bank and ABC data.

With respect to political effects, changes can be traced to before the 2016 impeachment. Rousseff was different in many aspects from her predecessor Lula, but the biggest difference was her attitude toward foreign policy. Since the beginning of her first term, it became clear that president Rousseff was more concerned with domestic issues than trying to have an active role in the country's foreign policy formulation. This lack of importance inevitably had an impact on the country's international profile (Cervo & Lessa, 2014; Saraiva, 2014). By way of an example, if at the end of Lula's administration the budget of the ABC reached US$100 million, under Dilma's government the amount plummeted to US$6 million, following a steady decrease that continued in 2016.

In this regard, with the change of administration, one of the most significant alterations was the appointment of José Serra as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his first week in office, Serra ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct an evaluation of the cost and benefits of each Brazilian embassy. His argument was that the costs of maintaining several embassies, mainly those opened in Africa under Lula's administration, were far greater than the economic gains from trade between Brazil and those African countries. After several discussions and the negative feelings generated by this initiative, José Serra backed off and decided to keep all the embassies open. Nevertheless, what has remained since then is the tendency to design policies within this cost-benefits framework, which contrasts with the Workers' Party guidelines, according to which investing in soft power initiatives was considered to be a worthy policy even if it was unprofitable in the short term.

Having arrived at this point, we can say that, due to the lack of resources, the minor importance given to the country's foreign policy and a change in the way of thinking about Brazil's international integration, the once high-profile international cooperation strategy has weakened to a level whereby it only survives in intensive care. Thus, in the last section of our article we discuss the consequences of this switch, as well as the lessons we can apply to other rising powers.

Conclusions

During this century, changes in the distribution of power created a window of opportunity for rising powers to assume a more prominent position in the international arena. Regarding international cooperation, countries such as India, Turkey and Brazil have displayed more active roles, increasing the amount of funding for bilateral and multilateral international cooperation projects. In this sense, Brazil sought to increase its international profile by seeking international support in the current global order main International Organizations. We suggest that one of the tools used by Brazil to this end was the provision of technical cooperation. Our results suggest that the bulk of the technical cooperation provided in this period was directed to its main allies these IOs. Nevertheless, recent international and domestic changes have raised some concerns about the ability of rising powers to maintain a consistent policy on this issue.

From the international side, nowadays there is an increasing distrust in multilateral agencies, which can affect the international cooperation system as a whole. For instance, the United States has elected a president with negative views on international organizations, the United Kingdom has decided to leave the European Union, and right-wing parties with nationalistic views are gaining strength all around Europe. If this tendency keeps growing, and as a consequence multilateral initiatives are underfunded, the ability for rising powers to sustain an active role in international cooperation projects will be necessarily affected. The latter have benefited from a network of international organizations that, if weakened, will leave room for only bilateral initiatives, which require higher investments and do not benefit from the knowledge and expertise of developed countries.

From a domestic perspective, the main challenge rising powers face is their relative lack of material and human resources. On the one hand, emerging powers suffer from a duality: in absolute terms, they are big economies, but at the same time they still suffer from structural deficiencies. On the other hand, given the European crisis and the Chinese economic slowdown, most developing countries are now going through economic trouble, which will necessarily impact upon their ability to pursue an active international cooperation policy. In the end, both structural and short-term economic hurdles will make it harder for the governments of rising powers to convince their populations that investing in interna-

tional cooperation should be a priority, principally when domestic needs are more pressing.

Moreover, and as we have seen for the Brazilian case, economic crises can give impetus to political ones. These domestic changes might not only affect a country's reputation, but can lead to changes in their foreign policy. Consequently, the latter can raise doubts about the ability of a State to maintain its international commitments, which might also affect international cooperation projects that need time to mature.

Finally, away from this less optimistic opinion, we might highlight that rising powers still have something to say with respect to international cooperation. Their rise or fall will depend on their ability to sustain growth, to translate political will into domestic legitimacy and on their capacity to maintain policies through changes in government.

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Article

Nothing Succeeds Like Failure? Honduras and the Defense of Democracy in Brazilian Foreign Policy

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Abstract

The world is becoming more multilateral, with established powers increasingly sharing decision-making with rising powers. At the same time, democratic institutions appear to be unstable in many parts of the world. What are the positions of the rising powers on the defense and promotion of democracy abroad? This article examines Brazil which, like India and South Africa, is a democracy. The conventional wisdom about Brazil is that its foreign policy prioritizes non-intervention, is pragmatic and open to negotiation to everyone, and prioritizes its own economic development as well as the political and economic integration of its own region, South America. Brazil's efforts to defend and promote democracy are also often depicted as minimal, and far less than those of established powers such as the USA and the EU. This article examines Brazilian policy towards Honduras after the coup d'état there in 2009 to challenge these interpretations. It argues that the Honduras case shows that Brazil does defend and promote democracy, especially when its material interests and geostrategic concerns are furthered by doing so.

Keywords

Foreign Policy, Rising Powers, Brazil, Democracy Promotion, Defense of Democracy, Coup D'état

Introduction

The twenty-first century world is witnessing a shifting balance of power. Formerly peripheral actors are becoming more important. As Antonio Patriota argues elsewhere in this issue, the world has become more multipolar (see also Amorim, 2015, 116). Established powers are having to share decision-making more broadly and the rising powers have a variety of distinctive perspectives on issues, resulting in fewer common initial positions amongst significant actors and more

ideological variation in global politics (Stuenkel, 2013, 339).[1]

An important issue affecting this new, more multilateral world order is where the rising powers stand on the issue of democracy. Political institutions in established democracies look increasingly vulnerable, as illiberal speech and social movements have become mainstream (Buxton, 2017, 169). In newer democracies, regression is also possible, and has taken place in some countries. In this context, rising powers' willingness – or unwillingness – to defend democracy through global and regional multilateral institutions, as well as bilateral statecraft, is a crucial factor in the shaping of the new global order.

Brazil can be considered a rising power or at least a power that has recently risen in international standing, and it is also a new democracy that emerged from a long dictatorship in the late 1980s. Despite its democratic credentials, Brazil's diplomatic reputation is not one of vigorous democracy promotion. Brazil's foreign policy tradition, according to former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer, is that of a middle power that takes a moderate, Aristotlean middle ground in world affairs, mediating between rich and poor countries, and powerful and weak states.[2] According to Lafer, Brazil prefers non-intervention and pragmatism in its foreign affairs. It tends to negotiate with all parties rather than stand on abstract principles. Its core interests are its own economic development and the political and economic integration of its region, South America (Lafer, 2009). The defense of democracy is not one of the explicit principles of Brazil's foreign policy in the 1988 Constitution.[3]

If the traditional principles of Brazilian foreign policy do not appear to furnish a strong foundation for the defense of democracy, the specialized literature on democracy promotion confirms this view. For example, Repucci (2014) argues

[1] In this article the term "rising powers" applies to second-tier states that are non-nuclear powers. This list includes Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudia Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. I take this from Milani, Pinheiro and Soares de Lima (2017), 585, 590. Although these authors avoid the term "rising powers" because they claim that it implies an upward and linear trajectory of ascent towards greater global influence, their focus on these second-tier states as significant actors in world politics seems appropriate.

[2] In international relations and foreign policy literature, the term middle powers typically refers to states that are not great powers but that have more influence than small or weak states, both regionally and globally. They tend to work through multilateral institutions and informal coalitions of states and avoid unilateral actions. The category overlaps with but is not the same as the "rising powers" category mentioned above, and often includes Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. See Cooper (2011).

[3] Article 4 of Brazil's 1988 Constitution lists the following principles of Brazil's foreign policy: national independence; the prevalence of human rights; the self-determination of peoples; non-intervention; equality between states; the defense of peace; the pacific solution of conflicts; the repudiation of terrorism and racism; cooperation between peoples for the progress of humanity; and the concession of political asylum. From Presidência da República (2017). This and other translations from Spanish and Portuguese have been made by the author.

that Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa "have proved unimpressive as ambassadors for democratic governance in their regions and beyond". Abdenur and Souza Neto (2013, 104) note "the common assumption that democracy and human rights promotion are exclusive to the Western agenda". Sean Burges asserts that "Brazil has not behaved consistently in support of democratic norm enforcement" and that Brazil's policies in this area have been "tepid" (Burges quoted in Stuenkel 2013, 345). And in a study conducted between 2012 and 2014, the New York City-based think tank Freedom House argued that Brazil's democracy promotion efforts were "minimal" and less vigorous than those of all but one of the ten other powers analyzed (the USA, the EU, France, Germany, Poland, Japan, India, Indonesia, Sweden, and South Africa). [4] The Freedom House commentators claimed that "the democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were less likely to exert pressure on rights violators in their regions and less inclined to condemn the abrogation of democratic standards by major powers than were the United States, the European Union, and individual European countries. The disparity is largely attributable to the emphasis placed by the former group on the principle of noninterference and respect for sovereignty" (Callingaert, Puddington and Repucci 2014, 1).

The case study presented in this article – Brazil's response to the coup d'état in Honduras in 2009 and the subsequent constitutional crisis and political deadlock that lasted until 2011 – challenges these assumptions, both about the basic principles of Brazilian foreign policy and the likelihood of Brazilian engagement in the defense of democracy. As can be seen in the sections that follow, Brazil's reactions to the suspension of democracy in Honduras violate several key assumptions about the way Brazilian foreign policy is supposed to work. They also show that Brazil can and does defend democracy under certain circumstances, even when that means challenging positions taken by the USA.

This article is divided into four sections. The first part is a brief outline of the events in Honduras. These events became a regional problem for the Organization of American States (OAS) and its members, and were also commented on by other multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union. The second section highlights Brazil's role in the negotiations that followed. In the third section, the article argues that the Brazil's policies upheld several important elements of the democracy agenda and were conducted as part of a carefully orchestrated multilateral process, even though these policies were not entirely successful from a Brazilian point of view. The fourth section places the Honduran crisis in the context of Brazil's recent actions regarding democracy

[4] Freedom House rated Brazil's support for democracy "minimal", faulting it for remaining silent about Cuban and Venezuelan human rights abuses. South Africa was the only other state whose support for democracy was judged to be "minimal" in the study. Freedom House's rating of US performance as "moderate" could be questioned.

around the world, while the conclusion argues that the crisis allows us to question some key assumptions about Brazilian foreign policy in general and, more specifically, Brazil's willingness to defend democracy.

Honduras: What's a Constitution Between Enemies?

The removal of Manuel Zelaya from the presidency (and the country) of Honduras on 28 June 2009 was the result of a long-simmering conflict within the Honduran political establishment. The Supreme Court, most members of Congress, and the leadership of the armed forces became convinced that Zelaya had violated the constitution by insisting on a referendum to consider changing the constitution. Zelaya's critics also believed that the President's large increase in the minimum wage and adherence to ALBA were taking the country in the wrong direction.[5]

The Supreme Court requested the action to remove Zelaya, who was deported from the country at gunpoint by the armed forces. President of the Congress Roberto Micheletti, like Zelaya a member of the Liberal Party, became President of the interim government. International reactions to the removal of President Zelaya were swift and negative. On 4 July 2009, the Organization of American States (OAS) suspended Honduras by a unanimous vote. The United Nations, the US government, and the European Union also condemned what they called a coup d'état.

A Texas judge was once reported once to have said, "what's the constitution between friends?"[6] The Honduras crisis illustrates the maxim, "what's the constitution between enemies?" There is evidence of the violation of the constitution by both President Zelaya and those who deposed him. It should be noted that the 1982 constitution is a rather odd one, reflecting the history of political conflict in Honduras. It has no impeachment clause and a strict prohibition on presidential proposals to change the constitution. In Article 42, section 5 it even states that anyone inciting, supporting, or promoting the continuity in power or re-election of the president will immediately lose her or his Honduran citizenship (Republica de Honduras, 1982).

President Zelaya visited Cuba in 2007 – the first official visit of a Honduran pres-

[5] ALBA is the *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*, or the Bolivian Alliance for the People of Our America, the free trade agreement that includes Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, as well as the Caribbean islands of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines

[6] President Lyndon B. Johnson recalled the remark, supposedly made by an elderly judge in Texas who was willing to help Johnson in an election early in Johnson's political career. From "Don't Let Dead Cats Stand on Your Porch" in Word for Word/A Tutorial from Lyndon B. Johnson, The New York Times, Sunday 20 September 2009, Review Section, p. 5.

ident to the island in 46 years.[7] In 2008, Zelaya made Honduras part of ALBA. In addition to these leftward political moves, Zelaya is alleged to have violated the constitution (including article 245, section 1, requiring the President to comply with the constitution). For example, it is said that he did not file a budget by the 15th of September 2008 as required by the constitution. On 11 November 2008, he issued a decree calling for a fourth ballot box at the November 2009 elections, so that voters could be asked whether they would consider convening a National Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution. Zelaya wanted a preliminary poll on 28 June 2009 to ask voters whether they wanted the fourth ballot box. In May 2009 Zelaya asked the military to distribute ballot boxes and other material for the poll. The Chief of the Armed Forces refused, after which Zelaya supposedly fired him (Zelaya denied this). These actions appear to have been unconstitutional (Republica de Honduras, 1982).

On the other hand, the forced exile of Zelaya to Costa Rica had little constitutional justification. Zelaya's arrest and trial could perhaps have been justified, but there is no provision in the Honduran constitution for exiling the president. In fact, article 102 of the constitution states explicitly that "No Honduran can be expatriated or turned over to the authority of a foreign state". Supporters of Zelaya's removal defended the act in terms of a political emergency or "state of necessity". They argued that trying Zelaya in Honduras would have led to violence, and that for pragmatic reasons it was better to remove him from the country. This may be a plausible, pragmatic political argument, but constitutionally, it is an ex-post facto rationalization of an act of force. Chapter III, article 187 allows for the suspension of the Honduran constitution in a time of "grave perturbation of the peace", but this suspension can only be decreed by the President, with the approval of the cabinet (*Consejo de Ministros*), and ratified by Congress within thirty days (Republica de Honduras, 1982). None of these procedures were (or could have been) followed in the case of 28 June 2009.

Both sides in the conflict were surprised by the intransigence of the other. Supporters of the Micheletti government stressed Zelaya's unconstitutional actions, and emphasized the role of the Supreme Court in requesting Zelaya's removal. They were hurt by the outside world's perception that a "coup" had taken place. Because a military regime had not been created after Zelaya's ouster, they denied that there had been a coup, and claimed that their actions were constitutional. They believed they were defending an important principle: a President should not be above the law.

Many supporters of the Micheletti government saw the conflict in Cold War, Manichean terms. For them it was part of a regional and even global struggle

[7] BBC News, Timeline: Honduras, 2 November 2011, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1225471.stm on 23 May 2012.

between *chavismo*, the pan-Latin American movement begun by the President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and its ideological bedfellows Communism and socialism. Since Zelaya was propagating *chavismo*, they reasoned, they had to stop him to save capitalism, the alliance with the United States, and Honduran democracy. Frederico Alvarez Fernandez, a Honduran businessman who visited the United States in defense of the Micheletti government in September 2009, complained, "The world is defending a principle…[but] Hondurans are defending their liberty".[8]

Some commentators argue that Honduras' constitution contributed to the crisis of 2009, in that Chapter X, article 272 (Republica de Honduras, 1982) requires the armed forces to "maintain peace, public order, and constitutional rule (*el império de la Constitución*)", effectively making them the arbiters of the political game (see, for example, Zaverucha, 2009). This argument would carry more weight if members of the armed forces' high command or other political actors favorable to the removal of President Zelaya had actually invoked article 272 during the crisis. However, nobody appears to have done so. Many Latin American constitutions formally grant the armed forces responsibility for the maintenance of the legal order, but this in and of itself seems insufficient to explain the removal of an elected president.

Furthermore, various other provisions of the Honduran constitution make it clear that the armed forces are under the command of the President (such as article 272 itself, which says the armed forces must be "professional, apolitical, obedient, and non-deliberative", and articles 277 and 278). It is true that the Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces is elected by the National Congress from a list proposed by the Superior Council of the Armed Forces and can only be removed by the National Congress (article 279), not the President (Republica de Honduras, 1982). But in all other respects the relationship between the Honduran President and the Chief of the Armed Forces is thoroughly conventional: the former is the latter's commander in chief. Therefore, arguments about the role of constitutional language in laying the foundation for the 2009 crisis should be considered skeptically.

Supporters of the Micheletti government devised a clever tactic to deflect criticism of Zelaya's removal and lay the groundwork for the acceptance of a new successor government. They argued that the Supreme Electoral Court (*Tribunal Supremo Electoral*), whose members were elected before Zelaya left power, would preside over the elections scheduled for 29 November 2009. This, they argued, would give the elections legitimacy. Once the elections had taken place, the new

[8] On 18 September 2009, three members of the Unión Civica Democrática (UCD) of Tegucigalpa, spoke about the crisis in Honduras at the University of New Orleans in an event hosted by the local World Affairs Council. Mr. Alvarez Fernandez made this remark in his presentation during this event.

government would have a mandate that the interim, de facto government of Roberto Micheletti lacked. This tactic ultimately succeeded, despite many problems with the elections. This is because the United States, which had first condemned the coup and cut off economic aid to Honduras, eventually declared that it would recognize the government the elections produced. This gave the Micheletti government an incentive to remain intransigent, and the focus of the international negotiations that dragged on from July to October of 2009 gradually shifted from whether Zelaya would be allowed to complete his presidential term to whether the new government would be recognized. The victory in November of Porfirio Lobo, a National Party Congressman who had lost to Zelaya in the 2005 presidential election, paved the way for Honduras' normalization of relations with a number of OAS member states, after Lobo was inaugurated in January 2010.

The Honduras situation dragged on for another sixteen months thereafter. Opponents of the Micheletti government and the subsequent Lobo administration, not all of them necessarily supporters of Manuel Zelaya, believed they were upholding an important principle. This is that a President should not be removed from office unconstitutionally and without due process. Zelaya physically embodied this principle when he snuck back into Honduras and took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa in late September 2009. He eventually left the Embassy, and Honduras, on 20 January 2010. In April 2010, in accordance with point 6 of the Tegucigalpa-San José accord, an international Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to investigate events that occurred in Honduras between January 2006 and January 2010, including the forced removal of Zelaya. This commission eventually concluded that Zelaya's removal had been unconstitutional. On 22 May of 2011 an agreement signed in Cartagena by President Lobo and Manuel Zelaya, as well as Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the then-Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro (now president), paved the way for Zelaya's return to Honduras and Honduras' re-admission to the OAS. A vote on the latter measure took place on 31 May 2011, with all member states except Ecuador voting in favor. (For more on Honduras before and after the coup, see Forti Neto and Lehmann, 2017.)

This summary of Honduras' constitutional crisis is not intended to be exhaustive. It is instead an overview that provides background to the discussion that follows. What can be seen from the summary is that the Honduran crisis was complicated, involving accusations of the violation of the constitution on both sides. Both sets of accusations contain some degree of plausibility. OAS member states had to make difficult choices at various moments during a conflict that dragged on for almost two years. How best to defend democracy in the case of Honduras was highly contested.

Brazil's Role in the Crisis

Brazil's role in the early phase of the crisis was unexceptional. It condemned the coup along with most other OAS member states. Its visibility rose in late September 2009, when Zelaya obtained shelter in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegulcigalpa. A war of words between President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva of Brazil (2003-2010) and interim Honduran President Micheletti ensued. Zelaya stayed in the Embassy for almost four months. One year after the coup, the US, Canada, the EU, Peru, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Guatemala recognized the Lobo government. Mexico and Chile followed suit in August of 2010. But Brazil did not; it was one of the last group of countries to recognize the government, after Honduras was reinstated into the OAS in late May 2011.

This behavior contradicts core assumptions about Brazilian foreign policy. For example, Burges and Daudelin (2007, 128) state that Brazil's "indifference to many of the crises taking place in Central America and the Caribbean also makes good sense: where little influence can be waged and where little can be gained, why expend scarce diplomatic and financial resources?"[9] Yet as we have seen, in Honduras, Brazil took a principled and disruptive stand in a country in which it had few economic interests. It continued to defend democratic principles even after many states pragmatically recognized the new Honduran government. And it challenged the US in a region, Central America, that it usually acknowledges as belonging in the US sphere of influence, and outside its own region of South America.

Reactions to this surprising Brazilian protagonism in Honduras were largely negative. The political scientist Riordan Roett, for example, writes, "…the critical question is why Brazil chose to ally itself with the radical nationalist governments in the region and did not seek to serve as a mediator" (Roett 2011, 146). Another political scientist, Professor Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, of the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo, characterizes Brazilian support for Zelaya as imprudent, hyperactive, impractical, and "a really bad decision."[10] International relations specialist Marcus Freitas argues that Brazil in Honduras blocked the operation of domestic institutions and frustrated other regional actors (Freitas cited in Burges 2017, 61). Michael Reid of The Economist criticized Brazil in March of 2012 as one of a "hard core of governments, including...Argentina and left-wing allies of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, [who] will have

[9] While Burges and Daudelin clearly did not anticipate the stance taken by Brazil in Honduras in 2009-11, much of the rest of their analysis in the chapter cited makes sense. Their argument that Brazilian foreign policy is essentially realist, characterized by an "opportunistic normativism" (ibid., p. 29) that is also adopted by most other states, seems persuasive and fits within the interpretive framework used in this article.

[10] Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, "Brazil: A Global Player? Foreign Policy in Changing Times", presentation at the Brazil Institute, King's College London, 17 January 2012.

nothing to do with Honduras".[11] And scholar Kevin Casas-Zamora (2011, 125) claimed that the outcome of the Honduras crisis was "a defeat of sorts for Brazil, which after being thrown in the eye of the hurricane by Zelaya's decision to seek shelter at the Brazilian embassy, missed a chance to use its regional influence to craft an adequate political settlement. It is now clear that Central America – too close geographically and historically to the United States – is, at most, a marginal concern in Brazil's strategic outlook".

Criticisms of Brazil's approach to Honduras could be found in the diplomatic community and civil society as well as in academia and the media. Mexico's former Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda claimed that Brazil acted more like a "dwarf" than a diplomatic giant in Honduras, "taking on minor battles for a country that is not decisive" (quoted in Heine, 2009). Former Brazilian Ambassador to the UK and the US Rubens Barbosa saw Brazil's actions in Honduras as a reflection of the "ideologization" of Brazilian foreign policy under the Lula administration. In his view, Marco Aurélio Garcia, President Lula's foreign policy advisor, politicized foreign policy to appease militants in the PT (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, or Workers' Party), the dominant party in Brazil's ruling coalition at that time. According to Barbosa, these militants were dissatisfied with the Lula administration's orthodox approach to economic policy, and wanted their leftist aspirations realized in the foreign policy arena. Barbosa was joined in this opinion by other former diplomats, including Rubens Ricupero and Luiz Felipe Lampreia, as well as serving diplomat Paulo Roberto de Almeida. Finally, Cuban anti-Castro activist Armando Valladares warned darkly about the "Chavist abyss" into which Honduras would fall unless the removal of Zelaya was approved by the international community (Valladares, 2009).

These examples suggest that a considerable body of opinion, perhaps a consensus view, is that Brazilian policy towards Honduras was a failure. It was unpragmatic and unconstructive, failing to contribute to a resolution of the crisis; it opposed the United States in Central America, a region where it had little influence, over a country that did not matter; it was driven by ideological and partisan impulses, rather than a concern for the defense of democracy; it placed Brazil in the company of radical governments such as those led by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia; and it was ineffective, failing to place Zelaya back in the presidency, failing to isolate the Lobo administration, and succeeding only in highlighting Brazil's lack of influence in Central America, and lack of readiness for regional and global leadership. The next section will argue that these criticisms are too sweeping, and based on a one-sided and misleading interpretation of Brazil's role in the Honduras affair.

[11] "Why a Pariah May Return", The Economist, 12 March 2012, p. 58.

Nothing Succeeds Like Failure? The Brazilian Position

From 1995-2005, 17 elected governments in Latin America did not finish their mandates. From 2006 to 2012, only one did not – that of President Zelaya in Honduras.[12] Therefore, the resolution of the Honduras crisis was fundamental to the defense of democracy in the region, and criticisms of any state's position in the crisis must be made carefully.

There are six main reasons to be skeptical about the criticisms of Brazil's policies described above. First, the constitutional principles and political realities at stake in Honduras were complex and hard to reconcile – reasonable people and governments could and did take different positions. Second, US policy was ambivalent and changed significantly over time, weakening the argument that Brazil should have been more deferential towards the US. Tracking US policy exactly would have forced Brazil to adopt an entirely inconsistent and subordinate series of positions. Third, Brazil never behaved unilaterally, and always worked within groups, including Mercosur, that were much larger than the ALBA grouping singled out by some critics of Brazilian foreign policy. Fourth, Brazil tried to contribute to the constructive resolution of the conflict, and many developments that occurred in 2011, such as the report of the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission, upheld the Brazilian interpretation of events as those were expressed in 2009. Fifth, the criticisms of Brazil's actions in Honduras are often contradictory; some of the same critics who complain about Brazil's reluctance to speak out about human rights abuses in countries such as Iran, for example, also complain about Brazil's stance in Honduras.

Finally, the allegation that Brazilian foreign policy was hijacked by the PT for partisan and ideological reasons deserves some skepticism. The Brazilian aim of diminishing Venezuelan regional leadership, a long-standing goal of the country's statecraft, should be separated from the issue of the PT's sympathies. The temptation to play a prominent role in Honduras would have been great for any Brazilian president, regardless of her or his party base or ideology. Furthermore, the argument that Brazilian's Foreign Ministry (often called *Itamaraty*, after the palace in Rio de Janeiro that was once its headquarters) was a model of non-partisanship and apolitical technocracy before the PT government came to power in 2003 does not withstand scrutiny. The Lula administration's positions in the Honduran crisis may have been different from those that would have been adopted by a center-right government, but they are consistent with long-standing Brazilian foreign policy goals rather than radical policy innovation.

Brazil's position in the Honduras crisis, that an elected president cannot be re-

[12] Statement made by José Miguel Insulza, then Secretary General of the OAS, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research, Tulane University, New Orleans, 7 January 2010.

moved without due process, was fully backed by the then-Secretary General of the OAS, José Insulza from Chile. It could also be interpreted as conforming to article 4, clause II of the Brazilian constitution, which states that the country's foreign policy will be guided by the principle of the prevalence of human rights (Presidência da República, 2017). Within this perspective, the right to constitutional government can be seen as a fundamental human right. Survey research suggests that the Lula administration position in Honduras, far from being exclusively backed by the PT, might have enjoyed support, at least in elite circles, in Brazil. A poll of some 2,400 professionals with an interest in foreign policy revealed that 57 percent agreed that an important goal of Brazil's foreign policy should be to support democracy elsewhere. 48 percent agreed that when the army overthrows the government of a Latin American country, Brazil should condemn the action and break off diplomatic relations with that government, which is what it did in Honduras.[13]

The Brazilian position on Honduras was also fully consonant with the original US position about Zelaya's removal. The immediate US reaction to the coup in Honduras was quite strong. It suspended economic aid to Honduras and pressured the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to suspend their aid to the country as well. It expelled interim President Micheletti's daughter from the Honduran Embassy in Washington DC and denied visas to the members of the de facto government. It is also known that US Ambassador to Honduras Hugo Lorens sent a cable to Washington on 24 July 2009 that read:

> *The Embassy perspective is that there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch, while accepting that there may be a prima facie case that Zelaya may have committed illegalities and may even have violated the constitution. There is equally no doubt from our perspective that Roberto Micheletti's assumption of power was illegitimate… Zelaya's arrest and forced removal from the country violated multiple constitutional guarantees, including the prohibition on expatriation, presumption of innocence and right to due process.*[14]

The fact that this did not remain the US position has little to do with a reappraisal within the US government of the constitutional issues at stake. It has much more to do with divisions in the Obama administration and a concerted lobbying effort by the Honduran-American community, the fourth largest Hispanic American

[13] Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, "Domestic Support for Foreign Policy in Brazil", presentation at the Brazil Institute, King's College London, 31 January 2012.

[14] Confidential cable from then-US Ambassador to Honduras Hugo Lorens to Washington DC, found on Wikileaks under the heading: TFH01: Open and Shut: The Case of the Honduran Coup at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TEGUCIGALPA645_a.html on 12 April 2017.

population in the United States,[15] and Republicans in Congress, led by Senator Jim DeMint. The Congressional Republicans used strong-arm tactics to bend the Obama administration's policy towards Honduras, holding up key Presidential appointments at the State Department and using them as bargaining chips. These were Arturo Valenzuela's appointment to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Thomas Shannon's appointment as US Ambassador to Brazil. (Valenzuela and Shannon were eventually confirmed by the Senate and took up their positions in November and December 2009 respectively.)

Republican obstructionists succeeded in changing the Obama administration's position. The result was contradictory: the US condemned the coup but recognized the Lobo government that was elected under questionable circumstances a few months later. One member of Congress hailed this as a political masterstroke that preserved US influence in Honduras. Nevertheless, if the policy was politically useful, it was a constitutional muddle. (For criticisms of the policy, see Frank, 2011).

The resolution of the Honduras crisis was well described by OAS Secretary General José Insulza. He said that initially, the OAS tried to resolve the problem multilaterally. But once the US decided to recognize the Lobo government, the old pattern of US unilateralism was reasserted. The problem was resolved according to US interests, and eventually all the other states fell into line.[16] Sufficient compromises were extracted to make both parties in the Honduran dispute feel upset about the outcome. Opponents of Zelaya felt the Lobo administration had compromised too much; opponents of the coup felt aggrieved that Zelaya never served out his term, and those who removed the president by force got away with it.

Brazil and the Defense of Democracy

Brazil's positions in the Honduras crisis is but a single case. It does not represent the whole of Brazilian foreign policy. The Honduran coup of 2009 and its aftermath was complex and idiosyncratic. The Brazilian position was the result of at least two unusual circumstances. As mentioned previously, Brazil could afford to reject the de facto status quo after the coup, because it had few economic interests at stake in Honduras. In a neighboring country with which it had more extensive trade and financial relations, Brazil might have been more cautious. Furthermore,

[15] Hondurans are the fourth largest Hispanic American immigrant group in the United States, behind Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans. From 2000 to 2010, the number of Hondurans in the US rose from 217,569 to 633,401, an increase of 191 per cent. From the US Census Bureau, quoted in Beaulieu (2012), 157-158.

[16] Summary of remarks made by José Miguel Insulza, then Secretary General of the OAS, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research, Tulane University, New Orleans, 7 January 2010.

the coup took place during the most dynamic phase of one of the most active periods in Brazilian foreign policy in the last few decades. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (2003-2010) and his team promoted an "active and assertive" (*ativa e altiva*) foreign policy and during the second term of President Lula (2006-2010) it reached its apogee. Less than a year after the Honduran coup Brazil engaged in one of its most controversial negotiations, achieving an agreement in May 2010 in Tehran on Iran's nuclear programme. Together with Turkey and Iran it issued the Tehran Declaration, and although the agreement was subsequently rejected by the US and the UN Security Council, it represented a significant incursion of rising powers into a diplomatic realm of international security issues previously thought to belong exclusively to the established powers (Amorim, 2015, 13-104).[17]

There is certainly evidence that Brazil's reputation for timidity when it comes to democracy promotion is deserved. For example, in 1992 Brazil was silent about a political crisis in Ecuador (Stuenkel, 2013, 343). In 2000 Brazil turned a blind eye to President Fujimori's fraudulent re-election in Peru and opposed the USA and Canada in the OAS General Assembly when they tried to criticize Fujimori (Burges, 2017, 60; Stuenkel, 2013, 344). In 2004 Brazil said nothing when a Franco-American operation removed elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from Haiti. Under Presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Brazil was largely silent about human rights abuses in Cuba, as well as questionable practices in the re-election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2012. Perhaps most egregiously, given Brazil's historical record of concern about non-intervention and international law, Brazil was mute when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

However, Brazil's record of supporting democracy in its own region, South America, is impressive. Since its own redemocratization in the 1980s, Brazil has taken gradual steps to build democratic safeguards through a variety of regional institutions, including the OAS, the Rio Group, Mercosur, and the South American Community of Nations, Unasul. Under Brazil's first civilian president after 21 years of military rule, José Sarney (1985-90), Brazil approved of the insertion of a reference to democracy in a new preamble to the OAS Charter. Under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Brazil used its influence in Paraguay in 1996 to prevent a military coup. It did so again in 1999 and 2000 (Stuenkel, 2013, 343-344). Vieira and Alden (2011, 516, 526) call these regional initiatives "normative leadership" and claim that they "represent fundamental foreign policy strategies aimed at achieving acceptance of…[Brazil's] regional leadership role".

These tendencies have become more pronounced in recent years. President Lula

[17] In this regard Brazil's position on the Honduran coup confirms Margheritis' contention that "domestic politics explanations are stronger than structural or systemic ones" when it comes to the defense of democracy; see Margheritis 2010, 42.

mediated a constitutional crisis in Bolivia in 2003 and a similar crisis in Ecuador in 2005 (Stuenkel, 2013, 344). When President Hugo Chávez was removed in a coup in 2002 and the US appeared to approve of and have been involved in instigating the action, Brazil under President Cardoso organized a Rio Group meeting and helped to issue a call for a return to constitutionality in Venezuela (Burges, 2017, 179). Chávez subsequently returned to power.

Democracy protection has become a key element of Brazil's attempt to use its hegemony in South America as a springboard for global influence (Amorim, 2015, 130). Stuenkel, citing Santosi, argues that "Brazil has played an exemplary and fundamental role in strengthening democratic norms and clauses across the region" (Stuenkel, 2013, 344). In his own words, promoting democracy "is increasingly aligned with Brazil's national interests as a regional hegemon" and "democracy promotion has become a key tool with which to contain threats against the legitimacy of the established order and to defend Brazil's growing economic presence in South America" (Stuenkel, 2013, 350). Admittedly, Brazil is more likely to exert itself during constitutional crises such as the Honduras coup and is less likely to take a firm stand when procedural issues cast doubt on the legitimacy of a democracy, as in Venezuela (Stuenkel, 2013, 345).

One stereotype about rising powers is that they defend democracy but do not promote democracy. They will react to a coup d'état as in Honduras, but they will not do the difficult daily work that the US and the EU do of strengthening political parties and institutions of electoral oversight, providing technical assistance, constitutional advice, and capacity building. This is democracy promotion, what Thomas Carothers defines as "aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening" (Carothers quoted in Abdenur and Souza Neto, 2013, 105).

The extraordinary relationship between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau belies this generalization. The case of Guinea-Bissau shows that Brazil can promote democracy, and do so outside its own region, in Africa. Guinea-Bissau, like Honduras, is a relatively low-risk country for Brazil, in that its trade with the country is negligible.[18] Like Honduras, Guinea-Bissau is unstable, and hardly a candidate for a democratic success story. Unlike Honduras, Guinea-Bissau is seen as strategic in Brazilian foreign policy circles, an Atlantic partner in Africa that is also a transshipment route for drugs emanating from South America. Nevertheless, Brazilian

[18] Abdenur and Souza Neto (2013, 109) show that trade between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau grew considerably between 2002 and 2009, but in the latter year was only $11.69 million. This is a very small amount compared to Brazil's $24.6 billion trade surplus in 2009. See "Brazilian Exports in 2009 Suffer Worst Performance in Six Decades" in MercoPress, 5 January 2010, at en.mercopress.com accessed on 13 April 2017.

engagement with its Portuguese-speaking West African partner has been sustained, multidimensional, creative, and prolific.

According to Abdenur and Souza Neto, Brazil's democracy promotion efforts in Guinea-Bissau flow through three different types of mechanism. The first is multilateral, through the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (*Comunidade de Países da Lingua Portuguesa*, or CPLP) and the United Nations, specifically the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Security Council, and UNIOGBIS (the UN Integrated Cabinet for the Consolidation of Peace in Guinea-Bissau). The second mechanism is trilateral cooperation between Brazil, Guinea-Bissau and other partners, most notably the USA. Finally, there are bilateral programmes coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. These three mechanisms combine to make institution-building a major part of Brazil's foreign policy towards Guinea-Bissau, giving the lie to stereotypes that rising powers only react spontaneously, and purely opportunistically, to democratic breakdowns abroad.

Some examples of Brazilian assistance to Guinea-Bissau consist of the following. In 2004, Brazil furnished aid to authorities conducting legislative elections there. In 2005, a Regional Electoral Court mission from the state of Minas Gerais provided technical assistance to those responsible for the presidential elections held that June, and donated twenty-five computers to help register voters. From 2006 to 2009, Brazil's Federal Police helped to establish a training center for the police in Guinea-Bissau. In 2011, Brazil provided help to Guinea-Bissau in the establishment and maintenance of a national system to register births. And up until 2010, 1,200 citizens of Guinea-Bissau took professional capacitation classes offered by SENAI, Brazil's National Industrial Training Service (*Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial*), while Brazil also engaged in a project to strengthen Guinea-Bissau's National Popular Assembly (Abdenur and Souza Neto, 2013, 109-113).

When a coup d'état took place in Guinea-Bissau in 2012, Brazil released a firm rebuke of the military action. Its Foreign Ministry tried to persuade the country's military leaders to release civilian politicians who had been detained and to organize a return to constitutional normality. After the United Nations appointed the former president and prime minister of East Timor and Nobel Peace Prize winner José Ramos-Horta as Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Guinea-Bissau in 2013, Ramos-Horta "characterized the role of Brazil in Guinea-Bissau as essential, stating that Brazil has `enormous credibility', as well as consolidated cooperation ties with Africa" (Abdenur and Souza Neto, 2013, 111-112).

Even in the case of its special engagement with Guinea-Bissau, Brazil has been

less assertive – some might say less arrogant – than established powers in promoting democracy. This is due partly to Brazil's long-standing tradition of respecting the principle of non-intervention. But it is also due to Brazil's own domestic shortcomings, including high levels of economic inequality, corruption, and human rights violations, including police violence in poor communities (Sahoo et al, 2015, 2). Established powers that expect Brazil to shout loudly about democracy are likely to be disappointed. Former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim argues that "there needs to be a dialogue rather than an intervention" and "democracy cannot be imposed. It is born from dialogue" (Amorim quoted in Stuenkel, 2013, 344).

Brazilian foreign policy has also been dialed down since the heady days when Celso Amorim was Foreign Minister. Under President Dilma Rousseff, the budget of the Foreign Ministry was slashed. President Rousseff's controversial 2016 impeachment, which some Brazilians and international observers regarded as illegitimate, made it more difficult for Brazil to pose as a potential model for other new democracies. The turmoil caused by Brazil's anti-corruption investigations have contributed additional political instability to the equation.

In summary, Brazil's policies in South America and its special relationship with Guinea-Bissau show that Brazilian defense of democracy is not just short term and reactive, and that long-term democracy promotion is not the exclusive purview of the EU and USA. The Honduras case is also important because it shows that generalizations about Brazil's foreign policy orientations and defense of democracy need to be questioned. Perhaps the policies of other democratic rising powers – for example, India and South Africa – should be re-examined as well. In Stuenkel's words, "contrary to what is often believed, Brazil has defended democracy abroad in many…instances, and over the past two decades its views on intervention have become decidedly more flexible" (Stuenkel, 2013, 343).

Conclusion

The world has become more multipolar. The post-Cold War consensus amongst some established powers in favor of exporting the institutions of liberal democracy has been shaken because these aspirations have "generated tensions and fragilities that were simplistically glossed over and marginalized in intellectual debate" (Buxton, 2017, 169). Furthermore, there has been a "lack of critical engagement with the failures, flaws, and, at points, egregious hypocrisies of the `West', of law breaking and institutional violation, and of illiberal internationalism" in the defense of questionable elections and in the application of "political double standards" (Buxton, 2017, 170).

In this context, unilateral and one-dimensional assessments of democracy such as those offered by Freedom House can be usefully complemented by the per-

spectives on democracy of rising powers such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. While these powers generally avoid the sweeping liberal ideology used by US and European democracy promoters, and indeed avoid the language of democracy promotion altogether, they can add value to the debate about democracy in the world. They are often seen as less condescending and arrogant than the established powers, they have experience in maintaining democracy under difficult conditions, and their record of domestic success makes them attractive to other countries struggling to create or maintain democracy (Stuenkel, 2013, 350-351).

This article argues that assumptions about Brazil's approach to democracy in its foreign policy, as well as the positions on democracy of other rising powers, need to be rethought. Brazil's foreign policy changed as the country became more globally influential, and traditional ideas about Brazil's foreign policy principles should be re-examined. These are that it prefers non-intervention and pragmatism, concentrates mainly on South American economic and political integration and does not invoke principles that do not advance its own economic interests. The literature on democracy promotion, for its part, suggests that Brazil makes minimal international efforts for democracy, preferring to cling to traditional notions of sovereignty and maintain a discrete silence in the face of anti-democratic actions abroad, both to protect its economic interests and its international support in multilateral fora. We should therefore expect Brazilian democracy promotion efforts to consistently lag behind those of the European Union and the United States.

Brazilian responses to the Honduran constitutional crisis and political deadlock of 2009-2011 show that these assumptions should be questioned. In this case, Brazil took a principled stance in defense of democracy, worked with other states within the OAS to defend this position, and went farther than the United States was willing to go to isolate the government that came to power in Honduras after the removal of President Zelaya. While Brazil's efforts were in some respects unsuccessful – it was unable to expand its influence in Central America, and it was forced, eventually, to seek a pragmatic compromise in the face of the unilateral decision of the USA to recognize the Lupo government after the 2009 elections – they were also constructive in upholding the OAS Democracy Charter, and positive in reaffirming the principle that governments that come to power through undemocratic means should not be encouraged or rewarded by regional representative institutions.

Brazil's position in the Honduras crisis was reasonable, principled, and shared by many other state and non-state actors. Brazil played a role in the compromise solution that was eventually achieved, a compromise that included the dropping of all charges against Zelaya and his return to Honduras, as well as an amnesty for those who took part in the 2009 coup. The fact that Brazil did not align in

lock-step with the United States is a point in its favor, given that the US position changed over time and was a muddle in constitutional terms. Brazilian policy could be faulted for its passivity. Brazil probably did not do enough to try to resolve the impasse over Honduras, thus hurting its ally El Salvador, which was badly affected by the prolonged nature of the crisis. Despite its ostensible independence, Brazil ultimately deferred to the United States and did not aggressively challenge the United States' preeminent role in the region. Having to house Manuel Zelaya in its Embassy was difficult, and tied Brazil's hands somewhat, but once the former President arrived there, it is difficult to see what else Brazil's Foreign Ministry could have done. It was obliged to allow him to stay, and to help secure his safe passage out of the country. The important thing is that the Brazil made a stand for multilateralism and the defense of democracy in the Americas.

Brazil's foreign policy goals have often been identified as multilateralism and negotiated solutions to international problems; a recognition of Brazil's global interests and role; the pursuit of its own economic development; and independence with regard to the United States. The Honduran crisis shows two more characteristics of Brazilian foreign policy. One is that it is likely to invoke high principles where doing so is least costly. Brazil's lack of economic ties with Honduras made it easier, not harder, to defend constitutionalism and democracy during the crisis and to insist on a reversal of the 2009 coup. In this respect Brazil behaves like other states. In addition, Brazil often takes actions independently of the United States, but it does not usually choose to openly confront its neighbor to the north, even when led by a government of the center-left.

As Antonio Patriota argues in this issue, and as another former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has argued, Brazil is an incrementalist and reformist power that wants improved multilateral institutions that are rule-based, consistent, and inclusive (see also Spektor, 2016, 35).[19] It is a moderate, and not revolutionary actor in the shifting global balance of power. It is an advocate for a new type of multipolarity. If Brazil's policy in Honduras was a failure in the sense that its immediate goal – the restoration to power of President Zelaya – was not realized, it was successful in that it showed a wholehearted commitment to the defense of democracy. The irony of Brazil's position was that the United States, which often claims to be a consistent and vigorous champion of democracy, chided Brazil for not being constructive and pragmatic enough to help in restoring stability to Honduras by recognizing a government that had come to power after a coup d'état. Sometimes nothing succeeds like failure.

[19] Lecture by Celso Amorim, "Constructing Multipolarity: the Brazilian Perspective", given at the Brazil Institute, King's College London, 2 November 2015.

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Bio

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Article

Trapped in Proto-Bipolarism? Brazilian Perceptions of an Emerging Chinese-American Rivalry

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Abstract

With the use of recent survey data, we empirically test a simple proposition that has strong impacts in terms of policymaking, both in Brazil and China: that the more Brazilians become aware of a post-hegemonic scenario in which the United States loses pre-eminence, the more China will be able to sell itself as a trustworthy partner. Although only 36 percent of Brazilians feel China is such a trustworthy partner, those who prefer a scenario in which China surpasses the United States economically have odds between 2.5 and 3.5 higher of trusting China. Brazilians, we believe, will reshape their opinion towards China gradually, as Chinese economic statecraft "wins hearts and minds".

Keywords

China, Brazil, Hegemony, Multipolarism, Survey

Introduction

In the first article of this special issue, Ambassador Antonio Patriota raised the question of the international system being ready for a competitive multipolar order. This question carries a highly important message: a changing world exhibits an array of challenges, and due to the lack of a single hegemon to provide leadership, political agendas are thus defined collectively. In this scenario, regional powers try to influence the international agenda in those specific areas in which they are able to exert a leading role. In Brazil's case, the country plays a prominent role in poverty reduction and in the development and environmental agendas, areas

where the country possesses expertise (Dauvergne & Farias 2012). However, this is not the case for many other issues.

A changing international system also makes possible the emergence of new superpowers that destabilize the world we are used to seeing. Rather than a multipolar system, in which Brazil would play an active role, we foresee a proto-bipolarism between the United States and China in which Brazil is trapped in a minor role. The rising influence exerted by China in Latin America, which is in part explained as a consequence of a vacuum of power left by the United States (Urdinez et al. 2016), is changing policies and perceptions in the region. In the aftermath of the Cold War, China's steady ascension has heralded a new force, creating an economic and political rivalry to the United States, which was only countered by the American government — quite aggressively— when Donald Trump started campaigning for the presidency.

While Brazil might need to conform to an increasingly multipolar international system as Patriota argues, it is still also very likely, we contend, that it will have to adapt to an increasing rivalry between the strongest poles, the United States and China. Both arguments converge on one point: unipolarity, which seemed durable only a few years ago, now appears today as a "passing moment" (Schweller & Pu 2011, p.41). How would Brazilians react to such a context? We believe that a national survey carried out in 2015 by the Institute of International Relations of the University of São Paulo can give us some interpretative clues to answer this question[1].

Previous work has used survey data to analyze perceptions about international issues in Brazil, some of them with regard to elites (Power & Zucco 2012), others to offer novel evidence on key historical periods (Loureiro, Guimarães & Schor 2015). Although this database has been used previously to analyze the Brazilian public opinion with respect to international affairs (Onuki, Mouron & Urdinez 2016), it has not yet been used to study the perception of Brazilians regarding the Chinese rise.

This article departs from literature that has suggested that the power distribution of the international system may lean towards bipolarism if China continues on the path of economic and military growth (Walt 2005; Paul 2005; Legro 2007; Layne 2008; Schweller & Pu 2011, to cite a few) as opposed to the literature that foresaw a multipolar scenario in which the BRIC countries would play an active role (Hurrell 2006; Brawley 2007; Zakaria 2008; Schweller 2011; Nadkarni & Noonan 2013; Acharya 2014; Stuenkel 2015). While some authors still define the current system as unipolar, they also leave the door open to a bipolar distribu-

[1] The survey is framed under The Americas and the World Project, held at CIDE Mexico, and can be found at www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu

tion in the future (Volgy & Imwalle 1995; Pape 2005; Ikenberry 2008; Ikenberry, Mastanduno & Wohlforth 2009; Walt 2009; Ikenberry 2011); this literature is also connected to our argument. This is an ongoing debate, and because no one has a crystal ball, predictions have limited value. What is certain is that China's rise is challenging American hegemony worldwide, and that will impact Brazil domestically.

This paper aims at empirically testing a very simple proposition with strong impact in policy making both in Brazil and China: is it true that the more Brazilians become aware of a post-hegemonic scenario in which United States loses pre-eminence, the more China will be able to sell itself as a trusting partner? Put differently, the efficacy to date of Chinese economic statecraft and soft power in Latin America depends also on how much it can be seen as an alternative to American hegemony (Gill & Huang 2006; Bräutigam & Xiaoyang 2012; Reilly 2013; Urdinez et al. 2016). In this sense, the Chinese economic rise in Latin America can progressively cause a gain in the the trust of countries in the region towards the Asian giant, overcoming the barriers of the lack of political legitimacy and shared values.

We organize this article into four subsections: the first examines feelings towards the rise of China, being overall defined as having a lack of trust and being fearful, and presenting some reasons for this finding. This section is followed by an evaluation of how trust in China might be enhanced by comprehension of the increasing benefits of the potential role that China can play in global governance issues, such as global peace and the economy, vis-à-vis a US-led international economy. The last section tests our hypothesis empirically using logistic models. Our findings confirm that there is a positive association between perceiving China as a positive alternative to the United States and having more trust in China

Has the Rise of China Created Mistrust?

While its profile rises, China may arouse uncertainties regarding its disposition toward the world. Has China been confrontational toward the international community? There are, we think, two overlapping theories addressing this question by two groups of renowned authors. On the one hand, Buzan & Cox (2013) refer to *rise*, and to describe it, they use a 4 × 2 matrix that can be used for comparative purposes with other historical rises (see table 1). In their view, peaceful rises, "such as the Chinese, involves a two-way process in which the rising power accommodates itself to the rules and structures of international society, while at the same time other great powers accommodate some changes in those rules and structures by way of adjusting to the new disposition of power and status" (2013, p.4). There are several authors whose works fit well into this categorization, although they do not always use the same concepts to describe Chinese ascent (Qingguo 2005;

Chan 2007; Yue 2008).

Table 1: Comparison of the Chinese Rise to Other Superpowers.

	Rise		Not Rise
Cold	*Peaceful*	*Hostile*	
	China	Pre-war Germany	
Warm	USA	British Empire	

On the other hand, some authors define China's diplomacy as *assertive*. This term can be defined as "a form of diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before" (Chen, Pu & Johnston 2014, p.176). While it is difficult to equate a rise (referring to an ascending move in the international system) with assertiveness (referring to a political attitude) both are used to describe the same phenomenon. It might be that because China is rising it behaves more assertively, for instance, but such a statement needs to be tested empirically. Authors that discuss policy recommendations for China to avoid conflict in South East Asia (particularly due to the One China Policy) can be categorized using the assertive-non-assertive matrix (Christensen 2006; Mearsheimer 2010; Glaser 2015; Harris 2015).

The Chinese rise — assertive or not — has been met with distrust by Latin American governments (Urdinez, Knoerich & Feliú Ribeiro 2016). One of the reasons could be that the guiding principles of international relations are still concentrated on American leadership (Zhao 2016) — values such as trade liberalization, non-discrimination and democracy remain the anchoring premises of most international agreements. However, Zhao, in an article published earlier in this journal, argues that the Chinese rise does not mean rivalry to the American order. His argument is that by taking a status quo option and not presenting a revisionist-revolutionary attitude to the world order, China remains in a non-rival position with respect to the values now set internationally.

Having a hierarchical and traditional political-social system, the country has had little chance of presenting itself as a global alternative order which has already embraced democratic values (Summers 2016). In this way, China reaffirms the principles of the West by concentrating its energies on taking advantage of globalization from its comparative economic capacity. As much as Chinese attitudes may not represent assertive destructive behavior toward the international order, it still does not instill confidence that it is a country that adheres fully to current values.

Just as the 'good neighbor policy' will play an important role in China's future role

as an alternative to the global order, the country will need more than economic partnerships to establish itself as a reliable ally of countries like Brazil. China still lacks soft power (Minjiang 2008), and this is highly important for Brazilian perceptions of the state. When asked about feelings toward China, Brazilians from all regions of the country tended to be suspicious of the Asian giant. The national average for those who think that China is a trustworthy partner was 36 percent. We have classified answers by federal units, and sorted them from most to least favorable.

Figure 1: Among the Following Words, Which One Best Describes Your Feelings Towards China?



Note: Elaborated by the authors. N=1881.

This question will be used as the dependent variable to understand the appeal of Chinese values among Brazilians. We have tested, in exploratory analysis, whether the differences between the federal units are due to their factor endowments or to their trade exposure to China, and we have found no evidence for these variables. Nor is there a clear geographic pattern, nor a relation with development measured in terms of GDP per capita. In section four we will include some of these variables as controls of individual perception.

Filling the Void: Chinese Ascension While American Influence Decreases.

China is filling the void left by the retreat of United States in Latin America. While the region seems to be less and less on the list of American priorities, Chi-

nese investments and trade are opening spaces for more stable political relations.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, American hegemony in Latin America has gone through two stages, first closeness and later detachment. The first of these stages stretched from 1990 to September 11, 2001. This period was marked by the paradigm of the New World Order (Hurrell 1992) and influenced by the neoliberal thinking of the Washington Consensus, with a return of a United States presence to the politics of the Latin American region. At the same time, the period has been described as presenting a systemic configuration of unipolarity, which led Huntington to name the United States as the "lonely superpower" (1999). In Brazil, this was the era of the Real Plan, the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the increase in foreign debt, which led to widespread anti-Americanism.

The second period ran from September 11 (2001), which began with the War on Terror, was followed by the Obama Doctrine, and lasted until November 9, 2016, with the election of Donald Trump. Tulchin (2016) performs a detailed analysis of the characteristics of American hegemony throughout this period. The characteristics of US influence in Latin America, and of the power configuration of the international system, are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: US Hegemony Since 1989.

	US Approach Towards Latin America	Regional Systemic Configuraiton
New World Order	Hegemonic Order	Lonely Superpower
War on Terror	Retreat	Lonely Superpower
Obama Doctrine	Post-Hegemony	Proto-Bipolarism

The terrorist attacks in 2001 and the militarized unilateralism favored by George W. Bush and demonstrated in the US War on Terror, destabilized the Latin American sense of community in the region, which had been experiencing a positive moment since the end of the Cold War (Tulchin 2016). According to Tulchin, "It also made the end of US hegemony more problematic. That meant that as the experience of agency in the world community became more familiar, it appeared inevitable that opposition to US hegemony would become adversarial" (2016, p.129). As the United States focused on the Middle East, the emergence of ISIS in northern Africa, and containing Russia's aggressive foreign policy, they left Latin America as a second-class priority.

After 9/11, the United States lost interest, the budget for operations in the region was gutted, and the new regionalism initiatives from Latin America served to erode the influence of the OAS. To this came the turn to the left, which came to be known as the Pink Tide (and which brought to power political parties who were very critical of the Washington Consensus), the Free Trade Area of the

Americas (FTAA) and a favorable period of high commodity prices that allowed Latin American countries to pursue an agenda of strong state investment (Campello 2015; Mares & Kacowicz 2015).

When Obama assumed the US presidency, his administration delineated a post-hegemonic policy which aimed at developing equal-to-equal relationships rather than the historically paternalistic approach of US foreign policy, which came to be known as the Obama doctrine (Drezner 2011). After the lessons of the 1990s, it was clear that despite unequaled military and economic power, and the use of that overwhelming power, the US could not guarantee specific political outcomes or protect its interests. However, populist governments would "go to extraordinary lengths to avoid following that lead and avoid US hegemonic control, even if that appears to go against their own interests" (Tulchin 2016, p.160). Furthermore, China was emerging as an alternative source of loans, investments and the main buyer of commodities filling a void left by US statecraft in the region.

Brazil's relations with the United States illustrate this general pattern. Throughout its history, Brazilian international relations have been defined by advances and withdrawals in its relations with United States (Neto 2011; Mourón & Urdinez 2014). Despite the fact that at times the relations between countries were shaken, for example in the independent Brazilian position of non-automatic alignment during the military period, Brazil and the United States systematically maintained significant trade relations and the US has had much cultural influence over Brazilian people. Perhaps much of the ups-and-downs of the relationship with the United States were due to the constant influence of the US in the domestic foreign policy agenda of Brazil, which was seen as a limit to Brazil consolidating its own area of influence in South America (Spektor 2009).

Previous research has attempted to quantify the hegemonic influence that US exerts over Latin America. Urdinez et al. (2016) develop an *American Hegemonic Influence Index* to test the hypothesis that Chinese economic statecraft was stronger in countries with low scores in the index. In their rank of 21 countries in Latin America, Brazil ranked fifth for the 2013-2014 period, which denotes a 'high' influence. While, comparatively speaking, Brazil scores lowly in agreement with the United States on UN General Assembly votes and received American aid, it scores very high in trade dependency and received investments. Despite the apparent diminished influence in the region, United States still economically influences Brazil to a considerable extent.

Despite the importance of the United States to economies in Latin America, the political detachment toward the region by the United States opened opportunities for the Chinese to increase their presence, mitigated by the lack of mutual values. While China steadily increased its share in the Latin American market,

one of the inhibitory aspects to transforming economic power into political influence was the uncertainty of a full adherence to shared values in the region. In this sense, the United States remains, in the public imagination, the natural locus of western values. This suggests support for the view of China being limited as regards becoming a viable alternative to the American global order. The figure below shows answers to the question: *'Which of the following countries instills in you the greatest confidence that it can keep the peace in the world?'*

Figure 2: Brazilian Confidence Toward China and the US



Note: Elaborated by the authors. N=1881.

When asked about which country inspires greater confidence as regards peacekeeping, most Brazilians opted for trusting the Americans. The ratio of the US to China was, on average, 4 to 1. In this case, we attribute this finding not only to the aspects of economic dependency that these countries may represent to Brazilians but also to emotional attachment to American values. Overall, responses were consistent across the country, despite varying degrees of dependency on Chinese and American markets.

The low level of confidence seems to follow the same pattern in other areas. China also does not seem to inspire confidence in security issues, either because of Brazilian difficulty in apprehending China's commitment to maintaining peace, or because of a Brazilian belief that China does not share similar values. It is reasonable to propose then, that Brazilians would opt for the Americans even in matters of national sovereignty, despite the historical mistrust of the American presence

in the region.

Certainly, in the economic arena, China is a threat to American economic diplomacy, and this trend will remain the same for years to come. Since the end of the Cold War, the gap in the size of the two economies has been reduced by a dual process, first a slight decrease on the part of the United States and, most importantly, the solid growth of the Chinese economy, such that adding both economies together nowadays represent more than 50% of world GDP.

The Asian country has not only increased the degree of economic integration with developing countries through direct investment, trade and foreign aid, but also helped promote local economies by absorbing low value-added exports, primarily agricultural commodities. Chinese demand has driven Latin American economy to a period of abundance. This phenomenon was known as the Commodity Boom (Ferchen 2011), which in Brazil was one of the main sources of it´s accelerated economic growth during the first decade of the 2000s and as such received major media attention. On the other hand, Chinese growth led to a loss of competitivity in the industrial sector, which suffered from cheap Chinese imports (Urdinez 2014). It was not by chance that Brazil challenged the Chinese several times in the WTO dispute settlement body, and enforced protectionist measures in defense of national industry. Since 2001, both imports and exports grew exponentially, creating opportunities and tensions (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Trade Relations with China.



Note: States are colored black when China is the main trade partner, in gray when China is the secondary trade partner. Source: MDIC.

If on the one hand trade and investments boost the relations between China and Latin American countries, in the international arena, Brazil and China compete in investment and political influence in certain regions. With China expanding its investments and foreign aid to the Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa, the Brazilian response was to facilitate the internationalization of domestic companies through competitive loans guaranteed by the National Development Bank (BNDES) and the expansion of programs of international cooperation for development (Rodrigues & Gonçalves 2016; Mouron, Urdinez & Schenoni 2016). Being strategic for Brazilian international purposes, those regions represent locations where conflicts of interests emerge.

Although we have observed that Brazilians prefer the US to China when it comes to keeping international peace and that there are disputes for regional influence between Brazil and China, most Brazilians do prefer a scenario in which China surpasses the US as the main economy in the world. This is very pragmatic reasoning, we believe. To the question *"in your opinion, if China's economy grew to be as large as the United States, do you think that fact would be positive or negative for the world?"* Most Brazilians respond in a pro-Chinese fashion, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Opinion Towards Chinese Economic Growth.



Note: Elaborated by the authors. N=1881.

Despite rivalry and the economic effects of Chinese expansion in Brazil and Latin America, the rise of China in relation to the United States is positively viewed by the Brazilian survey respondents. One possible cause of this result is the sustained belief that Chinese growth will simultaneously imply an opportunity for exports of low value-added products and a counterweight to the historic US hegemony in the region. Foreign aid and Chinese infrastructure investments also help shape

this outlook, supported by the idea that Chinese growth mitigates the degree of dependence on the US, viewed positively by countries in the region. Thus, we suggest, the degree of trust on China in global governance issues can acquire a positive trend as long as the Chinese economic presence increases, counterbalancing American dominance. In this proposition, the formation of a proto-bipolar order can progressively open space to the Chinese recognition as a legitimate global player in the region.

Empirical Findings

From the survey we know that most Brazilians see China as an untrustworthy partner. Furthermore, we know that most Brazilians prefer that China surpasses the United States economically. We believe that because the appeal of China to Brazilians is mostly economic, as Chinese economic statecraft grows, Brazilians will shift their perceptions towards a more trusting view of China. To test empirically our hypothesis, we estimated a logistic model that can be expressed as

$$P(\text{TrustChina}=1 \mid x)=G(\beta_0+\beta_1\ \text{ChinasurpassesUSA}_1+...+\beta_k\ \text{controls}_k)$$

To test the relationship between our independent and dependent variables we run four different specifications of our baseline model for robustness purposes. The first of these is a logistic regression without controls and without federal unit fixed effects. The second specification includes controls but not fixed effects. The third specification includes both controls and fixed effects. Finally, we run a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression with controls to let slope coefficients to randomly vary across Federal Units. For the main independent variable, we considered the question we analyzed in the previous section: "In your view, if China's economy grows to be as large as the United States', do you think that this would be positive for the world?", the answer to which is "yes" or "no".

To control for the respondent's appraisal of Chinese migrants we considered the following question: "What is your overall opinion on the Chinese people living in your country?". The variable was originally of ordinal nature, ranging from very positive (1) to very negative (5), and we created a dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 when the opinion on the Chinese diaspora is worse than the average opinion on the other nationalities being asked in the survey (i.e. American, Bolivian, Equatorial, Paraguayan, Peruvian, Spanish, Uruguayan, Venezuelan). In this way, we ensure that what we measure is the negative opinion towards the Chinese and not towards all immigrants.

To control for perceived costs associated with an increasing exposure to trade with China in each federal unit we created a variable which measures if the person lives in a federal unit whose main exports are the main national export to China (i.e. soybeans). To create this variable, we used the information on federal units

retrieved from the Brazilian Ministry of Economy. This variable was coded as a dummy variable.

The literature that uses survey data to analyze foreign policy positions typically includes controls for socioeconomic and ideological preferences at the individual level (Kertzer & Zeitzoff 2017). We used the appraisal the person made of American influence in Latin America; if the person lives (or not) in an urban center (larger than a million people); the person's age, gender and their degree of knowledge of international issues.

Table 3: Regression Results.

	Logit	Logit	Logit	Multilevel Logit
Positive if China surpasses USA	3.461*** (11.42)	2.487*** (5.09)	2.644*** (5.31)	2.495*** (5.08)
Perception of Chinese Immigrants		1.873*** (3.62)	1.857*** (3.51)	1.872*** (3.62)
Federal Unit's Trade Exposure		1.131 (0.73)	1.513 (0.75)	1.116 (0.59)
Urban Area		0.865 (-0.82)	0.957 (-0.20)	0.867 (-0.79)
Opinion on US' Role in Latin America		1.081 (1.63)	1.078 (1.52)	1.081 (1.62)
Ideology		0.988 (-0.44)	0.988 (-0.41)	0.988 (-0.43)
Income		1.368 (1.87)	1.353 (1.77)	1.367 (1.86)
Degree of Information		0.928 (-0.86)	0.921 (-0.92)	0.927 (-0.87)
Gender		1.413* (2.09)	1.435* (2.14)	1.414* (2.09)
Age		0.996 (-0.75)	0.994 (-1.01)	0.996 (-0.76)
Fed. Units' Fixed Effects	**No**	**No**	**Yes**	**No**
Observations	**1881**	**708**	**708**	**708**
Pseudo R Squared	**0.058**	**0.066**	**0.083**	
AIC	**2312.8**	**898.3**	**906.3**	**900.3**

*Note: Odds ratios as coefficients; T statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Dependent variable = 1 if China is a trusting partner.*

Our results show that the odds of a Brazilian trusting China is 2.5 and 3.5 (depending on the model specification), higher if the person sees as a positive outcome that China is surpassing the United States economically. Furthermore, the odds are higher (1.80 times higher) when the person has a positive image of the Chinese diaspora living in Brazil.

Trapped in Proto-Bipolarism?

The Chinese rise to the status of global power has profoundly altered the extent of US dominance in Latin America and the potential of the Brazilian claim of being a regionally prominent actor. This new global configuration reduces Brazilian options for accessing international political and economic resources. The country is trapped between the two largest economies of the world. While the systemic conditions for Brazil being among the greatest powers has become more complex, the reactions on the part of Brazilian public reflects such anxieties and dilemmas. As we have presented in this work, Brazilian attitudes reveal the mood of relations between Brazil, the United States, and China.

The rise of China has created mistrust among large parts of the world. After briefly reviewing the literature on the intentions of China and its growth, we evaluated how the Chinese rise is interpreted by the Brazilian audience. To a greater degree than economic matters, what seems to attract the attention of, and cause a general distrust in, the public are the values held by the Asian country. American influence in Brazil is still strong after all. Despite the long history of ups and downs, the United States has not disassociated itself from its position of regional leadership. High interdependence in trade and investments, as well as the wide advantage in the cultural domain, give the United States a status of the natural regional representative. No matter how much effort it makes, China still holds a position of low prestige among South American countries.

Despite its lack of legitimacy as an alternative model of power, China appeals to Brazilians as an economic superpower. This is not news (Oliveira 2010). What is new is that we find a positive association between China's economic appeal and how trustworthy the country is perceived to be. Results suggest that Brazilians value pragmatism in relation to China, and money can win over their hearts. Despite this finding, the novelty arises when we look at the optimistic way Brazilians see Chinese growth in relation to the relative stagnation of American global economic dominance. It also means, to a certain extent, that the possible Brazilian resistance against increasingly Chinese influence in the region can be mitigated through the economic benefits of such ascension, despite the obstacles the lack of soft power could create.

In summary, Brazilians are pragmatic from an economic point of view but norma-

tively adhere to American values. China lacks the soft power to be an alternative to the US hegemonic influence in Brazil but can strengthen its economic link with the country to win over hearts and minds.

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Article

Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian Foreign Policy and What it Means for the Region

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Abstract

For the last 20 years Brazil pursued an activist foreign policy both in relation to its own region and the wider world. Yet, in recent years, many Brazil's initiatives have stalled or collapsed. The argument put forward is that this inertia is largely due to the almost total absence of Brazilian political leadership, especially in South America. Yet, such leadership is urgently needed in the face of multiple regional and international challenges, with the political and economic crisis serving here as an illustrative case study. Particular attention here will also be paid to the role of UNASUR in this crisis.

Using the conceptual framework of Complexity and Human System Dynamics (HSD), it will be argued that Brazil cannot assume the leadership role that is needed because its foreign policy is marked by a lack of overarching objective, muddled foreign policy execution and a lack of clear channels through which to formulate such a coherent policy which has the chance to achieve its strategic objectives. The article will propose ways for Brazil to redefine its foreign policy approach and objectives to become the dynamic leader the region needs.

Keywords

Brazil, Venezuela, Leadership, Crisis, Complexity, Human System Dynamics

Introduction

Brazil is South America's dominant country. It is by far the biggest in terms of territory and population, has the biggest economy in the region and sits on an enormous pool of natural resources. Yet, for most of its history Brazil was not a 'natural' leader, its foreign policy being focussed principally on furthering economic development and ensuring autonomy, especially in relation to the United States. Its own region was often little more than an afterthought to these broader considerations.

Only with the arrival of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as President in 1995, followed by President Lula, did Brazil assume a more proactive foreign policy posture. Trying to engage across the world and to reform the international political architecture, Brazil was also at the forefront of promoting regional cooperation in South America for both political and economic purposes.

Little of this activism survives today and some of its achievements are crumbling. Mired in a domestic political and economic crisis, the country has been largely absent from the international stage. At the same time, regional cooperation has essentially come to a halt. This is both regrettable and dangerous, bearing in mind the multiple challenges faced within the region. Brazilian leadership is urgently needed to navigate these challenges and could make a significant and positive contribution to solving the various problems confronted.

This article aims to answer three questions: What factors explain this breakdown of foreign policy activism by Brazil over the last few years? What does this breakdown mean for both Brazil as it engages with the world and, more importantly, in South America? What can be done to overcome this inertia?

To answer these questions, the article will use Complexity and Human Systems Dynamics as a conceptual framework to reinterpret mainly existing scholarship, arguing that this approach offers a set of fresh perspectives which will enable analysts and foreign policy makers to address the problems many of them have themselves identified. The current situation in Venezuela will serve as an illustrative case study. Out of this case study, some original conclusions will be drawn on the possible actions to address the problems identified. Areas for further research will also be outlined.

Brazilian Foreign Policy in Perspective: A Brief History

Brazilian foreign policy has, historically, been marked by a great deal of continuity. In broad terms, one can identify the following principles: First, there has been a search for autonomy (Saraiva 2014). Fonseca (1998, p. 368) defines this concept as 'a desire to influence the open agenda with values that translate diplomatic tradition and capacity to see the international order with one's own eyes and fresh perspectives.'

A second key theme has been the idea of using foreign policy as a tool for national development. Lafer (2001, p. 108) describes this as 'the objective par excellence of [Brazilian] foreign policy, as a public policy devoted to translating domestic necessities into external possibilities.' In this sense 'development [is] a means to reduc[e] the power asymmetries that were responsible for South American vulnerability' (*ibid*, p. 81), making clear the link between the need for development and the quest for autonomy.

A third principle is the desire to be recognized. Lima (2005, p. 6) argues that 'this aspiration turns into foreign policy's very reason for [being].' She traces this desire back to the late 19th century when Brazil joined multiple international agreements and organizations in various policy spheres. The fear of being marginalized manifested itself even more strongly at the start of the 20th century, when Brazil made a point of participating in the Hague conference of 1907 and the Paris peace conference of 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War. On both of these occasions, the country argued strongly for the equality of states and against the distinction between 'great' and 'other' powers (Lafer 2005, pp. 68-74).

These principles have survived as guides for Brazilian foreign policy ever since. Yet, how these principles have been interpreted and translated into action has changed significantly.

To get a sense of this evolution, one only has to look at the meaning of the term 'autonomy' in Brazilian foreign policy. For many years, especially during the Cold War, autonomy essentially meant the country keeping its distance from, and therefore keeping out of, the superpower disputes of that time. Only with the end of Brazil's military dictatorship in 1985 and the subsequent end of the Cold War in 1989/90 did Brazil slowly begin to adopt a posture of 'autonomy through participation' (Fonseca Jr. 1998, p. 374). Brazil also started to promote specific values, such as democracy, 'a positive attitude in relation to human rights, social justice, search for peace [and] non-proliferation' (*ibid,* p. 374). These were seen as crucial preconditions to be able to participate fully within the international system in a post-Cold War world which witnessed the expansion of democracy and the supposed 'victory' of the liberal capitalist order at the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992).

These strategic considerations were taken further by the governments led by Presidents Cardoso and Lula. Both not only wanted Brazil to actively participate in the international political system but integrate with it. This phase of 'autonomy through integration' has been seen as the high point of Brazilian activism in foreign policy, which manifested itself in a renewed push for reform of the UN Security Council, active political engagement with the broadly defined 'global south', the push for the creation of new, and the deepening of old, international mechanisms of cooperation, such as the G20 or the BRICS grouping of developing countries (de Almeida 2009). Brazil, then, became an active promoter of international cooperation, regional integration and a keen advocate for profound reform of the international political system.

This change had a significant impact on Brazil's relationship with its own region, South America. Here, since the early 1990s, Brazil led a series of initiatives, creating an 'alphabet soup' of regional- and sub-regional organizations with a wide

range of responsibilities across a wide array of policy areas (Glickhouse 2012). The creation of organizations such as MERCOSUR, the Common Market of the Southern Cone, was a reflection of Brazil's desire to promote the region as well as manifest its own leadership credentials (Sweig 2010; Rothkopf 2012). It was also a reflection of an emerging consensus across the political spectrum about the kind of economic and political model to follow, inspired by the success of, in particular, the European Single Market. This consensus centred on a belief in free trade and the benefits of opening Brazil up to the wider world. In the region this meant a move away from 'closed' towards 'open' regionalism and a belief in the utility of regionalism as a tool for advancing particular national interests. This consensus was shared, broadly speaking, across the region and benefited greatly from the geopolitical stability of South America (Malamud 2010).

Yet, little of this activism survives today. In fact, many commentators have argued that Brazil is currently in headlong retreat from the international stage (Stuenkel 2014). The country has made deliberate choices, for instance, to disengage from key international forums on security (*ibid*). This disengagement is also reflected in the closing of embassies and consular representations across the globe, as well as other cut backs at the Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty (Stuenkel 2016). As a consequence, many of the initiatives started by Brazil in recent times lie moribond or abandoned. For instance, MERCOSUR is essentially paralyzed, reflecting a broader trend of the abandonment of regionalism as a foreign policy tool (Malamud 2012). With this, Brazil's push for profound reforms of the international political architecture has come to a halt without showing durable results (Malamud 2017).

Commentators have put forward a series of arguments to explain this situation. Some point to the country's internal political and economic problems as an explanation for its passive posture (Stuenkel 2016). Others point to former President's Dilma's relative lack of interest in foreign affairs, in sharp contrast to her two immediate predecessors (Zanini 2014). Yet others, however, looking at the more strategic level, point out that, even during its period of activism, Brazil's foreign policy was always hampered by what some have called 'ambiguities' and 'strategic confusion' (Hurrel 2008; Gardini 2015).

These arguments have considerable merit in explaining current Brazilian foreign policy inertia. In what follows I accept these arguments but interpret them through a new and innovative conceptual framework to explain this inertia: Complexity and Human Systems Dynamics. This framework will then be used to outline some tentative suggestions for action to overcome the problems identified. This is crucial since, whether it is the political and economic crisis in Venezuela, the repercussions of the peace process in Colombia or the impact of the Trump-presidency in the United States, the very near future is likely to present Brazil,

and South America, with formidable challenges which will require clear policies and effective leadership.

Foreign Policy as a Complex Adaptive System

Whilst many have acknowledged the multiple problems currently faced by Brazil, in these debates the nature of these problems have often been defined as complicated. As Edwards (2002, p. 17) points out, with complicated problems 'it is possible to work out solutions and implement them.' Therefore, UN Security Council reform is complicated and will require a lot of effort. Reforming the international political architecture is complicated and will require a lot of effort and negotiations. Dealing with the Venezuelan crisis is complicated and will require a lot of effort.

However, as Lehmann (2012) or Geyer & Rihani (2010) have shown international politics and, by extension, foreign policy, are not complicated but complex issues, marked by the following characteristics:

- The presence within the system of a large number of elements
- These elements interact in a rich manner, that is, any element in the system is influenced by, and influences, a large number of other elements
- These interactions are often non-linear
- There are feedback loops in the interaction
- The system and its elements are open to their environment
- These systems operate in a state far from equilibrium
- These systems have a history
- The elements of the system are ignorant of the behavior of the system as a whole

In the words of Dooley (1997), this describes a Complex Adaptive System, defined as 'a collection of semi-autonomous agents with the freedom to act in unpredictable ways and whose interactions over time and space generate system-wide patterns.' As Edwards (2002, p. 17) has observed, such systems 'have remarkable resilience in the face of efforts to change them.' This is partly due to the fact that the system's agents 'are constantly changing, as are the relationships between and amongst them' (Eoyang & Holladay, 2013, p. 16-17). As a consequence, 'uncertainty becomes the rule' (*ibid*: 17).

Yet, uncertainty does not mean permanent instability. In fact, in most cases,

changes in the relationship between agents take place within a framework of fundamental systemic stability. As Eoyang and Holladay (2013, p. 17) put it, interactions 'simply change the conditions and relationships among the parts and the whole; they do not change the system in any fundamental way.' The interaction between parts and the whole often sustains existing patterns as 'parts interact to generate emergent patterns while the patterns influence parts and their interactions. The result is a self-generating, self-organizing reality of human systems dynamics' (*ibid*, p. 18), based on the interdependence between the parts and the whole of the system. Self-organization here is defined as a process by which the internal interactions between agents and conditions of a system generate system-wide patterns (Eoyang 2001).

In such a situation change is dynamical, the result of multiple forces acting in unpredictable ways and generating surprising outcomes which even the most powerful actors cannot control entirely. Change, then, is only partially predictable and characterized by what Malcolm Gladwell (2000) calls 'tipping points' at which the dynamics of the system change profoundly to settle into a new pattern. In such a situation, even if an action could be executed as planned, it would not guarantee the 'right' result. As elements of a CAS are multiple and interdependent, 'one can never do only one thing' since one action will have multiple impacts and 'unintended consequences abound' (Jervis 1997). That means that the self-organization of a Complex Adaptive System does not stop at a particular, less so at an externally predetermined, point. Instead 'the best you can hope to do is to build adaptive capacity to coevolve with the system as it changes over time' (Eoyang & Holladay 2013, p. 25).

Consequently, actions have to be constantly evaluated and adjusted depending on particular local circumstances. Decision-making processes have to be flexible and decentralized. They have to be able to respond and adapt to unforeseen circumstances as agents of the system respond and adapt to any given policy.

To do so, Eoyang and Holladay (2013) developed a process they call 'Adaptive Action', a 'method for engaging in dynamical change in an ever-emerging, always self-organizing world'. They argue that it is necessary to approach any given problem with the aim of identifying the current state of self-organization to allow for targeted intervention that can change the pattern of self-organization which has given rise to, and sustains, the problem to be tackled. This process is based on three simple questions:

What?

The 'what' question tries to identify the current state of the process of self-organization, which, according to Eoyang (2001), is dependent on three conditions: elements which hold the system together (such as shared objectives, geographical

locations, social class etc.), differences between the agents of the system which generate tensions that allow for change (such as different interpretations of a particular issue, class, resources, location etc.) and channels through which these differences can be expressed (media, assemblies, meetings etc.). Eoyang (*ibid.*) calls these conditions 'Containers', 'Differences' and 'Exchanges'. She also shows that these conditions are interdependent and influence each other across time and space and can serve different functions within different particular contexts. A particular condition can serve as a container in one context but a significant difference or an exchange in a different context.

Questions that might be asked to reveal the current state of self-organization include: What do we see? What containers are the most relevant? What differences exist and what impact do they have? What exchanges are strongest and what are the weakest etc.?

So what (does it mean)?

The 'so, what' question tries to make sense of what has been observed. What do the patterns we observe mean for any possibility of action? Such a question is critical in that it generates options for action but also allows for the adaptation of action to different circumstances across time and space. Questions might include: So what does the current state mean to you, to me and to others? So what does that mean for our ability to act? So what does that mean for the future development of the system?

Now what (do we do)?

The 'now what' question, finally, allows for the taking of action having considered the current state of self-organization and its implications across time and space. Questions may include: Now what will I/you/we/they do? Now what will be communicated to others? Now what will the results and the consequences be?

These three questions allow exercising '[c]onscious influence over self-organizing patterns [as it permits] seeing, understanding, and influencing the conditions that shape change in complex adaptive systems' (Eoyang & Holladay, 2013, p. 30). Therefore, they allow for the identification of the conditions and patterns that give rise to, and sustain, particular problems, as well as actions to address this problem. As such, it will be useful to define more precisely what we mean by conditions and patterns.

Conditions

Conditions are the elements of the social system which, individually and in interaction with one another, determine the speed, direction, and path of a social system as it evolves (i.e. self-organises) into the future. In other words, conditions

and their interactions are critical to the outcome of any process of self-organization.

Patterns

Patterns are the expression of the interaction between the three different conditions outlined above and are understood as 'the similarities, differences and connections that have meaning across time and space' (Eoyang & Holladay 2013, p. 42).

These terms have critical implications for action. They suggest that problems of the type currently being faced by Brazilian foreign policy-makers are, in fact, the expression of a pattern of interdependent conditions across time and space. Therefore, what need to change are the conditions which form these patterns.

The Decline of Brazilian Foreign Policy from a Complexity Perspective

As mentioned above, one can detect some overriding principles which have historically guided the country in its dealings with the world. In the context of HSD and Complexity, these principles serve as containers which bound the system. As times changed – the end of the military dictatorship, the end of the Cold War, the changing paradigms of international economics from the 1990s onwards, the change of governments in Brazil etc. – so did the interpretations of these principles, as was outlined above. Yet, the principles itself remained largely in place. This allowed different governments to adapt foreign policy to the particular circumstances they found themselves in. In other words, whilst the container remains in place, different particular conditions – brought about by gateway events or other changes – led to different interpretations of these principles which, in turn, led to practical changes in foreign policy-making.

Presidents, as leaders, are crucial in articulating these interpretations and, therefore, serving as exchanges for the interaction between different conditions and actors that inhabit this system and try to shape it. In fact, they are themselves critical conditions. In recent times, perhaps no two Brazilian leaders have taken on this role as articulator of Brazilian foreign policy more clearly and determinedly than Presidents Cardoso and Lula, who governed Brazil from 1995-2010. Both managed, in their own distinct styles, to translate long-standing principles of Brazilian foreign policy into practical policies for their respective circumstances.

In both cases, 'engagement' served as a key container for the overall foreign policy direction. The multiple regional initiatives, the renewed push for a reform of the international political system, the opening up of Brazil to international trade or the enormous efforts that were made to foster cooperation with the so-called 'global south' are all testament to this principle (Altemani & Lessa 2008).

Crucially, the idea that Brazil should *lead* these efforts was also a common denominator. This is particularly true for efforts to foster regionalism, as shown by attempts to further MERCOSUR or the founding of UNASUR, which was the result of a Brazilian initiative at the start of the 2000s (Gratius & Saraiva, 2013). Yet, Brazilian leadership extended beyond the region. The BRICS initiative or the close engagement which Lula, in particular, sought with African countries, are also testament to this leadership. In fact, Brazil became an active, if not always effective, actor in both regional and international crisis diplomacy, as was the case after the Honduran military coup of 2009 or the Iran nuclear deal pushed by Brazil and Turkey in 2010 (Council of Foreign Relations 2010).

This is not to say that there were no differences either domestically or internationally. Domestically, it seems clear that the emphasis by Cardoso was more on economic development whilst, for Lula, it was more political and making Brazil heard in the world, although these two objectives obviously overlap (Altemani & Lessa 2008). In fact, and this will become crucial in the later discussion of the current crisis, both used important economic actors, such as Odebrecht, Petrobras or the national development bank BNDES, to underscore their foreign policy objectives, giving those actors key roles in executing a variety of infrastructure projects both in Latin America and Africa that also advanced Brazilian economic and political interests internationally (Malamud 2017). Equally, Brazil's push for a greater role oftentimes met with considerable pushback, as was clearly shown in relation to the above-mentioned cases of Honduras and Iran (Washington Post 2010).

Hence, the different emphasis by the two leaders was contained enough and could be channelled through exchanges (or connections) that ensure the movement of information and energy. Here, the strategy of engagement pursued by both Cardoso and Lula was vital because it allowed for the establishment of many connections both at regional and global level, be it through new regional organizations, be it through the G20 grouping or the BRICS or be it through the fact that Lula, in particular, opened a great number of Brazilian embassies across the world so that there always *were* connections, and the possibility of exchange, across time and space (Stuenkel 2014). It may be useful here to put this visually.

Table 1: Cardoso/Lula Foreign Policy as a Coherent Process of Self-Organization

Conditions for Self-Organization	Conditions Present
Container	Autonomy through integration and participation
Difference	Different leadership styles Different priorities in pursuing engagement
Exchange	Presidential leadership and pronouncements Regional and global forums (Increasing number of) diplomatic missions
Pattern	Coherent

As a consequence, Brazilian foreign policy was both coherent – here defined as the degree to which parts of a system "fit" each other or the external environment, and it is a necessary factor in sustainability - and effective, to the extent that several analysts attested to the arrival of Brazil on the world stage (Rothkopf 2012). The Economist (2009b) even proclaimed on its front page that 'Brazil takes off'. Relevant to the current debate, this coherence survived several political and economic challenges, such as high inflation confronted by Cardoso, the economic crisis of 2008 confronted by Lula or the various regional political crises that both confronted during their combined 16 years in power, including political instability in Venezuela and Central America. In other words, there was enough resilience in the system to weather these challenges.

In what follows it will be argued that the reason Brazil no longer has this resilience in the face of unfavourable circumstances is due to a change of conditions domestically which have meant a loss of coherence and an associated inability to effectively influence external events.

The first of these conditions was the change of President. Quite independently of the economic crisis through which Brazil is passing now Dilma took over the country in 2011 with little interest in foreign policy and, subsequently, few international connections. Whilst hand-picked by Lula as his successor, she had, for years, been his domestic 'fixer' and had far more interest in domestic affairs (Muggah 2015). As a consequence she did little to push forward the development of MERCOSUR or the BRICS or other initiatives. As Stuenkel (2014) pointed out, the retreat from the international stage by Brazil predated the economic and political crisis which ended up engulfing Dilma. A gateway event (the change of President), therefore, led to a clear change in a key condition: the container which had guided Brazilian foreign policy for many years.

This weakening commitment to engagement as a guiding principle of Brazilian foreign policy occurred at a time when the differences between Brazil and

its regional partners multiplied. In very simple terms, different regional governments pursued increasingly divergent policies both economically and in terms of engaging with the rest of the world. Lehmann (2013) identified three different groupings of countries with very different priorities and policy styles. This had significant consequences particularly for regional cooperation in South America which, as many commentators have pointed out, relies heavily on 'presidentialism' as a mechanism for action (Cheibub *et al*. 2011). Since Presidents were no longer coherent with regards to their foreign policy goals and approach, and with Dilma unable and unwilling to address this divergence, regional mechanisms have essentially fallen into a state of disrepair (Malamud & Gardini 2012).

Yet, this withering away of regional cooperation also took away one of the key conditions to reconcile increasingly divergent priorities and styles. South American countries have become increasingly inward-looking with many beset by their own internal crises (as will be shown below in the case of Venezuela) or with different political priorities as, for instance, in the case of Colombia which was negotiating a peace deal with the FARC to end its long-standing civil war.

The economic and political crisis faced by Brazil from around 2014 onwards became simply *one more* factor in explaining Brazil's declining interest in foreign policy, but it was in no way the starting point, nor the only factor. It was, however, crucial in three aspects: First, it *consolidated* this lack of interest in foreign policy institutionally as, in the name of austerity, cut-backs have been made to the budget of the Foreign Ministry, Itamaratry, and several diplomatic missions across the world have closed (Stuenkel 2016). As such, the decline of Brazil's leadership capacity has essentially been 'locked in' at institutional level for the foreseeable future.

Second, the economic and political crisis in Brazil has sharpened the ideological divide within the country and spilled onto the diplomatic stage, especially when it comes to Brazil's relationship with its own neighbourhood. This has become particularly evident in relation to Venezuela, as will be shown below.

Third, some of the very actors that were heavily promoted by Cardoso and Lula in their push for Brazilian insertion into the international arena are now involved in huge corruption scandals which are illustrative of the political and economic crisis through which Brazil is passing. Companies like Odebrecht or Petrobras are not only facing serious financial and political difficulties at home but also criminal investigations and reputational loss abroad. Having been key partners in Brazilian foreign policy, these scandals therefore have a direct impact on Brazil's ability to project itself abroad in a very practical sense: It impedes any possibility of the country using these companies to project itself as a benevolent benefactor to others, especially in the sphere of financing infrastructure projects or fostering

other aspects of south-south cooperation both in a practical or normative way. Key players executing this strategy are sitting in jail whilst confidence and trust in the motives of the Brazilian government have evaporated (Mares & Trinkunas 2016; Santoro 2017).

It is worth, once again, illustrating this change graphically.

Table 2: Current Brazilian Foreign Policy as a Process of Self-Organization

Conditions for Self-Organization	Conditions Present
Container	Presidential priorities Austerity
Difference	Divergent regional foreign policy priorities Economic circumstances nationally and regionally Changing and diverging economic policies
Exchange	Presidentialism Domestic audiences (Declining number of) Diplomatic missions
Pattern	Incoherent

What this demonstrates is an increasingly incoherent self-organizing process which is constantly being amplified by self-reinforcing feedback loops. Preoccupied with its own domestic crises Brazil has demonstrated a lack of leadership *capacity* to bring these various different interests (back) together. With the erosion of the container which used to hold the system together and the increasing number of differences both internally and externally, the system simply cannot cope with the tensions that are being generated. The consequence is an inability to act effectively. What this means in practice will now be demonstrated by looking in a little more detail at the political crisis in Venezuela and Brazil's efforts to lead attempts to solve it. It will show an incoherent process of self-organization in action.

What Does it Mean? The Case of Venezuela as an Example of Incoherence in Action

Venezuela has been on what seems like a death spiral for many years and many observers argue that some kind of internal implosion or even conflict can no longer be ruled out. As one Venezuelan opposition politician put it in an interview: 'There may well be some kind of conflict' (Interview with Venezuelan opposition politician 2015). A Colombian journalist argued that the great danger for the region stems from the fact that 'we do not know what's going on inside the country. We do not understand it and have no influence over it' (Interview Colombian journalist 2014).

With the country suffering the highest inflation in the world, a crime wave of unprecedented proportions, severe shortages of food and other basic necessities and a dysfunctional relationship between the national Congress and the Executive, as well as tensions at street level between supporters and opponents of President Maduro and his 'Chavista' government that have been rising steadily for years, the situation seems both dangerous and intractable and whose consequences are already being felt through the region. There are both practical concerns, for instance about the rising number of Venezuelans trying to flee the country which has a direct impact on some of Brazil's poorest regions (Estado de São Paulo 2017), as well as political/strategic concerns about how to deal with Venezuela and its governments within the various existing regional frameworks (Merke *et al*. 2016).

In many ways, the crisis would have been 'made' for Brazil to exercise its leadership. Brazil was instrumental in setting up regional mechanisms to address precisely this kind of crisis. UNASUR, founded by 12 member states in 2008 after an initiative by then- Brazilian President Lula, was intended to 'developing cooperative mechanisms to resolve [various…] security challenges ', ranging from drug trafficking, extraordinary levels of violent crime, to occasional political instability in a number of countries (Pothuraju 2012, p. 2). The idea was to provide a structure through which common challenges could be discussed and resolved (Briceño Ruiz 2010). Over the years, these challenges have included the question of how to preserve the democratic order and stability in the region (Heine and Weiffen 2015). This being the case it should come as no great surprise that, as the crisis in Venezuela got progressively worse and protracted, it was UNASUR which offered itself as the mechanism through which some kind of mediation process between government and opposition could be managed. This offer of mediation was first made in 2014 (O Globo 2014).

Yet, so far at least, these mediation efforts have come to, at best, very little and here the role played by Brazil, and its lack of leadership, is crucial. On the one hand, there has never been unequivocal agreement between all member-states about what the role of UNASUR should be, reflecting one of the main historic differences between South American countries: the main purpose of regionalism. Whilst, for some, regionalism is seen as a way to cooperate, for others it has always been an instrument to protect against outside interference in domestic affairs, albeit that, historically, most of this interference came from the United States (Keller 2013). In fact, UNASUR has sometimes been seen as an organization whose primary purpose is to underline and strengthen the autonomy of the region vis-à-vis outside intervention. Brazil has never resolved this glaring tension in relation to the organization (The Economist, 2009a). Nevertheless, one can say with confidence that sovereignty in South America serves as an enormously strong container for some countries, with obvious consequences for

the development of regionalism. As such, commitment to a regionally-sponsored solution to the Venezuelan crisis has never been unequivocal as it is, essentially, a domestic problem.

At the same time Brazil's position in relation to Venezuela has also been influenced strongly by domestic factors. Under Lula and Dilma, the country's posture to Venezuela was, according to some commentators too supportive of Chavez and his successor (Bandeira 2016). This shifted significantly when Michel Temer assumed the presidency in 2016. The government, under the then-Foreign Minister José Serra, began to publicly criticize Venezuela and assume a clear posture in favour of punishing the country for breaking the democracy clause. This facilitated, amongst other things, the suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR (El Nacional, 2016).

Yet, in the sense of influencing the conditions which have led to and sustained the current pattern – and therefore the crisis- in Venezuela these moves have not significantly altered these conditions. In fact, it can be argued that, in some ways, this change of posture has made the situation more intractable. The reasons for this can be found in both the domestic Venezuelan situation and the regional considerations.

In Venezuela, the changes in Brazil have merely fortified the respective containers of the government and opposition whilst deepening the divisions between them internally. As a result, there has been a complete breakdown of common endeavour between supporters and opponents of the government of Nicholas Maduro, who define each other in almost exclusively adversarial terms, as a series of interviews the author undertook in Venezuela in 2015 made clear.[1] There is, therefore, no container around which the basis of a mutually acceptable dialogue between the two sides can be constructed.

This being the case, the lack of knowledge and access by the rest of the region about and to Venezuela weighs heavily. Both sides in the Venezuelan conflict see outside actors exclusively through their own prism of being either for or against them. The suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR, in this respect, plays into the view held by the Venezuelan government that there is a conspiracy against the country which sees itself surrounded by hostile forces (Carey 2015). The change of posture by Brazil over the last year underscores this point. Almost logically, no mediation attempt undertaken by UNASUR has been able to overcome this debilitating difference. In other words, it has not been possible to establish a container or an exchange within which these differences can be expressed in such a way as to influence the incoherent pattern in a desired manner. Here, the lack of

[1] These interviews were held 'on background' in December 2015 with actors both supportive and critical of the current government.

institutional capacity on the part of UNASUR weighs heavily. The organization does not seem to have the structures and institutions necessary to act as a neutral arbiter, nor the capacity to project itself in such a way as to be *seen* as such an actor by both sides in the conflict.

At the same time, in assuming such an uncompromising position, the Brazilian government has exacerbated different perceptions of the crisis throughout the region. As mentioned above, there is now a regional problem of refugees from Venezuela in which Brazil is involved in a practical sense. However, other countries, such as Colombia feel the impact of the crisis on a much larger scale with tensions between the two countries running extremely high, leading to the closure of the shared border and serious problems in border communities in relation to the smuggling of goods and the attempts by Venezuelans to acquire basic necessities across the border in much larger numbers than has been the case in Brazil (The Guardian 2016). As such, any escalation of the rhetoric is seen with great concern by Colombia since the fall-out from it will be felt much more immediately by that country.

Taking these factors together one can see an extremely incoherent process of self-organization which it is worth visualizing for clarity.

Table 3: Response to the Crisis in Venezuela as a Process of Self-Organization

Conditions for Self-Organization	Conditions Present
Container	Pro-government Pro-opposition Impact on 'my' (neighbouring) country
Difference	Objectives of any political action Differences in impact Problem definition Preferred forum for problem resolution
Exchange	Respective national media Respective government pronouncements (Weakening) regional institutions Bi-lateral meetings with government or opposition
Pattern	Incoherent

What one has, then, is a process where multiple, and often contradictory, containers are not strong enough to hold the multiple and, recently, increasing differences that inhabit the system. These differences can be found across all levels of the system, from the local to the national to the regional. This in turn means that actions cannot be scaled across the system as a whole, making it highly unlikely, at best, that any actions could be effective. Brazil actively contributes to this inco-

herence by assuming such an uncompromising position in relation to Venezuela at the same time as it has essentially abdicated as a serious foreign policy actor in virtually all other questions. That means that, on the one hand, it is not seen as a 'neutral' actor in which both sides in the Venezuelan crisis have a minimum of confidence whilst not being able and willing to invest time and effort to make UNASUR into a central forum for the resolution of this, and this type, of conflict. The result is ineffective diplomacy and drift. There is no consensus about the role UNASUR could, or should, play in addressing the crisis, nor, consequently, about what to do to *make* the organization an effective actor in this respect. Brazil provides no leadership in order to address this question nor does there seem to be any particular demand on the part of many other countries that Brazil assume such a role.

As a consequence, there are also no effective exchanges through which the differences indicated above could be aired in such a way as to allow for change in a reasonably coherent and effective manner. The incoherence of the process of self-organization therefore becomes self-sustaining.

The question, then, is what can be done.

Now What?

Acting in self-organizing Complex Adaptive Systems is, in principle, straightforward. All one has to do is to change the conditions which give rise to the pattern which gives rise to and sustain the problem one is seeking to address. Therefore, for Brazil, the problem is not that it cannot lead, just as in Venezuela the problem is not that government and opposition do not trust each other and, therefore, cannot work together. The problem is the conditions which give rise to this lack of leadership or mistrust.

Therefore, the key is to identify the conditions that can be changed and over which Brazil, in our case, *would have influence*. This last bit is crucial since it makes absolutely no sense to try and influence conditions that are beyond the capacity of any particular actor. This being the case, the first thing Brazil can do is looking at itself. As the above has shown, the country itself currently suffers from an extremely incoherent foreign policy process fuelled, but not started, by an economic and political crisis which makes long-term strategic planning extremely difficult. Therefore, some key questions Brazil should ask itself in its foreign policy debate are: What conditions cause the incoherence in our foreign policy? What are our foreign policy priorities? How might different actors interpret these priorities? What does this mean for foreign policy action? What common ground can we find between different actors in terms of priorities and actions?

A debate on such questions is critical since it can strengthen the containers

around which foreign policy is made whilst allowing the tensions generated by the differences identified to be used constructively. In order to do this, however, one practical action that could be taken is to increase the exchanges through which these differences can be aired. It would, in this respect, be useful if the space given over to foreign policy in the media, in Congress and other forums – political and in civil society - was to be increased. Here the current economic crisis might actually be helpful in the sense that it would allow a return to a historic principle of Brazilian foreign policy: that of development. Whilst there would be disagreements on the exact ways and means through which development could be furthered through foreign policy, the principle that foreign policy should be used to improve the living standards for the population at large would surely be uncontroversial, if not particularly ambitious.

Only having resolved the basic principles of Brazilian foreign policy going forward, can Brazil hope to leave behind its foreign policy inertia since it will then be possible to once again engage with the outside world with a clear objective to pursue. This, in consequence, would also enable the country to once again engage constructively in the region, be it through MERCOSUR, UNASUR or bilaterally and assume a leadership role. Here also, the key is the critical *questions* that need to be asked: What are the priorities that all member states can agree on? What are the principle issues to be tackled at regional level for Brazil and for others? How would Brazil, and how would others, define the most important challenges for the region? What common ground can be established? What instruments could and should be used to address these common challenges?

Such questions are particularly important in the light of the current political and economic crisis in Brazil since it is these crises which have significantly altered the conditions within which Brazil can act. In simple terms, as shown above, many of the actors that were key partners of the government to promote and execute Brazilian foreign engagement during the Cardoso and Lula years are not only no longer available (since they are in jail or investigated criminally) but have seriously undercut the normative aspect of the approach followed by Cardoso and Lula. As a consequence, not only is Brazil not offering leadership, there is also very little *demand* for it on the part of other countries.

From this perspective, then, the most important thing is to change the conditions that lead to, and sustain, the current dysfunctional pattern. That means, above all, asking different types of questions to see where and how the conditions can be identified and influenced. This, in turn, will have significant implications for practical foreign policy action.

In relation to the case study of Venezuela, such a reconceptualization has critical consequences. First of all, approaching the country with questions, rather than

answers ('Maduro must go', for instance), might allow for more meaningful engagement. Approaching the country with the aim of focussing, for example, on the economy and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe ('What can be done to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe?', as one example) is far more neutral and might enable the construction of a consensus than to 'take sides'. It would also be critical, in this respect, to take any dialogue out of a setting (a geographical or political container) that may be construed as being biased. In this sense, recent attempts by the Catholic Church to broker a dialogue might be more promising in the medium-term. Asking the type of questions indicated above will also focus minds on what or who can realistically be changed. Since Maduro has given no indication that he will change his approach in any significant way, for instance, but since it is known that there are divisions within the government on how to handle the crisis, focus on these divisions in any action and concentrate on those actors that have shown willingness, albeit slight, to adapt and engage (Caselli 2013). In practical actions, focus on changing the conditions on the ground by helping, as far as possible, the population regardless of political beliefs in order to demonstrate the benefits of engagement. In other words, take the action out of the political arena where the pattern which sustains the political and social division in the country is so entrenched. Due to its influence, size and resources, Brazil could play a critical role in managing and developing these efforts.

A second, related, approach could be to focus on improving the institutional capacity of UNASUR to develop and deliver such practical humanitarian policies. Key questions would include what needs to be done to allow UNASUR to become an effective humanitarian actor to address the consequences of the Venezuelan crisis? Whilst such a focus would represent a significant departure for UNASUR politically, it would, at the same time, narrow in on something that member-states may more easily be able to agree on and, as a consequence, give new vitality to the group, especially if it were to be successful in alleviating the most dire consequences of the current humanitarian crisis. Such success, in turn, would change the dynamic within the group and build up its political capital. In other words, the conditions within which it is acting would change, allowing for a change of pattern and therefore open up the *possibility* of change. From a Brazilian point of view, it would also be a focus which could command consensus domestically.

Whilst the outcome of such changes would be uncertain, such a focus would, at the very least, *signal* change and a willingness to engage that may bring about a tipping point at which the system changes dramatically. It seems that worse than the current state is hardly possible.

Conclusion

In answering the question in the title of this article – Can Brazil lead? – the conclusion has to be that, at this moment in time, the country is unable to lead, at least in any effective and coherent sense. Yet, the purpose of this article was to show that this inability to lead is *not* the result of particular events like the economic crisis. Rather, Brazil's retreat from the international stage, and its subsequent inability to lead its own region, is the consequence of an incoherent pattern of conditions to which the economic crisis contributed but did not start. Using Complexity and Human System Dynamics, it was argued that the key to reassuming a leadership position and, as a result, be able to deal with important issues right on the country's doorstep, such as Venezuela, is to ask the right question to identify the conditions that form and sustain the pattern of incoherence which marks Brazilian foreign policy at the moment. That requires action both at the national, as well as the regional level. The actions proposed, like the broadening of the exchanges or a thorough debate about what should be the Brazilian foreign policy container, are obviously only sketched out very briefly here. How these ideas can be put into practice and be scaled across a giant system like the Brazilian foreign policy establishment, and those actors linked to it, will require a lot more work and research.

Yet, I hope to have shown that such work is urgent since the *absence* of Brazilian leadership has done nothing to stabilize the region or give it a greater and more coherent voice in the world. Even in a Complex Adaptive System, which is marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, leadership is a crucial element. The question is, therefore, not if one needs leadership but what one is leading for and towards. That is the question Brazil has to answer urgently.

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Article

Foreign Policy Retreat: Domestic and Systemic Causes of Brazil's International Rollback

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Abstract

Brazil's rise was a globally acclaimed phenomenon that took place under two consecutive administrations: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula (2003-2010). Under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), though, Brazil's foreign activism declined dramatically and its international visibility lost luster. This was due to a combination of domestic and systemic factors. This paper identifies these factors and gauges their influence in order to answer a main question: is there anyone to blame or was Brazil's international rollback bound to happen?

Keywords

Brazil, South America, Foreign Policy, Presidential Diplomacy, Rising Powers

Introduction

On September 26, 2016, a historic summit took place in the Caribbean resort city of Cartagena. More than a dozen heads of state, twenty-seven foreign ministers and ten top representatives of international organizations met to witness the signature of a peace agreement between the Colombian government and Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the oldest insurgent organization in Latin America. The presidents of Argentina, Cuba and Mexico among others, the emeritus king of Spain, Norway's foreign minister and the secretary general of the UN applauded as president Santos and guerrilla leader Timochenko shook hands. Through live TV broadcasting, the world watched one of the most momentous political events that the region had undergone in decades. It is possible that Brazil's president, Michel Temer, had been among the viewers since, to be sure, he was not present at the ceremony. Brazil, South America's putative leader, was absent as its neighbors celebrated the end of the region's most protracted conflict. Something was wrong.

Between 1995 and 2015, Brazil seemed to emerge as a regional leader and global power (Bethell 2010; Burges 2007; Reid 2014). Brazil's rise in the region was incarnated in the concept of South America – as opposed to Latin America –, which was masterminded in the 1990s as a response to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led by the United States, and institutionalized in the 2000s through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil's rise on the global stage was embodied in such acronyms as BRICS (a grouping of large developing economies comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), IBSA (the three largest democracies of the South: India, Brazil, South Africa), and the environmentally-oriented BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China). Brazil's emergence was a combined outcome of domestic stabilization, a pro-active foreign policy, a lucky streak of outstanding national leaders, and a permissive international environment. Yet, just when these conditions seemed deep-rooted and Brazil's rise was taken for fact (Gardini and Tavares de Almeida 2016), everything changed. Two covers of The Economist, the first run in 2009 ("Brazil takes off") and the second in 2013 ("Has Brazil blown it?"), illustrated the country's reversal of fortune. A third one ("The betrayal of Brazil"), published in 2016, meant to be the last nail in the coffin.

What had happened? This paper addresses this question in three steps. First, I describe the permissive environmental conditions that allowed for Brazil's breakthrough onto the global center stage. Second, I examine the domestic resources Brazil was able to mobilize in order to raise its international profile. Finally, I analyze how both environmental conditions and power resources exhausted themselves, which converged with poor leadership to bring about foreign policy retreat.

Systemic Opportunities for Brazil's Rise[1]

For a rising power, the permissiveness or restrictiveness of the international system is determined by two factors: polarity and rivalry. Polarity refers to the number of powers that determine the structure of interaction, whether unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. Ceteris paribus, the more the powers the more permissive the system. Rivalry refers to the degree to which the established powers are hostile or friendly to the rising power. This means that opportunities for peaceful rise, especially of middle or regional powers, are expected to improve with multipolarity and when other powers see the newcomer as a potential partner rather than a threat.

In 1991, two events prepared the launching pad for Brazil to take off. At the regional level, the signature of the Asunción Treaty gave birth to Mercosur, a trade deal that upgraded previous agreements with former rival Argentina, bring Paraguay and Uruguay into the group and secured Brazil's back. At the global

[1] This section draws partially on Malamud (2011), Malamud and Alcañiz (2017) and Malamud and Rodriguez (2014).

level, the collapse of the USSR meant the epitaph of bipolarity and opened the way, after the unipolar moment, for regional and middle powers to step into the forefront.

Regional Rise

Brazil's peaceful relations with its neighbors are a consequence of having demarcated all its borders at the beginning of the twentieth century. A satisfied country facing no territorial claims, it could afford to build a security tradition based on the absence of strategic enemies. However, the regional scenario used to be far from idyllic.

Until 1979, Argentina was seen as a major security threat, and the possibility of a military confrontation shaped the mission of the Brazilian armed forces. This perception began to change when both countries, under symmetric military rule, signed an agreement on the shared Paraná river basin (Resende-Santos 2002). The following democratic regimes deepened this cooperation path by signing several agreements covering nuclear to trade issues. In 1991, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) was established, and the historic rivalry between Argentina and Brazil was turned into full-fledged regional cooperation. As Argentina ceased to represent a threat, the Amazonian region began to be identified as the main security concern. Following several publications issued by military agencies, a new approach became official in 1996 with the publication of the National Defense Policy (Battaglino 2013). The mission assigned to the Brazilian military was based on a scenario of asymmetric resistance against an extra-regional power intervention in the Amazon, as expressed in the 2005 update of the National Defense Policy and in the National Defense Strategy, issued in 2008. Extra-regional powers are never named but off-the-record statements point to the United States as the greatest source of concern. The national strategy focuses on the Amazon as well as on the so-called Blue Amazon, Brazil's immense sea shelf and its oil reserves whose recent discovery has influenced the country's strategic orientation. This involves not only the army but also the navy and air force, who should have conventional capabilities to deny hostile forces the use of the sea and to secure local air superiority (Brasil 2008). Two goals are constant throughout all official documents: keeping the equilibrium between the three forces and fostering the modernization of the military arsenal, often with an eye on the development of indigenous technology.

The absence of enemies in the neighborhood, together with the nonexistence of nuclear powers, have crystallized into a relatively secure environment in which transnational crime is sometimes more pressing than strategic threats. Indeed, trans-border issues such as drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling are increasingly sensitive. Other non-military troubles have sporadically emerged in the neigh-

borhood, such as the negative externalities of domestic instability in contiguous states or the unfriendly nationalization of Brazilian state utilities. The White Book on National Defense, issued for the first time in 2012, reflects the country's overlapping defense, security and development concerns (Brasil 2012). A significant factor behind this amalgamation is the developmentalist ideology of the ruling coalition, which benefitted from low levels of threat perception to promote the inclusion of the defense area into a national development strategy.

The amalgamation of sectoral interests and policy areas has blurred the priorities of the defense agenda. Hence, the White Book lists four key areas: the (*Green*) Amazon, the *Blue Amazon*, the South Atlantic Ocean, and the western shore of Africa. Besides the precedence of responsibility over differentiated geographic areas, each military force has been assigned functional responsibilities: the Air Force is in charge of air control over the Green Amazon and space projects; the Army is responsible for border control and localized intervention in the hinterlands, as well as cyberspace; and the Navy remains in command of the Blue Amazon and its pre-salt oil resources, but also of the country's nuclear development including its crown jewel, the projected nuclear-powered submarine. As it turns out, organizational politics and developmentalist goals have influenced defense planning no less than strategic priorities.

Besides development, another constant in Brazil's foreign policy has been the quest for autonomy, whose contours have adapted to changing times. While the country's stance during the Cold War was labeled "autonomy through distance" vis-à-vis foreign powers and regional rivals, in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall the country's diplomacy promoted "autonomy through participation" in international institutions and regional organizations (Fonseca Jr. 2004). When Lula came to power in 2003, Brazil's foreign policy acquired a moderately revisionist tone that was dubbed "autonomy through diversification" of partners and arenas (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). "Autonomy through distance" was the diplomatic expression of Brazil's *developmentalism*, under which the country accepted the demand for alignment with the United States while trying to use it as bargaining chip for economic advantages. Likewise, "autonomy through participation" implied the adherence to international regimes in order to leverage, not impair, the country's foreign policy leeway. "Autonomy through diversification" sought the adherence to international norms by means of South-South and regional alliances in order to reduce asymmetries with the developed countries, thus always wedding the quest for autonomy with the goal of development. Unlike most other world regions, security issues were downplayed or combined with other priorities. This calls for attention to context and history, as "where wars have been rare, power has perhaps a softer meaning than elsewhere, and policy options may thus be framed differently" (Malamud 2011: 4). As Hurrell (1998) argues,

South America "provides important grounds for doubting that regional 'anarchies' are everywhere alike."

In the current Brazilian view, South America is not just a geographical region (different from Latin America as a whole) but also an autonomous political-economic area, given that U.S. influence recedes as distance from Washington increases. Brazil's elites consider this subregion to be within the country's natural sphere of influence (CEBRI-CINDES 2007; Souza 2009), although this perception has slightly changed its value load in recent years as the region was increasingly regarded as a burden rather than an asset (Malamud 2011).

Following Merke (2011), Latin America can be characterized by features that are accentuated in South America. First, in almost two centuries no state has disappeared and only one has been born. Second, the principle of Uti Possidetis (as you possess, you may possess) was agreed on even before the independence from Portugal and Spain and allowed state borders to be delimited much more peacefully than in Europe. Third, Latin America is the world region that contains the most bilateral and multilateral agreements related to the peaceful settlement of conflicts (Holsti 1996; Kacowicz 2005), as well as the "world record of adjudication and arbitration" (Kacowicz 2004: 199). International comparison is stunning: while "there have been some twenty-two instances of legally binding third-party arbitrations or adjudications with respect to sovereignty over territory in Latin America…, similar rulings apply to only one small case in continental Europe…; two among independent states in Africa; two in the Middle East; and three in Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific" (Simmons 1999: 6-7). Fourth, as mentioned, Latin America is a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In summary, state survival has been virtually guaranteed, wars have been rare, and legalization of disputes has been the norm. This does not mean that political violence has been eradicated, but either "there has been a limited conception of force within a strong diplomatic culture" (Hurrell 1998: 532; also Mares 2001) or it has been confined within – as opposed to across – borders (Martin 2006). Therefore, security has acquired a more domestic than international connotation. Brazil is a product of this historical and geographical environment, and as such it carries more resemblances to its neighbors than to either the traditional European states or the new emerging powers.

Global Rise

Brazil's strategic ambitions were marked by two events. First, the country reverted its longstanding policy of non-interference by contributing troops to, and even assuming the leadership of, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established in 2004. Second, it took global center stage in 2010 when, together with Turkey, it sealed a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. Indeed, the turning down of the deal by the UN Security Council marked the beginning of

the end of Brazil's international apogee.

In the economic realm, the factor that most boosted Brazil's foreign reputation was its promotion as a BRIC country (Armijo 2007). A report by the investment firm Goldman Sachs predicted that the combined economies of the BRIC countries would eclipse those of the current richest countries of the world by 2050 because of their rapid growth rates. The report did not advocate the creation of an economic bloc, but eventually the four countries sought to form a "political club" and convert their economic power into geopolitical stature.

Brazil has also shown skills in the realm of commercial negotiations. Although the current World Trade Organization (WTO) round has stagnated, a new collective actor has emerged from it: the Group of 20 (Trade G-20). This bloc of 20-odd developing nations brings together 60 percent of the world's population, 70 percent of its farmers, and 25 percent of world's agricultural exports. Its origins date back to June 2003.

The expansion of the Group of Eight (G-8) to the Outreach Five or Plus Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa), known as the Heiligendamm process and started in 2008, was a further moment for Brazil to celebrate its global rise. Eventually, the country also became a member of the Finance G-20 (more formally, the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors), a group of 19 of the world's largest national economies plus the European Union.

As to the soft aspects of Brazil's international activism (Flemes 2007), IBSA became a cornerstone. A limited and "principle-oriented" grouping, the acronym refers to the trilateral developmental initiative between India, Brazil, and South Africa to promote South-South cooperation and exchange that was launched in 2003. This group was publicized as bringing together the largest democracies on every continent of the Southern Hemisphere (Saraiva 2007). It therefore conveyed more powerfully than the BRIC the Brazilian foreign policy banners, such as democracy, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

An even more ambitious dynamic was reiterated at the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change in December 2009, when the leaders of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa negotiated the final declaration with U.S. president Barack Obama to the exclusion of the European Union, Russia, Japan, and other global powers.

A last conspicuous sign of international recognition of Brazil as an emerging power and regional representative was the European Union's 2007 invitation for a "strategic partnership." This is notable because the EU had been reluctant to engage other Latin American countries – especially those of MERCOSUR – individually. The times seemed ripe for Brazil to be considered as a global actor.

Brazil's Domestic Resources[2]

Social power, or the capacity to make others do something they would not otherwise, rests on three types of resource: coercive or political, material or economic, and persuasive or symbolic (Poggi 1990; Baldwin 2013). In international relations, the first two are often paired, giving rise to a twofold classification: "hard power" is based on the utilization of structural (that is military or economic) means to influence the behavior or interests of others, while "soft power" refers to the ability to achieve one's goals through co-optation and attraction rather than coercion or payment (Nye 1990). Ideas, institutions, and exemplary behavior or performance are the main instruments of the latter kind of power. As impressive as Brazil may look to the untrained eye, its hard power is often overestimated and most of its international achievements are based on the soft power deployed by its resourceful diplomacy (Burges 2008).

Despite its vast territory, relatively large armed forces and considerable defense budget, the highest in Latin America, Brazil is not – and has no intention of becoming – a military power. Instead, it describes itself as a peace-loving, law-abiding, and benign power (Lafer 2001; Brasil 2008); in the global scale it is a military lightweight. Brazil does not have, nor according to its Constitution is it allowed to have nuclear weapons, which sets it apart from both the established and emerging powers. Despite being the fifth country in the world by area and population and the seventh by the size of its economy, it is not ranked among the top-10 states when it comes to military personnel, military expenditure, arms exports or imports, or participation in peace operations (SIPRI 2012). Moreover, when measured as a proportion of GDP, its military spending is considerably lower than other South American states such as Chile and Colombia (Figure 1).

[2] This section draws on Malamud and Alcañiz (2017).

Figure 1: Military expenditure as % of GDP, selected South American countries, 1994-2016



Source: Elaboration by Júlio Cossio Rodriguez from data of SIPRI (2016).

Brazil also lacks the economic leverage to buy its way into regional or global leadership. Economic growth has been somewhat low and inconsistent even during Lula's much-praised decade (Figure 2), and it ranks at the bottom amongst the emerging markets. Physical infrastructure is scant and aging (The Economist 2013), threatening to become a bottleneck for development and a drain on national resources. Furthermore, the country's position in education, innovation and competitiveness rankings is gloomy. This has raised recurring fears of "the curse of the hen's flight," which describes "the centuries-old succession of brief periods of strong economic growth followed by phases of stagnation and depression" (Valladão 2013: 89).

Figure 2: Brazil GDP Growth Rate, 2004-2016



Source: World Bank Data (GDP growth, constant 2010 USD).

Unlike Germany's position in Europe, Brazil is the largest Latin American economy but not the richest. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay rank consistently higher in terms of GDP per capita and human development, and Mexico and Venezuela do so intermittently depending on oil prices. As a consequence, Brazilian politicians have found it extremely hard to sell domestically the importance of money transfers to neighboring countries, as this would entail sacrificing poor Brazilians to benefit wealthier foreigners.

Given the shortage of hard power resources, Brazil is one of the few emerging countries to have staked its future on soft power (Burges 2008; Sotero and Armijo 2007). This is based primarily on diplomacy, on the wise use of its cultural charm, and on its growing role as a facilitator and cooperation supplier. Successive administrations have put diplomacy to profitable use, managing to translate scale into influence. They have sat Brazil at every negotiation table to address issues as diverse as climate change, world trade, nonproliferation or cooperation for development. In the region, Brazilian envoys have often mediated in third party conflicts through the least intrusive means available. As is proudly said in *Itamaraty*, the foreign ministry palace, Brazil has a "diplomatic GDP" that exceeds its economic one: in other words, it can punch above its weight because of the high quality of its professional diplomacy. Yet, it was presidential diplomacy that turned out to be decisive in fostering the country's international reputation (Malamud 2005; Cason and Power 2009). No other country can boast a lucky streak of two exceptional presidents over sixteen consecutive years, plus the initial hopes raised by the election of the first ever woman as president. World class scholar Fernando H. Cardoso and iconic metal worker Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became symbols, in themselves, of a vibrant and progressive society. Moreover, both of them manifested an impressive dexterity at foreign policy management. Three able foreign ministers, two of which were professional diplomats, contributed to endowing Brazil with towering global prestige. Alas, lucky streaks do not last forever.

Inaugurated in January 2011, Dilma Rousseff was Lula's choice as the candidate of the incumbent Workers´ Party. Most observers believed that she would follow in his steps, whether on domestic or foreign policy issues. In keeping Lula's top foreign policy advisor, Marco Aurélio Garcia, Dilma hinted at continuity. However, her visible lack of charisma and her disinclination towards foreign affairs had led analysts to suggest that her foreign policy would be "less of the same" (Malamud 2011). Both handicaps could have been compensated by an able foreign minister empowered by presidential delegation (Amorim Neto and Malamud, forthcoming); yet, Dilma chose a different path. If Lula had only one foreign minister in eight years, Dilma had three in five years – and never fully trusted any of them. Foreign policy retreat was built into the president's personality; yet, the

rollback of Brazil on the global stage was not only due to poor leadership. Dilma's mismanagement of foreign policy (Cervo and Lessa 2014) combined with structural conditions, both systemic and domestic, that were already becoming unfavorable to Brazil.

The Underlying Causes of Brazil's International Rollback

The end of Brazil's golden age does not hinge on a single cause but on a combination of six. As shown above, they can be classified according to two criteria: the opportunities or restrictions provided by the international system, and the type of domestic resources involved. Table 1 displays the resulting matrix of conditions.

Table 1: Matrix of Conditions for Brazil's Rise

		Outcomes Depend On	
		Opportunities (Structure)	**Resources** (Agency)
Dimensions of social power	**Political** (Coercive)	Existence of an alternative world power to the hegemon	Military and technological superiority
	Economic (Material)	Global markets' demand for Brazilian manufactures	Diversified and competitive productive structure
	Ideological / Normative (Symbolic / Persuasive)	Global space for innovative, green, soft, gentle powers	Appealing cultural production and inspirational leadership

The political opportunities for Brazil to rise have been studied in depth by Rodriguez (2012, 2013). He shows that every time that the country increased its international prominence throughout the twentieth century, the underlying reason was the margin of autonomy allowed for by the emergence of a contending power to the global hegemon. Nazi Germany during the interwar period, the USSR at the apogee of the Cold War, and China at the beginning of the 2000s created the conditions, by either holding or distracting the US, for an otherwise weak regional power to intrude into global affairs. If this analysis is correct, China's current retraction and its unwillingness to geopolitically challenge the US (Urdinez et al 2016) set a limit to how far Brazil can or will dare to go. The only chance to recreate an enabling environment would be for India to come forward as a global power that challenges the status quo, a highly unlikely event in the foreseeable future.

Figure 3: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), selected countries, 1960-2012



Source: elaboration by Júlio C. Cossio Rodriguez from data of Singer et al (1972, v5.0).

Economic opportunities determine how Brazil connects its productive structure with global markets. By the mid-twentieth century, it did so as a dessert producer: sugar, cocoa and coffee made up to 85% of its exports. After the so-called economic miracle of the early 1970s and the currency stabilization of the early 1990s, Brazil became an exporter of manufactured goods, with the latter accounting for 60% of total exports. After that, the emergence of China led to a reprimarization of exports (Figure 4a) – and, in relative terms, of production. China displaced the developed economies of the West, mainly the US, as the center of a new dependent relationship where Brazil occupied the same peripheral position as ever. Henceforth, Brazil's emergence as an agricultural powerhouse had deleterious effects upon its productive structure. When China's growth halved, in the 2010s, Brazil's economy plummeted (Figure 4b). An international opportunity had inadvertently turned into a restriction.

Figure 4a: Brazil-China Asymmetric Interdependence



Figure 4b: Brazil-China Growth Correlation



Source: elaboration by Joaquim Cadete from data of the World Bank and Brazil's Central Bank.

Ideological/normative opportunities are more slippery than political and economic ones. After Trump's retreat from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and his threat to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, it is less clear than ever whether there exists a global demand for softer, greener, gentle powers – even less whether there is still appeal in boasting to be a "rainbow nation." In the new perplexing scenario, it is hard to see how Brazil could insert itself successfully into a new, attractive narrative.

Domestic resources do not foster optimism either. The geopolitical resources Brazil counts on are reduced. A military dwarf in global terms, it devotes less than 1.5% of its GDP to defense. Brazil's troops numbered around 320,000 in 2012, a figure closer to those of its smaller neighbors than to those of the world´s great powers (Figure 5). Furthermore, as more than 80% of the military budget is spent on salaries and pensions (FIESP 2011), logistical means are both inadequate and antiquated. Plans to build a nuclear-powered submarine have been allegedly underway since 2008, when a contract was signed with France. However, there are no prospects that the project will be completed before 2027 – if ever. Given Brazil's military weakness, its only advantage is that it faces no strategic threats. Yet, its low military investment means that the country is unable to project force or influence strategic decisions far away from its own borders.

Figure 5: Military personnel in selected countries, 1930-2012



Source: elaboration by Júlio C. Cossio Rodriguez from data of Singer et al (1972, v5.0).

Economic resources are also scarce. Participation in global trade is much smaller than the country's world share of GDP or population: it stands slightly over 1% vis-à-vis 3%, a figure lower than fifty years ago that puts the country at 22nd

in world rankings (WTO 2012). The re-commodification of the economy and exports (Figure 6a), together with the asymmetric association with China, has become a burden for development. Underdeveloped infrastructure, technological backwardness, and limited innovation compound a gloomy picture (Figure 6b). Without either a productivity revolution or the advent of a new giant market for its commodities, Brazil's economy is not expected to reach consistent growth in the coming years.

Figure 6a: Brazilian Exports by Economic Sector, 1964-2012



Source and elaboration: MDIC/SECEX

Figure 6b:



Source: http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21586680-getting-brazil-moving-again-will-need-lots-private-investment-and-know-how-road, accessed 5 July 2017.

Finally, soft resources of power have been depleted. If humanitarian interven-

tionism or international cooperation for development were once thought of as a means for regional leadership and "global protagonism" (Harig and Kenkel 2017; Pinheiro and Gaio 2016; Stuenkel 2011), those times seem to be over. Dilma drastically reduced the budget for humanitarian assistance and cooperation aid already in 2013 (Figure 7), and her successor continued this trend. The unhappy end of Rousseff's mandate, which combined her lackluster performance with the darker reputation of her accusers, not only stained Brazil's standing abroad but also produced an inward looking reflex that manifested itself in a wider retraction from global affairs. Even though Brazilian citizens chair important organizations such as the WTO and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Itamaraty's influence has receded to unexpected magnitudes.

Figure 7: Brazil's Humanitarian Donations to African Countries, 2010-2014



Source: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2015/03/1606466-brasil-recua-e-reduz-projetos-de-cooperacao-e-doacoes-para-a-africa.shtml, accessed 2 July 2017.

The rise of Vice President Michel Temer to the presidential office, which followed the ousting of Rousseff through congressional impeachment, was the last nail in the coffin of a twenty-year period of international prestige. Not only was Brazil nowhere to be seen when most of the Latin American presidents and several world leaders convened in Colombia to witness the signature of the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, but a few months later Temer declared that he would not attend the 2017 summit of the G20 in Germany due to domestic issues. On the international stage, Brazil no longer bites, nor does it kiss.

Conclusion

Insufficient resource endowment and cumulative policy mistakes mounted over increasingly unfavorable international conditions to produce foreign policy retreat and, ultimately, Brazil's international rollback.

A permissive systemic structure took root between 1991 and 2011: the end of the Cold War, the emergence of China, and a global appetite for softer forms of power fostered Brazil's rise. The rainbow giant seized the opportunity by capitalizing on its material – mainly natural – and symbolic – mainly cultural - charm, potentiated by shrewd presidential and professional diplomacy, to get a seat at every negotiating forum that opened up. However, its domestic resources were exhausted almost at the same time as the international conditions reverted to unfavorable, mostly due to the global financial crisis and China's change of development model. The combination of unfavorable conditions at home and abroad determined Brazil's drastic rollback from the international stage.

True, Brazil still is – and is expected to continue to be – a large country, a regional power, and an actor with a global voice. If demography is destiny, Brazil will eventually rebuild an international position of prestige for itself. In the foreseeable future though, its chances to become a regional leader or a global power are rather dim.

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Bio

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